Critique of Cynical Reason

by Peter Sloterdijk, Andreas Huyssen (Foreword), Michael Eldred (Translator)

Upon its publication in Germany in 1983, this author's book stirred both critical acclaim and consternation, attracting a wide readership. He finds cynicism the dominant mode in contemporary culture, in personal and institutional settings; his book is both a history of the impulse and an investigation of its role today, among those whose earlier hopes for social change have crumbled and faded away.

Theory and History of Literature series, Volume 40

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Theory, History, German Literature, Germany, Essays

600 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1983

About the author

Peter Sloterdijk is a German philosopher, cultural theorist, television host and columnist. He is a professor of philosophy and media theory at the University of Art and Design Karlsruhe.

Peter Sloterdijk studied philosophy, Germanistics and history at the University of Munich. In 1975 he received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg. Since 1980 he has published many philosophical works, including the Critique of Cynical Reason. In 2001 he was named president of the State Academy of Design, part of the Center for Art and Media in Karlsruhe. In 2002 he began to co-host Das Philosophische Quartett, a show on the German ZDF television channel devoted to discussing key issues affecting present-day society.

The Kritik der Zynischen Vernunft (Critique of Cynical Reason), published by Suhrkamp in 1983, became the best-selling philosophical book in the German language since the Second World War and launched Sloterdijk's career as an author.

The trilogy Spheres is the philosopher's magnum opus. The first volume was published in 1998, the second in 1999, and the last in 2004.

Reviews

[Nenad Vukusic · Rating 5 out of 5]

Five stars for one reason only. I used to be cynical beyond reason, until a friend pointed this book out to me. It changed my life. I know it sounds like a crappy self help section advice, but there are too many of us, just hating shit for no reason, giving shit to people for no reason and being generally mean. Don't do that. Love people, appreciate their opinions and listen to them. They might surprise you. Oh, and read this book motherfucker. It is worht your time.

[Jacob Wren · Rating 5 out of 5]

Peter Sloterdijke writes:



Psychologically present-day cynics can be understood as borderline melancholics, who can keep their symptoms of depression under control and can remain more or less able to work. Indeed, this is the essential point in modern cynicism: the ability of it’s bearers to work – in spite of anything that might happen. For cynics are not dumb, and every now and then they certainly see the nothingness to which everything leads. Their psychic apparatus has become elastic enough to incorporate as a survival factor a permanent doubt about their own activities. They know what they are doing, but they do it because, in the short run, the force of circumstances and the instinct for self-preservation are speaking the same language, and they are telling them that it has to be so. Others would do it anyway, perhaps worse. Thus, the new, integrated cynicism even has the understandable feeling about itself of being a victim and of making sacrifices. Behind the capable, collaborative hard facade, it covers up a mass of offensive unhappiness and the need to cry.


And later:


It is a matter of experiences for which I can find no other word than the exuberant experience of a well-spent life. In our best moments, when, overcome with success, even the most energetic activity gives way to passivity and the rhythmics of living carry us spontaneously, courage can suddenly make itself felt as a euphoric clarity or a seriousness that is wonderfully tranquil within itself. It awakens the present within us. In the present, awareness climbs all at once to the heights of being. Cool and bright, every moment enters its space; you are no different from its brightness, its coolness, its jubilation. Bad experiences give way to new opportunities. No history makes you old. The unkindnesses of yesterday compel you to nothing. In light of such a presence of spirit, the spell of reenactments is broken. Every conscious second eradicates what is hopelessly past and becomes the first second of an Other History.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of the most interesting books I've read since college. I don't have shit to say about it, though. If the title sounds interesting to you, I bet you'll enjoy it.

[Navid Baharlooie · Rating 5 out of 5]

Sloterdijk provides an astute description of our current state of mind. As we read Critique of Cynical Reason, we are compelled to see our own reflection in the mirror. What we see in the mirror is our pretentious attitude to everything. We pretend to care but don’t really give a damn after all—we’re quick to offer critique, but less willing to offer the hard work it takes to develop solutions that are grounded in bold visions.

According to Sloterdijk, our pretentious attitude is the distorted result that came about with the Enlightenment project, which emphasized a turn to reason, individualism, and skepticism. As a result of this turn, we have become extremely rational, calculable and strategic, and this analytical mindset has developed into a cynical reason that is critical of any truth related to feelings, aesthetics, and ideals.

Sloterdijk call this “the enlightened false consciousness” of cynicism. Our analytical mindset has made it easy for so many of us to be smart. We know so much about how the world works. But this smartness does not translate to wisdom and passion, and we seem to have lost the ability to recognize the most important aspect of existence: How to live a good life. The cynical reason can’t engage in a dialogue about the good life, because it’s not really interested. So we don’t really gain from a cynical ideology critique.

Our cynical self believes that nothing has value—that the world is meaningless—and thinks of the idealist as naive and stupid. The problem with our cynical attitude is the innate blind spot. With the prevalent cynicism in society there’s really no standpoint left from which the cynic can make a genuine critique. Because to which grand narratives or higher values can the cynic point to?

So it seems that we haven’t really become modern after the Enlightenment. We haven’t managed to fully develop modern values. In the last chapter (the most rewarding to me) Sloterdijk returns to the Enlightenment motto, the Latin phrase sapere aude, which can be read as ‘dare to use your own understanding and judgment.’ This is what we’re still missing. Sloterdijk hopes to revive a critical existentialism, an ”agile, worldly-wise intelligence,” as he calls it, that walks the talk—that is the antagonist to cynicism as a genuine interest in solutions that cultivate a better human life.

[sologdin · Rating 3 out of 5]

quite a bit going on here, but famous among literary & lefty types for the notion "enlightened false consciousness." not so sure about some of the other distinctions, such as kynicism/cynicism, or some of the local readings of various objects.

