“In December 1918, President Wilson arrived in France to guide the Paris Peace Conference. He and the first lady visited a US Army hospital in Paris; they passed through the wards, shaking hands and expressing thanks and concern to the wounded. When leaving, Wilson asked if he’d been shown everything. Everything but the jaw ward, he was told. What’s that? the president asked. It was the ward where men who’d been disfigured were treated. The wounds were so ghastly that nurses there had shorter shifts than anywhere else: faces mutilated by shrapnel, mouths exploded by bullets – men who had to be fed gruel, raw eggs, or gravy through tubes placed directly into their exposed throats or nostrils. Wilson and Edith entered and went down the line, stoically greeting the men, commiserating, and conveying the thanks of the nation. When the president emerged from the ward, he was, a witness recalled, ‘white as death and his hands trembled. He appeared to stagger. A look of suffering was on his face and he seemed completely crushed.’ The commander in chief had come face-to-face with a small part of what the Doughs had seen at the front every day…”
- Geoffrey Wawro, Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World War I
In 1918, Germany seemed poised to win the First World War. She occupied vast swaths of Belgium and France, to the extent that some French villages had changed the names of streets and shops to reflect the German language. Recently, Germany had knocked the Russian Empire out of the war, freeing hundreds of thousands of new troops for action on the Western Front. Meanwhile, the Allies were facing an acute manpower shortage. Great Britain was lowering its troop levels, while France was scraping the bottom of the barrel, gathering up the very old and very young. On top of that, the French Army had dealt with a mutiny, a keen indicator that morale could not get much worse.
Responding to these conditions, General Erich Ludendorff unleashed a series of five offensives, pushing massive bulges into the Allied lines, and coming within a stone’s throw of Paris itself.
These offensives turned out to be the German high tide. Within a few months of making them, the German Army would be in retreat, the Kaiser would abdicate and flee, and an armistice would be signed, halting four years of barbed wire entanglements, endless trench lines, poison gas, and industrialized slaughter.
To General Douglas Haig, commander of the British Expeditionary Force, this abrupt turnaround was a “miracle.” Author-historian Geoffrey Wawro disagrees. As he argues in Sons of Freedom, if there was any divine intervention, it came in the form of one-million American soldiers flung hastily – sometimes disastrously – into battle.
Despite a somewhat simplistic and chest-thumping title (which Wawro credits to an editor), Sons of Freedom is a brutally honest account of America’s performance in the First World War, methodically recounting the shortcomings and failures, as well as the victories. It is earnest, engrossing, and both learned and accessible.
At over 500 pages of text, Sons of Freedom has some serious heft to it. Due to excellent structuring and fine pacing, however, you never feel that length. Every page is worthwhile.
Wawro begins with a fascinating discussion of America’s controversial entry into the war. He shows how Great Britain used its naval might to keep the United States from trading with the Central Powers, essentially abrogating America’s neutrality (which during the Napoleonic Wars, led to the War of 1812). American industrialists and farmers willingly accepted this, as both Great Britain and France made huge purchases of arms and food, ultimately causing massive disruptions to the economy of the United States. Wawro notes that French military intelligence believed that the U.S. would intervene simply to stabilize the economy. Of course, when President Woodrow Wilson – who had won a hotly-contested second term by promising to avoid war – eventually asked Congress for a declaration to begin hostilities, he framed the enterprise in wholly idealistic terms (leading, I suppose, to the appellation Sons of Freedom).
With the Allies on the verge of being demolished by Germany, the United States had to essentially form an army from scratch. Though it is hard to imagine now – with America’s vast, expensive military machine – the Regular U.S. Army of 1917 was tiny and underfunded, supplemented by National Guard units that were woefully deficient (and used by state governors for patronage). Eventually, the Regulars and certain Guard units formed the nucleus of the American Expeditionary Force, which was backed by a huge, poorly-trained, poorly-equipped National Army (four million men would be put under arms, though only one million made it to Europe).
These forces were led by General John “Black Jack” Pershing, who spent as much time fighting with Great Britain and France as he did the Germans. With the Allies clamoring to absorb the U.S. troops into their own armies, Pershing had to work hard to maintain American force independence. For all Pershing’s qualities, Wawro is very critical of his tactical acumen, his campaigns resembling the frontal assaults of 1914 (or, for that matter, 1864). Moreover, his personality certainly did nothing to smooth interallied relations, as Georges Clemenceau and General Ferdinand Foch tried desperately to get him fired. If nothing else, Pershing’s questionable performance makes one realize just how effective and important Dwight D. Eisenhower was in World War II.
As to the American forces themselves, Wawro is much more sanguine. With some exceptions, the men were not especially effective, their officers were amateurish, and thousands of them were – to use the parlance of the day – “skulkers” who simply wandered away from their units to avoid battle.
But by and large they were brave.
Thrown into the fire at places like Belleau Wood and the Meuse-Argonne, they made desperate assaults heedless of devastating casualties. Again, it’s strange to think about this now, since the modern American way of war is based on light footprints and high technology. In 1918, however, the U.S. soldier was borrowing his artillery from the Allies, and had to rely on his guts and perseverance to smash through German lines that had been perfected over the course of the war.
Wawro’s thesis that America “won” the war for the Allies is passionately argued, though it is not entirely convincing. The Allies, after all, had been bleeding Germany for years. Nonetheless, they certainly tipped the scales in terms of manpower (and forced Ludendorff to make some hasty moves to win before the Americans arrived). Furthermore, the historiography of Great Britain and France – who cared far more about the war than Americans, and lost far more – has vastly underplayed America’s vital contributions, and not simply in terms of money (though that is pretty damn vital itself). Wawro’s book is an important corrective to that narrative. Still, it was a complex combination of things that led to Germany’s collapse, not the least of which was the nascent socialist revolutions erupting in the cities.
Like the Napoleonic Wars – which were also fought on a global stage, owing to the participants’ colonial empires – the First World War was a Eurocentric affair, fought for territorial acquisitions, border adjustments, and hegemony on the continent. Over a hundred years later, it is hard not to see America as a cat’s paw of Great Britain and France, drawn into a fight that was arguably none of their business. This is really evident in the Treaty of Versailles, in which the Allies rearranged the pieces of various fallen empires – Austro-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottomans – to suit their own ends, while rolling their eyes at President Wilson’s ephemeral demands.
The irony, of course, is that in propping up their own faltering dominions, Great Britain and France set the stage for a more cataclysmic struggle down the road (a war that a shocking number of contemporaries accurately predicted). More than that, by maneuvering America into their widespread war of local interest, Great Britain and France created the conditions for the United States to emerge – however briefly – as the greatest power in the world.