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Osprey Air Campaign #10
Six-Day War 1967: Operation Focus and the 12 hours that changed the Middle East
The story of how the Israeli Force achieved one of the most audacious and important air power victories in history, wiping out enemy air forces more than twice its own size in a single morning.
This new illustrated study examines the planning, execution and aftermath of Operation Focus showing how it not only effectively won the Six Day War for Israel, but also impacted military thinking--in the Middle East and all over the globe--so profoundly that military leaders' perceptions of air superiority were practically transformed in its wake, signalling a turning point in the Cold War.
The Israeli Air Force's Operation Focus was not only a watershed in the history of the modern Middle East but was one of the greatest and most effective air superiority campaigns ever waged. On a single morning, almost the entire IAF was committed to a surprise, preemptive airstrike against the air forces of the encircling Arab states. The attack was extraordinarily successful. Hundreds of Arab aircraft were destroyed, their airfields crippled, and the IAF gained almost complete air supremacy for the rest of the war.
This new illustrated study examines the planning, execution and aftermath of Operation Focus showing how it not only effectively won the Six Day War for Israel, but also impacted military thinking--in the Middle East and all over the globe--so profoundly that military leaders' perceptions of air superiority were practically transformed in its wake, signalling a turning point in the Cold War.
The Israeli Air Force's Operation Focus was not only a watershed in the history of the modern Middle East but was one of the greatest and most effective air superiority campaigns ever waged. On a single morning, almost the entire IAF was committed to a surprise, preemptive airstrike against the air forces of the encircling Arab states. The attack was extraordinarily successful. Hundreds of Arab aircraft were destroyed, their airfields crippled, and the IAF gained almost complete air supremacy for the rest of the war.
96 pages, Paperback
Published June 18, 2019
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
October 7, 2021
This title is fairly standard Osprey fare, excellent art, excellent first-hand accounts, and good introductory text to this Air Campaign.
Of course, those wanting more will find this to be merely an appetizer, while others can be confident they could at least be conversational on the topic.
Of course, those wanting more will find this to be merely an appetizer, while others can be confident they could at least be conversational on the topic.
September 23, 2019
This book focuses on first 12 hours of the war. So it covers initial strikes against Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq, beginning in the morning, when bombing started, and ends in evening when it stopped for the night. It only briefly and neutrally covers events leading to war, such as water war. Which I suppose is a step above usual Israeli line that Syrians were fully responsible. It also only briefly outlines political events leading to it. Which, given Aloni's previous work and his status and position among Israeli historians is a pleasant surprise. Instead books gives almost blow-by-blow description of attacks against individual Egyptian air bases. In such it offers nothing radically new in terms of conclusions, what sets it apart from similar work so far is the fact that it's very detailed and narrowly focused on 12 hour time period.
So if you are looking for more controversial events, such as attack on USS Liberty or H-3 attack fiasco you'll be dissappointed, as book, as I've mentioned, concludes with event of first day and subsequent events are only briefly mentioned.
What is interesting regarding the subject is that recently Tom Cooper and several other authors published a series covering Arab MiGs, with Six Day War being subject to its own volume ARAB MIGS VOL 3: The June 1967 War . As such I could compare the numbers of planes destroyed as claimed by each author covering their respective sides. However due to different breakdowns and information published only overlap is with Egyptian air force fighter and bomber force, Cooper doesn't provide details for other Arabs (Aloni does) while Cooper offers number for helicopters etc which Aloni doesn't. also information is presented a bit differently, Aloni lists planes as "destroyed" while Cooper presents numbers of what was operational at the end of war with rest not being necessarily destroyed. But as Aloni correctly pointed out, if plane was damaged to the degree it was only repaired and returned to service after the war as far as everybody involved in fighting that plane was as good as destroyed.
So let's first look at what authors say was operational on 5th. list is given in type/Aloni/Cooper format
MiG-15/17* 96/96
MiG-19 28/27
MiG-21 102/100
Su-7 16/34
Il-28 27/34
Tu-16 27/23
Aloni bunches types together but Cooper does not
So we can see numbers roughly match. Discrepancies can be attributed to levels of serviceability, plane might have been withdrawn from service but parked in airbase so Israelis might count them as operational etc.
So let's look at claims of destroyed planes. Aloni distinguishes losses between those on the ground and shot down but Cooper does not. type/Aloni/lost in air-air combat/Cooper.
MiG-15/17 89/6/59
MiG-19 7/3/16
MiG-21 77/11/78
Su-7 1/0/25
Il-28 27/0/34
Tu-16 26/0/23
Looking at numbers were see mixed bag. With earlier fighters and Su-7 there is huge difference but general match with MiG-21 and bomber force. I really can't think of logical explanation for it other than one side is terribly wrong. Could Israelis have claimed as destroyed those that were only lightly damaged and returned to service during the war? Or were earlier fighters sturdier and as such harder to knock out and easier to repair, meaning quicker repairs? I guess this will still cause some controversy in future but at least now we have bit of information from both sides we can compare.