[Dustyn Hessie · Rating 4 out of 5]

Before I read this book I was indoctrinated with the belief (partly by education, mostly by general opinion) that Sloterdijk was a "post-humanist," and a "neo-facist" (both of which I am not so found of). But in the Critique of Cynical Reason I didn't get any sideways ideology out of this 20th century German thinker.

This philosophical critique doesn't just hone in on our modern idea of the cynic, the melancholy bastard of epithets and premature gloominess, but it also turns our heads back to the true, radical cynicism of Greek Philosophical Antiquity, Diogenes, in whom we have a rather enlightened "kynicism" (as I believe Sloterdijk had called it). Diogenes presided in ancient Greece, and in witnessing the mayhem and untruthfulness of his era and people, emphatically, in light of much joy, gave Greece the, "No," due in much part to their insistence on hasty modernization and inflated overvaluation of material excess (all, of course, in the very same epoch as Alexander of Macedonia and Aristotle).

Of course, Diogenes, as kynic par excellence, recurs several times in Sloterdijk's Critique. But there are also several sudden flights of illuminative discourse regarding cynicism I'd almost call indispensable for any philosophy reader: his critique of the almost-hyperbolically cynical Grand Inquisitor in Dostoevski's world famous, The Brothers Karamazov; his knee-deep inspection into the new cynic, the person who admittedly refuses any truth, and so, goes along with the modern hedonistic ethos of "self"-preservation and such; and lastly, I'll note Sloterdijk's flattering insistence on the truth of enlightenment.

I'll leave much to the imagination of any reader self-propelled into this here Critique. I slammed through the 600-page monster of a book in a week without much trouble, but Sloterdijk's style (and I say this as a mild warning) does begin to blur into obscurity with his tendency to use a plethora of -isms of menial renown, by using such cackling half-baked-ideological phrases: prefacist-kynicist-postmodernism, and the like...

[j. · Rating 4 out of 5]

some good fart jokes, some swearing, deceptively breezy for a 600-page book of critical theory. his psychological interpretations sometimes have a tendency to sound facile, but he seems to find that funny too, and anyway just when you're thinking you're superior to them he tosses off another one that makes it seem pretty likely that you're never going to read as much of THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT as he has so there's not much point in getting too fussy about his details. a man who includes several separate major discussions of naughty body parts in his work seems to deserve to have his intellectual project too.

the scope of his effort to trace the transformation of ancient cynicism into modern cynicism suggests that the reason you don't see lots of other people dealing with the issue is that it's too much for them to manage. but it may also be that his approach incorporates an assumption that less critique-oriented scholars aren't signed on to—treating ancient cynicism as itself a form of critique of power. as a result of the assumption his account has a secret-historyish flavor.

this is possibly a liberating book.

it's surely fallen by the wayside in the u.s., though. unsure whether his recent flurry of english translations will generate any more interest for what sure seems like an underappreciated book.

i never looked into this for years despite always seeing it around in used bookstores—it just looked like outdated 'theory' trash. the very beginning may be more indulgent than the main text is once he kicks the machinery into gear.

[Leonart Maruli]

Buku langka ini...beruntung banget bisa pinjam buku ini di perpustakaan daring...

[Héctor · Rating 5 out of 5]

MIER...DA Y CONCIENCIA ECOLÓGICA

Como hijos de la cultura anal, todos nosotros tenemos una relación más o menos perturbada hacia la propia mierda. La separación de nuestra conciencia de la propia mierda es el más profundo adiestramiento que nos dice lo que tiene que suceder oculta y privadamente. La relación que se inculca a los hombres hacia sus propios excrementos suministra el modelo de relación que existe para con todas las basuras de la vida. Hasta ahora se las ha ignorado regularmente. Sólo bajo el signo del moderno pensar ecologista nos estamos viendo obligados a recoger nuestras basuras en la conciencia. La alta teoría descubre la categoría mierda; un nuevo estado de la filosofía natural se abre con ello, una crítica del hombre como un hiperproductivo animal industrial acumulador de mierda. Diógenes es el único filósofo occidental del que sabemos que ejecutaba consciente y públicamente sus ocupaciones animales y hay base para interpretar esto como parte de una teoría pantomímica. Ésta hace alusión a una conciencia natural que valora positivamente las vertientes animales de lo humano y no permite separación alguna de lo bajo o vergonzoso. Quien no quiera admitir que es un productor de basura y que no tiene ninguna otra posibilidad para ser de otra manera se arriesga a perecer asfixiado un día en la propia mierda. Todo está a favor de que admitamos a Diógenes en la galería de precursores de la conciencia ecológica. La hazaña histórico-espiritual de la ecología, que irradiará incluso hasta en la filosofía, la ética y la política, consiste en haber convertido el fenómeno de la basura en un tema "superior". A partir de ahora, ya no constituye un molesto efecto secundario; más bien se reconoce como principio fundamental (...) Se tiene que ir al encuentro de la mierda de una manera distinta. Ahora se debe excogitar de nuevo la utilidad de lo inutilizable, la productividad de lo improductivo o, dicho filosóficamente, hay que descubrir la positividad de lo negativo y reconocer también nuestra competencia para lo imprevisto. El filósofo quínico es alguien que no se asquea. En eso está emparentado con los niños que todavía no saben nada de la negatividad de sus excrementos.

PETER SLOTERDIJK, Crítica de la razón cínica. Ed. Taurus, 1989.

