The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871

by Geoffrey Wawro

The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 violently changed the course of European History. Alarmed by Bismarck's territorial ambitions and the Prussian army's crushing defeats of Denmark in 1864 and Austria in 1866, French Emperor Napoleon III vowed to bring Prussia to heel. Digging into many European and American archives for the first time, Geoffrey Wawro's Franco-Prussian War describes the war that followed in thrilling detail. While the armies mobilized in July 1870, the conflict appeared "too close to call." Prussia and its German allies had twice as many troops as the French. But Marshal Achille Bazaine's grognards ("old grumblers") were the stuff of legend, the most resourceful, battle-hardened, sharp-shooting troops in Europe, and they carried the best rifle in the world. From the political intrigues that began and ended the war to the bloody battles at Gravelotte and Sedan and the last murderous fights on the Loire and in Paris, this is the definitive history of the Franco-Prussian War. Dr. Geoffrey Wawro is Professor of Strategic Studies at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Wawro has published two The Austro-Prussian War (Cambridge, 1996) and Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792-1914 (Routledge, 2000). He has published articles in The Journal of Military History, War in History, The International History Review, The Naval War College Review, American Scholar, and the European History Quarterly, and op-eds in the Los Angeles Times, New York Post, Miami Herald, Hartford Courant, and Providence Journal. Wawro has won several academic prizes including the Austrian Cultural Institute Prize and the Society for Military History Moncado Prize for Excellence in the Writing of Military History. He has lectured widely on military innovation and international security in Europe, the U.S., and Canada and is host of the History Channel program Hardcover History--a weekly book show with leading historians, pundits, critics, statesmen and journalists.

Genres: History, Military History, European History, France, Nonfiction, War, Germany

346 pages, Paperback

First published August 25, 2003

About the author

Geoffrey Wawro is the General Olinto Mark Barsanti Professor of Military History at the University of North Texas, and Director of the UNT Military History Center. His primary area of emphasis is modern and contemporary military history, from the French Revolution to the present.

Reviews

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

“Once the Germans began firing, the French could find no cover anywhere. They were hit with a storm of shells whistling in from an arc of ninety degrees. A hill might shield French soldiers from shells fired from one direction, but they lay naked to projectiles smashing in from other angles. Worse, shellfire burst among the trees, adding jagged splinters to the shrapnel and shell fragments tearing into French units. The one-sided bombardment exhilarated the German gunners, who drove in for the kill against no resistance. For their helpless French targets, who watched the German gun flashes draw closer and closer, the sights, sounds, and shocks of this artillery massacre became a horror beyond description. With six-pound shells bursting in their midst, the French troops dissolved in a great sauve qui peut headed for Sedan. There men tumbled into the ditches and frantically tried to climb the walls of the fortress…”
- Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871

In my opinion, the most rewarding thing about studying history is that there is always a brand new story waiting to be discovered. Even if you devoted your entire life to exploring all the major events since the dawn of humanity, you could only cover a fraction. Everywhere you turn, there’s something you don’t know, and that’s exciting. At least, it’s exciting to me. When I tried to impress that nugget on my kids at dinner, they all looked down, squirmed awkwardly, and asked to be excused.

I thought about that as I finished Geoffrey Wawro’s thoroughly engaging The Franco Prussian War. This is a conflict that I had heard about in passing, mainly in my readings about World War I. Aside from its mere existence, though, I knew very little else. This book – a rather slim 314 pages of text – provided a wonderful crash course.

Fought over a period of only six months, and started over a ridiculous squabble between Napoleon III of France, and Chancellor Otto von Bismarck of the North German Confederation, the Franco-Prussian War was nevertheless quite impactful in terms of both European and world history. By the time it concluded, over 180,000 men had been killed, around 230,000 had been wounded, the French Second Empire had fallen, the Third Republic had risen, and the various German kingdoms – spearheaded by militaristic Prussia – finally joined together to form the German Empire. While this did not directly cause the First World War, it certainly helped set the table, causing France to lose face, along with Alsace and Lorraine, and turning the German Empire into a massively powerful continental force, which had learned an unfortunate lesson about getting what they wanted by invading their croissant-loving neighbor.

For a newcomer to this subject, I don’t think I could have picked a better book. While Wawro is not trying to present this as a Franco-Prussian War for Dummies, he approaches things methodically. The first chapter, for instance, is titled “Causes of the Franco-Prussian War,” and distills the tension between Kaiser Wilhelm I, Bismarck, and their hopes for a fully unified Germany on the one hand, and Napoleon III, who was hoping to keep certain kingdoms, such as the Kingdom of Bavaria (which had actually fought the Prussians in the Austro-Prussian War) out of Bismarck’s clutches. Just as helpfully, the following chapter is called “The Armies in 1870,” and compares the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces. France had their veteran “Old Grumblers” and the chassepot bolt action rifle, but were led by leaders by turns hapless and traitorous, and had a reserve system filled with men who didn’t want to fight. Germany’s small arms were not nearly as good, but they had Krupp-manufactured breechloading cannon, an effective reserve system, and were led by General Helmuth von Moltke, who besides being good with an epigram, had a sound overall strategic plan (at least a better plan that von Moltke’s nephew took to war in 1914).

While these chapter headings sound pedantic, I can assure you, this is an enjoyable read. Wawro is serious about his research – as well as structuring it in a clear manner – but he also has a dry wit, an ability to get to the essence of a general’s character, and is very good with the battle narratives, combining complex tactical maneuvers with solid descriptions and first-person accounts. The maps are not all that I would have hoped for – they never are – but there are enough of them placed throughout The Franco-Prussian War that I was able to follow along quite well.

