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Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them
Conspiracy theories are inevitable in complex human societies. And while they have always been with us, their ubiquity in our political discourse is nearly unprecedented. Their salience has increased for a variety of reasons including the increasing access to information among ordinary people, a pervasive sense of powerlessness among those same people, and a widespread distrust of elites. Working in combination, these factors and many other factors are now propelling conspiracy theories into our public sphere on a vast scale. In recent years, scholars have begun to study this genuinely important phenomenon in a concerted way. In Conspiracy Theories and the People Who Believe Them, Joseph E. Uscinski has gathered forty top researchers on the topic to provide both the foundational tools and the evidence to better understand conspiracy theories in the United States and around the world. Each chapter is informed by three core questions: Why do so many people believe in conspiracy theories? What are the effects of such theories when they take hold in the public? What can or should be done about the phenomenon? Combining systematic analysis and cutting-edge empirical research, this volume will help us better understand an extremely important, yet relatively neglected, phenomenon.
536 pages, Hardcover
First published October 16, 2018
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
October 24, 2020
Guess I'm the first one to review this book. I read this rather long essay volume because I wanted a better understanding of the phenomenon of CT because of the election and stuff. Uscinski seems to have based this volume on a large conference he put together. It seems like he wanted to get the whole conference to publish in this volume, which makes it a bit overstuffed. I have some problems with a lot of the essays, but overall the editor did a strong job soliciting a broad range of fairly short essays. I'll definitely pull from this volume in the future for research purposes.
CT in the sub-field of the study of CT are defined quite literally: they are theories (explanations for something about the world) about conspiracies (as in, the thing we are trying to explain is driven by or caused by a secretive but powerful group acting on the world and trying to mask their influence). This book had some themes that kept popping up. Probably the most valuable is that researchers shouldn't assume that CTs are wrong when they start their research. They may usually be wrong, but a presumption of guilt, so to speak, creates enormous potential to bias the research. I tend to agree. Furthermore, the authors here create a sort of psychological profile for CT-ists: they are usually "losers," as Uscinski puts it, often alienated from power and mainstream politics, usually distrustful of the powerful, often resentful or fearful of rival groups, often scoring high on the authoritarian personality scale, often of lower educational level and therefore more susceptible to simplistic explanations that play loosely with evidence. There's an overlap between CT and mental illness, but given that so many people believe in at least one CT, the authors rightly warn against fully pathologizing CT. People in societies that have undergone enormous strains or crises often seize upon CT to both protest authority and try to understand the world around them. There are some excellent essays in here about CT in places like Russia or Poland where they are used to demonize hated insiders or outsiders and to deflect blame for problems and crises. CT is also a pretty bipartisan phenomenon, as members of both parties express belief in CT at roughly the same rates (of course, the authors could have acknowledged that only 1 party has made a conspiracy theorist its chief representative; there's a broader story about institutional filters here that should be explored).
These are all valuable finds, but I did have a few beefs with the book. First, the overlap between essays is often annoying; a more curated set would have been more valuable and readable (this book is 500+ pages). Second, this is heavily social-science oriented, so a good half of the essays are very dry. Third, I had a big problem with what might be called the "critical approach" to CT. A good number of scholars in here seem to believe that CT are actually a good thing because they are a weapon of the weak, a way for the poor and marginalized to de-legitimize oppressive structures and discourses. They add that, in many cases, CT turn out to be true or partially true: Watergate, Iran Contra, even the idea of CIA support for drug smuggling in partially true when it comes to Latin American right wing insurgencies and stuff.
Nonetheless, I thought this argument was wrong-headed for a number of reasons. CT may be, in part, a cry of the oppressed, but they are not rational attempts to understand the world or understand and solve one's own oppression. As several essays in this volume show, CT can just as easily, and usually more effectively, be used by the powerful themselves to distract, divide, and stupify (as in make stupid) the people (Putin's Russia is the perfect example of this. CT thinking is not clear thinking, not a rational method of inquiry; instead, they begin from the premise of conspiracy and reason a priori to prove that goal, manipulating and/or ignoring evidence and expertise on the way. CTs empower the extremes of politics and foment hatred of weaker groups; African-Americans, for instance, may use CT about the government starting the crack epidemic to protest their marginalization, but they have more often been marginalized and victimized by CT, from the fear of slave rebellions to the fear of black sexual abuse of white women to Trump's birther conspiracy. These authors too often ignore that anyone can use CT, and when the powerful use it, it becomes more damaging to the already marginalized.