[César · Rating 5 out of 5]

4'5

[Lorraine · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is very productive for thought, though one would be advised to read it with double vision -- the same kind as the splintering of doubles that it explores. Sloterdjik is adapt at exploring the contradictions of modernity, and ends with a call to courage. But this is undermined by the kind of cynicism/kynicism that allows for the book's insights (unfortunately, I don't think that they're as separable as he would like them to be, cue doubling). He wants to have his cake and eat it. It is too easy to understand one's self as taking on a more traditional 'heroic' mantle, and being the voice of kynical reason, in the call to courage, but this is actually undermined by what the book suggests -- it is too close to what they call 'master cynicism' for comfort. A book for the wary/weary, but dangerous as it is enlightening.

It is less a work of 'philosophy' per se than a superb piece of 'writing' -- in the way of a 'literary' texts -- highly enjoyable. It does not hold together that well, but that is part of its power. The mixture of lightness and heaviness that it gives is part of the contradiction of living in modernity, and the only 'courage' one can probably claim is the 'courage' involved in reading something apparently useless.

[Adam · Rating 3 out of 5]

More entertaining than edifying; frequently garrulous, occasionally perceptive. The primary demerit is Sloterdijk's heavy-handed advocacy of the "kynical" position, which amounts to little more than an attitude or lifestyle and is sometimes too cozy with the glib history of anti-intellectualism.

[Dionysius the Areopagite · Rating 5 out of 5]

If I give you $15,000 and a year's supply of domestic beer, porn, and a sports car, will you seriously commit to altering your perspective, belief on eternity at year's end?

[Malachy · Rating 2 out of 5]

Zu lang.

[John · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sloterdijk’s Critique of Cynical Reason. The title echoes Kant’s Critique but Sloterdijk is far from Kant’s concern with the philosophical basis of scientific procedure. Sloterdijk rejects Kant’s cognitively-biased universalisms associated with the Enlightenment, such as impartiality in scientific practice, materiality-based empiricism. Instead he argues from what he calls a ‘pre-Enlightenment’ tradition that posits the body, critical (i.e. not Heideggarian) ‘existential ontology’. He sets the body against intellect, desire against abstraction, a sexual exhibitionist’ impulse versus the bourgeois boudoir and privatization of sexual desire. In essence, he calls for the

instantiation of desire into Soviet-era as much as western European forms of the public sphere.
Sloterdijk’s key philosophical sources are the pre-Enlightenment ‘low thinkers’ like the ‘cheeky’ (surely the translator could have come up with a better translation of the German than this?) Kynic (the K to distinguish them from later cynical reasoners) Diogenes and Heraclitus and their modern age heirs in artistic developments like Dadaism, and literary figures like Goethe’s Mephistopheles.
Low theory is a philosophy of ends, of desire, embodied reason rather than the perverted thinking of means, procedure, subject-object division. Sloterdijk’s low theory is one that is constantly historicizing thought and theories that obscure their functionalism and involvement in political subjectification. Low theory counters on the basis of an epistemology pinioned on the subject and physicality the ‘physiogonomist as philosopher’. This is pitted against, for example, forms of ‘schizoid’ reasoning found in Freudian analysis which must always sublimate the ‘id to the superego’. Sloterdijk wants to counter ‘Nobodyness’ because Kynicism and embodied identity have no place, at least in pure form, in bourgeois’ disembodied publicness or its constant attendant dangers of nationalistic war and state’s suspicion of their own and foreign populations. For Sloterdijk we need to start thinking substantively of ends because this will save us, politically, from the cynical and manipulative sciences and technologies based on procedure and other forms of means-directed thought.
A long chapter engages with Heidegger because this cynical uptake of ontology (in its conceptualization of the idea of ‘homeliness’, death-consciousness, in particular) typifies the corruption of ontological thought – as seen in its involvement in Nazism. Instead Sloterdijk wants to kynicise ontology and combat its political misappropriation of the human desire for belonging and community:
Inspired by the kynicism of ends, life that has learned the coldness of producing, ruling and destroying through the cynicism of means could become warm again for us. The critique of instrumental reason presses for its completion as a critique of cynical reason. Its chief task is to loosen Heidegger’s pathos and break its tight hold on the mere consciousness of death. 207
Sloterdijk counters embodied kynical reason to unearth the failings of the degenerative ‘master cynicisms’ that dominant modern societies such as the state and military power, Christianity, sexual cynicism. His writing style is often marked by diffuseness, allusion and, particularly because he comes from a position outside the cynical traditions he analyses, somewhat dualistic. Sloterdijk also tends to a highly functionalist form of argumentation as seen in statements like, ‘Imperialist power submitted to Christian Kynicism in order to tame it’ (235). The master cynicisms act always thus to sublimate Kynical impulses into serving the means of power and