My only real criticism of The Franco-Prussian War is that while the first two-thirds are very detailed, with the major battles each receiving their own chapters, the final third feels like a summary that left my head spinning. In this rush to the finish, certain momentous scenes get shortchanged. For example, the crowning of Wilhelm I as Kaiser of the German Empire in Versailles’s Hall of Mirrors is reduced to a single paragraph. Extremely bloody clashes, which earlier in the book had received maps and detailed descriptions, are dispensed with brisk and superficial explanations.

Despite the weakness in Wawro’s endgame, I left extremely satisfied. When you venture into a somewhat obscure corner like the Franco-Prussian War, sometimes the best that you can hope for is a book with grammatically sound sentences. I was thus happily surprised to be both educated and entertained. More than that, the education came from a guy who knows his business. Don’t let the television-friendly looks or the fact that Wawro was host of numerous programs on The History Channel fool you: he is a history nerd with a very specific niche. Obviously, as I’ve admitted, I barely know what I’m talking about when it comes to this conflict, but Wawro’s judgments seem nuanced and sound.

The outcome of the Franco-Prussian War did not make anything afterwards an inevitability. Still, it tended to make certain things more probable. This was due to a couple circumstances. For one, Prussian military influence in the new German Empire would play an outsized role in the years to come. For another, it created a brand new player in the endless game of European blood-chess. As we all know, that new player would find itself facing a deadlier, higher-stakes rematch forty-three years later.

[Nooilforpacifists · Rating 4 out of 5]

About 2/3 about the battles themselves; the remaining, and more interesting, about the politics and strategy. The French should have won: they had interior lines, they had a far superior rifle, the Chassepot. But they had neither battle plans nor maps, and a purely defensive strategy: they declared war on Prussia, dug trenches and waited to be attacked. Prussia won with accurate Krupp artillery, skirmishers that enveloped French positions--and stoic willingness to accept casualties. Had the French counter-attacked. . . but the French generalship was awful, and (without Prussia's universal conscription) France had fewer troops.

Paris, encircled, was a mess: Bonapartists battling Republicans instead of uniting behind the war effort: "Hence the reactionaries say 'mieux les Prussiens que la Republique' - 'better the Prussians than the Republic.'"

One French army fled South to neutral Switzerland, saying "Better the Swiss than the Prussians."

Negotiating the peace treaty: "The chancellor never let up and when [provisional French President] Thiers refused to cede Belfort in addition to Strasbourg and Metz, Bismarck threatened a resumption of the war. After consulting with the king and Moltke, Bismarck relented on Belfort in exchange for a gloating victory parade through Paris in March by 30,000 German troops."

After the war, all the great powers emulated Prussian tactics, General Staff, etc., the result of which was mutual slaughter in WW1.

[Mac McCormick III · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Franco-Prussian War is one little read about, less often written about, and frequently forgotten. In fact, many Americans may not have even heard of it. This is unfortunate because along with other wars such as the Crimean War and American Civil War, it was a war in which modern technology met old tactics and foreshadowed the death and destruction of World War I. Like the Crimean War, it also helped set the stage for World War I. During this centennial of World War I, I have been looking for books to read on the war and it occurred to me that reading about wars that helped set the stage for it would be just as important as reading books about World War I itself. Along those lines, I just finished reading The Franco-Prussian War by Geoffrey Wawro.

The war was a brief war but important one and to ignore the origins and the after effects of the war would have been a mistake. The Franco-Prussian War can be divided into three sections, one on what brought the war about, another composed of 2/3 of the book on the fighting, and a final section on the aftermath of the war and its after effects. Each section explores both the military and political/foreign policy aspects of the war.

In the lead up to the war, Wawro explains how politics and foreign policy brought France and Germany to war and discusses the military readiness of both countries as well as the states of the armies and schools of thought on tactics and strategy. The contrast between the German Army and the French Army was stark. The Germans, under Prussian leadership, had a modern, forward thinking military that emphasized initiative and education. In the German army, not just the officers were educated, many of the common soldiers were literate. Not so in the French Army; it looked more to the past and there was a distinct cultural divide between the aristocratic officers and the illiterate lower class soldiers. The French Army looked more to the defense and lacked the flexibility at lower ranks that the Germans enjoyed. The Franco-Prussian War very much seemed to be contest between a disorganized and apathetic French Army and a well-organized and professional German Army. When it came to political leadership, it seemed Napoleon III was seeking to put the Prussians in their place after being diplomatically outmaneuvered and stumbled into a trap Bismarck had set to create an environment in which he could finish German unification.

The section about the war itself doesn’t limit itself to a discussion of the strategy and tactics employed by the generals but also how their political masters’ actions shaped those strategies. Just as Bazaine and Moltke and the Chassepot rifle and the Krupp cannon were important militarily, Napoleon III and Bismarck were just as important politically, it was their actions and policy that impacted the decision making of the generals and the use of the weapons. Wawro discusses how the superior French Chassepot rifle shaped and the superior German Krupp artillery shaped the German tactics. He also discusses how errors by the French squandered their advantages and how errors by German leadership led them to take heavier casualties than they should have. Essentially, leaders on both sides committed many errors, but the errors on the part of the French leadership were more grievous and contributed toward their defeat. Particularly in the closing stage of the war, he shows how the political leadership of both sides and political upheaval in France shaped strategy in attempt to bring about each sides’ desired outcome.