CT is not a sign of a healthy, skeptical democracy; it is a sign of paranoia, poor education, diseased and distorted thinking, hatred and distrust. In short, skepticism is good for the body politic, but CT is a perverted form of skepticism, a non-skeptical skepticism that is itself impervious to evidence. After all, the thing that most strongly predicts CT belief is prior CT belief: if you believe one or two you probably believe 9 or 10, making it a habit of mind rather than a method of inquiry in any scientific sense. I'd like to ask some of this scholars who are so sympathetic to CT: should there be more of it in America, or less? CT has already taken over 1 party, should it control both? Would that make our politics more functional, reasonable, and kind? I think the answer is obvious. To me, this argument (only a handful of the authors in this volume actually make this argument) reflects the poverty of critical theory, which tends to think anything that can be used to disrupt or undermine a discourse or power structure must be a good thing as long as it is used from below, not from above. The embrace of clearly harmful CT by some of these scholars reflects that problem with this overall field/method.
CT, in short, should be studied objectively but morally and politically marginalized and delegitimized. That doesn't mean, however, we just write off the all the people who believe them as crazy. CT is too widespread a phenomenon to do that. Instead, promoting transparency, procedural justice, and sound analytical thinking skills are the best ways to insulate people against this perversion of rational though.
CT in the sub-field of the study of CT are defined quite literally: they are theories (explanations for something about the world) about conspiracies (as in, the thing we are trying to explain is driven by or caused by a secretive but powerful group acting on the world and trying to mask their influence). This book had some themes that kept popping up. Probably the most valuable is that researchers shouldn't assume that CTs are wrong when they start their research. They may usually be wrong, but a presumption of guilt, so to speak, creates enormous potential to bias the research. I tend to agree. Furthermore, the authors here create a sort of psychological profile for CT-ists: they are usually "losers," as Uscinski puts it, often alienated from power and mainstream politics, usually distrustful of the powerful, often resentful or fearful of rival groups, often scoring high on the authoritarian personality scale, often of lower educational level and therefore more susceptible to simplistic explanations that play loosely with evidence. There's an overlap between CT and mental illness, but given that so many people believe in at least one CT, the authors rightly warn against fully pathologizing CT. People in societies that have undergone enormous strains or crises often seize upon CT to both protest authority and try to understand the world around them. There are some excellent essays in here about CT in places like Russia or Poland where they are used to demonize hated insiders or outsiders and to deflect blame for problems and crises. CT is also a pretty bipartisan phenomenon, as members of both parties express belief in CT at roughly the same rates (of course, the authors could have acknowledged that only 1 party has made a conspiracy theorist its chief representative; there's a broader story about institutional filters here that should be explored).
These are all valuable finds, but I did have a few beefs with the book. First, the overlap between essays is often annoying; a more curated set would have been more valuable and readable (this book is 500+ pages). Second, this is heavily social-science oriented, so a good half of the essays are very dry. Third, I had a big problem with what might be called the "critical approach" to CT. A good number of scholars in here seem to believe that CT are actually a good thing because they are a weapon of the weak, a way for the poor and marginalized to de-legitimize oppressive structures and discourses. They add that, in many cases, CT turn out to be true or partially true: Watergate, Iran Contra, even the idea of CIA support for drug smuggling in partially true when it comes to Latin American right wing insurgencies and stuff.
Nonetheless, I thought this argument was wrong-headed for a number of reasons. CT may be, in part, a cry of the oppressed, but they are not rational attempts to understand the world or understand and solve one's own oppression. As several essays in this volume show, CT can just as easily, and usually more effectively, be used by the powerful themselves to distract, divide, and stupify (as in make stupid) the people (Putin's Russia is the perfect example of this. CT thinking is not clear thinking, not a rational method of inquiry; instead, they begin from the premise of conspiracy and reason a priori to prove that goal, manipulating and/or ignoring evidence and expertise on the way. CTs empower the extremes of politics and foment hatred of weaker groups; African-Americans, for instance, may use CT about the government starting the crack epidemic to protest their marginalization, but they have more often been marginalized and victimized by CT, from the fear of slave rebellions to the fear of black sexual abuse of white women to Trump's birther conspiracy. These authors too often ignore that anyone can use CT, and when the powerful use it, it becomes more damaging to the already marginalized.
CT is not a sign of a healthy, skeptical democracy; it is a sign of paranoia, poor education, diseased and distorted thinking, hatred and distrust. In short, skepticism is good for the body politic, but CT is a perverted form of skepticism, a non-skeptical skepticism that is itself impervious to evidence. After all, the thing that most strongly predicts CT belief is prior CT belief: if you believe one or two you probably believe 9 or 10, making it a habit of mind rather than a method of inquiry in any scientific sense. I'd like to ask some of this scholars who are so sympathetic to CT: should there be more of it in America, or less? CT has already taken over 1 party, should it control both? Would that make our politics more functional, reasonable, and kind? I think the answer is obvious. To me, this argument (only a handful of the authors in this volume actually make this argument) reflects the poverty of critical theory, which tends to think anything that can be used to disrupt or undermine a discourse or power structure must be a good thing as long as it is used from below, not from above. The embrace of clearly harmful CT by some of these scholars reflects that problem with this overall field/method.
CT, in short, should be studied objectively but morally and politically marginalized and delegitimized. That doesn't mean, however, we just write off the all the people who believe them as crazy. CT is too widespread a phenomenon to do that. Instead, promoting transparency, procedural justice, and sound analytical thinking skills are the best ways to insulate people against this perversion of rational though.
March 14, 2022
There are many interesting things in this very long book but one thing that bothered me was the casual definition of conspiracy theories. Comparing Bernie Sanders' rhetoric about the rich and powerful rigging the economy with Trump's insane conspiracy theories and on top of that drawing a parallel with the conspiracy theories in Nazi Germany regarding Jews diluted the definition of conspiracy theories to the point of meaninglessness.
If the rich and powerful do not control the world, then who does? Control in Bernie Sanders' rhetoric does not imply a secret society of any sort. Control is a product of concentrated wealth and power and those who have control use it to their own benefit. No great conspiracy is needed. The process is rather transparent.
If the rich and powerful do not control the world, then who does? Control in Bernie Sanders' rhetoric does not imply a secret society of any sort. Control is a product of concentrated wealth and power and those who have control use it to their own benefit. No great conspiracy is needed. The process is rather transparent.
April 18, 2024
An all around excellent selection of essays charging from many different directions. There are cold scientists, treating the history of what humanity has believed and believes in today like a laboratory experiement they remain detached from. The authors of this stripe tend ro be boring writers. They discuss gathered data, and test scores, and reports, and do all the responsible academic things one should do to justify their argument. Only . . .
Most of the essays offer a great deal more human understanding, discussing circumstances of belief, and the varieties and perversions that can invade people's minds. While some are deep psychological studies, others focus on group dynamics, rumors, and the influence of the press, television, and social media. There are even suggestions at the end on how to rationalize civilization, but they are the weakest pieces.
A few wonderful essays are here, notably by Kathryn Olmstead, Karen Douglas, and Steven Smallpage, and in particular an exciting and very entertaining autobiographic essay by Stephan Lewandowsky. Definately worth your time if you can stomach some of the dreary academic assertions here and there, more interested in pointing out their judicious presentation than offering anything about how people perceive the world.
Most of the essays offer a great deal more human understanding, discussing circumstances of belief, and the varieties and perversions that can invade people's minds. While some are deep psychological studies, others focus on group dynamics, rumors, and the influence of the press, television, and social media. There are even suggestions at the end on how to rationalize civilization, but they are the weakest pieces.
A few wonderful essays are here, notably by Kathryn Olmstead, Karen Douglas, and Steven Smallpage, and in particular an exciting and very entertaining autobiographic essay by Stephan Lewandowsky. Definately worth your time if you can stomach some of the dreary academic assertions here and there, more interested in pointing out their judicious presentation than offering anything about how people perceive the world.
July 21, 2023
This is a very interesting collection of academic papers dealing with conspiratorial thinking and discourse in society. It is multi-disciplinary and thus topic is seen from various angles, with many of the contributors taking different positions from each other. I found a good deal of the papers to have useful information, demonstrating how this type of discourse has been a long staple in public discussion and permeates all social classes and political leanings.
The biggest drawback to the papers is that almost all of the authors take an "objective" value-neutral tone to the topic which obfuscates both the degrees of truth and political impacts that these lines of inquiry have on social imagination and material consequences.
The biggest drawback to the papers is that almost all of the authors take an "objective" value-neutral tone to the topic which obfuscates both the degrees of truth and political impacts that these lines of inquiry have on social imagination and material consequences.
December 30, 2022
I read this book because I see it and essays in it cited often, and I've been doing research on conspiracy theories as a central aspect of right-wing populist politics. While many of the essays are interesting, the editor implies that any analysis of political inequality is the same thing as "conspiracy theory" such that the only person who isn't a conspiracy theorist is one who just trusts experts and political authorities. For example, critiques of corporate American *can* be conspiratorial in nature but the statement that corporations influence politics is not an indication that one believes in a conspiracy theory.
August 5, 2025
Plants don’t flourish when we pull them up too often to check how their roots are growing: political, institutional and professional life too may not flourish if we constantly uproot it to demonstrate that everything is transparent and trustworthy.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews