Avrupa Neden Dünyayı Fethetti?

The Princeton Economic History of the Western World #54

by Philip T. Hoffman, Mihriban Doğan (Translator)

1492 ila 1914 yılları arasında Avrupalılar dünyanın yüzde 84’ünü fethettiler. Fakat yüzyıllar boyunca Çinliler, Japonlar, Osmanlılar ve Güney Asyalılar çok daha ileride olmalarına karşın dünya üzerinde egemenlik kurmayı başaran neden Avrupalılar oldu? Bu kitapta Philip Hoffman, (coğrafya, bulaşıcı hastalıklar ve sanayi devrimi gibi) geleneksel açıklamaların bu soruyu yanıtlamakta yetersiz kaldığını gösteriyor. Bunun yerine, ekonomik ve siyasal tarihin bu süreçte çok önemli rol oynadığını öne sürerek, eğer bazı değişkenler farklı olsaydı Avrupa’nın elinin kolunun bağlanacağına ve başka bir gücün dünyanın efendisi olacağına işaret ediyor. Avrupa devletlerini farklı bir gelişme, askeri rekabet ve savaş yoluna sokan iki binyıllık ekonomik, siyasal ve tarihsel değişimlere ışık tutuyor. Hoffman bu farklı gelişim seyrinin Avrupalılara sonradan öğrendikleri ateşli silah teknolojisinde diğer uygarlıkların önüne geçerek, üzerinde dünya egemenliğini kuracakları bir temel atma fırsatını verdiğini belirtiyor.

Genres: History, Economics, Nonfiction, European History, Politics, World History, Political Science

367 pages, Paperback

First published June 29, 2015

Reviews

[Allen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Some people, presumably those who are not blaming the Jews or the Americans, claim that all the problems in the world are the fault of white males of European descent. There is some truth to that. One could also claim that everything good in the modern world was developed, invented, discovered by those same white males of European descent. There is some truth to that. For the past several hundred years they seemed to be the only ones actually doing anything. There is some truth to that, too, but like the other claims, there are exceptions, of course. But in general, it would seem to hold.

The question then becomes why? How did Europe, in particular Western Europe, eclipse China, India and the Ottoman Empire which at one time were the world’s largest economies and most vibrant civilizations? Why and how did a backwards, poverty stricken, highly fragmented Europe, after the collapse of the Roman Empire, go on to conquer 35% of the world by 1800 and control 84% of the world by 1913 and have very beneficial trade concessions from two of the countries, China and Japan, it did not control? Why were relatively small numbers of European soldiers able to defeat overwhelming numbers of Aztecs, Bengali’s, Ottomans or Chinese?

Some would say superior genetics. Don’t make me laugh. Others a superior culture and list gross disgusting and horrible things about other cultures. This idea was popular at the height of the British Empire. If you would like a list of gross, disgusting and horrible attributes of British and American culture, I am sure someone would be only too happy to oblige. Every culture has good and bad and we need to learn from the good and discard the bad in all cultures.

Jarrod Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies provided some of the answers as did Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000but did not answer all the questions that might be asked. Julia Lovell’s The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams, and the Making of Modern China, in which a few British gun ships and a small number of soldiers humiliated the Chinese Empire sent me looking for more answers. Good thing I didn’t go looking any sooner as this book was only published in 2015. Philip T. Hoffman’s Why did Europe Conquer the World? builds partly on Diamond and Kennedy though he rebuts their conclusions but answers the main question better than any other book I have read.

The answer is gunpowder technology. China may have invented gunpowder and made the first firearms but Western Europe perfected the technology over the centuries. Gunpowder technology includes everything, not just firearms but logistics, defense structures, strategy and tactics, development, administration, and training of both army and navy. Why did Europe outstrip all other parts of the world in perfecting gunpowder technology?

Hoffman describes four essentials for advancing gunpowder technology:
1. There must be frequent war. Rulers must therefore face similar political costs of mobilizing resources and must be battling for a prize that was valuable relative to the fixed cost of establishing a fiscal system and a military apparatus. There cannot be huge differences in the size of their countries or economies or their ability to borrow, although credit can allow the ruler of a small country to fight a larger opponent.
2. Frequent war, though, is not enough, for rulers must also lavish huge sums on it. Once again, the prize must be valuable, but in addition, the rulers’ political costs of summoning resources must not only be similar, but low.
3. Rulers must use the gunpowder technology heavily, and not older military technologies.
4. Rulers must face few obstacles to adopting military innovations, even from opponents.

