This is a whimsical and eclectic collection of biographical sketches, and the result is a very enjoyable and entertaining book. It is researched and written to Sir Max Hastings' usual high standard, complete with well-argued conclusions, direct and forceful opinions, and fairly blunt assessments of the character and abilities of the men he is writing about.
There is no unifying framework or theme that links the various chapters, and while some of his subjects have some common features, there is no single mould for the modern warrior. Some of these men, like Harry Smith or Frederic Manning, would be great dinner companions; others, like Guy Gibson or Audie Murphy, I would avoid like the plague. Some were men of impeccable character, like Joshua Chamberlain; others were rogues like John Paul Vann. For some, like Eddie Rickenbacker, success followed them through life; for others, like John Chard, their only achievement of note was on the battlefield.
As I hinted above, you are never left wondering what Max Hastings thinks about a particular topic or individual, and many of his positions are explored at greater length in his other books. Some of these continue to convince me, such as his understanding of the Vietnam War. Hastings is surely right to point out that America's tactical approach to the war (maximum firepower) was completely wrongheaded, and John Paul Vann's (initial) emphasis on equipping the ARVN and winning hearts and minds was likely to be a more fruitful approach to prosecuting the war. More fundamentally, however, and even Vann missed this, the lack of a credible South Vietnamese regime meant that any approach to waging the war was ultimately doomed to fail. This is an essential thread to a critical understanding of the reasons for the American failure in Indo-China, and to understanding more recent military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other opinions that he holds have aged much less well, such as his constant insistence that, pound for pound, the German infantryman was a more effective soldier than his British or American counterpart. I don't think this can survive critical scrutiny, and it fails to take account of either the Axis and Allies' wildly different approaches to waging the war, the political realities that each contended with, and the actual data on the performance of the soldiers in the field. For every example of German tactical brilliance, there is a counterexample of incompetence; for every example of stodgy Allied progress, there is an example of rapid manoeuvre and drive. Any differences between the performance of the Axis and the Allies are those of degree rather than of kind, and are all explainable when the wider cultural, political, technological and operational level considerations are taken into account. Statements such as his contention that if the Allies had had more Audie Murphy's the war would have ended months sooner just don't add up for me, and tip over into the realm of fantasy.
None of this takes away from the value and quality of this book, and even where I found myself disagreeing with his conclusions, I was still stimulated and entertained. The character portraits themselves are also all vivid and colourful, so if you are interested in the subject matter, this book is worthy of your time.