Perhaps the most important part of the book is the final section about what happened post-war; Wawro writes about what the military leadership took away as lessons learned, how the war altered the map of Europe, and how the outcome of the war led to World War I. He discusses how the military leadership of both France and Germany (and the generals of other countries) came away from the Franco-Prussian War with a false reading on offensive tactics and how those false readings led to the massive loss of life in World War I. He tells how the landscape was altered through annexation and how Bismarck’s humiliating terms to France primed the pump for World War I, much as the terms of peace following World War I led to World War II. It is easy to come away from this last section of the book that in the short term, the Germans won the war but that in the long term they lost it by setting themselves up for defeat in World War I.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. It was well written and well researched. Political and military histories can easily become dry but Wawro wrote a book that is easy to read and captures the reader’s attention and touches on tactics, strategy, and technology without getting bogged down in minutiae. Perhaps it was because I was reading about a war that doesn’t receive a lot of attention but I genuinely found this book hard to put down. Each chapter has extensive end notes; it’s obvious that he did a massive amount of research. As usual, I read the Kindle version and it’s important to note that The Franco-Prussian War has maps in their appropriate place – with the relevant text (see, it can be done!!). This made it easy to visualize the military maneuvers that Wawro was writing about. I enthusiastically give this book 5 out of 5 stars and I strongly recommend it if you are interested in learning about an overlooked yet historically important war.

[Oleksandr Zholud · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a non-fic about one of the ‘forgotten wars’ of the 19th century, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. While it is mainly a military history, there are a lot of vignettes and more general history.

The pre-history: on one side Prussia with Bismarck, growing world power, winner of 1866 war with Austria. On the other – France, which holds to its Napoleonic past (from, the structure of army to his nephew as the current emperor) and assumes that it is able to press others to do what France wants. Bismarck fires up French by a series of provocations (which France is eager to follow) to declare the war on Prussia (thus losing potential favorable international opinion).

France’s army was smaller and older, with professional solders, mostly uneducated. It has two wunderwaffen – Chassepot rifle, which shot further and more precise then Prussian needle rifle; and Mitrailleuse – early modern machine gun, which doesn’t swivel, so its volleys were more spectacular than effective sweeping fire. Prussian had their wunderwaffen as well Krupp’s steel tube guns with a great range. Their army was larger, conscripted and more educated, which is a great boon in the industrial era.

The armies also had quite almost opposite approaches to the war: Germans attacked again and again, each attempt quickly gaining support of the neighboring units, fallen officers quickly replaced but educated NCOs; French based everything on their old glory, long-range rifle and static defense, the latter pulverized by Krupp’s guns. Another problem is a constant bickering among French high command, were everyone wanted honors but not the responsibility, so they march their troops to exhaustion only to leave them under enemy fire.

To a large extent this war, more than any other led to the WWI as we know it – French elan tactics, fight for Alsace and Lorraine, raise of Germany with resulting fear of it, assumption that a future war should be short, so its ok to throw millions of solders into this meatgrinder, and so on.

A great history book for everyone interested in the period.

[Faustibooks · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a good book on the often overlooked Franco-Prussian War. This brutal conflict did not last long but it drastically changed the balance of power in Europe, ending the Second French Empire, severely weakening France and leading to the creation of the German Empire. Wawro writes in a concise and clear manner, colouring in the narrative with many anecdotes, diary entries, letters and quotes from many different types of people involved in the conflict.

[James Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Geoffrey Wawro can make history read like a story. And he tells it so well, so clearly that even such tangled webs as Prussian President Otto von Bismarck's intricate diplomatic maneuverings leading up to the Franco-Prussian War are crystal clear. A Wawro history is a crisp stream with lively currents rather than the dry stony bed of lesser writers.

We in America think of the mid-ninteenth century as the slavery issue, the Civil War, and conflict with the Indians. But it was a violent time in Europe, too, particularly as Bismarck sought to unify the Prussian north and the southern, Catholic German states into one nation. The brief Danish war in 1864 and the swift defeat of Austria in 1866 were desiged to solidify the Prussian state. An alarmed French Emperor Napoleon III rightly felt threatened and began preparing for war. But they were still not ready and had no strategy for defeating Prussia when, in July 1870, Bismarck created the diplomatic crisis which coerced France into declaring war and coerced the south German states into joining Prussia as a united front in the war against them. Wawro explains all this well, and he describes the military operations that followed in prose both immediate and academic. The campaign in France, northeast and south of Paris, were hard-fought battles characterized more by brutal weight than by nimble maneuvering, but Wawro keeps it interesting. He's severely hampered here by the poor maps provided in support of his text. Good maps are a necessity in military history. I quickly found myself searching through other sources for a graphic complement to Wawro's textual explanation of the operations.

Wawro is best at historical analysis. The big body of operational commentary is propelled by the wings of the causes and results of the war. Napoleon III went into exile and the French crown was replaced by a republic. The alliance of the south German states with Prussia encouraged Bismarck to proclaim a German empire under Wilhelm I. However, there were still internal political contradictions and the need to dispel them was yet another prod toward war in 1914, as was the Prussian annexation of Alsace-Lorraine which remained a burr aggravating France. Military actions foreshadowed the 1914-18 war in the discovery of the destructive power of breech-loading artillery and machineguns which overcame infantry tactics and small arms. Wawro is at his best in such analysis and his wings give flight to his history.

[Andrew · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871, by Geoffrey Wawro, is a book detailing the history of the Franco-Prussian War. It analyzes the background to the conflict, including the political machinations of Napoleon III and Otto von Bismarck, the two charismatic leaders of France and Prussia, respectively. The conflicts background is complex, and disputes between France and Prussia were legion. Prussia was stoking German nationalism in order to unite the German states, and indeed in 1866 had defeated Austria-Hungary in a decisive war, gaining control of the Northern German states and eroding the independence of Bavaria, Baden and Wurttemberg in the south. This alarmed France greatly, for they coveted a united States of Europe, under the control of France of course. Other disputes included a Prussian funded railway through Switzerland, which threatened France with a Prusso-Italian alliance. A succession dispute in Spain, however, sparked the conflict, with the Spanish government asking a Hohenzollern prince to take the throne. This was a situation France could not bare, and so they declared war.