As far as air to air combat goes Cooper claims Egypt lost 31 planes in air combat while shooting down 8 Israeli planes. Aloni in turn claims 28 victories and 23 losses from all sources for Israel. Overall Aloni claims 46 Israeli planes lost to all sources and Cooper 42 lost in air-air combat. As such direct comparison is difficult because of different breakdowns but differences is substantial. Add to that the fact Israelis were always reluctant to admit loos in air-air combat, preferring to assign loss to "ground fire" and were on the other hand quick to claim victory in turn. So I suppose which numbers to believe is up to reader, Israelis are nominally more open about it but wrap everything in layers propaganda, justifications and outright fabrications. Arabs on the other hand have kept their archives closed, with Egypt being only one that is somewhat open. And in turn they promote their own propaganda, justifications and outright fabrications. So there is no absolute, neutral truth and every source on either side needs to be treated with caution and not taken at face value.
So if you are looking for more controversial events, such as attack on USS Liberty or H-3 attack fiasco you'll be dissappointed, as book, as I've mentioned, concludes with event of first day and subsequent events are only briefly mentioned.
What is interesting regarding the subject is that recently Tom Cooper and several other authors published a series covering Arab MiGs, with Six Day War being subject to its own volume ARAB MIGS VOL 3: The June 1967 War . As such I could compare the numbers of planes destroyed as claimed by each author covering their respective sides. However due to different breakdowns and information published only overlap is with Egyptian air force fighter and bomber force, Cooper doesn't provide details for other Arabs (Aloni does) while Cooper offers number for helicopters etc which Aloni doesn't. also information is presented a bit differently, Aloni lists planes as "destroyed" while Cooper presents numbers of what was operational at the end of war with rest not being necessarily destroyed. But as Aloni correctly pointed out, if plane was damaged to the degree it was only repaired and returned to service after the war as far as everybody involved in fighting that plane was as good as destroyed.
So let's first look at what authors say was operational on 5th. list is given in type/Aloni/Cooper format
MiG-15/17* 96/96
MiG-19 28/27
MiG-21 102/100
Su-7 16/34
Il-28 27/34
Tu-16 27/23
Aloni bunches types together but Cooper does not
So we can see numbers roughly match. Discrepancies can be attributed to levels of serviceability, plane might have been withdrawn from service but parked in airbase so Israelis might count them as operational etc.
So let's look at claims of destroyed planes. Aloni distinguishes losses between those on the ground and shot down but Cooper does not. type/Aloni/lost in air-air combat/Cooper.
MiG-15/17 89/6/59
MiG-19 7/3/16
MiG-21 77/11/78
Su-7 1/0/25
Il-28 27/0/34
Tu-16 26/0/23
Looking at numbers were see mixed bag. With earlier fighters and Su-7 there is huge difference but general match with MiG-21 and bomber force. I really can't think of logical explanation for it other than one side is terribly wrong. Could Israelis have claimed as destroyed those that were only lightly damaged and returned to service during the war? Or were earlier fighters sturdier and as such harder to knock out and easier to repair, meaning quicker repairs? I guess this will still cause some controversy in future but at least now we have bit of information from both sides we can compare.
As far as air to air combat goes Cooper claims Egypt lost 31 planes in air combat while shooting down 8 Israeli planes. Aloni in turn claims 28 victories and 23 losses from all sources for Israel. Overall Aloni claims 46 Israeli planes lost to all sources and Cooper 42 lost in air-air combat. As such direct comparison is difficult because of different breakdowns but differences is substantial. Add to that the fact Israelis were always reluctant to admit loos in air-air combat, preferring to assign loss to "ground fire" and were on the other hand quick to claim victory in turn. So I suppose which numbers to believe is up to reader, Israelis are nominally more open about it but wrap everything in layers propaganda, justifications and outright fabrications. Arabs on the other hand have kept their archives closed, with Egypt being only one that is somewhat open. And in turn they promote their own propaganda, justifications and outright fabrications. So there is no absolute, neutral truth and every source on either side needs to be treated with caution and not taken at face value.
September 23, 2024
The Six-Day War started on June 5, 1967 with the most successful surprise attack in the history of warfare. Within the first fifteen minutes of the war, the Israelis destroyed half the Egyptian air force on the ground. Within a few hours, they had eliminated the rest, and then methodically did the same to Syria and Jordan. By the end of the day, Israel was the only combatant with any air power left.
This book describes that day in more or less total detail, plane by plane, minute by minute. This might be of historical value, but I didn't find it especially readable. However, the introductory chapters gave me a much better understanding of the planning context. Aloni makes Focus seem natural and logical, rather than some brilliant master plan.
Many accounts of the war (including Oren's) make it sound like this was a planned attack, specifically as part of the war strategy. It wasn't. Since basically the foundation of the Israeli Air Force, the national strategic doctrine had been to seize air superiority straightaway, and the simplest way to do that was to destroy the enemy's bases and planes on the ground. So the IAF had been planning and practicing for airbase attacks for years and had prepared to do this to all their potential enemies. The Israelis also understood that fast turnaround time would make up for limited numbers, and so they had emphasized that. And they had built a command-and-control setup so that they could, on a timescale of minutes, assign planes to targets. And they understood that flying low, in radio silence, would impair enemy reaction.