Western Europe met all four requirements almost all of the time. From the time of the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the only business of rulers was war. No ruler in Western Europe was able to grow powerful enough that it discouraged other rulers from fighting them. Gunpowder technology was adopted as soon as it was available and improved constantly over time as it was superior to Knights in armor and archers on foot. The bayonet meant that pikemen, who protected musketeers from cavalry, could be replaced with musketeers, doubling firepower. Cannons were improved and made lighter, stronger and more portable. Every ruler learned from every other ruler; there were no secrets

Hoffman walks us through China, Japan, India and the Ottoman Empire and explains why in each case, they lost ground to the Western Europeans because they did not meet all of the four requirements all of the time. China, for example, was often at war but mostly with nomads of the Steppes. Horse mounted archers were far more effective against them than slow-moving infantry armed with muskets and cannon. (It was only in the mid-late 19th century that repeating rifles and pistols allowed the complete subjugation of the indigenous American nomads of the West). So if rulers spent resources on old technology, they were not spending it on gunpowder technology. Western Europe did not have to deal with nomads because Russia, Poland and Hungary kept them at bay.

Why was Western Europe able to continually meet the four essentials to allow it to make such huge improvements in gunpowder technology, long before the Industrial Revolution? It was not preordained, Hoffman said but rather the result of their particular political history. If any of the “Great Powers” from the 16th century on had been able to overcome the others and become so dominant there would be no more fighting. If any of the Great Powers had faced more resistance to high taxes, of which up to 90% was spent on war, things would have been different. The discussion of the political histories of the different parts of the world is crucial to understanding the why.

The author uses algebraic equations to illustrate his models. These are in appendices and can be skipped by non-economists as his narrative is reasonably clear. The research that went into this was incredibly meticulous and every chapter has expensive end notes.

If you have read Guns, Germs and Steel then How did Europe Conquer the World? is the logical next step in understanding how we got where we are today. What is the legacy of “winning the arms race” and controlling the world? Two world wars, massive poverty in many countries, in particular Africa and the immigration “crisis” as people move from relatively poor areas to relatively rich areas of the world.

[Wind · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kitabı çok beğendim. Çok başarılı buldum. Öncelikle şunu söylemem gerekiyor ki bu kitap giriş seviyesi bir eser değil. Hatta özellikle Tüfek Mikrop ve Çelik - Jared Diamond kitabını okumuş olmanız gerekiyor bu eserdeki bir çok bölümü bağlamıyla beraber anlayabilmeniz için.

Jared Diamond kendi eserinde batı avrupalıların Amerika kıtasını ele geçirmiş olmalarını tüfekleri olmasına ve çeşitli salgın hastalıklara bağışıklık sahibi olmalarına bağlıyor ve bu bağlamda bir inceleme yapıyor.

Bu kitapta Philip T. Hoffman ise "...sadece batı avrupalılar değil Osmanlı, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin, Japonya'nın da tüfeği vardı ve salgın hastalıklara onlar da bağışıklık kazanmışlardı. Diamond'un yaklaşımı bize Dünyayı neden Osmanlı, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin veya Japonya değil de batı avrupalılar fethetti sorusunun cevabını vermiyor..." diyor ve bu soruya kendisi cevap vermeye çalışıyor. Bence oldukça da başarılı olmuş.

Şunu belirtmek isterim ki ilk akla gelen yanıt "Sanayi Devrimi" olabilir ancak bu kitapta sanayi devriminden önceki yıllar (1200-1800) ağırlıklı olarak ele alınıyor ve diğerlerinde olmayıp avrupada olan neydi sorusuna cevap aranıyor.

[Liviu · Rating 4 out of 5]

interesting but not that conclusive and generally demonstrating that history happened because it happened - the author argues convincingly the well known fact that military competition between states that are not that big to comprehensively ruin one another in fighting wars (see Rome vs the Persians in the 6th century), but big enough to raise (lots) of money to fight for long period of times because that is the thing "done" leads to military progress, while the availability of technology that is a game changer (gunpowder + sailing vessels) means that said progress can be projected everywhere physical conditions allowed

while looking at Russia and the Ottoman Empire for example, the book really forces its arguments as the Ottomans were quite powerful even well into this period (1500-1900) and only the defeat at Vienna in 1683 and the rise of imperial Russia which essentially focused its energies into defeating them for quite a long time (as for example Spain/Austria/the Habsburgs with all their other entanglements couldn't do) took them down in the 1800's, though even then they have enough power to be reckoned with, while same with Russia and its rise (piggybacking on the West's developments and having a farsighted Tsar and less entrenched bureaucracy true)

the other main fail of the book in trying to straitjacket things into their model is the huge difference between the "New World' and Asia, as in the former the book fits very well its conclusions (very small number of conquistadors with powerful technology defeating huge native empires, sometimes with local allies but sometimes like in Peru without and then ruling over them fairly uncontested), but in the latter, yes the Europeans (the Portuguese first, the Spanish and then the Dutch, English and French) came and took some stuff with force, got some bases and starting interfering in local affairs, but it took a long time to Empire and imposing their complete domination

Overall, mostly well known stuff tried to be fit into a straitjacket theory that has some merit (though again, I think it's been part of the narrative for a long while), but with tons of forced stuff that is glossed over or "explained" away when the theory doesn't fit any more; on the other hand better historically than similar books based on geography (here the author does a good job at debunking that), "protestant ethic" (somehow the Portuguese did it in Asia and the Spanish in the New World to start with and for a long time), racial reasons (the Europeans were the same in the 1200's when they got drubbed in the Crusades) etc

[David · Rating 1 out of 5]

A brutal read, no idea how it was published unless the writer was the child of the publishing house editor. Dry, repetitive, rife with grammatical errors, and draws no conclusions from the proposals in the abstract. First Amazon book I want a refund on. Ugh.

[Adam Wilsman · Rating 4 out of 5]

Chapter 1 - Introduction - By 900, Western Europe was a backwater. There were no cities but for Cordoba, which was really established by the Muslims. Luxury goods were extremely expensive and to get them, you needed to trade with Muslims some of the few items that they wanted from Europe (furs and slaves). The Muslim Middle East was much more advanced. So too was southern China. But for someone from that era to travel to 1900, they would be shocked. Europe ran the world. It's only competition was the U.S., a European clone, and Japan, which gained strength by copying Western traditions. What changed? Why didn't China or the Middle East rule the world? There are many theories, like disease. But all Eurasians had the advantage of disease over the natives of the New World. It wasn't industrialization either because the European takeover of the world was well underway before that revolution began. To Hoffman, the answer is European superiority in military technology, particularly gunpowder weapons.

Chapter 2 - How the Tournament in Early Modern Europe Made Conquest Possible - How come Europe was so great at innovating gunpowder weapons? 1. There must be frequent war and in Western Europe, there was (see awesome chart on page 22). 2. Rulers must lavish huge sums on war. The prize must be valuable, but in addition, the rulers' political costs of summoning resources must not only be similar, but low. 3. Rulers must use the gunpowder technology heavily (elsewhere, gunpowder weapons were not terrifically useful against nomads, Western Europeans didn't fight nomads, as for example, the Chinese did) 4. Rulers must face few obstacles to adopting military innovations, even from opponents. All of this was true in Western Europe

Chapter 3 - Why the Rest of Eurasia Fell Behind - If you look at the other major powers of Eurasia, none had the exact right circumstances to progress in the field of gunpowder weaponry at the same pace as the Western Europeans. For the Chinese, most of their fighting was against nomads against whom gunpowder weapons were less effective than horse-mounted archers. They were also less invested in naval warfare for the same reason. They were also the unquestioned hegemon of East Asia. They didn't have the competition factor. Japan did innovate until the Tokugawa united the country after which they had few enemies (again, China was too formidable) with which to fight. India fought all the time, but it was very expensive to raise the money to advance weaponry. Tax collection was inefficient. The Ottomans and Russians mostly fought nomads too. Distance from Western Europe also hurt countries' ability to innovate and copy Western European weapon types and strategies.

Chapter 4 - Ultimate Causes: Explaining the Difference between Western Europe and the Rest of Eurasia - The political fragmentation of Europe was helpful in facilitating the kind of war tournament there that would facilitate rapid improvement in gunpowder technology. What accounts for that political fragmentation? A millenium of war and ensuing cultural evolution split western Europe into small, hostile states, whose rulers and elites were engrossed in the fight for glory and the other prizes of battle. The European rulers were forced to make deals with the nobility to raise money rather than rely on slaves like the Ottomans. As a result, European states raised more money more easily earlier. Heavier taxes in Europe. Ability to borrow money for rulers. Representative institutions helped with this borrowing and the imposition of new taxes. Tokugawa became hegemons within Japan, Chinese emperors hegemons within East Asia. Western Europe this never happened in part because the powerful Catholic Church kept European rulers weak and in many cases actively worked against the consolidation of powerful political counterweights like the Holy Roman Emperor.