This was to Bismarck's advantage however. It isolated France on the political stage, and gave Prussia an opportunity to go toe to toe with the French themselves. Nobody, not even the Prusians, would have predicted the outcome of this war, however. Prussia defeated France, then the Great Power of the world, in less than a year. In the end, superior military organizations and tactics led to a total route.

How did this come about? It shocked the world at the time, but Wawro takes a deep look at the tactical advantages and weakness' of both sides of the conflict, and the Prussian too, had many. Each battle and its aftermath politically are analyzed in depth, including troop numbers, organization and supply. Wawro writes an in depth history of this war that is both informative and highly readable. This is an excellent read for nay history buff, and a good precursor for those interested in the Great Wars of the 20th century, as this conflict played a key role both politically and socially in the attitudes and alliances that came afterwards. Highly recommended.

[Carlos Wang · Rating 4 out of 5]

論十九世紀中期最重要的歷史事件，我會投普法戰爭一票，因為它，中歐誕生了新的強國，並在接下來的半個世紀內，成為舊歐洲動盪的根源。兩次大戰雖然未必德國都是元凶，但少了這個國家歷史走向肯定大不相同。不過，這場戰爭就後世的眼光看來，卻帶有一種必然性。德意志民族主義的統一聲浪勢不可擋，而法國斷不會輕易容忍此事發生，解決的方法只有按照俾斯麥說的「鐵與血」。

就我所知，普法戰爭向來是被包括在德國統一的環節中或者是俾斯麥的個人傳記中討論，做為一個單獨的歷史事件成為專著在華文圈中幾乎沒有，這本《普法戰爭》算是目前唯一的選擇。

本書作者喬福瑞‧瓦夫羅(Geoffrey Wawro)並非初次引進市場，他的那本《哈布斯堡的滅亡：第一次世界大戰的爆發和奧匈帝國的解體》也是偏冷門但又意義不凡的作品。而有讀過這本的，那麼，應該也知道作者的風格跟文筆。他以戰史為中心，導出其緣由與產生的影響，是一部在軍政兩方都兼顧的作品。


普法戰爭是一場以民族主義為背景，夾雜著地緣政治衝突，與一場軍事革新驗收的較量。俾斯麥將日耳曼民族建國的夢想背負在肩，步步為營的主導統一之路，他玩弄著高超的外交手段，利用地緣政治的矛盾從中取利，同時，向世人展現在經歷過拿破崙戰爭失敗之後，自國軍事改革再次領先全歐的事實。普魯士雖然只被認定為歐洲二流國家，但十九世紀上半工業化勢頭強勁，一旦控制日耳曼地區，光是人口量就足以在西歐占盡優勢。而軍事上，在毛奇領導之下，全民皆兵的徵兵制度保障了充足兵源，出色的基礎教育保障底層軍官素養足以執行「任務性領導」(只給目標其餘讓戰地指揮官臨機應變)的戰術風格，以及規劃基礎建設確保後勤萬無一失與快速動員，讓普魯士在軍事上佔據優勢地位。

與之相對地，垂垂老矣的拿破崙三世不復雄心，一心只想鞏固搖搖欲墜的第二帝國，利用戰爭樹立軍威，鞏固波拿巴家族執政合法性，全然不顧各種內政與軍事上的破綻。法蘭西的人口增長停滯，工業發展陷入瓶頸，過去支持皇權的中產階級跟農民都開始動搖，反對派聲浪不再能夠輕易壓制。軍事上，職業兵制事實上只養出了一堆老兵油子，他們整天只想打混摸魚，混口飯吃；而領導階級也整個官僚化，貪腐成性，底層軍官晉升緩慢，毫無士氣精神可言。法軍唯一的優勢，只在於其步槍夏賽波確實是戰爭爆發時歐洲最先進的裝備。

不過，儘管如此，戰爭也並非全然的一面倒，普魯士還是付出了極大的傷亡，才取得對法軍的勝利。隨軍行動的俾斯麥在戰場上訪問了一位被俘的法國軍官後，他得出了結論：「給我們普軍人人一支夏賽波，或者給你們一個毛奇當統帥，這場該死的戰爭都不用打這麼久。」

確實，普魯士在戰術上佔有優勢，但面對武器上的劣勢只能採取靠他們更出色的克魯勃砲來反壓制(信奉火炮至上的拿皇死不瞑目啊)。但這場戰爭勝敗更多取決於法軍的將帥不合。令讀者目瞪口呆的事實是，拿破崙三世任用的其中一名主帥巴贊，在戰前就跟其主子鬧的彼此厭惡，有識者云：「疑人不用，用人不疑」，結果偏偏「疑而用之」，下場就是巴贊在戰場上的各種擺爛。作者指出，法軍並非沒有勝算，而且其實非常有機會的。儘管初戰兩場都不幸兵敗導致國境大開，但只要拿破崙三世迅速集結後備兵力在通往巴黎的要地固守，巴贊跟麥克馬洪會師後側面夾擊，或者把戰爭拖成持久戰，大有可能讓原本中立的列強干涉，最後以極低代價談判乃至和局坐收，那麼俾斯麥是否還能順利成立帝國就只有上帝知道了。但現實是，巴贊的各種不作為導致自己被困於梅斯，拿破崙三世與麥克馬洪為了救援他而被擊退奔往色當，在各種不利局勢下與普軍決戰後兵敗被俘，戰爭便大勢底定。

接下來的狀況是俾斯麥極不想見的。由於皇帝被俘，法蘭西第二帝國瞬間垮台，新成立的共和國派系林立，是戰是和取決不下。鐵血宰相本想快速取勝後談判要求利益來結束戰爭，如今他已不知找誰談起，戰爭結束顯然遙遙無期，讓俾斯麥差點崩潰。此時，「多虧」由無產階級革命而誕生的巴黎公社，終於促成了法國保守派跟普魯士的利益一致，在入侵者的「善意中立」甚至某種程度的協助下，共和政府平定了革命，並與新成立的德國和談。這個故事顯然告誡著後人，有很多事起頭簡單，收拾卻很難，戰爭肯定是其中之一。色當戰後那段時間的抵抗，其實已是無意義的作為，法國又沒有像一戰後的土耳其團結在凱末爾領導之下，只是各自為政的亂打一氣，平白添加民眾的死傷，還有各種財產的損失。而歷史證明了，忍得一時屈辱，法國很快就還完賠款，重新再起。


瓦夫羅對這段故事的敘述頗為精彩，他詳實地描述了戰爭的過程，並給予了適當的評論，至於說的如何就見仁見智了。個人是覺得作者對德國有點偏見，他在最後顯然還是把一戰爆發主要責任歸咎在德國身上，這點就有些爭議了。但不管怎樣，這依然是一部出色的作品，值得一讀，也希望作者的另外一本《普奧戰爭》能夠順利引進。

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

Of all of the wars fought in Europe between 1815 and 1914, none was more important in terms of its impact than the Franco-Prussian War. The culmination of Otto von Bismarck's strategy for unifying the German states into a single country, it saw the displacement of France as the dominant Continental power and the formation of a new nation that would dominate events in Europe for the next three-quarters of a century.

Such an epochal conflict is well deserving of study, yet for Geoffrey Wawro to write this book is in some respects an act of bravery. For decades Michael Howard's The Franco-Prussian War has been the go-to source for readers seeking an English-language history of the conflict, and little has changed since its publication in 1961 to undermine its value. Yet Wawro's book is a worthy addition to the literature on the war, thanks to the directness of his analysis and the clarity of his prose. He provides readers with a superb introduction to the conflict, starting with an analysis of its political background and the strengths and weaknesses of the two armies before detailing the major campaigns of the war. From his analysis emerges a tale of two powers, one rotted yet still possessing formidable strengths, the other dynamic but suffering from its own set of flaws. Wawro makes it clear that while the Prussians enjoyed several advantages the outcome was far from ordained, with the flaws of French leadership being a decisive factor in its defeat.

Wawro's book illuminates the depth of France's humiliation in their defeat. In doing so, he helps to underscore the long-term significance of the war, as France would emerge from it determined to undo its loss. Though this may not have made the conflict that took place four decades later inevitable, the seeds for it were clearly sown in 1870-1. To understand why is just one reason why this book is necessary reading for every student of modern European history, as well as anyone seeking an accessible overview of this pivotal clash of powers.

[Matthew Davenport · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wawro masterfully tackles a pivotal conflict that has been sadly sidelined in the modern study of history--particularly narrow Americentric here in the US. This is essential reading for anyone who desires an understanding of German unification, or who yearns for a perspective of the diverging paths leading to the Great War that followed 43 years later, or wishing to grasp European history in general. Great, recommended read.

[Bill · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a well written military history of the most significant war in late 19th century Europe. The war led to the unification of Germany in a ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. The balance of power established in 1815 was irrevocably changed by Prussia's creation of a German Empire.
In 1870 the Prussians were enjoying the fruits of their victory over Austria in 1866. Napoleon III had been in power since 1848 and he no longer inspired enthusiasm in the hearts of the French people. Count Otto von Bismarck was at the height of his powers. A meeting between the Kaiser and the French ambassador was described in the Ems Dispatch. After Bismarck's editing and a poor translation it was offensive the French over reacted and mobilized. Napoleon's actions helped to isolate France and deprive her of allies in the war.
After setting forth the causes of the war the author does an informative sketch of the two armies at the beginning of the war. The French army was an all volunteer army professional army of 400,000 men. The Prussians had an army of almost one million men based upon conscription and the use of reserves on the front line. The French rifle was superior in all respects but this was balanced out by the superiority of the Prussian artillery. The Prussian artillery was breech loading while the French was muzzle loading. When the fighting started the Prussian artillery ruled the battlefield foreshadowing the tactics of World War I.
The critical difference between the two armies was their leadership. The Prussian General Staff had great planning capabilities and had developed superior tactics. The French relied on the Napoleonic system of Marshals, great generals who controlled whole armies. In 1870 their generals fought defensively and were enveloped by the Prussians.
The author's use of primary sources provides insight into two major factors that led to France's complete defeat. The rank and file of the French Army had no desire to fight. The French soldier had little confidence in their generals and was not motivated to make sacrifices for victory. The Prussians and soldiers from other German states were young and confident. They had been trained to follow orders and to think on the battlefield.
The morale of the French generals was no better than the rank and file. They were defeatist and steeped in defensive tactics. The Prussians were supremely confident after their victory over Austria in 1866.
The great battle of Sedan where the French army was defeated and Napoleon III captured effectively ended the war. The great victories of the Prussian armies fueled German militarism which contributed to World War I. These victories were as much the product of the incompetence of French leadership as the efficiency of the Prussian armies.
I was interested to learn that Phil Sheridan was an observer of the war for the United States. The author's quotes from Sheridan and the British observer provide some interesting insights into the conduct of the war.
The author picked out a very interesting quotation from a German officer's diary, " every battle is a skein of personal crises only loosely joined by a plan of operations." He is reminding the reader that there is a temptation in looking back on something as helter skelter as a military battle in 1870 to see patterns and order that was not there in the minds of the participants.
I had started this book about five years ago and couldn't get through it. It seems that all of my reading about the American Civil War has changed my attitudes about military history. It is a good book but not excellent and I would limit my recommendation of the book to those interested in military history

[Diego Hincapié Upegui · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hábil en estilo y siempre con la cita lista para justificar sus afirmaciones. Bien investigado. Resuena la frase de Moltke: ningún plan de batalla resiste el primer disparo.

[Chris D'Antonio · Rating 4 out of 5]

All in all, a solid account of the military conduct and movements within the Franco-Prussian War. I appreciated Mr. Wawro's perceptiveness to the depredations which soldiers on both sides were subjected to while their leaders angled politically, or failed to do so. This account in many ways highlights the war as a harbinger for struggles to come (e.g. WWI, WWII) and the logistical pressures which would be "corrected" in following conflicts up to the First World War (Communications, troop movements, supplies).

This is perhaps one of the strangest wars I have learned of, as for all the patriotism involved, so much of the circumstances around it show how the respective armed forces were being willed into battle, or battle fatigue by their leadership, so very much against their will. Perhaps because of the bumbling conduct of the French, and the ensuing change of government and depletion of the German invading armies by war, famine, and disease it lies as a bit more of an open book than other struggles.

Just as a general simple perception, war sucks.

[Mike · Rating 3 out of 5]

A well written military history, although it does hit the midpoint between a gripping, well written read like Meyer's World Undone or McPherson's Battle Cry of Freedom and a more technical mil hist text. The book basically goes from battle to battle, and in keeping with the author's thesis describes each the same - the French rifles outclass the Prussians, but the Prussian artillery overcomes. The last section is a bit jarring and out of place where instead of a discussion of diplomatic outcomes the reader is simply given the author's thesis, told it is correct and that it results in WWI. Despite that this is a good, solid read on this war.

[Dave · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wawro gives an excellent summary of this brief war that set into motion the events that would lead to World War I. A good read for anyone interested in seeing how a major power like France was brought down by supposedly inferior enemy.

[Todd · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book highlights the development of modern initiative-based command and shows the difficulty of grasping reality from the confusion of battle.

[Alec Gray · Rating 5 out of 5]

A concise and readable history of an ignored but very important conflict. Shows the folly of the French and the hard-nosed foriegn policy of the Germans

[Rob Humphrey · Rating 3 out of 5]

Extremely detailed description of the war, its causes, and the personalities involved. I wish there were better maps!

[多余人-Lishnye Lyudi · Rating 4 out of 5]

俾斯麦询问军医：为何不就地取材给伤员提供食物？军医回答：他不能杀这些家禽，因为它们不是政府财产。俾斯麦愤怒难当之下威胁说要亲手宰杀这些家禽，转瞬又放下手枪而拿出钱包准备买下这些家禽以支付家禽所属的农户。倘若故事就此结束，德意志的民主进程依然有希望。但，他没有……他亲手为德意志新帝国设计的体制，最终推动了这个国家走上了军国主义之路，为后世（未来）埋下了天大的祸根……古往今来，所有民族都会在用他人鲜血铺就的血路上跌倒，胜利也从来都不是什么好老师。今天的我们，是否真的从历史中得到过警惕？答案可能永远被留在未来而不是当下。所以，历史一直在呼唤和平，然而这个世界，就没和平过。

[DS25 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Semplice e completa ricostruzione di uno dei conflitti portanti del XIX secolo.
Dal lato militare completa, anche se avrei gradito qualche cartina in più (comunque l'apparato è ben più che sufficiente). Dal punto di vista politico avrei gradito qualche spunto in più sul post bellico, ma è una mia fissazione.
Lo stile è preciso, "tedesco" senza troppi frizzi e lazzi.

[Dan Mareck · Rating 5 out of 5]

Koste es, was es wolle.

[Clint Wyatt · Rating 4 out of 5]

If you are at all interested in 19th century European history then definitely read Geoffrey Wawro’s ‘The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871.’ Though this conflict is often overlooked in favor of the earlier Napoleonic Wars or later World Wars – two eras with which this one is intimately bound – the author manages to make the conflict stand on its own as a defining period in European history. Foregoing the trap of historical relevancy, Wawro provides only those details pertinent to the war. These include the consolidation of the North German Confederation under Prussian (see Bismarck) hegemony following the Second Schleswig War (1864) and the Austro-Prussian War (1866), as well as the fall of the First French Republic and rise of the Second French Empire under Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte following an 1851 coup d’état. These events provide the setting for this book and the conflict it describes.

As a further prelude to the war, the author enumerates on the differences between French and German soldiers (long-service professionals vs. universally conscripted greenhorns), the weapons they used (chassepot vs. Dreyse needle gun, mitralleuse vs. Krupp Gun), and the tactics employed (strategic defense vs. enveloping offence). Following this, the author dives into a blow-by-blow account of the war. These include light skirmishes, set-piece battles, and sieges, as well as the politicking and squabbling between everyone involved. Events at places like Metz, Sedan, and Paris will be familiar to anyone after reading this book. Included are pictures, paintings, and – with almost every battle – maps that the reader can use to trace the routes of whole armies, corps, and divisions across France and during battles. However, these maps only provide the units' position at the beginning of the engagement, and thus require a little bit of imagination to recreate the events the author puts down in words.

Wawro paints a very clear picture of what he thinks is the most important aspect of the war: the failure of French leadership. This includes a lack of élan and a defeatist nature that was present even before the declaration of war. From Louis-Napoléon and Marshal Bazaine on down, these attitudes festered within the French pysche to the point where, at the end, whole armies were fleeing from battle. On the German side, you have almost the complete opposite: Wilhelm I, Bismark, Moltke, and Roon – and their officers – constantly on the offensive, seeking to bludgeon and strategically envelope their opponent. The dead are testament to the fact that fighting did in fact occur, but it was a lopsided affair, with the Germans constantly on the offensive, attacking either the tail-end of a French retreat or a fortified French position. Repeat ad nauseam. The author details the many ways in which the French could have turned the tides of battles and possibly the war, but thus is the power of hindsight.

