I have long known in my gut that usual measures of social wealth, most of all GDP, are fraudulent, in that they falsely identify value where there is none. I have intuited we were all being lied to, and that those who assured us that ever more value was being generated by our society by what appear to be objectively valueless activities were, at best, hiding something. This outstanding book, by left-wing economist Mariana Mazzucato, explains what is being hidden, what hard truths are being avoided, and what she thinks we should do about it. And while I don’t agree with all her prescriptions, or with her rosy view of government competency, the first step on the path to self-improvement is admitting you have a problem.
Others have tried to explain the corruption of the modern economy, such as Rana Foroohar in her dreadful Makers and Takers, but Mazzucato succeeds where they failed. Her core claim is that “much of what is passing for value creation is just value extraction in disguise.” What is value is the heart of this book, along with who creates value. And if value is defined not just as bargained-for exchange, it alters who and what can and should be viewed as productive of value.
Most of all, this book is an attack on the financial industry as extractive and unproductive, something I have also long believed but could not precisely say why, even though I have a lot of direct experience with that industry. Since the financial industry has hoodwinked and bribed much of the world, especially conservatives, into thinking it is a key component of economic growth, and that attacks on it are attacks on the free market and on apple pie, this is a heresy. But a heresy that is also an essential truth.
No surprise, Mazzucato begins by explaining value. “At its heart it is the production of new goods and services.” This is obvious, in a way, but frequently overlooked, ignored, or distorted. In my usual thought experiment, twenty people sitting around on the savanna who do nothing at all except eat and drink what is at hand produce no value. Mazzucato adds the qualifier that not all value, which for her is functionally the same thing as wealth, is net positive, because of externalities. A factory that produces new goods but pollutes creates less net value than if it did not pollute. Similarly, a Gender Studies or Latino Studies professor pollutes society and creates negative net social value, though that’s not an example Mazzucato gives. Conversely, value extraction is “activities focused on moving around existing resources and outputs, and gaining disproportionately from the ensuing trade.”
Thus, determining what is a productive activity is the key to understanding value. In the modern era, since the late eighteenth century, variations on defining the “production boundary” have been used to make this determination. Activities inside the boundary create wealth; activities outside extract it. Today, economic orthodoxy views the production boundary as encompassing all bargained-for exchanges. If a price is paid, value exists. Mazzucato rejects this, holding that some prices paid result in unearned income not representing value creation, a throwback concept, and that some activities currently viewed as creating value actually destroy value.
The first third of the book is a history of economic value. This is a quintessentially modern debate; until the late seventeenth century, economic value was essentially a moral question, revolving around virtuous behavior and contribution to the common good. With the changes wrought by the discovery of the New World, in particular the massive influx of metals, threads of abstract economic thought began to crop up, initially of the mercantilist sort—roughly, the idea that the more metals a country retained, the better. And to measure whether a country was advancing or retreating, the concept of national income was born. William Petty, surveyor to Oliver Cromwell and secretary to Thomas Hobbes, had the insight that viewing each country as a closed system, income and expenditure aggregated the same (ignoring savings), and thus if he could estimate national expenditure, he could estimate national income. He set the production boundary (although he didn’t call it that) to include in national income only production of necessities, such as food and clothing. What is inside and what is outside the production boundary is the core determination for all future calculations of national income—or, as we call it now, more or less, gross domestic product.
The next major thrusts in this area were made by the Physiocrats during the reign of Louis XV, in the mid-eighteenth century. For them, only the primary sector, mostly agriculture but also activities such as mining, was productive. All other activities, including industrial transformations, merchant activities, and of course government, were outside the production boundary. Soon enough, along came the classical economists: Adam Smith and David Ricardo, along with Karl Marx, who are all three here (and not often elsewhere) lumped together, as deriving value, and therefore national income, primarily from labor itself (along with other direct costs of production), not from the focus of the labor. Smith set the production boundary to include any activity involved in production, because it creates value, and to exclude services (lawyers and the like) and government (as well as household production), which do not create value, but live off the surplus created by others. For Smith, using generated wealth to produce more was the key to national growth and success. (This would avoid the example of Spain, which under mercantilist theory should have been in great shape because of the enormous amounts of metals it absorbed, but it did not become more productive, and so sank back into poverty.) Rents, that is transfers of value to those who hold a monopoly on a scarce asset, most obviously land but not at all limited to that, were also unproductive.
Ricardo further developed the theory of rents. As the population grew and assets such as land became relatively scarcer, Ricardo saw rents rising and economic stagnation resulting. Here we see telegraphed Mazzucato’s theme that most of the modern finance industry is not productive, but a seeker of, and gorger upon, rents. For Ricardo, consumption to allow more economic activity, as by industrialists, was good consumption; consumption of frippery was bad consumption. Ricardo, however, included services within the production boundary, as long as they were part of productive processes. Government services were, though, by definition unproductive (true, Ricardo was focused on war spending, and ignored activities such as infrastructure spending).