Chapter 5 - From the Gunpowder Technology to Private Expeditions

Chapter 6 - Technological Change and Armed Peace in Nineteenth-Century Europe

Chapter 7 - Conclusion: The Price of Conquest

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

Philip T. Hoffmann’s Why Did Europe Conquer the World is another book in the tradition of offering a unified field theory for why Europeans came to conquer or control some 85% of the globe by the eve of the First World War.

The theory is twofold. Part one, gunpowder technology & part two, tournament warfare. The first is fairly straightforward, but the second will require a brief explanation. Tournament warfare is “the sort of competition that…can drive contestants to exert enormous effort in the hope of winning a prize”. What this appears to suggest is that war for the Europeans was a zero sum game: one winner and one loser.

As with all such neat theories it has a problem with complexity. However, Mr. Hoffman does a very good job of attempting to force a round peg into a square hole. Many will be convinced by the argument, but the process of colonization/imperialization was a long and complicated one. During the process there were many twists, turns, false-steps, and outright failures. This, however, is another argument.

What the author offers, within the frame of their argument, is a convincing structure on many levels. Is it believable? Not even a little bit, but it was a very good effort.

Recommended for those puzzling on the rise and domination of Europe from the 18th through the early 20th Centuries.

Rating: 3 out of 5 stars. Not a bad book, but an unconvincing one.

[John Turlockton · Rating 1 out of 5]

Very poorly argued. He jumps around in time a lot, doesn't provide evidence for many of his arguments, he often gives citations for tangential points, not the core of the argument and makes a claim without really discussing it. Often leaves very obvious gaps in the argument undiscussed. The only interesting and plausible part was the part he borrowed from Jared Diamond. I didn't find it hard to read like others here however.

[Peter Bradley · Rating 5 out of 5]

Please give my review a helpful vote on Amazon - https://www.amazon.com/review/R11TPGK...


This book put me in mind of Isaac Asimov's Foundation stories, where "psychohistorians" used the science of "psychohistory" model - and control - the development of galactic civilization after the fall of the first galactic empire. The difference here is that economic modeling replaces the fantastic science of psychohistory. Whether this economic modeling could ever be used prospectively or not, it does offer some insights into the intriguing question of "why did Europe end up conquering the world" despite starting out at the tail of the pack and being the unlikeliest candidate for that honor.

Philip T. Hoffman's answer is "political history," which boils down to "luck of the cards." Hoffman addresses a couple of perennial favorites, i.e., geography and constant warfare, to point out that these may be necessary conditions but they are not sufficient conditions since, inter alia, India experienced constant warfare and China had far more territorial diversity than Europe, but neither took the prize.

Hoffman's answer lies in developing a model of what it took to become the leader of the pack. He postulates a simple model based on two powers fighting for the "prize" of glory (or power or whatever). To win the prize, the power with the advantage of pouring the greatest resources into the military project at the the lowest cost (political or financial) will generally be the winner, inasmuch as resources largely determine who wins. The proximity of European states to each other tended to reduce the cost of war while raising the value of the "prize." In addition, the history of Europe in creating small bands of warriors devoted to the lord, who dishonored shirkers, was a political necessity because of the close, warlike conditions of Europe, which had the effect of helping to develop a political culture with low political costs against going to war and was willing to tolerate a level of taxation that was inconceivable in India or China.

These factors tended to place Europe in the running for developing a gunpowder technology. What kept Europe in the running while other powers dropped out were things like: (a) Western Europe was able to devote its entire attention on gunpowder when other powers on the edge of the steppes had to deal with the ancient enemy of nomads with the ancient technology of archer cavalry; (b) there was no European hegemony, as there was in China and Japan and the Ottoman Empire, which in those areas had the tendency to reduce warfare, and reduce taxes, by the sheer fact that most powers were unwilling to attack such an overwhelming power; (c) European states were sufficiently close that technological advances could diffuse among the states, thereby stimulating the arms race; (d) correlated with the last fact was that the proximity and common culture of Europe meant that Europeans shared complimentary technology such that advances in one state could be appropriated by an already existing technological base in other countries, something which was largely not true when other states attempted to buy or appropriate Western technology.

Hoffman supports his points with economic mathematics - which is daunting and not particularly convincing - but provides the pay-off for the purchase of his book by offering a high level description of the historical facts that support his argument. I viewed the economic math as a useful way of compartmenting particular factors for analysis. I thought that this approach paid dividends.

