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In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s
In this magisterial book, a prize-winning historian shows how war has defined modern America. Michael Sherry argues that America's intense preoccupation with war emerged on the eve of World War II, marking a turning point as important as the Revolution, the end of the frontier, and other watersheds in American history. In the sixty years since the war, says Sherry, militarization has reshaped every facet of American life: its politics, economics, culture, social relations, and place in the world.
According to Sherry, America's militarization began partly in response to threatening forces and changes abroad, but its internal sources and consequences in the long run proved more telling. War--as threat, necessity, or model of unified action--persistently justified the state's growing size, power, and activism. But as national government waged "war on poverty," war on AIDS," and "war on drugs," it fostered expectations of "victory" that it could not fulfill, aggravating the very distrust of federal authority that leaders sought to overcome and encouraging Americans to conceive of war as something they waged against each other rather than against enemies abroad. The paradigm of war thereby corroded Americans' faith in national government and embittered their conflicts over class, race, gender, religion, and the nation's very meaning. Sherry concludes by speculating on the possibility of ending America's long attachment to war.
According to Sherry, America's militarization began partly in response to threatening forces and changes abroad, but its internal sources and consequences in the long run proved more telling. War--as threat, necessity, or model of unified action--persistently justified the state's growing size, power, and activism. But as national government waged "war on poverty," war on AIDS," and "war on drugs," it fostered expectations of "victory" that it could not fulfill, aggravating the very distrust of federal authority that leaders sought to overcome and encouraging Americans to conceive of war as something they waged against each other rather than against enemies abroad. The paradigm of war thereby corroded Americans' faith in national government and embittered their conflicts over class, race, gender, religion, and the nation's very meaning. Sherry concludes by speculating on the possibility of ending America's long attachment to war.
624 pages, Paperback
First published August 30, 1995
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About the author
Michael S. Sherry
8 books4 followersMichael S. Sherry is Richard W. Leopold Professor of History emeritus at Northwestern University, where he taught from 1976 until his retirement in 2020. A graduate of Washington University, Sherry earned his PhD at Yale University.
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January 22, 2022
In his book, Michael S. Sherry traces the story of America's militarization, which began in the late 1930s, and the way it changed the nation.
For the better part of the 20th century, Americans lived "in the shadow of war." Sherry describes their perception of war through a 1941 advertisement displaying a bomber's shadow darkening a picturesque suburban home – an external threat hanging ominously over the domestic calm. According to him, to Americans, war came from somewhere outside to intrude upon their lives. It was an obscure phenomenon – enemies were invisible and the approach to defeating them was difficult to pinpoint. Because the destruction war brings never came directly to America, its substance was impossible for Americans to grasp. When Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed, Americans "saw" the mushroom cloud in the distance, but not the destruction and suffering the atomic bombs brought to the Japanese cities.
Generally, the Americans' understanding of what war was and where it came from was part hypocritical, part idealistic. They regarded military vigilance and action always as necessities imposed on them by external forces. They discussed how war transformed their country, but not how, purposefully or inadvertently, they changed themselves through war and changed war making itself. The author compares their perception to a simple moral drama, in which they were the passive victims and it was the enemy – the Nazi, Japanese, Communists etc. – who forced them to take up arms. But this perception was not enough to justify the vast national security apparatus America built, for while national security demands had urgency created by the national myth of a peaceful nation compelled to defend itself from external threats, they lacked even basic legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the apparatus was built – providing an opportunity for other goals, such as profit for the powerful military-industrial complex, to persist – and it came to have far-reaching effects on America's history. Once an insignificant concern, national security acquired permanent importance in daily American life, so that much of the nation's budget was spent on it, American armed forces spread all over the world, and the purpose of American science and security was re-oriented. A good example of the latter that comes to mind are the Cold War universities like Stanford that rose from previously small, poor institutions to major research centers funded by the US government to pursue research in Chemistry and Physics. The success of politicians also became reliant on their attitude towards war. For instance, Lyndon Johnson's 1964 campaign portrayed Barry Goldwater as a warmonger ready to start a nuclear war.
All in all, militarization re-shaped every aspect of American life – politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations.
Over a year ago, I read a book called Warfare State, which argues for a thesis similar to Sherry's – that the Second World War set up a warfare state rooted in the American society, as well as in its government. Due to the Cold War, militarism did not end in 1945, but lasted for decades. While that is certainly true, however, Michael S. Sherry cautions against the use of labels such as "the national security state" or "the warfare state" because, according to him, they fail to capture the breadth and the specifics of America's militarization. Judging by what I have read about the Cold War, I agree with him. The federal government was too often in chaos and too challenged by other concerns to give national security utmost priority. By the same token, America never became a "warfare state" in the full sense of that term, for it never welcomed or entered into a war whole-heartedly enough.
Therefore, American militarization remained unique. Unlike that of Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, it was not dominated by military institutions and elites – American civilian leaders often pursued national security objectives and embraced military values with greater enthusiasm than military officers. Furthermore, American society was not inherently warlike. The people of America did not enjoy war. Torn by contrasting feelings, such as fear at the prospect of a hot war and the desire to enjoy post-WWII prosperity, Americans could not develop a real war spirit like that of Imperial Japan. As Sherry concludes, the main factor that drove American militarization and ensured its long existence was its leaders' and citizens' inability to trust and justify joint national action except when it occurred during a war or in warlike mode. Americans wanted their government to do more, so they saw in war or in warlike conditions a way to overcome their distrust of governmental action.
IN THE SHADOW OF WAR is a theoretical, abstract study whose concepts are often difficult to grasp. The author himself points out that there is not enough scholarship on American militarization yet, so both the secondary and the primary sources he uses are limited. His work requires a solid understanding of modern American history and especially of the American experience during the Second World War and the Cold War. His writing style is academic and sometimes dry, so this is not a study for the faint of heart. Nevertheless, I recommend this book to all serious students of modern American history, for I believe that it will contribute to their understanding of the dominant forces that shaped American society in the 20th century.
For the better part of the 20th century, Americans lived "in the shadow of war." Sherry describes their perception of war through a 1941 advertisement displaying a bomber's shadow darkening a picturesque suburban home – an external threat hanging ominously over the domestic calm. According to him, to Americans, war came from somewhere outside to intrude upon their lives. It was an obscure phenomenon – enemies were invisible and the approach to defeating them was difficult to pinpoint. Because the destruction war brings never came directly to America, its substance was impossible for Americans to grasp. When Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed, Americans "saw" the mushroom cloud in the distance, but not the destruction and suffering the atomic bombs brought to the Japanese cities.
Generally, the Americans' understanding of what war was and where it came from was part hypocritical, part idealistic. They regarded military vigilance and action always as necessities imposed on them by external forces. They discussed how war transformed their country, but not how, purposefully or inadvertently, they changed themselves through war and changed war making itself. The author compares their perception to a simple moral drama, in which they were the passive victims and it was the enemy – the Nazi, Japanese, Communists etc. – who forced them to take up arms. But this perception was not enough to justify the vast national security apparatus America built, for while national security demands had urgency created by the national myth of a peaceful nation compelled to defend itself from external threats, they lacked even basic legitimacy.
Nevertheless, the apparatus was built – providing an opportunity for other goals, such as profit for the powerful military-industrial complex, to persist – and it came to have far-reaching effects on America's history. Once an insignificant concern, national security acquired permanent importance in daily American life, so that much of the nation's budget was spent on it, American armed forces spread all over the world, and the purpose of American science and security was re-oriented. A good example of the latter that comes to mind are the Cold War universities like Stanford that rose from previously small, poor institutions to major research centers funded by the US government to pursue research in Chemistry and Physics. The success of politicians also became reliant on their attitude towards war. For instance, Lyndon Johnson's 1964 campaign portrayed Barry Goldwater as a warmonger ready to start a nuclear war.
All in all, militarization re-shaped every aspect of American life – politics and foreign policy, economics and technology, culture and social relations.
Over a year ago, I read a book called Warfare State, which argues for a thesis similar to Sherry's – that the Second World War set up a warfare state rooted in the American society, as well as in its government. Due to the Cold War, militarism did not end in 1945, but lasted for decades. While that is certainly true, however, Michael S. Sherry cautions against the use of labels such as "the national security state" or "the warfare state" because, according to him, they fail to capture the breadth and the specifics of America's militarization. Judging by what I have read about the Cold War, I agree with him. The federal government was too often in chaos and too challenged by other concerns to give national security utmost priority. By the same token, America never became a "warfare state" in the full sense of that term, for it never welcomed or entered into a war whole-heartedly enough.
Therefore, American militarization remained unique. Unlike that of Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, it was not dominated by military institutions and elites – American civilian leaders often pursued national security objectives and embraced military values with greater enthusiasm than military officers. Furthermore, American society was not inherently warlike. The people of America did not enjoy war. Torn by contrasting feelings, such as fear at the prospect of a hot war and the desire to enjoy post-WWII prosperity, Americans could not develop a real war spirit like that of Imperial Japan. As Sherry concludes, the main factor that drove American militarization and ensured its long existence was its leaders' and citizens' inability to trust and justify joint national action except when it occurred during a war or in warlike mode. Americans wanted their government to do more, so they saw in war or in warlike conditions a way to overcome their distrust of governmental action.
IN THE SHADOW OF WAR is a theoretical, abstract study whose concepts are often difficult to grasp. The author himself points out that there is not enough scholarship on American militarization yet, so both the secondary and the primary sources he uses are limited. His work requires a solid understanding of modern American history and especially of the American experience during the Second World War and the Cold War. His writing style is academic and sometimes dry, so this is not a study for the faint of heart. Nevertheless, I recommend this book to all serious students of modern American history, for I believe that it will contribute to their understanding of the dominant forces that shaped American society in the 20th century.
research
July 30, 2021⤑ research tag: in an effort to organise my shelves, I'm going to be labelling the books I'm using for study purposes as I tend to dip in and out of these.
March 17, 2015
By far THE BEST book on the Cold War and its influence on America both politically and culturally. The cultural impact is strongly emphasized here so you should not consider it a military history at all, -- really.
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