instrumental reason rather than the ends of the good, the unstoppered complex desires and rhythms of the body.
Despite these drawbacks this book is compulsive, critical, creative in its analysis, and the examples he gives from 17th century western culture onwards are always intriguing – some of the illustrations alone are probably worth half the book’s cover price. But the theoretical (rather than the stronger historical) bases of his critique are somewhat weaker. Sloterdijk’s key thinkers, Heraclitus and Diogenes are not really strong enough to build such a wide-ranging critique of western culture and science. And a concept like embodiment could have been deepened and made more analytically useful by linguistic theorists like Merleau-Ponty, for example. Similarly, more from Foucault could have deepened Sloterdijk’s analyses of the master cynicisms from a bio-power perspective.
One must, also, turn the book’s historicism back upon itself. This is a height of the Cold War-era study circ. 1983 and the threat of nuclear Armageddon, its consequent features of spying and surveillance, inform its analysis of cynical reason. But cynical reasoning has moved on – the commoditization of desire, for example, it could be argued has made the ‘gay sciences’ themselves more corrupted as they become pervasive. And one will find nothing of the key political Other of our era - Islamophobia. Sloterdijk cannot be guilty of missing such contemporary issues, but the Euro-centric nature of his examples means it is hard to relate to his work now. And Sloterdijk is responsible for his glaring oversight of racial ideologies in the traditions of cynical reasoning, and the impact of colonialism.
However, how on earth this (great) book passed under my radar when I was employed in research and teaching about Habermas and public sphere theory in the Noughties is beyond me. This book was referred to in a recent TLS review of Sloterdijk’s latest book and its suggestive title, like Bourdieu’s Logic of a Theory of Practice, shouts out at one, it demands to be read. Sloterdijk is, essentially, a theorist who prefers to allude indirectly to the contemporary thinkers he has in mind. Thus Habermas’s early idea of Universal Pragmatics isn’t mentioned directly but adapted in Sloterdijk’s idea of Universal Polemics, or Ricoeur’s ideas on rhythm analysis go unreferenced (there is one cryptic reference to Ricoeur early on in the book.) Habermas and the bourgeois concept of the pubic sphere, dialogic reason is more directly discussed, the diogenetic questioning of the classical Greek foundations of the public and private divide being a key feature of the book:
Where dogmatics postulates an unconditional duty toward truth, the Gay Science assumes from the start the right to lie. And where theory demands that the truth be presented in discursive forms (argumentatively self-contained texts, chains of sentences), the original critique knows of the possibilities of expressing the truth pantomimically and spontaneously. 289

In this way Sloterdijk dismisses the Habermasian argument that dialogical agreement, disembodied reasoning are the bases for unbiased political argument or reasoning. So the Habermasian idea that ‘agreement’ is good in itself – is a false ‘Third Party’ that erases the specific quality of experiential forms of knowledge and argumentation.
But Sloterdijk never really puts forward a viable utopian moment – his is a Kynicism of negation, a negative dialectic. Sloterdijk, in the end, remains a much better critic than theorist. His Gay Science, the concern with the body, of pre-Enlightenment ideas, is thin on any prescription other than that of radical dissent, of revealing ‘bluff’ and ‘disingenuous opinion’ (402) If there is anything to cling to, to hope with, it is an erotics, not just a sexual erotics, but of non-objectifying love:
[T]here is another kind of precedence that is not based on subjugation: The precedence the object enjoys in sympathetic understanding does not demand that we reconcile ourselves to an inferiority and an alienated position. Its prototype is love. The ability to concede the object a precedence would be tantamount to the ability to live and let live (instead of following the impulse to pull everything down into death with us). 360
But that, I’m afraid is just very noble guff.

[Hemphill_D · Rating 4 out of 5]

Los efectos que causa el fascismo y su pensamiento en nuestra ideología, lo limitante que llega a ser nuestra realidad y lo angustia vivida con resignación. Me ha gustado, más allá de lo que saco para mi TFM. Si bien es cierto que me he leído trozos seleccionados, quizás en un futuro leeré mas en profundidad.

[Nemo · Rating 5 out of 5]

In his Critique of Cynical Reason, Peter Sloterdijk explores the philosophical implications of the pervasive cynicism that dominates contemporary society. Greek kynic philosophers, believed that the key to a good and happy life lies in living in accordance with nature and reason, rather than being swayed by societal norms and expectations. According to kynic philosophers , society has twisted this natural state by imposing foolish opinions and unnatural needs on individuals, creating never-ending demands that can never truly be satisfied. However, he believes that people can always rewrite their brains to rediscover this natural state and reclaim their happiness.The kynic philosophers envisioned themselves as equal to kings, so when Alexander found Diogenes taking the sun, Alexander said “Ask me for anything you’d like.” Diogenes, lying on the ground asked him to move a little, so as not to block the sun. Alexander later told his courtiers, that had he not been Alexander, he would like to have been Diogenes. Modern society has turned this attitude on its head, promoting the belief that people are hopelessly selfish and materialistic. This pessimistic view of human nature has led to a sense of resignation and apathy, preventing people from taking action to bring about real change.
In this sense, Sloterdijk's critique of cynical reason can be seen as a call to action, encouraging individuals to reject the cynicism that pervades contemporary society and strive towards a more enlightened way of life.

[Rui · Rating 4 out of 5]

In Critique of Cynical Reason, Sloterdijk argues that the Enlightenment rational critique of everything ended up giving birth to our current cynical age. He thinks that the antidote to this dangerous strain of egoistic nihilism is the return of Greek cynic philosophy, an ironic and satirical critique rooted in a practical/existential detached niilism.
This is a great book, possibly even the best book I have read this year (way better than Sloterdijk's Rage and Time). But it should be a lot shorter. What could easily have been a 200/300 pages book, ended up a 600 pages work, full of unnecessary ramblings. The historic section is specially annoying. I understand that Sloterdijk had to give some use to the years he spent studying Weimar Germany, but spending 180 p. on it is just a distasteful waste of the reader's time.
But, oh boy, the short chapter on farts makes up for all the wasted time!

[Tadas Talaikis · Rating 4 out of 5]

Someone said me that this book works better than my actions, but as it turns out, it works only in his own mind, not the real. Reality still needs some sort of an appeal on emotions of the ego = survival function = fight or flight response and somewhat anti-cynical scientific cynical reasoning and game theory. No real solutions provided here for new religions like scientism.

Laugh as a solution works, but the book misses the big part of the human psyche that it is a part of first step - categorization - to genocide. I still consider hard thinking (about theories or ideologies or people) far more valuable than easy laughs (Thinking, Fast and Slow).

[Joshua · Rating 2 out of 5]

i liked several things about the book. the setup for the project is clear and compelling. sloterdijk develops some useful concepts and insightful points. but the writing style is esoteric and difficult to follow, particularly after around the halfway point. the structure and direction of the argument seems to fall apart as the book progresses. and at several points, i felt that sloterdijk simply wasn't interested in being understood at all. cool ideas, bad communication. not a book for me.