Focus wasn't so much a detailed plan as a standing doctrine and a set of tactics meant to facilitate it. Some accounts suggest that the Israelis carefully timed their attack to land after the Egyptian dawn patrols landed. Aloni offers a different version -- the Israelis wanted to start as early as they could, but needed daylight to marshal and launch their strike in radio silence, and also wanted to avoid a natural "clock" time.
There wasn't some detailed plan for the whole day's air operations, nor was any of this planned in detail long in advance. It couldn't have been, since the Israelis couldn't have known in advance exactly how many planes were flyable that day. In the week or two before the start of the war, they formulated a plan for the first wave of strikes, basically just "some attackers for every nearby Egyptian base, matching up attack squadrons to bases in their range envelope." And then onwards, they relied on battle damage assessment to pick targets, and sent out the next waves of planes as they were ready.
This book describes that day in more or less total detail, plane by plane, minute by minute. This might be of historical value, but I didn't find it especially readable. However, the introductory chapters gave me a much better understanding of the planning context. Aloni makes Focus seem natural and logical, rather than some brilliant master plan.
Many accounts of the war (including Oren's) make it sound like this was a planned attack, specifically as part of the war strategy. It wasn't. Since basically the foundation of the Israeli Air Force, the national strategic doctrine had been to seize air superiority straightaway, and the simplest way to do that was to destroy the enemy's bases and planes on the ground. So the IAF had been planning and practicing for airbase attacks for years and had prepared to do this to all their potential enemies. The Israelis also understood that fast turnaround time would make up for limited numbers, and so they had emphasized that. And they had built a command-and-control setup so that they could, on a timescale of minutes, assign planes to targets. And they understood that flying low, in radio silence, would impair enemy reaction.
Focus wasn't so much a detailed plan as a standing doctrine and a set of tactics meant to facilitate it. Some accounts suggest that the Israelis carefully timed their attack to land after the Egyptian dawn patrols landed. Aloni offers a different version -- the Israelis wanted to start as early as they could, but needed daylight to marshal and launch their strike in radio silence, and also wanted to avoid a natural "clock" time.
There wasn't some detailed plan for the whole day's air operations, nor was any of this planned in detail long in advance. It couldn't have been, since the Israelis couldn't have known in advance exactly how many planes were flyable that day. In the week or two before the start of the war, they formulated a plan for the first wave of strikes, basically just "some attackers for every nearby Egyptian base, matching up attack squadrons to bases in their range envelope." And then onwards, they relied on battle damage assessment to pick targets, and sent out the next waves of planes as they were ready.
February 16, 2020
Very detailed!
Almost all the information presented is from the IDF’s claims and reports so there are no counter-reports to provide a comprehensive overview of actual events. Nevertheless, Shlomo does a great job with presenting, in meticulous detail, the brilliant planning and execution of the Israeli Air Force’s attack on the EAF which sealed the fate of the whole war in the morning hours of the first day’s attack. For those who are intrigued by the meticulous strategy and planning which led to arguably the most successful air campaign in modern warfare, this is a great read.
Almost all the information presented is from the IDF’s claims and reports so there are no counter-reports to provide a comprehensive overview of actual events. Nevertheless, Shlomo does a great job with presenting, in meticulous detail, the brilliant planning and execution of the Israeli Air Force’s attack on the EAF which sealed the fate of the whole war in the morning hours of the first day’s attack. For those who are intrigued by the meticulous strategy and planning which led to arguably the most successful air campaign in modern warfare, this is a great read.
July 19, 2019
Excellent summation of IAF Operations on the first day of the Six-Day War, but for me it was a little impersonal, and a little too much pure statistics. Others may like that, but I wish there had been more pilot interviews/reports and experiences. Also in the last, summary chapter it was all hardware... there was nothing on personnel losses (on either side). But overall, enjoyable, well written and very informative.
January 17, 2020
Good first hand account of the Six day war, focusing on the air campaign, this one in particular was a milestone, this was the first time that the elite of the elite, fought a vicious battle against A numerical superior foe. It shows the new tactics in the making, the brave accounts of the pilots who in the end, enter the history as the enablers of the total victory on that war. Excellent and concise way to deliver the story. As always with Osprey, excellent booklet.
July 7, 2021
My initial response to this series when Osprey introduced it was to wonder if it was really necessary, considering all the other series that the firm publishes. However, "Air Campaign" has developed into something quite impressive and this is one of the better booklets to come out, as it really advanced my knowledge of the Israeli side of the opening of the Six Day War. As for the Arab experience, we may well never know just what was going on, particularly from a personal perspective.
April 3, 2021
Good read
This is a very good read on the first day air campaign of the six day war o f 1967 , I found it well balanced between what can sometimes be just a long list of air attacks / missions and the personal recollection of persons involved in the actual campaign.
This is a very good read on the first day air campaign of the six day war o f 1967 , I found it well balanced between what can sometimes be just a long list of air attacks / missions and the personal recollection of persons involved in the actual campaign.
May 22, 2022
Very technical and detailed description of the six day war.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews