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Maßgebliche Abhandlung: Fasl al-maqal
Der arabische Philosoph, Richter und Arzt Ibn Rushd (lateinisch Averroes, 1126-1198) aus al-Andalus verfaßte eine Vielzahl von philosophischen Schriften, vor allem Kommentare zu den Werken des Aristoteles, durch deren lateinische Übersetzungen er ab der Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts auch in Europa zu der Aristoteles-Autorität schlechthin wurde. Die Kirche sah sich daraufhin im 13. Jahrhundert gezwungen, die sogenannten „Averroisten“, die Ibn Rushds Aristoteleskommentar rezipierten, zu verurteilen, weil ihrer Meinung nach die Lehren Aristoteles' kirchlichen Dogmen widersprachen.
In seiner Maßgeblichen Abhandlung (Fasl al-maqal) streitet Ibn Rushd für eine Vereinbarkeit von Philosophie und Offenbarung, argumentiert aber, daß die philosophische Wahrheit nur von einer geistigen Elite verstanden werden könne, während die Offenbarung auch für die Masse der Menschen bestimmt sei. Der einfache Gläubige wird durch die Offenbarung zu tugendhaftem Handeln angeregt, der Philosoph aber gelangt mittels apodiktischer Beweise zu wahrhaftigem Wissen über Gott.
Ibn Rushds Maßgebliche Abhandlung, eine Antwort in der Form eines Rechtsgutachtens (fatwa) auf al-Ghazalis Polemik gegen die Philosophen, wird seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in der arabischen Welt sowohl von islamistischen als auch von säkularistischen Kreisen stark rezipiert, da man glaubt, mit ihr eine Reform der arabischen Welt sowohl mit dem Islam als auch gegen ihn begründen zu können.
Frank Griffels Übersetzung berücksichtigt die Varianten der erhaltenen Handschriften. In seinem ausführlichen Kommentar erklärt er den Text aus seiner Zeit, zeigt die Bezüge zu den Philosophiedebatten des 12. Jahrhundert auf und skizziert die neuzeitliche Text- und Rezeptionsgeschichte.
In seiner Maßgeblichen Abhandlung (Fasl al-maqal) streitet Ibn Rushd für eine Vereinbarkeit von Philosophie und Offenbarung, argumentiert aber, daß die philosophische Wahrheit nur von einer geistigen Elite verstanden werden könne, während die Offenbarung auch für die Masse der Menschen bestimmt sei. Der einfache Gläubige wird durch die Offenbarung zu tugendhaftem Handeln angeregt, der Philosoph aber gelangt mittels apodiktischer Beweise zu wahrhaftigem Wissen über Gott.
Ibn Rushds Maßgebliche Abhandlung, eine Antwort in der Form eines Rechtsgutachtens (fatwa) auf al-Ghazalis Polemik gegen die Philosophen, wird seit dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in der arabischen Welt sowohl von islamistischen als auch von säkularistischen Kreisen stark rezipiert, da man glaubt, mit ihr eine Reform der arabischen Welt sowohl mit dem Islam als auch gegen ihn begründen zu können.
Frank Griffels Übersetzung berücksichtigt die Varianten der erhaltenen Handschriften. In seinem ausführlichen Kommentar erklärt er den Text aus seiner Zeit, zeigt die Bezüge zu den Philosophiedebatten des 12. Jahrhundert auf und skizziert die neuzeitliche Text- und Rezeptionsgeschichte.
246 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1988
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About the author
ibn Rushd
197 books264 followersArabic version: ابن رشد
Commentaries of well known Arab philosopher, jurist, and physician Averroës or Averrhoës, also ibn Rushd, of Spain on Aristotle exerted a strong influence on medieval Christian theology.
Abu'l-Walid Ibn Rushd, better as Averroes, stands as a towering figure in the history of Islamic as that of west European thought. In the Islamic world, he played a decisive role in the defense of Greeks against the onslaughts of the Ash'arite (Mutakallimun), led by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, and in the rehabilitation.
A common theme throughout his writings properly understood religion with no incompatibility. His contributions took many forms, ranging from his detailed, his defense against the attacks of those who condemned it as contrary to Islam and his construction of a form, cleansed as far as possible at the time of Neoplatonism.
After centuries of nearly total oblivion in west Europe, world recognition as early as the 13th century contributed to the rediscovery of the master. That instrumental discovery launched Scholasticism in Latin and the Renaissance of the 15th-century Europe in due course. Since the publication of [title:Averroes et l'averroisme] of Ernest Renan in 1852, notwithstanding very little attention to work of Averroes in English, French showed greater interest.
See more here.
Commentaries of well known Arab philosopher, jurist, and physician Averroës or Averrhoës, also ibn Rushd, of Spain on Aristotle exerted a strong influence on medieval Christian theology.
Abu'l-Walid Ibn Rushd, better as Averroes, stands as a towering figure in the history of Islamic as that of west European thought. In the Islamic world, he played a decisive role in the defense of Greeks against the onslaughts of the Ash'arite (Mutakallimun), led by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, and in the rehabilitation.
A common theme throughout his writings properly understood religion with no incompatibility. His contributions took many forms, ranging from his detailed, his defense against the attacks of those who condemned it as contrary to Islam and his construction of a form, cleansed as far as possible at the time of Neoplatonism.
After centuries of nearly total oblivion in west Europe, world recognition as early as the 13th century contributed to the rediscovery of the master. That instrumental discovery launched Scholasticism in Latin and the Renaissance of the 15th-century Europe in due course. Since the publication of [title:Averroes et l'averroisme] of Ernest Renan in 1852, notwithstanding very little attention to work of Averroes in English, French showed greater interest.
See more here.
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Displaying 1 - 14 of 14 reviews
January 3, 2011
Review:
September 2006
On Philosophical Tools
This is an extraordinary work. Averroes is here presenting a 'legal' case against the art of Kalam (speculative theology) with the Islamic Jurists sitting in Judgment. But, and this is important, this argument is not against religion per se. Now, the Latin West was very aware of the Aristotelian writings of Averroes but unaware of his other writings. The Christians knew his Commentaries and even of his controversy with Ghazali. But they were largely unaware of his works that attempt to 'harmonize' philosophy and revelation (i.e., religious law). The 'Decisive Treatise' is among the most important of these. Here Averroes is at pains to show that not only isn't philosophy forbidden by the Koran; it is in fact commanded - but only for some!
Humanity is divided into three groups by Averroes. There are the common people (the 'people of rhetoric'), people of uncommon discernment (the 'people of dialectic'), and philosophers (the 'people of demonstration'). It is a pyramid, with the ordinary people at the base and the falasifa (i.e., Islamic philosophers) at the summit. But this is no celebration of diversity, the ideal that hovers over these pages is Ijma - consensus. Averroes is charging the 'people of dialectic' with the ruin of consensus. What ruins consensus? Interpretation. The 'people of interpretation' (both Falasifa and Theologians) must keep the vagaries of interpretation from the people. In this the Islamic Theologians have, according to our author, failed miserably. The Falasifa are let off with a slap.
Now, to introduce a schema not entirely foreign to the text, one could say that in the medieval Islamic landscape there are basically three institutions: Law, Theology, Philosophy. What Averroes intends to do is forbid access to theological and philosophical speculation (i.e., interpretation) to the people. Okay, but why involve the Islamic Jurists? Because the Theologians have proven incapable of keeping their interpretational arguments from the people. This has two consequences -the ruin of consensus, and the rise of unbelief- and they are both bad. The Jurists are interjected into these interpretational arguments in order to keep these disputes from the common people. The Jurists, guided by the falasifa, are to decide what can and cannot be publicly said. One is tempted to say that this in effect leaves the falasifa as the only competent interpreter.
But it seems it would be a mistake to say that Averroes intends to do away with the Islamic Theologians. There are things in the Koran about which demonstrative certainty is impossible, thus there must be discussion of the (merely) possible - this is the legitimate realm of dialectics. It is only the overriding importance of Ijma (consensus) in the Islamic context that makes the Jurists more 'important' than the Theologians. The theologians discuss possibilities that should only be heard by a few; the Law (i.e., the Koran) however, is for all. But this last objection can be aimed at the falasifa too. The people are only capable of hearing the Law through rhetorical imagery, not speculative interpretation. Thus the theoretical (whether demonstrative or dialectical) can never be a matter of consensus.
So, if Law is for all and interpretation is not why should the Jurists consent to the leadership of the Falasifa? -Two reasons. First, the people are not One. The Law (i.e., Koran) is intended for all but It relates to each type differently. Secondly, there are passages in the Koran Itself about which there is 'legitimate' dispute. Speculation, whether of philosophy or Kalam, is required and thus not to be silenced if it is hidden from the people. Again, the Law (Koran) is One, and It has one intention. It intends "only to teach true science and true practice." But this Intention manifests itself in various ways. For this the finesse and moderation of philosophy -the first well beyond the ability of the Jurists, the latter well beyond the ability of the theologians- is required.
Averroes concludes his 'case' by noting that more could be said - and then he doesn't say it. In this manner Averroes demonstrates the restraint of philosophy vis-à-vis the Islamic Theologians.
But this review is not under any such constraint; thus I add a few points. Interpretation is only dangerous if it becomes generally known. The speculations of the philosophers are not a problem because they and they alone know how to hide. One is tempted to ask whether this is 'proven' or 'falsified' by the fact that elements of the Averroistic position are taken up in the Medieval Latin West (e.g., Siger, Marsilius, Dante) that eventually come to 'fruition' in Machiavelli and then the Enlightenment. It is not simply a mistake to consider Averroes the great-grandfather of the European Enlightenment. But the Latins did not know the whole Averroes. Thus the heirs of this misunderstanding did not realize that the Enlightenment that Averroes foresaw was never meant to be Universal. The line of descent that one can draw from the Latin radical Averroists to the Enlightenment ends by making it a point of both honor and theory to say everything to everyone. -Averroes would have been appalled.
As to the controversy between Averroes and Ghazali one can briefly say that Averroes is an inverse Ghazali; the latter demands the censure of philosophy while the former demands the censure of Kalam. In both cases consensus is not to be disturbed. Thus the argument between them is this: how is speculative mania to precede in a History in which consensus must remain undisturbed? Averroes chose the Jurists because Ghazali's choice -theological speculation- led to dissension in the community. Unfortunately, the 'secularists' in the Latin West (in the line of Radical Averrosm) will, after severing all ties to theology, take to their own brand of 'speculation'. Thus Ideology replaced Revelation and philosophy goes from pillar to post. ...Perhaps there will soon be a genuine philosopher calling for an 'alliance' with religion? And why not? There are, after all, ultimately only two things of which we have been speaking: philosophy and the tools of philosophy (i.e., theology and the political).
What theoretical speculation intends is the Truth; what the Law (understood as Nomos) intends is consensus. However, Science and Philosophy are cumulative, speculation cannot be stopped. There is no 'consensus' in theoretical matters. But Revelation (Law) -whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic- routinely claims to be at an end. Thus just as speculation (philosophical mania) and religious Law could not sync up - one wonders how long the 'honeymoon' between philosophy and secular 'enlightened' law will last. The Laws (whether religious or secular) will always have the forbidden. But philosophical mania forbids itself nothing... Even though Averroes is at pains to argue that philosophers possess theoretical virtue while the jurists possess practical virtue and thus can be reconciled we must note that this would only be true if theoretical and practical virtue were themselves reconcilable. But this could only be true if mania and moderation were reconcilable...
So, "whenever demonstration leads to something different from the apparent sense of the Law, that apparent sense admits of interpretation..." In other words, one finesses (or creates) the 'reconciliation'. But Creativity was the Ideal of the theologians (i.e., Divine Creativity) just as creativity is today an idol of 'enlightened' modernity. But for the medieval Aristotelians creativity (making) is opposed to knowing, and thus something of a bête noire. Creativity is a sign that something has gone wrong. Thus when Averroes, who all along in this text had insisted upon the tripartite division of humanity (the rhetorical, dialectical, demonstrative), at the very end creates a fourth type (for the Jurists) between the 'low level' of the traditionalists and the 'turbulence' of the theologians we are perhaps made aware of the ad hoc nature of this 'alliance' between Philosophy and Jurists.
Of this 'solution' we can say that the Law (Koran) is divided in two (surface and hidden) but humanity is divided in three. There are two interpretive classes (Demonstrative, Dialectical) and two classes that deal with the apparent/surface (Dialectical, Rhetorical) and the dialectical participates in both. Dialectic is neither demonstrative theory nor simple faith but a mixture of both. All the doctrinal problems that arise are due to the dialectical class. One closes this book wondering how the invention of a 'fourth type' of humanity -another mixture- would solve anything. After all, as Averroes says, demonstrative "interpretation ought not to be declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude." Thus we should perhaps not mention that any alliance with philosophy (whether consisting of theologians or politicos) is an alliance in name only.
The major fault line in this alliance is best exposed by considering the fact that sound interpretation is not the same as true interpretation. The Jurists are concerned with behavior and results while the philosophers are concerned with a Truth that the Jurists (or our modern politicos) cannot possibly understand. It is in the end this lack of understanding -"and that will be grasped after the slightest examination by anyone who is cognizant of the condition of demonstration"- that dooms all philosophical alliances...
This brief essay by Averroes is magnificent; it pulls back the curtain, however briefly, on something that is rarely seen. Look away if you can. The Islamic Translation Series and C. E. Butterworth have our thanks.
September 2006
On Philosophical Tools
This is an extraordinary work. Averroes is here presenting a 'legal' case against the art of Kalam (speculative theology) with the Islamic Jurists sitting in Judgment. But, and this is important, this argument is not against religion per se. Now, the Latin West was very aware of the Aristotelian writings of Averroes but unaware of his other writings. The Christians knew his Commentaries and even of his controversy with Ghazali. But they were largely unaware of his works that attempt to 'harmonize' philosophy and revelation (i.e., religious law). The 'Decisive Treatise' is among the most important of these. Here Averroes is at pains to show that not only isn't philosophy forbidden by the Koran; it is in fact commanded - but only for some!
Humanity is divided into three groups by Averroes. There are the common people (the 'people of rhetoric'), people of uncommon discernment (the 'people of dialectic'), and philosophers (the 'people of demonstration'). It is a pyramid, with the ordinary people at the base and the falasifa (i.e., Islamic philosophers) at the summit. But this is no celebration of diversity, the ideal that hovers over these pages is Ijma - consensus. Averroes is charging the 'people of dialectic' with the ruin of consensus. What ruins consensus? Interpretation. The 'people of interpretation' (both Falasifa and Theologians) must keep the vagaries of interpretation from the people. In this the Islamic Theologians have, according to our author, failed miserably. The Falasifa are let off with a slap.
Now, to introduce a schema not entirely foreign to the text, one could say that in the medieval Islamic landscape there are basically three institutions: Law, Theology, Philosophy. What Averroes intends to do is forbid access to theological and philosophical speculation (i.e., interpretation) to the people. Okay, but why involve the Islamic Jurists? Because the Theologians have proven incapable of keeping their interpretational arguments from the people. This has two consequences -the ruin of consensus, and the rise of unbelief- and they are both bad. The Jurists are interjected into these interpretational arguments in order to keep these disputes from the common people. The Jurists, guided by the falasifa, are to decide what can and cannot be publicly said. One is tempted to say that this in effect leaves the falasifa as the only competent interpreter.
But it seems it would be a mistake to say that Averroes intends to do away with the Islamic Theologians. There are things in the Koran about which demonstrative certainty is impossible, thus there must be discussion of the (merely) possible - this is the legitimate realm of dialectics. It is only the overriding importance of Ijma (consensus) in the Islamic context that makes the Jurists more 'important' than the Theologians. The theologians discuss possibilities that should only be heard by a few; the Law (i.e., the Koran) however, is for all. But this last objection can be aimed at the falasifa too. The people are only capable of hearing the Law through rhetorical imagery, not speculative interpretation. Thus the theoretical (whether demonstrative or dialectical) can never be a matter of consensus.
So, if Law is for all and interpretation is not why should the Jurists consent to the leadership of the Falasifa? -Two reasons. First, the people are not One. The Law (i.e., Koran) is intended for all but It relates to each type differently. Secondly, there are passages in the Koran Itself about which there is 'legitimate' dispute. Speculation, whether of philosophy or Kalam, is required and thus not to be silenced if it is hidden from the people. Again, the Law (Koran) is One, and It has one intention. It intends "only to teach true science and true practice." But this Intention manifests itself in various ways. For this the finesse and moderation of philosophy -the first well beyond the ability of the Jurists, the latter well beyond the ability of the theologians- is required.
Averroes concludes his 'case' by noting that more could be said - and then he doesn't say it. In this manner Averroes demonstrates the restraint of philosophy vis-à-vis the Islamic Theologians.
But this review is not under any such constraint; thus I add a few points. Interpretation is only dangerous if it becomes generally known. The speculations of the philosophers are not a problem because they and they alone know how to hide. One is tempted to ask whether this is 'proven' or 'falsified' by the fact that elements of the Averroistic position are taken up in the Medieval Latin West (e.g., Siger, Marsilius, Dante) that eventually come to 'fruition' in Machiavelli and then the Enlightenment. It is not simply a mistake to consider Averroes the great-grandfather of the European Enlightenment. But the Latins did not know the whole Averroes. Thus the heirs of this misunderstanding did not realize that the Enlightenment that Averroes foresaw was never meant to be Universal. The line of descent that one can draw from the Latin radical Averroists to the Enlightenment ends by making it a point of both honor and theory to say everything to everyone. -Averroes would have been appalled.
As to the controversy between Averroes and Ghazali one can briefly say that Averroes is an inverse Ghazali; the latter demands the censure of philosophy while the former demands the censure of Kalam. In both cases consensus is not to be disturbed. Thus the argument between them is this: how is speculative mania to precede in a History in which consensus must remain undisturbed? Averroes chose the Jurists because Ghazali's choice -theological speculation- led to dissension in the community. Unfortunately, the 'secularists' in the Latin West (in the line of Radical Averrosm) will, after severing all ties to theology, take to their own brand of 'speculation'. Thus Ideology replaced Revelation and philosophy goes from pillar to post. ...Perhaps there will soon be a genuine philosopher calling for an 'alliance' with religion? And why not? There are, after all, ultimately only two things of which we have been speaking: philosophy and the tools of philosophy (i.e., theology and the political).
What theoretical speculation intends is the Truth; what the Law (understood as Nomos) intends is consensus. However, Science and Philosophy are cumulative, speculation cannot be stopped. There is no 'consensus' in theoretical matters. But Revelation (Law) -whether Jewish, Christian or Islamic- routinely claims to be at an end. Thus just as speculation (philosophical mania) and religious Law could not sync up - one wonders how long the 'honeymoon' between philosophy and secular 'enlightened' law will last. The Laws (whether religious or secular) will always have the forbidden. But philosophical mania forbids itself nothing... Even though Averroes is at pains to argue that philosophers possess theoretical virtue while the jurists possess practical virtue and thus can be reconciled we must note that this would only be true if theoretical and practical virtue were themselves reconcilable. But this could only be true if mania and moderation were reconcilable...
So, "whenever demonstration leads to something different from the apparent sense of the Law, that apparent sense admits of interpretation..." In other words, one finesses (or creates) the 'reconciliation'. But Creativity was the Ideal of the theologians (i.e., Divine Creativity) just as creativity is today an idol of 'enlightened' modernity. But for the medieval Aristotelians creativity (making) is opposed to knowing, and thus something of a bête noire. Creativity is a sign that something has gone wrong. Thus when Averroes, who all along in this text had insisted upon the tripartite division of humanity (the rhetorical, dialectical, demonstrative), at the very end creates a fourth type (for the Jurists) between the 'low level' of the traditionalists and the 'turbulence' of the theologians we are perhaps made aware of the ad hoc nature of this 'alliance' between Philosophy and Jurists.
Of this 'solution' we can say that the Law (Koran) is divided in two (surface and hidden) but humanity is divided in three. There are two interpretive classes (Demonstrative, Dialectical) and two classes that deal with the apparent/surface (Dialectical, Rhetorical) and the dialectical participates in both. Dialectic is neither demonstrative theory nor simple faith but a mixture of both. All the doctrinal problems that arise are due to the dialectical class. One closes this book wondering how the invention of a 'fourth type' of humanity -another mixture- would solve anything. After all, as Averroes says, demonstrative "interpretation ought not to be declared to those adept in dialectic, not to mention the multitude." Thus we should perhaps not mention that any alliance with philosophy (whether consisting of theologians or politicos) is an alliance in name only.
The major fault line in this alliance is best exposed by considering the fact that sound interpretation is not the same as true interpretation. The Jurists are concerned with behavior and results while the philosophers are concerned with a Truth that the Jurists (or our modern politicos) cannot possibly understand. It is in the end this lack of understanding -"and that will be grasped after the slightest examination by anyone who is cognizant of the condition of demonstration"- that dooms all philosophical alliances...
This brief essay by Averroes is magnificent; it pulls back the curtain, however briefly, on something that is rarely seen. Look away if you can. The Islamic Translation Series and C. E. Butterworth have our thanks.
February 4, 2014
Le discours décisif de Ibn Rushd, autrement connu sous le nom d'Averroès, est un texte juridique qui pose quels sont les relations entre l'Islam et la philosophie, si elles ne concordent pas. Averroès a vécu comme cadi au douzième siècle dans les terres musulmanes de l'Espagne et de l'Afrique du nord, sorte d'autorité judiciaire. Tombé après sa mort dans l'oubli au sein du monde musulman, il a connu par contre une grande fortune en France et dans le reste de l'Europe chrétienne au siècle suivant, lorsque les controverses sur l'éternité du monde battaient leur plein, si bien que les thèses défendues par Averroès ont peu a peu été déformée avec le temps par les différents disputeurs, au point que l'andalou a pu être pris pour un précurseur des libres penseurs.
Il suffit de lire le texte pour se détromper. Ainsi, s'il n'oppose pas l'éternité du monde d'Aristote avec la création telle qu'elle est racontée dans son texte sacré, c'est parce que dans le coran que le monde existait avant sa création. Pour l'auteur, il ne peut jamais y avoir d'erreur dans le coran, mais on peut se tromper en l'interprétant, tout comme on peut se tromper en philosophant. L'investigation philosophique pourrait donc permettre de corriger des interprétations erronées dans cette perspective, mais aussi conduire à des méprises si elles sont menées avec étourderie, lesquelles entraineraient disputes, controverses, schismes et dissensions.
Il déplace donc le débat vers qui peut ou non mener ces investigations philosophiques. Comme pour prédécesseur Al Fârâbî, il considère que la connaissance ne doit être accessible qu'à un très petit nombre, et interdite à la multitude, laquelle doit se contenter de croire les interprétations données par les autorités. Mais pour Averroès, les sages eux-mêmes sont contraint de ne surtout pas divulguer les résultats de leurs investigations à la multitude, car cela pourrait la troubler, et faire naître le doute dans son esprit, et peut-être lui faire apercevoir que les dogmes qui lui sont inculqués ont surtout l'utilité politique de lui inspirer de la docilité. En particulier, les dogmes de l'immortalité de l'âme et des peines et récompenses après la mort, que Platon recommandaient dans sa lettre VII, sont à exclure de toute controverse et de tout questionnement. Les philosophes doivent donc par prudence se condamner à la solitude et au silence. Difficile de diffuser la philosophie dans ces conditions, si on restreint le nombre de ses adeptes, ainsi que leurs échanges, les livres étant à cette époque des objets très rares.
Il suffit de lire le texte pour se détromper. Ainsi, s'il n'oppose pas l'éternité du monde d'Aristote avec la création telle qu'elle est racontée dans son texte sacré, c'est parce que dans le coran que le monde existait avant sa création. Pour l'auteur, il ne peut jamais y avoir d'erreur dans le coran, mais on peut se tromper en l'interprétant, tout comme on peut se tromper en philosophant. L'investigation philosophique pourrait donc permettre de corriger des interprétations erronées dans cette perspective, mais aussi conduire à des méprises si elles sont menées avec étourderie, lesquelles entraineraient disputes, controverses, schismes et dissensions.
Il déplace donc le débat vers qui peut ou non mener ces investigations philosophiques. Comme pour prédécesseur Al Fârâbî, il considère que la connaissance ne doit être accessible qu'à un très petit nombre, et interdite à la multitude, laquelle doit se contenter de croire les interprétations données par les autorités. Mais pour Averroès, les sages eux-mêmes sont contraint de ne surtout pas divulguer les résultats de leurs investigations à la multitude, car cela pourrait la troubler, et faire naître le doute dans son esprit, et peut-être lui faire apercevoir que les dogmes qui lui sont inculqués ont surtout l'utilité politique de lui inspirer de la docilité. En particulier, les dogmes de l'immortalité de l'âme et des peines et récompenses après la mort, que Platon recommandaient dans sa lettre VII, sont à exclure de toute controverse et de tout questionnement. Les philosophes doivent donc par prudence se condamner à la solitude et au silence. Difficile de diffuser la philosophie dans ces conditions, si on restreint le nombre de ses adeptes, ainsi que leurs échanges, les livres étant à cette époque des objets très rares.
November 21, 2021
Cred că pentru un prim pas în cultura islamică Ibn Rusd (Averroes) e destul de potrivit pentru că pare să fie un punct de intersecție între ceea ce creștinilor le e mai familiar (Aristotel, Toma d`Aquino) și marele necunsocut pe care îl voi numi ”Rânduiala islamică”. Subiectul abordat și metodologia folosită sunt... medievale, scolastice aș spune, însă compehensibile și foarte utile prin referințele și notele de subsol (trimiterile la Avicenna, Abu-Hamid ș.a.) ale volumului. Ideea centrală, conform căreia cunoașterea textelor sacre este accesibilă oricui, însă nu pe aceeași cale (Averroes distinge trei căi diferite, în funcție de capacitățile înnăscute sau câștigate ale fiecărui om în parte), mi se pare nu doar îndrăptățită dar și foarte... actuală. Bineînțeles că rămân de discutat repercursiunile unei atare atitudini vis-a-vis de accesul la cunoaștere, dar Averroes n-are cont de facebook, așa că-l putem citi fără supărări!
March 9, 2022
why is this book actually impossible to get a hold of
May 2, 2020
Defense of use of philosophy in conjunction with religion. Argues that religion demands that those capable pursue knowledge, because the fundamental precepts in a virtuous religion are true and will correspond with the findings of philosophers. Truth does not conflict with truth, says Averroes, and it’s up to us to understand the first cause as such if we are able.
- topics, some unresolved:
-distinction b/w existence and essence
- Arts as an indication of the Artisan (in what way does God make his character known?) -Aquinas speaks more about this in Summa Contra Gentiles with the proof Architectonic structure
-demonstrative knowledge/kinds of knowledge v ‘law-based syllogistic reasoning’
-Argument in defense of the Ancients, why it is obligatory to study foundational truths (Aquinas also argues for this in summa contra gentiles effectively, stating if truth wasn’t ‘fitting for belief’ it would be unattainable except by those best suited to it after a lifelong amount of time. Accepting some things by faith which we can’t know or prove may have the irrational consequence of leading us to knowledge)
- topics, some unresolved:
-distinction b/w existence and essence
- Arts as an indication of the Artisan (in what way does God make his character known?) -Aquinas speaks more about this in Summa Contra Gentiles with the proof Architectonic structure
-demonstrative knowledge/kinds of knowledge v ‘law-based syllogistic reasoning’
-Argument in defense of the Ancients, why it is obligatory to study foundational truths (Aquinas also argues for this in summa contra gentiles effectively, stating if truth wasn’t ‘fitting for belief’ it would be unattainable except by those best suited to it after a lifelong amount of time. Accepting some things by faith which we can’t know or prove may have the irrational consequence of leading us to knowledge)
May 22, 2017
Une excellente traduction avec une introduction de Alain De Libera qui résume efficacement le contexte historique de l'écriture de ce traité au caractère juridique, et qui explique clairement certaines notions ainsi que chaque section de paragraphes du texte. Une version à recommander à ceux qui souhaitent étudier la vision de l'usage de la philosophie au 12ème siècle selon Averroès.
May 20, 2020
Une superbe introduction d'Alain de Libéra qui démystifie l'Averroès construit par les Latins, en premier lieu Thomas d'Aquin dont l'image fausse et donc l'interprétation fantaisiste a persisté jusqu'au XXè siècle. La traduction et les annotations de Marc Geoffroy sont le résultat d'un remarquable travail de recherches manuscrites et de critiques largement nécessaires aux parfois errances de son lontain prédécesseur Gauthier, même si par endroit j'ai pu être embarrassé de trouver quelques oublis (sur la notion d'adventicité, de bidaa et plus généralement sur les débats historiques entre madhahib comme contexte) ou abus dans la traduction ("chariaa" devient Révélation dans les premières pages!). L'édition comprend en plus un dossier final sur la réception très éclectique après la Nahda des thèses d'Ibn Rushd ra dans le monde arabophone, tantôt philosophe inaccompli car encore comme menotté à la Révélation, tantôt apôtre du "rationalisme" (sic) triomphant contre la religion, bref un dossier d'un inégal intérêt.
Ibn Rushd ra n'écrit pas ici un essai philosophique mais bien une fatwa en 72 points sur l'obligation de l'apprentissage des méthodes philosophiques (pour ceux qui en ont du moins les capacités), prenant ainsi à revers l'accusation courante des théologiens - en premier lieu Al-Ghazali ra - de la dissémination de thèses dites hérétiques du corpus grec ancien (éternité du monde, l'ignorance de Dieu des particuliers, la corporéité dans la akhira) dans la culture savante islamique. Ibn Sina et al-Farabi ayant été décrits ainsi comme kuffar.
Il n'hésite pas pour cela à conduire une dizaine d'attaques en règles du courant théologique majoritaire dans l'Occident musulman malikite, les acha'rites, jusqu'à un point de non-retour pour eux, qui les contraindraient soit à admettre qu'ils s'égarent bien plus que les falasifa dans leur dissémination du ta'wil auprès de publics ignorants, soit à leur méconnaissance pure et simple des thèses mêmes d'Aristote et de ses suiveurs. Et ce, sans compter celles spécifiquement contre Al-Ghazali ra (et son Tahafut al-falasifa, qui n'est pourtant pas une critique en soi de la philosophie) dont il admire pourtant très clairement la vertu de son oeuvre spirituelle incontournable Ihya 'ulum ad-din et sa volonté de sortir du sectarisme et du seul conformisme imitatif produit par un fiqh sans âme.
Il recourt pour ses fins aux métaphores (Dieu comme Artisan, les dangers de l'eau ne peuvent être qu'accidentels et non essentiels, l'erreur du médecin chevronné n'est pas péché mais celle du pseudo-médecin est criminel, la Philosophie comme compagne ou soeur de lait de la Révélation) mais surtout le Qoran al-karîm lui-même dont il se fait largement commentateur pour dénier le caractère hérétique des thèses des falasifa mis au ban par les acha'rites et démontrer magistralement l'insupérabilité du Kitab Allah taala (ou "i'jaz") par le fait même qu'il contienne les trois méthodes de "production de l'assentiment", c'est-à-dire, démonstrative, dialectique et rhétorique, que l'on peut illustrer par la lecture étonnante qu'il fait de ce verset (les Abeilles, XVI, 125) : "Par la sagesse [Hikam, la philosophie] et la bonne exhortation [rhétorique] appelle (les gens) au sentier de ton Seigneur. Et discute avec eux [jadala, dialectique] de la meilleure façon. Car c'est ton Seigneur qui connaît le mieux celui qui s'égare de Son sentier et c'est Lui qui connaît le mieux ceux qui sont bien guidés." Il devient alors plus délicat pour ses opposants de s'attaquer à la Révélation même, décrite comme impeccable car notamment dotée de toutes les voies pour toucher l'entendement de tout un chacune.
Quelques points restant toutefois en suspend cela dit, car Ibn Rushd remue bien plus que la surface d'un débat qui depuis 1000 ans est bien stérile dans la pensée islamique sur la validité ou non du ta'wil : en attaquant la prétention à l'ijma' des théologiens acha'rites sur le ta'wil, on peut se demander s'il ne remet pas tout simplement en question ce principe (usûl al-fiqh) lui-même, principe non-coranique devenu canonique dont l'une des conséquences négatives est l'indépassabilité de certaines vues juridiques, quand bien même les 'ulema eux-mêmes ne sont plus bien souvent des savants dans de nombreux domaines. L'ijma' fonctionnant au final chez les sunnites sur la prétention improuvable à l'unanimité mondiale des 'ulema sur un point et, de ce fait, devenant aussi incassable que la prétention chiite d'un ayatollah à un avis masum (infaillible).
Autre point très intéressant, le 49 où il attribue un double rôle à la Révélation : l'apprentissage de la Vérité (plutôt consensuel) et celui de l'incitation à sa mise en pratique. Ce 'ilm al-'amali, praxis islamique, oeuvrant comme véridiction du message coranique par nos pratiques, serait la voie vers la béatitude finale, mais aussi une transformation de la dounia. Une sorte de démonstration (pour jouer avec les mots qu'il chérie) humaine de la puissance d'un esprit complet, qui agirait harmonieusement, selon ses moyens après avoir compris la hikma et el-Kitab.
Et pourtant, il fait aussi par endroit usage d'ahadith suspects et garde encore des traces, compréhensives car il est juriste, d'une approche très normative du fiqh pour la société.
Sa conclusion semble plaider pour l'élaboration d'un nouveau travail rationnel de savants sur le sens du qoran al-karim, qui aurait pu probablement conduire à un nouveau tafsir (dont il sème ici les germes) ou traité d'aqida plus littéral et logique, débarrassé des cadres sophistiques dangereux comme il le prétend, de théologiens incapables de maîtriser la dialectique ou la démonstration. D'ailleurs, il conclue en rappelant la rigueur des salafs as-saleh sur l'absence de publicité sur le ta'wil (mais pas son interdiction pour autant), pour un kalam et une hikma véritable, honorant les diverses voies de compréhension du monde présentantes dans al-quran
En attendant des éditions bilingues complètes et de qualité du Kashf et de Tahafut at-tahafut...
Ibn Rushd ra n'écrit pas ici un essai philosophique mais bien une fatwa en 72 points sur l'obligation de l'apprentissage des méthodes philosophiques (pour ceux qui en ont du moins les capacités), prenant ainsi à revers l'accusation courante des théologiens - en premier lieu Al-Ghazali ra - de la dissémination de thèses dites hérétiques du corpus grec ancien (éternité du monde, l'ignorance de Dieu des particuliers, la corporéité dans la akhira) dans la culture savante islamique. Ibn Sina et al-Farabi ayant été décrits ainsi comme kuffar.
Il n'hésite pas pour cela à conduire une dizaine d'attaques en règles du courant théologique majoritaire dans l'Occident musulman malikite, les acha'rites, jusqu'à un point de non-retour pour eux, qui les contraindraient soit à admettre qu'ils s'égarent bien plus que les falasifa dans leur dissémination du ta'wil auprès de publics ignorants, soit à leur méconnaissance pure et simple des thèses mêmes d'Aristote et de ses suiveurs. Et ce, sans compter celles spécifiquement contre Al-Ghazali ra (et son Tahafut al-falasifa, qui n'est pourtant pas une critique en soi de la philosophie) dont il admire pourtant très clairement la vertu de son oeuvre spirituelle incontournable Ihya 'ulum ad-din et sa volonté de sortir du sectarisme et du seul conformisme imitatif produit par un fiqh sans âme.
Il recourt pour ses fins aux métaphores (Dieu comme Artisan, les dangers de l'eau ne peuvent être qu'accidentels et non essentiels, l'erreur du médecin chevronné n'est pas péché mais celle du pseudo-médecin est criminel, la Philosophie comme compagne ou soeur de lait de la Révélation) mais surtout le Qoran al-karîm lui-même dont il se fait largement commentateur pour dénier le caractère hérétique des thèses des falasifa mis au ban par les acha'rites et démontrer magistralement l'insupérabilité du Kitab Allah taala (ou "i'jaz") par le fait même qu'il contienne les trois méthodes de "production de l'assentiment", c'est-à-dire, démonstrative, dialectique et rhétorique, que l'on peut illustrer par la lecture étonnante qu'il fait de ce verset (les Abeilles, XVI, 125) : "Par la sagesse [Hikam, la philosophie] et la bonne exhortation [rhétorique] appelle (les gens) au sentier de ton Seigneur. Et discute avec eux [jadala, dialectique] de la meilleure façon. Car c'est ton Seigneur qui connaît le mieux celui qui s'égare de Son sentier et c'est Lui qui connaît le mieux ceux qui sont bien guidés." Il devient alors plus délicat pour ses opposants de s'attaquer à la Révélation même, décrite comme impeccable car notamment dotée de toutes les voies pour toucher l'entendement de tout un chacune.
Quelques points restant toutefois en suspend cela dit, car Ibn Rushd remue bien plus que la surface d'un débat qui depuis 1000 ans est bien stérile dans la pensée islamique sur la validité ou non du ta'wil : en attaquant la prétention à l'ijma' des théologiens acha'rites sur le ta'wil, on peut se demander s'il ne remet pas tout simplement en question ce principe (usûl al-fiqh) lui-même, principe non-coranique devenu canonique dont l'une des conséquences négatives est l'indépassabilité de certaines vues juridiques, quand bien même les 'ulema eux-mêmes ne sont plus bien souvent des savants dans de nombreux domaines. L'ijma' fonctionnant au final chez les sunnites sur la prétention improuvable à l'unanimité mondiale des 'ulema sur un point et, de ce fait, devenant aussi incassable que la prétention chiite d'un ayatollah à un avis masum (infaillible).
Autre point très intéressant, le 49 où il attribue un double rôle à la Révélation : l'apprentissage de la Vérité (plutôt consensuel) et celui de l'incitation à sa mise en pratique. Ce 'ilm al-'amali, praxis islamique, oeuvrant comme véridiction du message coranique par nos pratiques, serait la voie vers la béatitude finale, mais aussi une transformation de la dounia. Une sorte de démonstration (pour jouer avec les mots qu'il chérie) humaine de la puissance d'un esprit complet, qui agirait harmonieusement, selon ses moyens après avoir compris la hikma et el-Kitab.
Et pourtant, il fait aussi par endroit usage d'ahadith suspects et garde encore des traces, compréhensives car il est juriste, d'une approche très normative du fiqh pour la société.
Sa conclusion semble plaider pour l'élaboration d'un nouveau travail rationnel de savants sur le sens du qoran al-karim, qui aurait pu probablement conduire à un nouveau tafsir (dont il sème ici les germes) ou traité d'aqida plus littéral et logique, débarrassé des cadres sophistiques dangereux comme il le prétend, de théologiens incapables de maîtriser la dialectique ou la démonstration. D'ailleurs, il conclue en rappelant la rigueur des salafs as-saleh sur l'absence de publicité sur le ta'wil (mais pas son interdiction pour autant), pour un kalam et une hikma véritable, honorant les diverses voies de compréhension du monde présentantes dans al-quran
En attendant des éditions bilingues complètes et de qualité du Kashf et de Tahafut at-tahafut...
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
September 17, 2021
A short but edifying read, one of ibn Rushd's most important works in terms of impact. He gives several decent arguments that philosophy as a method is not only compatible with Islam, but is an inextricable part of the religion, and that philosophical inquiry is actually mandated by Allah in the Qur'an. He chooses some interesting ayat to make this point, but leaves out a few others that arguably make his point even better than do those ayat he did choose.
He also addresses some of al-Ghazali's arguments against ibn Sina, al-Farabi, et. al. as advanced in al-Ghazali's "The Incoherence of the Philosophers", and addresses them quite well.
After this, however, ibn Rushd goes in some very questionable directions, arguing, for instance, that, while philosophical inquiry is mandated in Islam, it's mandatory only for select persons. Not only should philosophy be left to particular scholars, but those scholars should not even attempt to share or explain either the philosophical method or their reasoned conclusions as regards matters of religion with the wider Muslim audience. This and other aspects of ibn Rushd's arguments are wrongheaded and downright objectionable.
Nevertheless, the "Decisive Treatise" is a seminal work that proved very influential in the effort to combat the condemnation of philosophy by certain traditionalist currents within Islamic scholarship, and is a must-read as result.
The English and Arabic (side-by-side) edition published by Brigham Young University Press is ideal, as it contains both languages in an easy-to-read-and-compare format that serves those who can read in both languages extremely well, as the reader can refer to the Arabic to see the exact terminology used by ibn Rushd. The translation is generally excellent, but there are passages where knowing the precise Arabic terminology used by the author makes everything all the more clear.
He also addresses some of al-Ghazali's arguments against ibn Sina, al-Farabi, et. al. as advanced in al-Ghazali's "The Incoherence of the Philosophers", and addresses them quite well.
After this, however, ibn Rushd goes in some very questionable directions, arguing, for instance, that, while philosophical inquiry is mandated in Islam, it's mandatory only for select persons. Not only should philosophy be left to particular scholars, but those scholars should not even attempt to share or explain either the philosophical method or their reasoned conclusions as regards matters of religion with the wider Muslim audience. This and other aspects of ibn Rushd's arguments are wrongheaded and downright objectionable.
Nevertheless, the "Decisive Treatise" is a seminal work that proved very influential in the effort to combat the condemnation of philosophy by certain traditionalist currents within Islamic scholarship, and is a must-read as result.
The English and Arabic (side-by-side) edition published by Brigham Young University Press is ideal, as it contains both languages in an easy-to-read-and-compare format that serves those who can read in both languages extremely well, as the reader can refer to the Arabic to see the exact terminology used by ibn Rushd. The translation is generally excellent, but there are passages where knowing the precise Arabic terminology used by the author makes everything all the more clear.
October 30, 2020
Very difficult to read
Want to read
October 26, 2007Brigham Young University (Provo, UT) is behind this important endeavour to translate all great works from the Islamic world! i can't express how thrilled and grateful i am that some very insightful & inspired individuals/scholars at the Y have dedicated themselves to bridging this gap of ignorance about this part of the world. bravo! i salute you! and will read up soon. :)
May 7, 2007
enjoyed parrallel arabic and english texts; commentary is worthwhile - get to have a touch of ibn rushd
Read
November 21, 2009None
August 20, 2013
كتاب فصل المقال في طبعة باللغتين العربية والفرنسية يتلوها تحليل للكتاب و تفسير لمفرداتها في إطارها الفلسفي.
كتاب رائع
كتاب رائع
February 22, 2013
One of my favorite Philosophy books.
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