[Brian]

Tried reading this twice and failed. Oh well. Someday.

[Stephen Ragan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really interesting book. Sloterdijk explores individual psychology and cultural trends during the Weimar Republic to describe the contemporary cynical disbelief in truth and use of morality as a tool for social control citing among other examples Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor as this ultimate manifestation. Against this cynicism Sloterdijk advocates the kynical philosophy of Diogenes. The homeless philosopher who told Alexander the Great to get out of his sun light.

Hard to describe all the gems included in this book.

One criticism is that Sloterdijk seems to be a bit of a confused intellect at times including passages that don't seem to serve the overall thesis.

[Kristian Paris · Rating 3 out of 5]

Fornuften bedrages hverken af ideologi som falsk bevidsthed (jf. Marx) eller af ideologien som ikke-falsk men autentisk virkelighed (Zizek), men er snarere blevet falsk oplyst bevidsthed. Med det menes, at fornuften gennemstrømmes af en kynisme, der "ved, hvad den gør, men gør det alligevel". Den tese udtrykker Sloterdijk med udgangspunkt i virkelige eksempler. Bedst virker parallelen til 2. verdenskrig: folk vidste (for det meste) hvad de gjorde, men gjorde det alligevel. Årsagerne hertil gennemgås også.

[Ryan Denson · Rating 5 out of 5]

"Ancient kynicism, primary and pugnacious kynicism, was a plebian antithesis to idealism. Modern cynicism, by contrast, is the masters' antithesis to their own idealism as ideology and as masquerade."

"The more a modern society appears to be without alternatives, the more it will allow itself to be cynical. In the end, it is ironical about its own legitimation. 'Basic values' and excuses merge imperceptibly."

"The meaninglessness of life - about which so much stupid nihilistic prattle winds itself - in fact provides the foundation for its full preciousness."

Originally published in 1983 as Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, Sloterdijk's book became a best-seller in Germany at the time. The title, being an obvious parody of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, hints at the persistent engagement with philosophical traditions. (Making it an even more remarkable feat that a 500+ page philosophic text should become a best-seller in any era). Much of its contemporary popularity was doubtlessly owing to the lively style and accessibility provided by the exceptionally wide array of examples he uses to illustrate these ideas.

The overall thesis of the book centers upon the distinction between kynicism and cynicism, relating the two by the modern tendency to transliterate the Greek kappa as a 'c'. Kynicism, for Sloterdijk represents ancient philosophical cynicism, or at least the spirit behind the extant stories about Diogenes of Sinope. This kynicism is meant to represent a counter both to various types of status quo ideas that get passed off as 'natural' or 'normal' as well as a material counter to Platonic idealism. Sloterdijk notes also the element of Diogenes always being represented as a lone individual, whose singular criticisms having a remarkable piercing ability to undermine common ideologies (or at least take a stab at their weak points). Cynicism, representing popular cynicism, on the other hand, is what happens when kynical thought patterns become more mainstream and exploited, not to unmask inadequate ideology, but rather as a self-serving tool to mask (and, frequently, to justify) one's own motives. This is the more familiar type of thought, the kind often accompanied by apathy and even nihilism. Sloterdijk's work, then, illustrates a wide range of examples, primarily through his six cardinal cynicisms, 'six great arenas of values' in which he highlights examples of kynicism/cynicism: military, politics, sexuality, medicine, religion, and knowledge. Occasionally, literary examples are sprinkled in, such as Goethe's Mephistopheles and Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor. Notably, he points out that cynicism is not entirely a modern phenomenon, showing an example of it in Lucian of Samosata, and likewise contrasting the kynicism of the earliest Christians to the cynicism of post-Constantinian Christianity. Relying on his own literary specialty, Sloterdijk also brings forth the Weimar Republic as an era particularly lodged in cynicism.

Overall, it's an interesting, albeit time-consuming read. Throughout the work, Sloterdijk proves to have many prescient comments, such as the effects of the deluge of information brought on by modern mass media and what we would now call the attention economy, a phenomenon only made worse now by social media platforms. Sloderdijk's whole project with this work remains relevant today, as little has changed in terms of the proliferation of cynicism nearly 40 years later. It is an overwhelmingly prevalent attitude that tends to be passed off as only 'natural', though this reminder of the alternative kynicism, and the potential utility of it, serves to at least cast list on such tendency, even if they are so (seemingly) hopelessly ubiquitous now.

[Prudente Impertinente · Rating 5 out of 5]

Punta de lanza del autor alemán, con este texto consiguió su merecido reconocimiento internacional. Pocas veces he leído y oído tanto entusiasmo sobre un autor contemporáneo como por Sloterdijk. Siendo exactos, puede que ningún otro haya obtenido tantas recomendaciones e incluso declaraciones de algunos profesores universatarios de filosofía sobre que éste es el último filósofo occidental a tener en cuenta en nuestra ya larga tradición reflexiva.

Si bien su obra magna debe considerarse su trilogía "Esferas" (las cuales, por cierto, leí antes de este libro), puede bien considerarse esta obra como la más característica del autor, donde se expone y se encarna en la palabra, donde puedes dilatar las pupilas ante brillantes reflexiones y contraerla ante abruptos juicios localistas.

Podríamos considerar esta obra un complemento desapasionado de la Dialéctica de la Ilustración de Adorno&Horkheimer. En efecto, el slogan usado por el propio autor reza: «El cinismo es la falsa conciencia ilustrada. Es la moderna conciencia infeliz sobre la que la Ilustración ha trabajado tanto con éxito como en vano.» Esta contradicción es el desarrollo que Peter establece a través de las más de 700 páginas, apoyándose en la dinámica entre cinismo y quinismo. Entre el cinismo de aquella ilustración que intenta reírse de su propia catástrofe y aquel quinismo que intenta superar cualquier idealismo en el mismo momento de ser creado. Así Diógenes de Sinope.