From my perspective, Russia offers a nice substantiation of Hoffman's arguments. Why has Russia lagged behind so often? One reason is that Russia had to deal with Steppe nomads and therefore a large part of its economy went into the technology of horse archers, which while effective against nomads was never going to provide the asymptopic increase in power that gunpowder technologies developed. Consequently, since Russia had to compete with European powers, it found itself, under Peter the Great, importing Germans and others to provide the technological base for gunpowder technology. This importation was made more difficult because of the cultural/religious differences between Russia and the non-Orthodox West.

Hoffman has a nice discussion of how the Papacy seems to have played a role in the political history that led to European success by the fact that the papacy kept Europe fragmented and prevented the emergence of a hegemon. However, a flip of the cards in the other direction, perhaps a more enduring Carolingian Empire that turns the papacy into a department of the state, as occurred in Byzantium and Russia, and maybe there is a European hegemony that retards the development of technology. If that happens, would we now be enjoying technology at the level of pre-World War I Europe? Fascinating question.

Hoffman does not extrapolate his model to the nuclear age, but I wonder if there are features that apply. It seems that Russia and America acted as hegemons for the most part during the Cold War, which may have retarded nuclear proliferation. Likewise, the inability of a lot of countries to transition into nuclear powers is noteworthy, e.g., Iraq, Iran, Libya, which suggests a lack of complementarity. On the other hand, Pakistan and North Korea were successful. If Hoffman's view of history is correct, we might suspect that these countries purchased - or stole - the technology, rather than developing it natively.

This is an interesting book. Obviously, it bears pondering. It is also relatively short, so perfect for a diversion from the real world for the intellectually curious.

[Joe · Rating 4 out of 5]

Why Did Europe Conquer the World?

Why? Gunpowder Technology mostly. Why didn't other civilizations make use of it? Well, this is because many of them were involved in conflicts with steppe nomads. And some others were fighting mostly with and against cavalry. In the beginning gunpowder technologies were useless or minimally effective in both these cases. Guns simply had not yet advanced to the point of being decisively useful in these types of battles.
The Europeans, on the other hand, for the most part fought only against each other, with battle formations and tactics such that improvements in their gunpowder technologies paid big dividends. And so they spent time and treasure improving it. This constant warfare internal to Europe forced the combatants to improve battlefield tactics, global strategies, technologies, and everything that had to do with waging war. (Our author refers to this constant warfare as the 'Tournament'.)
There was also a concurrent improvement in sailing technology in Western Europe. Later, as cannons came into common use on ships, gunpowder technology paid very big dividends here too.
On top of that, European governments were more efficient in collecting taxes than the Eurasian powers when measured on a per capita basis. We all know that if you can't fund your war, you will soon find you can't fight it either. Thus, improvements made in gunpowder technology, sailing technology, and increasing (or at least steady and predictable) monetary resources available for military technology and actual warfare (gold and silver from the Americas of course added to this) made European dominance inevitable.
This was a very scholarly discussion. It is not intended to be a thrilling read. And it is not. But it is very thought-provoking nonetheless. Many readers, I expect, will find the mathematical model (mostly buried in the appendices) indecipherable and boring.

[Isa Lappalainen · Rating 4 out of 5]

Egentligen 3,5 kanske. Modellen som presenteras tycker jag känns något forcerad men i sin helhet är boken intressant och läsvärd!

[Andres Felipe Contreras Buitrago · Rating 4 out of 5]

El libro en general es bueno, tiene puntos a su favor como lo corto que es, muy pocas veces el autor se explaya en ciertos temas, la lectura es amena para todo público, el único error de redacción que vi fue que se repetía mucho el conector de "Así pues".

Sobre la tesis del autor y su abordaje para responder la pregunta es bastante interesante, porqué se centra en una competencia que hubo en Europa, para ello trata temas como la superioridad militar y la fragmentación política que tenía Europa, claro que puede ser muy criticada la visión del autor, pero Hoffman tiene muchas fuentes para sustentar sus ideas, además, que es claro desde que un inicio se va centrarse en ese elemento, y no en ningún otro.

En lo que respecta a los capítulos, el primero es interesante pues cuestiona los planteamientos de anteriores investigadores sobre el porqué de la superioridad europea, es así que demuestra que la geografía y la rivalidades de Europa, no fueron tan determinantes a la hora de explicar la ventaja del antiguo continente, igualmente, las enfermedades y pólvora son importantes; no obstante, para el historiador no son tan contundente esos fenómenos a la hora de responder la pregunta del autor.

Ya en el segundo capítulo plantea la tesis de las 4 condiciones necesarias para impulsar la tecnología de la pólvora: guerra constante, gasto militar masivo, innovar en el uso de pólvora y pocos obstáculos a la hora de implementar cambios militares, Europa occidental si cumplía con esas condición mientas que el resto de Eurasia no, justamente eso último es una ventaja del autor, su método global en el que aplica sus ideas en varios lugares del planeta tierra.

En el segundo y tercer capítulo el autor muestra como los vínculos parentales y la geografía no fueron tan importantes a la hora de explicar la fragmentación de Europa, más bien fueron aspectos políticos y religiosos los que llevaron a su división, la no existencia de un solo emperador, llevo a más guerras y por ende a más innovación militar, cosa contraria que pasó en China y Japón.

En el quinto capítulo, muestra Hoffman como los Estados de la Europa moderna impulsaron las empresas privadas como las compañías de las indias orientales, estás al estar más familiarizadas con la pólvora les resultó más fácil conquistar territorios alejados, las ganacias que dejaban estas también fueron un motor para generar dichas empresas. Por el contrario, China e india no tenían interés en surcar mares para conquistar nuevos lugares.

En el penúltimo capítulo, Hoffman se centra más en explicar cómo la Europa del siglo XIX siguió invirtiendo recursos en el aspecto militar, aquí yace la idea de un tipo de guerra fría, donde los europeos debido a sus rivalidades estaban armándose cada ves más, estás mejorar que veían desde las esferas privadas y estatales, contribuyeron a que los Europeos conquistará lugares que antes eran imposibles de acceder como África.

El último capítulo, muestra que a pesar de todo, luego de la primera guerra mundial el poderío militar de Europa cayó, y con ello también todo sus posesiones, es así que se abre espacio a nuevas potencias como Estados Unidos.

En últimas el libro es bueno, y el autor hace algo que no muchos historiadores hacen que es el de plantear una fórmula y aplicarla en varios lugares, otro aspecto a tener en cuenta es que Hoffman refuta muchas ideas que damos por sentado como las de J. Diamond.

[Haydn · Rating 3 out of 5]

Read 5 pages then skimmed the rest. I'll save you doing the same:

- The political, historical, and geographic nature of Europe resulted in constant fighting, allowing for military advancement and eventual global military dominance
- Commercialisation of war and general freedom as it pertained to commerce
- Intra-European peace from like 1800 onwards

It's not a bad book. It's packed with interesting data, well-researched, well-structured and easy to read.

Generalised Review Footnote

It might say more about me that I find myself utterly incapable of concentrating on a book composed as such. This journalistic, formulaic, intro-point1-dataforpoint1-point2-etc-conclusion way of writing that feeds the reader the information on a plate without the need for said reader to do any interpretation or cognitively exert. I think at this point I've just read too much old, long, technical, dry material that my body has an adverse reaction to nicely-packaged content.

[Stephen Coates · Rating 4 out of 5]

Much has been written on the topic of why, between the 16th and 19th centuries, European countries conquered and established colonies in most of the rest of the world. Hoffman has examined this question and concluded that this was largely due to, following the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the coalescing of a number of small to medium-sized states in the early modern period none of which was big enough to dominate the continent for any length of time yet were big enough to resist conquest by and incorporation into any of the others which, in turn, led to frequent wars which itself led to continuous development of gunpowder technology.

He contrasted the political development of Europe with that of China, Japan, the Ottomans and South Asia where the dominant power in the area had reached a point where neighbouring states couldn’t challenge it but these dominant powers wouldn’t benefit from further expansion. The number and size of the European states weren’t the only factors enabling this military development. Others included the proximity of European countries to each other which enabled learning from each others’ weapons, the development of complementary skills and industries from navigation to boring cannons, the development of fiscal systems which enabled the raising of significant revenues through taxation to fund armies and navies, the ability to recruit soldiers to these armies, the development of the corporation and the absence of raids and warfare from nomads against which firearms of the era were much less effective than archery, which was the case China and, to a lesser extent South Asia where it inhibited their development of gunpowder technology.

Hoffman uses that tournament warfare model – "the sort of competition that can drive contestants to exert enormous effort in the hope of winning a prize" – extensively which suggests that the book is at least a partial adaptation of his academic publishing. The book is well-referenced and the models themselves are included in appendices for those with a mathematical bent leaving the text itself very readable.

Although an excellent book, where it fell down for me was that that it dismissed all factors other than political history and the tournament warfare model as contributors to the rise to global dominance of European powers. To cite one example, in " The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor", David Landes cites several factors Hoffman didn’t mention including the development of spectacles which extended the working life of those needing them, the development of the mechanical clock and the printing press with movable type, the gulf stream which has and continues to make European agriculture highly productive and able to support a significant non-agricultural workforce, the earlier development of women’s rights and the competition between Protestant and Catholic churches beyond that between the states adhering to these two religions.

[David Zerangue · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book was a little challenging to get into. There is a heavy emphasis on economic theory to explain history. So, the opening of the book is a bit heavy (as are the appendices). However, the detail of the history is very interesting and really opens one’s eyes to the how the ‘world today’ came into being. It offers explanations to the ‘why’ and does not seek to exalt one position or the other for how things came to be. Rather it acknowledges the atrocities committed along the way. The book was quite insightful. The only pet peeve triggered in my brain was the constant reference to ‘the gunpowder technology’. I really would have preferred ‘the’ to have been omitted in countless references throughout the book.

[Hang On · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an extremely important book for understanding the world in which we live. Europe conquered the world because of its tournament warfare that required continually improving weapons. But it required more than just firepower, a set of institutions and the development of institutions that would allow it to administer empires. This book should be read in conjunction with Why Nations Fail.

[HsynBuendia · Rating 2 out of 5]

Avrupa ülkelerinin egemenliğini yalnız savaş ve coğrafi etkilere bağlıyor. Avrupa kültürünün felsefe, bilim geçmişinden bahsedilmiyor. Turnuva teorisine çok bel bağlanmış, yazar bu teori ile popüler olmak istemiş gibi ama başarılı olduğu söylenemez. Kitap konuya sığ bir bakış açısı getirmiş. Ayrıca kitabın adında neden değil de nasıl sorusunun olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum.

[Saba · Rating 2 out of 5]

The tournament model is an interesting take on a decades old question. Using Bernard Lewis to examine Middle Eastern history or politics is a serious error though, which makes me question the sources for the conclusions on the politics/history portion of his tournament model in other regions of the world.

[Vadim Polikov · Rating 4 out of 5]

Well written, focuses on the military part of European dominance, with the specific focus on gunpowder technology. This advantage in gunpowder tech is in turn based on constant warfare by small states in a "tournament" model with big payoffs for winners which incentivizes constant investment into warfare and innovation. In the model, these small states should not be held back by a focus on older but effective non-gunpowder tech (such as focusing on horse archers to defend against other horse archers), or limited by an inability to invest heavily (because they cannot raise taxes). China on the other hand had large internal peace and focused it's military on the nomad threat. Japan also stopped fighting wars when the Shoguns centralized the government. Some interesting discussion about Europeans culturally predisposed to focusing on military glory and religious glory, with many private entrepreneurs like Cortez or East India Company in Europe while stronger and larger central governments like China funneling their nobles into bureaucracy and administration and enforcing peace. Lots of good references, especially on the military side. Good economic data on the productivity growth in gunpowder weapons tech. Not enough focus on the other advances Europeans were making at the same time as they were progressing their gunpowder technology and why that was occurring.

[Fatma Kızıl · Rating 4 out of 5]

Okuması gerçekten zor bir kitap bilhassa ekleri okumak güç. Kitabın merkezinde turnuva modeli yer alıyor. Buna göre, Batı Avrupa içerisindeki rekabet askerî ve ekonomik ilerlemeyi ve kolonyalizmi beraberinde getiriyor. Tabi yazar iddalarını temellendiriyor ve istatistiklerden çok fazla istifade ediyor. Barut teknolojisi üzerinde, rekabetin bu teknolojinin gelişmesini sağlaması üzerinde ısrarla duruyor. Batı’nın bilhassa Batı Avrupa’nın neden dünyanın geri kalanına göre daha fazla ilerlediği meselesi üzerine çok fazla şey yazılıp çizildi. Ama kitap bu literatür içerisinde bence kendine has bir yere sahip.

[EleanxrC. · Rating 3 out of 5]

An informative book about how Europe came to be the most influential continent, focusing mainly on the development of gunpowder and warfare. Whilst the argument it offers is based on an economic model, it explains itself in a straightforward way so that those who aren't economists can understand. The author is clear and introduces many supporting examples, making this book worth a read in order to understand the part of the history of Europe and the world.

[Septemus · Rating 5 out of 5]

Kültürel evrimin, askeri ve bilimsel devrimleri nasıl tetiklediğini, barut kullananlar ile sermaye yoğun barut kullananlar arasındaki küçük farkın Avrupa ve diğer devletler arasında ki büyük farka nasıl neden olduğunu, Özel teşebbüslerin , Avrupa'da askeri ve bilimsel ilerlemede önemli bir role sahipken, İslam ülkelerinde fıkıh hükümleri nedeniyle nasıl engellendiğini, bu sebeple bu milletlerin Avrupa karşısında nasıl geri kaldığını açıklayan ufuk açıcı bir kitap.

[Hamzo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Eine historische Analyse der militärischen und letztlich kompletten Dominanz Europas über die restliche Welt. Er räumt mit vielen Mythen auf und beantwortet die Frage wie Europa China und die arabische Welt überholen konnte, wenn auch mit einigen, unnötigen Wiederholungen.

[Brad · Rating 3 out of 5]

Extremely interesting analysis of the factors that may have contributed to Europe's domination militarily as societies developed into the modern age.
A bit dry, at times, which makes sense as the backbone of the analysis/theory is an economic model.
But an interesting read. Satisfied my curiosity.

[Ankit Sharma · Rating 5 out of 5]

Why Did Europe Conquer the World? Is wrote by Philip Hoffman
This book is an ultimate fact about the European economic history, book describes how European Develop a techniques to conquer the World, also the technology of gunpowder & military technology enhance the power of Europeans how Europe struggle to make their economic stronger then rest of world, Start with year 900 when no one wants to live in western Europe to year 1914 by which Europe conquer the 84%percent of the globe, when rest of world struggle to make their economic better that time Europeans adopt a technology of trade & bargain effectively to develop their economic conditions not even better but to target conquering the rest of world in terms of economy, the book binds you from chapter 1 to till final chapter to read the story of Europeans conquering the rest of world

[James S. · Rating 5 out of 5]

The negative reviews here are idiotic. This book is the most convincing explanation of European dominance I've ever read. The economic explanations are easy to understand but convincing, and the book clearly discusses the reasons other regions weren't similarly dominant. This book makes the last 500 years of history snap into focus. Required reading.

[hai wang · Rating 5 out of 5]

Partial but precise

Very interesting argument in the context of political history. It does explain many of my questions in concert with other theories.

[Patrdr · Rating 4 out of 5]

As the title makes clear, this is an ambitious book.
The author develops a sequence of models to see if he can explain why European nations gained a decisive edge that enabled them to conquer the rest of the world (rather than the other way around).
Not to do justice to the analysis but he develops a tournament model in which sovereigns regularly pit their resources in battle with their neighbors in tournaments. The technology of war (the gunpowder technology) advances through learning-by-doing, at least until the 19th century when research and development becomes more important. Hoffman discusses the historical evidence and concludes that the conditions for (nearly) continuous rounds of tournaments existed in western Europe but not elsewhere.
With the leg up of more advanced military technology and the incentive of short-run gains from conquest, Europeans were able to dominate the globe (temporarily)
I enjoyed this work. It's well written with the maths (not too elaborate) confined to the appendices.

[Vysloczil · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hoffman summarises his work that earlier appeared in two of the most prestigious field journals of economic history in this popular writing. It is a theory that essentially tries to explain the so called great divergence up until the eve of WW1. His workhorse is a simple model from one of his earlier articles, that essentially predicts that competition between fragmented neighboring states in europe led to the advancement of gunpowder technology. This was the main reason why Europeans could conquer virtually the whole world by 1914.

The chain of reasoning in a nutshell: fragmentation in Europe -> conflict -> incentive to push gunpowder tech (R&D + adoption from neighbors / diffusion)
Furthermore he emphasises the importance of political history throughout the book.

It is nicely written, helps to refresh some historical knowledge. The nicest feature IMO is, that he is one of the few authors that manages to explain & argue along a rigorous economic model (albeit a very simple one) without being to technical.
A good read for a broad audience.

[cool breeze · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a scholarly rebuttal of the politically correct revisionist histories by Jared Diamond and others regarding why Europe conquered the world. It is a moderately difficult read aimed at an academic audience, not a popular history aimed at a general audience, like Diamond. 4+ stars for the content, but 2 stars for readability.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

Rather boring... Didn't address one king just being pissed off with another causing a war. Probably happened with no regard to the tournament rules.