Six historians, six points of view. A quote from the preface: "If [these essays:] do nothing more than demonstrate how complex the problem of historical causation is and how wary writers must be of oversimplification, they will have served their purpose." So you've been warned about the "peer-review" style — but if you can get past it, you will learn a lot from this slim volume.
The notion I retain from this book is that the outcome of the Civil War was embedded in the reasons for Secession: Slavery and States Rights.
Yes, Davis was a poor Commander-in-Chief (for instance keeping Robert E Lee at a desk and giving him a command when it was probably too late already; bypassing his field commanders with inane orders to lower officers, in the midst of battle);
Yes, the King Cotton strategy backfired (20/20 hindsight: when you have one riches, you use it rather than sitting on it in the idle hope of coaxing foreign support);
Yes, the Union had roads, people and industrial resources the South lacked (though the same disparity didn't prevent the Colonists from winning their Secession from Brittain).
But what did the Confederacy in was, in a darwinian fashion, what caused it to exist:
-Slavery: even though it was Brittain's strategic interest to support the Secession and weaken the Union, as well as her economic interest to secure cotton for her textile industry, the Royal Navy did not commit one ship to the Southern cause; British and French citizens were even forbidden to volunteer to serve the Confederacy. In a rare show of European solidarity, every nation chose to view the Civil War as a war of Good (Abolition) vs. Evil (Slavery).
In addition, the South diverted enormous ressources to prevent a slave revolt: almost half its population was kept from participating in the war effort, as neither the slaves, nor their owners and supervisors, were drafted in the army or even used to provide the logistical and financial needs of the army.
-States Rights: you can't win a war with a de-centralized power structure (for instance, Texas committed some of its soldiers to its own defense rather than participate in the eastern battles or even Vicksburg; regardless of competence, no officer could be promoted to command a regiment from another state).
Worse, the Confederacy had no financial ressource other than what the States chose to contribute: the war was financed 60% by printing money, 30% by borrowing and only 10% by the States (even those 10% were obtained not by tax, but by borrowing, reflecting Southern citizens' aversion to contributing their share of the national Treasury).
Of course this financing scheme produced third-world inflation: when the Confederacy was finally allowed to "impress" (commandeer) resources, that was payed for in a currency that lost half its value in the time it took to pay. Eventually, people stopped producing foods and goods they had to sell at a loss.
Finally, lacking boots, uniforms, munition, rifles, the starving rebel soldiers lost their stomach to fight.
In that way, it was not so much the incompetence of the Confederal administration or its weak economy that doomed the South, but the Articles of Confederation themselves.
Look at this: I've written my own essay rather than reviewing the essays in the book. Oh well, goes to show how much food for thought they contain.