In 1899 Great Britain was at the pinnacle of its Imperial power. Yet the British army was destined to be defeated by a citizen militia composed of South African frontier farmers - the Boers. In one week in December 1899 the farmers of the South African Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal inflicted three serious reverses on British troops. This book sets the battles in context and explains the failure of a professional army, skilled in the fighting techniques of the nineteenth century, when faced with an enemy whose weapons and tactics foreshadowed the warfare of the twentieth. In 1899 Great Britain was at the height of its Imperial power. The Queen Empress had been on the throne for more than 50 glittering years, and her domain touched upon every continent. Yet, even at this very pinnacle of Imperial pomp and majesty, the British army, the guardian of Empire in countless wars across the globe, was destined to be humiliated by poorly-organised citizen militia consisting of men whom the British professionals despised as back-wood farmers. In one week in December 1899 the farmers of the South African Boer Republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal inflicted three serious reverses on British troops. In the hills around Stormberg railway junction, on the dusty plain before the Magersfontein heights, and on the grassy flats before the Thukela heights at Colenso, the highly trained British military machine ground to a halt in the face of the Boers' practised marksmanship and nineteenth century techniques met twentieth century tactics and firepower ending in blood-baths for the British forces. In this book, Ian Knight examines the opening stages of the Natal campaign, the battle of Colenso and the battle of Spioenkop.
Ian Knight, BA, FRGS is a historian, author, battlefield guide and artifacts specialist internationally regarded as a leading authority on the nineteenth-century history of the Zulu kingdom, and in particular the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. He has a degree in Afro-Caribbean Studies from the University of Kent and has been researching and writing for more than thirty years. He has published over forty books and monographs, the majority of them on Zulu history and the rest on other nineteenth-century British colonial campaigns. He has appeared on-screen in a number of television documentaries. He is an Honorary Research Associate of the KwaZulu-Natal Museum in Pietermaritzburg.
Though the title of Ian Knight’s book refers to one of the defining battles of the second Boer War, it is its subtitle that gives the reader a better understanding of its focus. Knight uses the battle as the centerpiece of a description of the Natal campaign waged by Sir Redvers Buller at the start of the Boer War. In just a few dozen pages, he summarizes with admirable efficiency the context of the war, the events that led to its outbreak, and the emerging situation that Buller faced in Natal upon his arrival in South Africa with his troops. Doing so explains how the newly appointed commander of British forces found himself mounting a relief expedition to save British forces unnecessarily trapped in Ladysmith by the Boers.
Knight’s focus is not confined to the British, however, as he also includes the Boers’ perspective as well. He shows how the same rugged individualism that made them such fearsome fighters on the battlefield also constrained Boer operations, as it limited their ability to maintain an offensive that might have won for them the negotiated peace that their leaders sought. Nevertheless, the tactics practiced by their commandos proved a foreshadowing of the warfare soldiers would face in the next century. As the British discovered at Colenso to their cost, their traditional close-order formations provided easy targets for the long-range Mauser rifles of the Boer marksmen, resulting in unexpectedly high casualties for little gain. While critical of Buller’s caution, Knight points out that nobody else on the British side had anticipated this situation, and the general adapted to it over the course of the campaign. When coupled with the overwhelming numbers deployed by the British, it proved enough eventually to break through the Boer defenses and relieve Ladysmith.
As Knight acknowledges, the war was decided not in Natal, but by the campaigns further west. Yet thanks to its timing the British defeat at Colenso was combined with the Boer victories at Stormberg and Magersfontein to become part of the infamous “black week” symbolizing the imperial crisis that their empire faced. This exaggerated what the author characterizes as more of a bloody check of Buller’s campaign than a fatal setback for his operations. Despite this, his defeat was enough to cost Buller his command, and to turn the battle into an enduring metaphor for Britain’s military failings. Knight’s book is an efficient account of it, one that is abundantly illustrated with photos and three-dimensional maps of the battles. While it suffers from the poor editing that is unfortunately characteristic of Osprey titles, the flaws are too minor to detract from what is a clearly presented and highly useful account of one of the most famous campaigns in British imperial history.