In the end, Louis-Napoléon was captured at Sedan, both the German Empire and a new French Government of National Defense were declared, and eventually an armistice was signed and the war ended. The author briefly describes the post-war climate. The armistice, which saw France saddled with a war indemnity of 5 billion francs ($15 billion today), lose all of Alsace and large parts of Lorraine, and suffer a German victory parade through Paris did little to diminish the antagonism between France and Germany. More importantly, it upset the delicate balance of power between the major European states (Austria, England, France, Germany, and Russia) and did more to harm Germany’s image than France’s national well-being. Wawro attempts to present these events as a prelude to the breakout of the Great War in 1914, but understandably falls short of any lasting detail. I would recommend Robert Massie’s ‘Dreadnought’ or Barbara Tuchman’s ‘The Proud Tower’ for a detailed description of the events that lead to that fateful year.

Overall, this book provides a good account of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871. The draw of this book is definitely the individual battles and anyone looking for their fill of 19th century combat will likely be satiated after reading this. The author provides a mid-level account of unit movements, attacks, and retreats, neither focusing on the individual soldier’s life nor glossing over entire conflicts. Though the author does interject his own opinions – a habit that can be forgiven – he does a good job of using direct sources and quotes to let the dead speak for themselves. I would recommend this book to anyone interested in any of the subjects described in the preceding paragraphs, and would encourage them to seek out other books on the subject, including Geoffrey’s Wawro’s other publications.

[Wilson Hines · Rating 5 out of 5]

What a book!
Dealing with the cards that Bismarck had in his hand, the crafty politician absolutely turned Europe inside and out during the 1880's and 1870's. It would seem that every single opportunity that Bismarck had to make Prussia better for His Majesty and His Majesty's subjects, that exactly what Bismarck was able to do.
Even if you don't like Bismarck, you had to - you were literally forced to- respect the count, general, and prince. With just as much respect that you hold in the name of Bismarck, you have to hold the same in disdain for Louis Napoleon III. What an imbecile. The French lost the war, not to lack of ability, armament, or even strategy, but due to the likes of Napoleon III and his lethargic generals. The following was an excerpt simply talking about the Council of War meeting with Napoleon and his generals, including the freshly brought forward Bazaine from Mexico - "No wonder Napoleon III and his staff pressed Bazaine for answers; the war would unquestionably begin as a series of linked strategic movements with the Prussians trying to break into Alsace-Lorraine, and the French into the Rhineland or Franconia. Someone the French headquarters needed to mark the way forward, but no one did" [p. 72].
This is really the tell all how they failed. They literally failed by not doing. Bazaine was chased around the entire country side of northern France and the Prussians held him in a siege that wasted away his entire army; he simply refused to make strategic decision and refused to fight, even with a better equipped army!
The thing about this war that amazed me second to the ineptness of the Emperor and his generals was how the war was started. Either Bismarck was an incredibly brilliant political strategist or the French leaders, including Napoleon III, were complete fools when it came to politics. You take your pick. While reading the book, when I learned that France declared war on Germany, I was astounded. Completely blown away. It was pure stupidity.

In conclusion, Wawro was harsh on Bismarck in the last chapter on the lasting effects of the Franco-Prussian war. Everything from France getting their act together politically and strategically in the 1890's through to the Great War, on into how the great German state forced an incredible arms race with Russia, the U.K's activism, America's waning isolationism, ect, ect. I don't know what to make of it all. If Germany had not unified, are you telling me the art of war would have not further evolved and Russia wouldn't act like Russia always acts, and the U.K wouldn't try to be the quasi-isolated bully they've always been, and that the republicans of France would've been happy? I seriously doubt it.

[Jeff Clay · Rating 4 out of 5]

Emile Zola, in his novel The Debacle, called the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) the "murder of a nation." Clearly the old France of Napoleon III's Second Empire died a mere month into the struggle, but who killed it? Napoleon himself whose fear of an expanding German state drove him and his government to declare war? The German king William I and his minister Otto von Bismarck who wanted a war to complete their over-arching drive of German national unity? The offensive infantry and artillery tactics of Helmuth von Moltke coupled with his brilliant operational understanding of modern warfare? The blundering, dithering, demoralizing, and in the end, defeatist lack of any form of war strategy or battlefield tactics of the French generals Bazaine, de MacMahon, et al? Yes, as Wawro lucidly shows: all hands were on the knife that was thrust deep into the French Empire's heart.

The author does a superb job setting the stage for the actual war by detailing the causes and graphically illustrating the radically different approach to warfare and campaigning between the French and the Prussians. The latter were in the midst of revising their tactics and operational understanding after the successful conclusion of the Austro-Prussian War, four years before. The French, on the other hand, though greatly dismayed by the surprising Prussian victory learned seemingly nothing. Complacent hubris and willful ignorance will always trip the guilty.

The campaigns and battles themselves are artfully detailed via quotes from a number of primary sources and the writing style and use of language is lucid and crystalline. The maps are well-drawn and help one understand the ebb and flow of the troops.

The whole long, drawn-out denouement of the French defeat is painful to follow, but in the end Wawro offers an interesting and trenchant twist on the question of "who won?" Whilst clearly from the military and short-term political viewpoints, the Prussians/Germans were the victors. However, the author postulates that at least partially due to the harsh capitulation terms -- which including embarrassingly (for the French) a Prussian victory parade in Paris, the crowning of William I as German Emperor in Versailles, as well as the more substantive expropriation of the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine -- the seeds were sown for a future war of revenge. In the end we got two, as those that drafted their terms in 1918 sowed yet more seeds.

[Jeff · Rating 4 out of 5]

I picked this book up because I had a decided hole in my knowledge of "progress" in the conduct of military affairs between the American Civil War and World War I. So many advances occurred between the two — trench warfare, the use of Gatling/machine guns, the use of more accurate breech-loading rifles — and it seemed to me that an examination of the principal European war between the two, the Franco-Prussian War, was in order.

The Franco-Prussian War itself (in a nutshell) was a war that had no reason to be fought. The Prussians entered the war with the goal of using it to coalesce the other German states around Prussia to create a German nation. The French entered the war because the imperial regime of Louis Napoleon (Napoleon III) was faltering and Louis figured that a little winnable war against Prussia would rally the country around his reign… and that of his son.

At the start of the war, the French had every advantage in terms of manpower and weaponry (except for artillery) and, in fact, the French had the upper hand at the beginning of almost every battle… only to lose each battle because of flawed tactics and a failure to commit reserves at the right time in the right place. The superiority of German artillery counterbalanced everything else in the end. And the Germans ended up marching through Paris.

As with most wars, each side drew the wrong lessons in both defeat and victory, all of which manifested itself very plainly in 1914. But the book…

This is not a "page turner" kind of book. You will not find compelling anecdotes nor particularly memorable stories. But Mr. Wawro is a competent, concise author who writes with great clarity. He explained clearly the internal pre-war politics in both countries and the events and machinations leading up to the declaration of war. His descriptions of the battles and movements of armies were conveyed in a very straightforward manner. His last chapter outlines very well the lessons that each side "learned", the lessons that each side should have learned, and the impact of both on the Great War.

And so, if you are inclined to learn more and are comfortable with reading a very straightforward history, I recommend The Franco-Prussian War highly; otherwise… well, I would move on to some other topic.

[Columbia Warren · Rating 3 out of 5]

This book provides a pretty good overview of the Franco-Prussian War, and I certainly learned a lot about the war. However, there are a few frustrating characteristics of the author's approach. First, the author repeatedly buried what I would consider to be monumental events (i.e., the commencement of armed hostilities, the commencement of the shelling of Paris, the proclamation unifying Germany, the signing of the armistice, and the signing of the peace treaty) within paragraphs. Some of these events just seem to have popped out of nowhere in the narrative. While he focused extensively on details of battles, the author provided shockingly little discussion or analysis of events such as those just mentioned. In addition, the author did not do a great job of describing simultaneously occurring events, often writing in detail about events in one region of France, then jumping back in time to write about events in another region. It seems that the entirety of the conflict could have been described in a more cohesive fashion.

Overall, the book is a useful overview of the war, but contains some troubling flaws.

[Ian Fleischmann · Rating 5 out of 5]

Wawro's history of the Franco-Prussian War is possibly one of the best military histories I've read. The Franco-Prussian war contained what we would now consider all the default phases of the joint phasing construct and showed the weakness of forces designed under the operating concept of short decisive wars when confronted with enemies which do not concede defeat (Iraq anyone?). Wawro's text starts with the discussion of the strategic precursors to war, the operational approaches of both sides, and the tactical capabilities and effects of both belligerents. Napoleon III's lack of a plan contrasted against the detailed plans of the Prussian General Staff showed the weakness of the politics of the French government at the beginning of the war and Moltke and Bismarck's disagreements during the winter of 1870 showed the corresponding political weaknesses in the Prussian camp. This kind of complete coverage (with just the right mix of personal anecdotes) makes this a perfect reference anyone wanting to truly understand the causes, conduct, and ramifications of the Franco-Prussian war. I'll definitely be reading more on this topic.

[Paul W · Rating 4 out of 5]

Under the Congress of Vienna Britain, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia committed to conferring to prevent changes to existing borders or governments. But the consensus did not last long.
In 1853 an Austro-Franco-Anglo alliance attacked Russia in the Crimea. France went to war with Austria in 1858-59. Prussia, under Bismarck, formed an alliance with Austria to keep the French out of Prussia's war with Denmark in 1864, and then an alliance with France when Prussia attacked Austria in 1866. This then formed the backdrop to Franco-Prussian relations in 1870.
As Bismarck presciently forecast after Prussia's swift victory over France: the French "will not forgive us our victories now no matter how generous our peace teams." Bismarck's maxim "Great crises provide the weather for Prussia's growth" was to echo through European history for the next 75 years.
This is a well-researched and informative book about a lesser-known period in European history.

[Sam Schulman · Rating 4 out of 5]

A wonderful book that taught many things I didn't know - that it was the French who had a seasoned professional army and the Germans who had citizen-soldiers; that Prussian generalship was not good, merely a bit less bad than the French; that the French infantry were better armed than the German, but that it didn't matter, because it was settled by artillery; and that Bismarck mis-handled the peace negotiations out of a sense of weakness (!). It also confirmed many things that I already knew: that liberals are amazingly eager to sell out their most deeply held convictions for the merest soupcon of power, however fleeting; and that aristocrats are amazingly willing to sell the sacred honor of their family for a sum of ready cash sufficient only for the present generation. An utterly pointless war that was hugely consequential for the history of the world.

[John Reas · Rating 4 out of 5]

Wawro has written a thorough and definitive history of a pivotal period in European history that occurred several years after the American Civil War. With the successful conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, France's imperial aims to return to the years under Napoleon that were attempted under Napoleon III, his nephew, were finally ended once and for all, only to see the ascendancy of an even more powerful nation that developed similar goals, Germany. As I have always been curious how a loose confederacy of German-speaking principalities and states could eventually be united to form the nation that created so much devastation in the 20th century, Wawro's historical work does an excellent job in showing how Bismarck used the war for a call to unification.