Con este libro Peter establece una agudísima crítica a la Ilustración occidental, a sus mecanismos de actuación, a su ideología, a su materialización, estableciendo la crítica a la derecha por su cisimos y a la izquierda por su falta de quinismo y de superación de su propia condición.

El remate es un grueso capítulo en el que la exhibición de la Crítica de la Razón Cínica se pone en práctica analizando la Alemania de Weimar, justo en el momento en el que el cinismo más famoso de Occidente se manifestó: el nazismo.

Un hurra por Peter !

PD: 700 páginas de libro, hay que cogerlo con ganas. Pero ayuda que la traducción haya conseguido fluidez y que esté, como suele decirse, muy bien escrito.

[Rosewater Emily · Rating 3 out of 5]

Невзи[]рая на заключение, написанное в стилистике пресловутого 1968, труд Слотердайка[ не мог не сыграть и таки] сыграл внушительную (завидную, к примеру, и для Гегеля и для Ницше) роль в создании последних assэистических сотрясаний гаваней патриотических AI (automated intellectuals) зенкой, плоды чего периодически выкладываемы для потребления рядовыми sygmaтами. Отчасти поэтому, рецензия не может стать объёмной - примечания, разделяемые на три категории (голубые, розовые, зелёные и серые), могли сообщить всё необходимое; из них не составит великого труда конструирование полноценного, даром что "своеобразного" реферата, полученного, к примеру, в назидание за пропущенные лекции претенциозной аксиологии имени Драгоманова (не имеющей с названным историческим деятелем ничего вразумляюще-общего). В рамках зии зенка затрагивает лишь малую толику голубых (проще говоря, спорных - способствующих в большей мере полемике, нежели дискуссии, и отражающих вполне ощутимый, обонябельный дискурс).
In ihm erwachen die "Ideologien" zu sich selbst ([В цинізмі] ідеології пробуджуються до самопізнання) - царапнёт, без того неуклонно отслаивающуюся, сетчатку заключение преумножившейся идеологии в кавычки; дескать, подача информации гвинейскими свинками левого крыла фундаментально отличается от подачи её правизною (независимо от убик-свинства) - якобы вследствие восприятия и практического применения того и другого категорически отличимы и выстраиваемые соответственно социополитические структуры, иначе взаимодействуют правоохранение и законодательство, частные лица существенно различаются в методах и средствах решения бытовых и биографических дилемм - однако, Слотердайк, очевидно, "имеет виды" на донесение другого сорта тезиса (не исходя ли из "идей" оказавшегося к месту во фриланс-карьере автора ашрама?). Как концепция, способная пережить автора, последователей и все мыслимые воплощения, идеология едина, всепоглощающа - спорить, при наличии естественного желания дать засилию сторонников каждой отдельной концепции рекреационный "отпор" (сам по себе являющийся следствием идеологической оценки), особого проку нет. Преодоление идеологии оказывается настолько же реалистической инициативой, что и преодоление [понятия] литературы (чего, осторожничая, касаются, например, в качественном сборнике научных эссе 2021 года How Literatures Begin). Пробуждение идеологии к самосознанию, по ск[о]ромному мнению зенки, приводит к формированию [идеологии] идентичности, ретранслирующей уже испытанные насильственные структуры на психотерапевтические и реабилитационные автопортреты их (структурных) жертв.
Ironischer weise ist das Ziel der kritischsten Anstrengung das unbe fangenste Sichgehenlassen ("Іронія в тому, що вкрай критичне зусилля має подібну до вільного й невимушеного відпускання\попущення ціль")..и вне непосредственной связи оригинала: "Усі першопочаткові мотиви виникнення ворожнечі породжені відокремленням життя і смерті" (Alle primären Verfeindungen leiten sich von der Abspaltung des Todes vom Leben her). Руководствуясь, допускаю, одной предвзятостью в отношении ошоизма, зенка обнаруживает, сопоставляя представленные сентенции, несостыковку, характерную для культовых форм миро[пони]мания: если цель критического усилия, при оценке событий и данных, принятии решений и формировании принципов незаменимого, состоит в испытании свободы отпускаемой "ситуации" (в про-живании ситуации, как отпущенной, вышедшей за рамки её пере-живания) - разве смерть, таким образом, не становится тем самым "непринуждённым" отпусканием? Или же последнее предполагает в сущности "приятие" нежеланных следствий и ответвлений на равных с искомыми правах? На примере: не требует (для зенки, если угодно) доказательств 'bellicus\militaris est injustus' ('terroristic' in context); исходя из риторики Высоких-Аки-Сосна-Корабельная-Кабинетов, "переговоры с террористами" не служат одним из принципов Дипломатии-Чьё-Брюшко-Благородное-Едва-Щекочут-Сосны-Корабельные - сиречь, происходит то самое жизни от смерти "отделение", но, следуя логике кофейной чашки, избегается необходимое, с точки зрения перспектив и процветания, делание Критического Усилия, состоявшего бы в приятии терроризма в качестве функционального элемента любого рода суверенитета. Оперируя глоссарием досужих (безоплатных) комментаторов президентских отчётов по ночным (2 июля года 2026) событиям, словосочетание "слуга дьявола" может послужить новым (подцензурным, потому цинико-официальным) политическим девизом на предстоящих (ли) выборах - ибо ведь названным "дьяволом" оказывается включающий пресловутого комментатора "народ".
Die heilsame Fiktion des freien Dialogs aufrechtzuerhalten, ist eine letzte Aufgabe von Philosophie ("Збереження за фікцією цілющого діалогу [відповідної до конкретних феноменів] сили є кінцевим завданням філософії")..и в дополнение, дефрагментированное из выводов: "Оцінка великою філософією життя історично була незмінно серйознішою за оцінювання [оновленною] 'серйозністю життя' - філософії" (Die große Philosophie hat seit jeher das Leben ernster genommen als der "Ernst des Lebens" die Philosophie). Безусловно, величие Софьи Гросс значительно бы теряло в весе, кабы ей привелось взять на себя незавидное обязательство по принятию чего-то вроде "оскорбленной позы" при случайном столкновении с Эрнстом Лебенсом в свободолюбивой очереди за 'всё ещё съедобными' товарами на заднем дворе гипермаркета. В то же время, некоторое (не прям уж "смутное", конечно) беспокойство доставляет постановка Слотердайком letzte Aufgabe (the latter could be translated as "surrender" and "renunciation" also) философии, по умолчанию не обладающей (ссыльным, вероятно) величием; какова [преодолевшая идеологи-ку] формула этой 'функции'? С какой целью серьёзность отношения к жизни намеренно представляется 'иллюзорной' автором, когда она (серьёзность) подразумевает рекреативную 'диалогичность'? Вспоминается послесловие переводчика, посмертного лауреата по вкладу в Евразийскую софию-2025, Александра опять-Владимировича Перцева: "супруга теолога, адвокат по профессии" стала ключевой в акцентуации аудитории, встретившей "Критику цинического" в первый же год издания наиболее дружелюбно; товарищ Перцев, кроме как отличившись высоким качеством перевода не самого буквалистского материала, успевает сослаться во время произнесения тоста и на обязательность в деле самосовершенствования взращивания персонального, внутреннего, не по-средневековому крикливого "морального троечника".
Wo Einsicht herrscht, ist das Kampfsubjekt immer schon vergangen ("За присутності розуміння суб'єкт боротьби\борець припиняє свою існування")..наконец: "Було б цікаво написати історію боротьби між іронією і ідентичністю, талантом і характером" (Man müßte eine Ideologiegeschichte des Kampfs zwischen Ironie und Iden tität, Talent und Charakter schreiben). В завершение можно было бы задать вопрос, по имени позволительно, правда ведь, Петеру: а чем была критика цинизма в 1983 году - проявлением характера или таланта, поиском иронии в происходящем или идентификацией с иронически происходящее толкующим?

[Volbet · Rating 5 out of 5]

As an admittedly cynical motherfucker, I was surprisingly pleased with Peter Sloterdijk's analysis and histography of the inherit cynicism of the Enlightenment project. As radical as Sloterdijk’s thesis sounds, he does make a series of very good and thorough arguments to support his point: the Enlightenment’s focus on instrumental, objective reason has alienated the individual and made the general epistemic mode cynical and borderline defeatist.

Sloterdijk does this by doing a quick historiographical survey of cynicism (and thereby differentiate it from the more individualistic cousin, kynicism). Then the entire analysis culminates in an in-depth analysis of the cultural and political mode of the Weimar Republic.
But what I found so brilliant about this book is the way Sloterdijk marries two schools of thought that, for more or less arbitrary reasons, spend decades in opposition to each other, namely the Marxist dialectics of the Frankfurt School and the more systematic works of the French post-modernists. Specifically, Sloterdijk manages to combine the thoughts of Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Benjamin with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

[Planetka · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Różnica między kynikiem a cynikiem jest różnicą praktyczną. Taką się wybiera filozofię, jakim się jest człowiekiem (Fichte)".

No i Sloterdijk z pewnością jest kynikiem. A może i cynikiem? Sam w końcu przyznał, że jedno wcale nie leży daleko od drugiego. Trzeba zacząć od tego czym są obie te postawy. Ponoć obie wynikają z zarzucenia idealizmu. Z tym, że o ile kynik drwi z tego na czym innym zależy dla samej potrzeby obnażenia swojej bezsilności i małości, tak cynik uczestniczy w świecie lawirując między tym, co naprawdę myśli, a tym co prezentuje innym. Sloterdijk rozróżnia jeszcze cynizm idei od cynizmu środków. Przy czym cynizmu środków nic nie usprawiedliwia (nawet jeśli sięgasz po dyskusyjne moralnie narzędzia w sprawie, w którą wierzysz). Jest to zatem trochę intuicyjne, a trochę nieintuicyjne myślenie o cynizmie. Gdy Sloterdijk mierzy cynizm miarą społeczną (manipulacji), to Jung wskazuje na dużo bardziej indywidualne źródła cynizmu (przy czym też wskazuje na to, że jest to bardzo powszechna postawa): "Świat jest pełen ludzi, którzy cierpią z powodu skutków własnego, nieprzeżytego życia. Stają się zgorzkniali, krytyczni albo sztywni nie dlatego, że są z natury źli, ale dlatego, że w ich wnętrzu drzemie potężna, niewykorzystana siła życiowa, która nie znalazła ujścia". Co stałoby się, gdyby Hitler jednak został przyjęty na akademię sztuk pięknych? Ano właśnie. Nos Kleopatry: gdyby był krótszy, inaczej potoczyłyby się losy świata...

Sloterdijk połączył temat psychoanalizy (ale też i marksizmu) z tym z ducha foucaultowskim założeniem: wiedza = władza. Kto posiada wiedzę, ten ma władzę. Wrócił do hipnotycznych i mesmerycznych podwalin psychoanalizy, jeszcze sprzed Freuda, i wskazał na to, że oświecenie z początku było zachwycone sztuką wydobywania informacji z podświadomości. Niosło to nadzieję na to, że każdy człowiek sam dla siebie jest rezerwuarem wiedzy, którą magnetyczne fluidy lub hipnoza są w stanie odkryć. Początkowy zachwyt nad mesmerycznymi transami ustąpił po odkryciu zjawiska pamięciowej fugi. Cóż jest warta wiedza, którą się o sobie zdobyło, jeśli traci się ją tuż po przebudzeniu z hipnotycznego stanu lub tuż po wypuszczeniu z rąk naenergetyzowanego magicznym fluidem przedmiotu? No niewiele taka wiedza jest warta. Opuszcza ona człowieka szybko i nie można już dłużej twierdzić, że magnetyzm Mesmera czy hipnoza Charcota stanowią przyczynek do oświeceniowej wiedzy-władzy lądującej w rękach i umysłach mas pojedynczych jednostek. Sloterdijk tak właśnie tłumaczy odwrót od tych koncepcji i zwrot w kierunku Freuda, że psychoanaliza jawi mu się jako ta prawdziwa propozycja oświecenia ludzi pod względem tego, co kryje ich nieświadome. Sloterdijk wyraża się o psychoanalizie w dość pochlebnych słowach, wskazując na to, że jej zaletą jest nieustający dostęp do wszystkich treści wygenerowanych w trakcie terapii mówieniem. Jest przekonany o tym, że wyższość psychoanalizy nad mesmeryzmem i hipnozą polega na tym, że nie zachodzi w trakcie analizy żaden trans, a więc nie zachodzi fuga pamięci (zapominanie tego, co o sobie odkryliśmy). Wnioskuje zatem, że analizant prawdziwie zdobywa wiedzę o swojej nieświadomości, a zakres tej wiedzy jest dokładnie taki sam u analityka, jak i u analizanta. Sloterdijk może nie przyznaje tego wprost, ale lekko wskazuje na to, że psychoanaliza jest już bliżej realizacji oświeceniowej obietnicy wiedza [o sobie] = władza [nad sobą] niż mesmeryzm i hipnoza.

Otóż nie zgadzam się. Psychoanaliza cierpi na dokładnie te same bolączki, co hipnoza i mesmeryzm. Sesje analityczne bardzo często łączą się z doświadczeniem fugi pamięciowej. Freud wskazywał na to, że im silniejszy wgląd następuje u analizanta, tym równie silnie może nastąpić ponowne wyparcie wszystkiego, co przed chwilą było dla nas rewolucyjnym odkryciem. Uderza w nas to, a za kilka dni zastanawiamy się o co nam właściwie chodziło i jak to leciało. Co do tego założenia, że analizant i analityk mają tę samą wiedzę o odkrywanych treściach nieświadomości, bo prowadzą tę samą rozmowę i oboje pozostają w pełni władz umysłowych, to również mylne założenie. Analityk głównie słucha i tworzy interpretacje we własnej głowie. Jego zadaniem jest NIE DZIELIĆ się większością interpretacji z pacjentem, bo psychoanaliza wychodzi z założenia, że interpretacji można dokonać tylko wtedy, jeśli analityk jest pewien, że pacjent jest gotów ją przyjąć. A na ogół nie jest gotów, bo procesy analityczne trwały latami. Pozycja analityka jest zatem odmienna od pozycji analizanta. Analizant głównie obcuje ze swoim mówionym strumieniem świadomości, a analityk pozostaje milczący, mając jednocześnie dostęp zarówno do tego strumienia od analizanta, jak i do szeregu własnych skojarzeń, technik, myśli, lektur, interpretacji, etc. Analityk nie dzieli się wiedzą o pacjencie z pacjentem. A zatem jeśli ktoś ma tu wiedzę-władzę, to zdecydowanie jest to wyłącznie psychoanalityk.

Sloterdijk miał poczucie, że czasy epoki Weimarskiej stały się kolebką współcześnie rozumianego cynizmu. Według niego - w zasadzie wszyscy jesteśmy cynikami. Współczesna kultura wychowała nas w mechanizmie oświeconej fałszywej świadomości. Cynizm polega na tym, że wiemy o byciu "hodowanymi", "formatowanymi" i tresowanymi przez system, ale akceptujemy to, dopóki "Kryształowy Pałac" zapewnia nam komfort, bezpieczeństwo i rozrywkę. Wiedza o tym, że jesteśmy poddawani antropotechnikom, staje się częścią samej ideologii, działając jako "refleksyjny bufor", który pozwala nam uczestniczyć w systemie bez poczucia naiwności. Ten refleksyjny bufor to właśnie istota cynizmu. Wiemy, że system jest zły, ale gramy w jego grę, bo tak jest wygodniej i przede wszystkim mamy wtedy poczucie, że nie jesteśmy przecież naiwni, bo wiemy jak jest. Duma i gniew ludzi (thymos) są kapitalizowane przez system. Współczesna tresura zastępuje tymotykę erotyką i konsumpcjonizmem.

Jaka jest pointa dociekań Sloterdijka? Chodzi mu głównie o dowartościowanie greckiej postawy kynicznej. Prawda nie powinna być jedynie poprawnym logicznie zdaniem, lecz stanem organizmu i czynem. Sloterdijk postuluje powrót do „radosnej wiedzy”, która integruje intelekt z cielesnym i moralnym doświadczeniem, przełamując paraliż cynicznego rozumu.

[Luis4b1d · Rating 5 out of 5]

Es tal vez una de las mejores piezas de filosofía de los últimos 15 años. Presenta una perspectiva sobre la llamada cotidianidad, desafiando la necesidad de perspectiva histórica, y la posibilidad de hacer excepcional cualquier elemento de deseo.

[Andrew · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brilliant and enjoyable to read (none of the dryness of so much philosophy.)