Marx followed Ricardo in seeing labor as the source of value, but differed in seeing the extraction of surplus value from workers as the key engine of the modern industrial economy (and also the creator of alienation in the workers). Marx included “circulation” within the production boundary—that is, certain activities, including some merchants and some finance, that were needed for productive industry to realize profits. Surplus value that would otherwise be absorbed by production capitalists goes to circulation capitalists—but they also create surplus value, by making activities possible for the production capitalists that would not otherwise be possible. Amazon is an example, as are certain elements of finance—but not lending, “interest-bearing capital.” Thus, anything that created surplus value was within the production boundary. Other aspects, along with government and with household production, were as usual outside the production boundary. Along the same lines, rents were seen as merely redistributing value, not creating it, and were outside the production boundary—they were also merely claims on surplus value created by labor.
In the late nineteenth century, and into the twentieth, the concepts of value developed by classical economics went by the wayside with the rise of the neoclassical economists, such as Alfred Marshall, who developed the marginalist theory of value. They held, and it is nearly universally held today, that people buy goods or services based on their subjective estimation of utility at the margin to the buyer, and therefore the only value of a good or service is whether and what someone is willing to pay for it. Of course, as Mazzucato points out, this means that total value production in a national economy is now purely subjective, and that measures of productivity now fluctuate with prices. Even more perniciously, this theory means that someone who is unemployed is merely choosing leisure over value, by preferring the utility of leisure to whatever work may be available. This also implies that to maximize national value any barriers to trade must be removed, such that everyone can get what he deserves based on his marginal production. Government’s role is only to remove market failures (and that only if it can be proven government will not be a worse cure than the disease, according to James Buchanan’s public choice theory), since by definition the totally free and frictionless market will provide optimal outcomes. Finally, it implies that rents in the old sense, of a monopoly on something such as land or capital, are no longer viewed with distaste; they are merely part of an individual’s utility maximizing, and income from rents is now viewed as inside the production boundary, whether derived from land or capital.
Therefore, nearly every purchase transaction is included within today’s “comprehensive boundary.” Under this new view of things, anything that fetches a price is included in national income, GDP. Mazzucato goes into great detail about the modern calculation of GDP, something that I have long failed to understand, but which she makes accessible, though even with her explanations it’s still mushy and confusing, in its nature, not due to any failure of the author. The accounting calculations are very complex and frequently shifting, done pursuant to something of which you have never heard, the “United Nations’ System of National Accounts,” the SNA. It attempts to calculate GDP as “the amount of value added by production.” National production equals national income equals national expenditure. In theory, at least—but Mazzucato says much of this is ad hoc, such as the switch in 2008 from ignoring research and development to including it in GDP, which magically added 2.5 percent to United States GDP with no actual change in the economy. And anything that does not fetch a price, such as household work, is not part of GDP—but six percent of GDP is rent imputed to homeowners, again with the ad hoc judgment calls. Government spending is included in GDP only for amounts government spends as an actor, excluding transfer payments such as pensions and unemployment benefits (which show up in GDP as part of household spending). Government is ignored in calculations of production, something to which, again, Mazzucato objects, since she views government as very often a value creator.
The explanations here don’t answer some of my questions, though. Where does money borrowed from the Chinese show up? Given the level of foreign debt we incur, national expenditure would seem to grossly exceed national production and national income. Or is the debt transferred to national income and national “production” by government spending? But how can debt be considered production? Or, to take another question that fascinates me, how about California? We are always told how big California’s economy is, how important it is to our country, how it “contributes” so much to national value. We are told if California were independent it would be the world’s fifth-largest economy. We are, of course, told these things to suggest that being run by people on the far left, woker than woke, is totally compatible with economic success, and that “red” states are parasites upon the awesome success of California and New York.
I went exploring, to determine what it is that makes up California’s GDP, through statistics provided by the Bureau of Economic Affairs. The vast majority is things that do not, according to Mazzucato, actually result from the creation of value. Forty-seven percent is FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate), “professional and business services,” or “information.” Twelve percent is manufacturing. Eleven percent is “government and government enterprises.” Ten percent is education and social services. Wholesale and retail trade is eleven percent. And collectively, agriculture, construction, transportation, utilities, and mining are thirteen percent. Thus, what normal people regard colloquially as productive, manufacturing and other forms of real new value creation, is around twenty-five percent of the total. Maybe thirty-five percent, if you optimistically include part of education, “information” and “business services,” though the latter is probably mostly transactions costs such as lawyers imposed by the government and plaintiff’s lawyers engaging in legal extortion. But then, from that maximum of thirty-five percent you have to take away what is really not part of California at all. For example, it appears that any corporation headquartered in California has any capital investments included in California GDP, regardless of where the investment takes place. Along similar lines, presumably “information” includes revenue Google obtains from selling advertising, facilitating transactions that occur mostly totally outside California, and revenue derived from server farms, mostly located outside California. (If calculating GDP by the production method, are all iPhones produced attributed to California’s GDP? I’m not sure.) And so forth, suggesting that much of what appears as value in substantive categories is really not at all attributable to California—it is either fictional, not value at all, or tied to California merely by accounting convention. In other words, as Kurt Schlichter preaches in his “Split” novels, there is no there there, and California would merely collapse like the house in Poltergeist, or Venezuela, if it were severed from the rest of the country, because what passes for value in its GDP is mostly not value at all.
Mazzucato’s history is warmup to her main application of an accurate value framework . . . [Review completes as first comment.]