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Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime
"A chilling testimony to the evil that executed—and the bungling that coud not prevent—an 'ethnic cleasning' massacre, the single worst atrocity in Europe since World War II."— The New York Times Book Review.
224 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1996
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
January 20, 2015
Can't even wrap my head around this all happening when my mother was pregnant with me. And to think my family had to live through this. Some didn't make it. May Allah grant every innocent Muslim that lost their life a place in Jannah. A very detailed account of the plans made against Srebrenica and how the rest of the world turned their cheek to ethnic cleansing.
May 18, 2010
Another testament to the uselessness and ineptitude of the UN.
September 29, 2012
Detailed account of all events that lead up to the massacre in the enclave of Srebrenica. The record is both emphatically and objectively written. It shows empathy in it's power not to judge, but takes a careful account of the decision making process in all parties that played a part in the events while leaving the reader free to make up his mind about the moral issues.
Finished this book finally, gave me goosebumps from start to finish. Why did I read this? That's what I ask myself every now and then. The only reason I came up with until now is that the most extreme human behaviors fascinate me and I think they can be great examples to teach us about much smaller issues in our own behavior. Personally I think the power of cause and effect while making choices is the most prominent in this book. For example, if looking at the choices made by multiple EU countries, for me it is clear that most were making choices to protect themselves, not the people of Srebrenica. Through that line of thought, we the people of the Western world were holding the guns against the heads of those people just as much as the Serbs who did the actual killing.
The world stood by and let it happen.
Finished this book finally, gave me goosebumps from start to finish. Why did I read this? That's what I ask myself every now and then. The only reason I came up with until now is that the most extreme human behaviors fascinate me and I think they can be great examples to teach us about much smaller issues in our own behavior. Personally I think the power of cause and effect while making choices is the most prominent in this book. For example, if looking at the choices made by multiple EU countries, for me it is clear that most were making choices to protect themselves, not the people of Srebrenica. Through that line of thought, we the people of the Western world were holding the guns against the heads of those people just as much as the Serbs who did the actual killing.
The world stood by and let it happen.
November 2, 2017
A must read for everyone and not just those interested in history and Bosnian war. This is a book to learn from.
some excerpts....
The vast majority of the Muslim men met a gruesome fate. They were executed and anonymously buried in mass graves, many were tortured before being killed, a small number were put in prisons and only very few managed to escape.
As for final culpability, this must rest squarely on the shoulders of the most senior Serbian politicians and officers. They authorized and organized the crime.
In Hague, Defence Minister was very worried. He told US Ambassador Terry Dornbush that although he was not sure the Serbs were going to overrun the enclave he was very pessimistic and described the situation as hopeless. The evidence also indicates that on the same day a call by the US in NATO for airstrikes was countered by the Dutch ambassador to NATO as dangerous and counterproductive.
In the southern part of enclave, the situation continued to deteriorate.
They were convinced that air power (Dutch) was the only weapon available to compensate for weakness on the ground.
The Deportation
The refugees believed that the Dutch would protect them from the invading Četniks and arrange for them to be taken to safety, but in the expectation, they were sorely disappointed.
The Serbs, on the other hand, were acting on the basis of the carefully prepared plan. By the time the Dutch realized this, the deportation of the Muslim population was well underway. As a formality, the men would be screened for "war crimes", in fact, all of the men were to be executed.
The Serbs knew that the key to successful deportation was speed. They had to make sure the operation was executed quickly enough to stymie any effective UN response.
The units carrying out deportations and executions had to be efficient and experienced ethnic cleansers.
The third ingredient to the successful operation was to reduce the resistance from both the Dutch and the refugees themselves. ...Fearful and confused, both groups largely played into the hands of the Serbs. .... Although Karemans later explained that he had only been holding a glass of water, the effect of images was to portray the UN and the Dutch army as legitimators of ethnic cleansing. The pictures became a symbol of the UN humiliation in Srebrenica.
The situation is deteriorating in such a way that additional measures must be taken for both refugees and soldiers. In my opinion, there is one way out: negotiations today to the highest level (Karremans).
The Serb soldiers who arrived in Potočari that Wednesday demanded immediate entry to the Dutch compound. They insisted on their right to inspect the refugees. Initially, the peacekeepers refused to open the gate, but the Serbs threatened to use force if necessary and were finally let in. Five Serbs made a brief detour and left. Meanwhile, a growing number of Serb soldiers and military police were flooding into the area.
The Muslims were given a false sense of hope. They advanced towards the Serbs, putting pressure on Dutch cordon.
Most of the men sat with their heads between their knees, and when they did look up their expressions were of terror. The Dutch hostages also reported hearing frequent gunshots, particularly from the direction of the football pitch.
Johan Bos: They bragged about how they murdered people and raped women. They were proud of what they were doing. They seemed pleased with themselves in a sort of professional, low-key way. They looked and behaved as if they were more than capable of doing what they claimed.
The soldiers from the escorts were held by the Serbs at a number of points along the route for their own safety. The Serbs did not want the Dutch to witness what was happening on the road between Kladanj and Bratunac.
A 7 vehicle convoy with over 50 wounded people left Potočari at 18.00 on 12 July. Apart from the wounded, the convoy contained some Dutchbat personnel and 10 young Muslim women working for the MSF. Upon arrival at the drop-off point near Kladanj, the Serb soldiers were initially friendly. but when they discovered men of fighting age among the wounded, their attitude abruptly changed.
A 19-year-old MSF assistant was taken off as well. She returned to bus sometime later, greatly distressed, saying that she had been raped by three Serbs.
In the evening of 12 July, the deportation stopped. Already there were indications that Serbs were picking men out of the crowd of refugees and executing them.
One Bosnian later told HRW: by that night, the people who had not been transported yet became hysterical and frightened. We began to hear talk about corpses being discovered in the area.
When Nesib Mandzić was informed by civilians that executions had taken place during the night, in desperation he asked Major Franken to stop evacuation. ..but deportation continued. Now acutely worried about the fate of men, Franken gave instructions to make a list of all Muslim males of draft-age, hoping this would enhance their security by enabling the UN to check on their whereabouts at a later stage. A list was compiled of 239 men, with some 60 more refusing to put their names on it. The deportations resumed at 6.30 on 13 July.
Clearly, the Serbs were not just hunting down able-bodied men of draft-age.
There were rumors that 9 Muslim men had been executed.
The Serbs naturally tried to hide human-rights violations from the Dutch and were mostly successful in doing so. None the less, Koster now had irrefutable proof that the Serbs committed summary executions of Muslim men.
Corporal Paul Groenwegen saw a group of 4 Serbs pull a man out of a crowd of refugees and force him to walk to the corner of the house. His account was echoed by Christina Schmitz, a German nurse working for MSF. She reported hearing regular shots from handguns from behind the house where the men were detained.
Of 239 names on the list of men, at least 103 definitely appear on the Red Cross list of missing men from Srebrenica but it is likely that over two-thirds are missing. by 7 o˙clock on 13 July all Muslim refugees had left the compound. Srebrenica enclave was ethnically clean.
The Massacre
BUT AT SOME POINT, THE Muslims WOULD HAVE TO CROSS EITHER BRATUNAC-KONJEVIĆI ROAD north of the enclave or Konjevići-Milići road to the west.
That same day, an American U-2 spy plane photographed some 600 people crowding the pitch surrounded by what appeared to be guards. When the plane returned some days later, the football pitch was empty, but it noticed that a nearby field had changed in appearance: it showed signs of recent digging, and experts identified what they believed to be three mass graves.
Journalist David Rohde of the CSM evaded Serb patrols to visit the field. He reported finding recent digging and in one place what appeared to be decomposing human leg protruding from the freshly turned dirt.
Under international humanitarian law, the summary execution of prisoners of war/civilians constitutes a war crime.
They squeezed everyone in one small pot near Kamenica.
The men were driven west along Bratunac Konjevici road toward Nova Kasaba. By then the column lost its cohesion.
Serb tanks were placed all along the route from Kravica to Konjevic Polje up to the intersection at KPolje.
From the statements of few survivors, it is possible to reconstruct how the murder of thousands of captured Muslim men was organized. A substantial number were summarily executed as soon as they surrendered. Those who survived the initial round of indiscriminate killing were taken to collection & interrogation points.
Basically, all the men in the enclave were regarded as enemies and legitimate targets and a conscious and deliberate effort were made to kill them.
One of the next scenes is a group of men huddled together in collective terror. It is a brief final image of some of the thousands of Muslim men from Srebrenica who were captured by the Serbs and who have never been seen alive again.
Dutch soldiers witnessed many bodies being removed in an odd assortment of pick-up trucks, tractors with carts, and vehicles with shovels. The personal belongings of the Muslim men, which had littered the road were collected and burnt.
By Friday, Bratunac was emptied of Muslim men. The operation was well-organized and conducted by disciplined troops, whose reign of terror extended to playing mind-games with prisoners. One survivor recalled:
For a second I thought we would be saved, exchanged for Serb prisoners, but when I saw the Četniks saluting and talking to the four UN soldiers who turned out to be Četniks themselves, I realized it was all over.
The terror was kept at the constant level. The objective - as emphasized by the forced running, beating and yelling - was to instill the execution process with a sense of inexorable movement and speed. No one, including executioners, was given the opportunity to question the process.
Nezad Avdić, survivor, described: I remember being frightened, thinking I would soon be dead or another bullet would hit, I thought it would soon be all over.
Avdić and his new-found friend managed to escape the field of death.
Erdemović ended up with a special unit, 80 men strong 10th Sabotage Detachment commanded by Lt Milorad Pelević.
The unit came under direct command of the military headquarters of the BSA.
To speed things up, Gojković decided to use the machine gun. But it was not as accurate as rifles.
Stovanović later claimed to have used 700 bullets.
It requires no exceptional men to commit exceptional crimes.
Of the large group of Muslim men who anticipated their fate and who tried to break out of the enclave, several thousand were captured alive. Many of them were seen by Dutch bat soldiers.
Erdemović estimated that he participated in the execution of some 1,200 men.
Petrović video which was taken around 16.30 on July 13, shows relaxed Bosnian Serb soldiers, whistling tunes, smoking cigarettes, listening to music, while armored vehicles are firing bursts of heavy machine-gun fire into the woodlands adjoining the road and Muslim men are still surrendering.
According to the Red Cross files, about 1,700 men were last seen alive in Potočari by their families.
There was a systematic process of victimization of the Muslim population that included as Art 5 of the Statue states "murder, extermination, deportation...."
Two questions resound.
First, Why did the Serbs attack safe area and systematically kill so many of its male inhabitants?
Second, why did the international community not protect the safe area and prevent its fall?
PART 2 SAFE AREA
He made it clear that this state would not be restricted to the administrative entity of Serbia proper, but would be the fatherland of all the Serbs. He warned the Serbs who want to return to the Serbian fatherland have the right to do so and the Serbian nation would enforce that right.
Eastern Bosnia, would, according to his vision become part of this new, greater Serbia.
JNA was fast becoming a Serbian army. Even before the conflict erupted in 1991, the officer corps had been dominated by Serbs. Close to 2/3 of officers before 1990 and almost all senior officers claimed that ethnic origin.
Autumn 1991 exercises were a cover for the redistribution of the weapons confiscated by JNA to the STF. They also established the army presence at key strategic locations. early in 1992, Serbs were poised for action.
Despite the clearly distinguishable pattern, most people did not realize the extent of the complicity of JNA and the careful planning that had gone on.
The paramilitaries generally performed the most gruesome and difficult parts of these operations.
According to two, not widely advertised laws, of July and Dec 1991, the framework was created to include paramilitaries in JNA and accord them regular status with all related benefits. Yet, to the outside world, the connection was not so obvious. The absence of overt links with M. Gov made it possible for him to deny responsibility for the crimes the paramilitaries committed.
Though many people were indiscriminately killed, tortured, beaten and threatened, the process was anything but random.
two of the defining characteristics of the Serbian war in BiH was that it was highly organized and that ethnic cleansing was part of a deliberate strategy.
tHERE IS NO FOOD SUCH AS WE KNOW. tHEY HAVE NOT HAD REAL FOOD FOR MONTHS. tHEY ARE SURVIVING O Chaff from wheat and roots from trees. everyday ppl are dying from hunger, exhaustion. Medical situation could not be more critical. Ppl die from simple injuries bc there is lack of medical supplies.
When the convoy arrived to Tuzla next evening several women/children died of exhaustion, exposure, asphyxiation. Ppl began to realize the extent of the tragedy that was unfolding in Podrinje. Refugees were surrounded by the sickening stench. Wounds were neglected , amputations had to be performed immediately as gangrene was eating away peoples bodies.
UN faced a terrible dilemma: should they evacuate ppl, stand accused of facilitating ethnic cleansing, or should they continue to try in all likelihood fail to deliver air to the enclave.
on April 5, Serbes renewed their attack. Town was subjected to further shelling, hospital was hit. Water supply was cut off when advancing Serbs captured water purification plant at Zeleni Jadar. Although Muslim forces recaptured the site the next day, they could not restore the water supply as the Serbs mined the plant.
Morillon arrived to Tuzla devastated. He failed to honor his personal obligation to Sreb ppl. UN humiliation was plain for everyone to see. By 13 Ap, fall of Sreb was imminent.
Radio report was accurate. Shortly before midnight, SC adopted Resolution 819 declaring "Sreb and its surrounding" a safe area.
Powell and Chaney believed safe areas would give the seal of approval to ethnic cleansing. Most crucially, there was general agreement within the Bush admin that US could not promote the idea while refusing to contribute troops to protect them.
Which countries with troops on the ground would be willing to abandon the UN impartiality and risk a war with the Serbs.
Following up on Resolution 787, Boutros Ghali requested UN access to NATO contingency plans on safe heavens. Such plans did not exist.
Mrs Ogata pointed out to politicians that both Croats and Serbs made it clear to her that they would regard the boundary of secure zones as the front line.
It was not until March 1993, when the world attn shifted towards embattled town of Sreb that the idea was resurrected.
In 6 hrs of consultations prior to its adoption, a broad consensus was formed in SC that smth needed to be done to prevent Serbs from ethnically cleansing Sreb through brute force.
They made sure Sreb was turned into a safe area as opposed to safe haven, the latter being what was created for Kurds in Iraq. The difference under international law is that safe havens need not depend on consent of the warring parties and could be enforced while safe areas were based on consent.
Within two days of the arrival of the Canadian troops in Srebrenica their government smelt a rat and began to express deep misgivings about the nature of their mission.
Declaring Sreb a safe area was a stop-gap measure which only succeeded in thwarting the Serbs for the interim.
M Albright stated in a press conference Feb 1993 that the plan amounted to rewarding aggression and punishing the victims. She reflected a strongly moralistic strand in the American debate on Bosnia. Its adherents advocated logically a tough, interventionist policy. The same day when she voted for the Resol 824 she conspicuously refused to support a French draft resolution endorsing Vance - Owen plan bc US had other measures in mind.
CH 6
B.Ghali wrote that he wanted to take up the offer made by Dutch gov when UN requested combat troops for safe area protection.
At its high point in early 1994, around 3100 Dutch troops were deployed in&around ex-Yug. All of these deployments - including Sreb - were approved by unanimous votes in parliament.
Majority of Dutch believed that the guilty party (Serbian aggression) should not just be contained but punished. Polls consistently indicated that Dutch favored peace-enforcement in BiH.
Prominent figures in calling for military intervention were former supporters of massive anti-nucl movement of early 1980s.Faber argued that by not offering protection to cities *Sar, Sreb*, where thousands of ppl were trapped&exposed to terror bombardments of Cetniks, intern community was also guilty of this form of genocide.
in a flurry of op-eds Voorhoeve called for military intervention and the establishment of safe havens.
Since they believed that the dominant voices of these debates favoured the Serbs too heavily and as a result rewarded agression, Dutch FM felt a pressing need their voice to be heard. Combat units might open the doors of international diplomacy to them.
general Couzy had 3 concenrs: 1. bureaucratic nature - participation in peace-keeping was not in the institutional self-interest of the army bc it compromised equipment plans.
2. Dutch army was not ready yet. It needed more time to complete transition from conscript based to professional army.
3. Generals were afraid of being sucked into an unwinnable guerrilla conflict.
Prospect of becoming entangled in a second Vietnam, whether justified or not haunted all NATO militaries.
During 1993, a pressure in Parliament for more action increased. Labour Party which was part of the governing coalition, was particularly exasperated by the failure of the international community to combat what they perceived as the major injustice of the war: ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims.
A fundamental flaw with Dutch DM regarding deployment of combat units to BiH was that it was driven almost exclusively by moral outrage.
Public, parl, gov wanted to do smth about the war. But few considered carefully whether smth that was actually useful could be achieved.
Dutch gov failed to read negative signals emanating frm their NATO allies. DSafe-area resolution had been taken by the Dutch at face value. Few seemed to realize that the actual motivation behind them was to paper over the abandonment of Vance-Owen plan.
Serbs took great care to keeping supplies to a min bc they knew that no modern army could properly function without them.
Dutch could not patrol in their armoured vehicles, had to go on foot instead.
Serbs regualrly refused clearance for convoys to exit the enclave, or at least held them up.
During 1994, total of 5858 tons were delievered by 122 convoys, by the end of the year there were increasing shortages.
Dutch were not at all impressed by the behaviour of the Bosnian army. Many of the soldiers had little sympathy for the Muslims.
On Feb 18, 1995 the last convoy of diesel fuel was allowed in.
Onlymonce, on June 20 did some more fuel arrive - pitiful 12000 l that lasted fewer than 6 days.
Dutch were so preoccupied with the rotation of Dutchbat that they failed to recognize the signs that the war in BiH was changing
inexorably during summer 1995, and that with each passing day a Serb offensive against Sreb enclave was growing more likely.
CH 7
In Feb 1995 Americans secretly had communications equipment flown into Tz which would enable BA to coordinate offensive op between larger units.
Since UN forces were not strong enough to defend themselves in enclaves, there existed an understanding they would have to rely on air power to deter attacks.
R.Smith hoped that logic&strength of his arguments would do the job. His analysis seemed too catastrophic to be beliveable, let alone palatable. Many responded by reasserting their blanket faith in air power.
some excerpts....
The vast majority of the Muslim men met a gruesome fate. They were executed and anonymously buried in mass graves, many were tortured before being killed, a small number were put in prisons and only very few managed to escape.
As for final culpability, this must rest squarely on the shoulders of the most senior Serbian politicians and officers. They authorized and organized the crime.
In Hague, Defence Minister was very worried. He told US Ambassador Terry Dornbush that although he was not sure the Serbs were going to overrun the enclave he was very pessimistic and described the situation as hopeless. The evidence also indicates that on the same day a call by the US in NATO for airstrikes was countered by the Dutch ambassador to NATO as dangerous and counterproductive.
In the southern part of enclave, the situation continued to deteriorate.
They were convinced that air power (Dutch) was the only weapon available to compensate for weakness on the ground.
The Deportation
The refugees believed that the Dutch would protect them from the invading Četniks and arrange for them to be taken to safety, but in the expectation, they were sorely disappointed.
The Serbs, on the other hand, were acting on the basis of the carefully prepared plan. By the time the Dutch realized this, the deportation of the Muslim population was well underway. As a formality, the men would be screened for "war crimes", in fact, all of the men were to be executed.
The Serbs knew that the key to successful deportation was speed. They had to make sure the operation was executed quickly enough to stymie any effective UN response.
The units carrying out deportations and executions had to be efficient and experienced ethnic cleansers.
The third ingredient to the successful operation was to reduce the resistance from both the Dutch and the refugees themselves. ...Fearful and confused, both groups largely played into the hands of the Serbs. .... Although Karemans later explained that he had only been holding a glass of water, the effect of images was to portray the UN and the Dutch army as legitimators of ethnic cleansing. The pictures became a symbol of the UN humiliation in Srebrenica.
The situation is deteriorating in such a way that additional measures must be taken for both refugees and soldiers. In my opinion, there is one way out: negotiations today to the highest level (Karremans).
The Serb soldiers who arrived in Potočari that Wednesday demanded immediate entry to the Dutch compound. They insisted on their right to inspect the refugees. Initially, the peacekeepers refused to open the gate, but the Serbs threatened to use force if necessary and were finally let in. Five Serbs made a brief detour and left. Meanwhile, a growing number of Serb soldiers and military police were flooding into the area.
The Muslims were given a false sense of hope. They advanced towards the Serbs, putting pressure on Dutch cordon.
Most of the men sat with their heads between their knees, and when they did look up their expressions were of terror. The Dutch hostages also reported hearing frequent gunshots, particularly from the direction of the football pitch.
Johan Bos: They bragged about how they murdered people and raped women. They were proud of what they were doing. They seemed pleased with themselves in a sort of professional, low-key way. They looked and behaved as if they were more than capable of doing what they claimed.
The soldiers from the escorts were held by the Serbs at a number of points along the route for their own safety. The Serbs did not want the Dutch to witness what was happening on the road between Kladanj and Bratunac.
A 7 vehicle convoy with over 50 wounded people left Potočari at 18.00 on 12 July. Apart from the wounded, the convoy contained some Dutchbat personnel and 10 young Muslim women working for the MSF. Upon arrival at the drop-off point near Kladanj, the Serb soldiers were initially friendly. but when they discovered men of fighting age among the wounded, their attitude abruptly changed.
A 19-year-old MSF assistant was taken off as well. She returned to bus sometime later, greatly distressed, saying that she had been raped by three Serbs.
In the evening of 12 July, the deportation stopped. Already there were indications that Serbs were picking men out of the crowd of refugees and executing them.
One Bosnian later told HRW: by that night, the people who had not been transported yet became hysterical and frightened. We began to hear talk about corpses being discovered in the area.
When Nesib Mandzić was informed by civilians that executions had taken place during the night, in desperation he asked Major Franken to stop evacuation. ..but deportation continued. Now acutely worried about the fate of men, Franken gave instructions to make a list of all Muslim males of draft-age, hoping this would enhance their security by enabling the UN to check on their whereabouts at a later stage. A list was compiled of 239 men, with some 60 more refusing to put their names on it. The deportations resumed at 6.30 on 13 July.
Clearly, the Serbs were not just hunting down able-bodied men of draft-age.
There were rumors that 9 Muslim men had been executed.
The Serbs naturally tried to hide human-rights violations from the Dutch and were mostly successful in doing so. None the less, Koster now had irrefutable proof that the Serbs committed summary executions of Muslim men.
Corporal Paul Groenwegen saw a group of 4 Serbs pull a man out of a crowd of refugees and force him to walk to the corner of the house. His account was echoed by Christina Schmitz, a German nurse working for MSF. She reported hearing regular shots from handguns from behind the house where the men were detained.
Of 239 names on the list of men, at least 103 definitely appear on the Red Cross list of missing men from Srebrenica but it is likely that over two-thirds are missing. by 7 o˙clock on 13 July all Muslim refugees had left the compound. Srebrenica enclave was ethnically clean.
The Massacre
BUT AT SOME POINT, THE Muslims WOULD HAVE TO CROSS EITHER BRATUNAC-KONJEVIĆI ROAD north of the enclave or Konjevići-Milići road to the west.
That same day, an American U-2 spy plane photographed some 600 people crowding the pitch surrounded by what appeared to be guards. When the plane returned some days later, the football pitch was empty, but it noticed that a nearby field had changed in appearance: it showed signs of recent digging, and experts identified what they believed to be three mass graves.
Journalist David Rohde of the CSM evaded Serb patrols to visit the field. He reported finding recent digging and in one place what appeared to be decomposing human leg protruding from the freshly turned dirt.
Under international humanitarian law, the summary execution of prisoners of war/civilians constitutes a war crime.
They squeezed everyone in one small pot near Kamenica.
The men were driven west along Bratunac Konjevici road toward Nova Kasaba. By then the column lost its cohesion.
Serb tanks were placed all along the route from Kravica to Konjevic Polje up to the intersection at KPolje.
From the statements of few survivors, it is possible to reconstruct how the murder of thousands of captured Muslim men was organized. A substantial number were summarily executed as soon as they surrendered. Those who survived the initial round of indiscriminate killing were taken to collection & interrogation points.
Basically, all the men in the enclave were regarded as enemies and legitimate targets and a conscious and deliberate effort were made to kill them.
One of the next scenes is a group of men huddled together in collective terror. It is a brief final image of some of the thousands of Muslim men from Srebrenica who were captured by the Serbs and who have never been seen alive again.
Dutch soldiers witnessed many bodies being removed in an odd assortment of pick-up trucks, tractors with carts, and vehicles with shovels. The personal belongings of the Muslim men, which had littered the road were collected and burnt.
By Friday, Bratunac was emptied of Muslim men. The operation was well-organized and conducted by disciplined troops, whose reign of terror extended to playing mind-games with prisoners. One survivor recalled:
For a second I thought we would be saved, exchanged for Serb prisoners, but when I saw the Četniks saluting and talking to the four UN soldiers who turned out to be Četniks themselves, I realized it was all over.
The terror was kept at the constant level. The objective - as emphasized by the forced running, beating and yelling - was to instill the execution process with a sense of inexorable movement and speed. No one, including executioners, was given the opportunity to question the process.
Nezad Avdić, survivor, described: I remember being frightened, thinking I would soon be dead or another bullet would hit, I thought it would soon be all over.
Avdić and his new-found friend managed to escape the field of death.
Erdemović ended up with a special unit, 80 men strong 10th Sabotage Detachment commanded by Lt Milorad Pelević.
The unit came under direct command of the military headquarters of the BSA.
To speed things up, Gojković decided to use the machine gun. But it was not as accurate as rifles.
Stovanović later claimed to have used 700 bullets.
It requires no exceptional men to commit exceptional crimes.
Of the large group of Muslim men who anticipated their fate and who tried to break out of the enclave, several thousand were captured alive. Many of them were seen by Dutch bat soldiers.
Erdemović estimated that he participated in the execution of some 1,200 men.
Petrović video which was taken around 16.30 on July 13, shows relaxed Bosnian Serb soldiers, whistling tunes, smoking cigarettes, listening to music, while armored vehicles are firing bursts of heavy machine-gun fire into the woodlands adjoining the road and Muslim men are still surrendering.
According to the Red Cross files, about 1,700 men were last seen alive in Potočari by their families.
There was a systematic process of victimization of the Muslim population that included as Art 5 of the Statue states "murder, extermination, deportation...."
Two questions resound.
First, Why did the Serbs attack safe area and systematically kill so many of its male inhabitants?
Second, why did the international community not protect the safe area and prevent its fall?
PART 2 SAFE AREA
He made it clear that this state would not be restricted to the administrative entity of Serbia proper, but would be the fatherland of all the Serbs. He warned the Serbs who want to return to the Serbian fatherland have the right to do so and the Serbian nation would enforce that right.
Eastern Bosnia, would, according to his vision become part of this new, greater Serbia.
JNA was fast becoming a Serbian army. Even before the conflict erupted in 1991, the officer corps had been dominated by Serbs. Close to 2/3 of officers before 1990 and almost all senior officers claimed that ethnic origin.
Autumn 1991 exercises were a cover for the redistribution of the weapons confiscated by JNA to the STF. They also established the army presence at key strategic locations. early in 1992, Serbs were poised for action.
Despite the clearly distinguishable pattern, most people did not realize the extent of the complicity of JNA and the careful planning that had gone on.
The paramilitaries generally performed the most gruesome and difficult parts of these operations.
According to two, not widely advertised laws, of July and Dec 1991, the framework was created to include paramilitaries in JNA and accord them regular status with all related benefits. Yet, to the outside world, the connection was not so obvious. The absence of overt links with M. Gov made it possible for him to deny responsibility for the crimes the paramilitaries committed.
Though many people were indiscriminately killed, tortured, beaten and threatened, the process was anything but random.
two of the defining characteristics of the Serbian war in BiH was that it was highly organized and that ethnic cleansing was part of a deliberate strategy.
tHERE IS NO FOOD SUCH AS WE KNOW. tHEY HAVE NOT HAD REAL FOOD FOR MONTHS. tHEY ARE SURVIVING O Chaff from wheat and roots from trees. everyday ppl are dying from hunger, exhaustion. Medical situation could not be more critical. Ppl die from simple injuries bc there is lack of medical supplies.
When the convoy arrived to Tuzla next evening several women/children died of exhaustion, exposure, asphyxiation. Ppl began to realize the extent of the tragedy that was unfolding in Podrinje. Refugees were surrounded by the sickening stench. Wounds were neglected , amputations had to be performed immediately as gangrene was eating away peoples bodies.
UN faced a terrible dilemma: should they evacuate ppl, stand accused of facilitating ethnic cleansing, or should they continue to try in all likelihood fail to deliver air to the enclave.
on April 5, Serbes renewed their attack. Town was subjected to further shelling, hospital was hit. Water supply was cut off when advancing Serbs captured water purification plant at Zeleni Jadar. Although Muslim forces recaptured the site the next day, they could not restore the water supply as the Serbs mined the plant.
Morillon arrived to Tuzla devastated. He failed to honor his personal obligation to Sreb ppl. UN humiliation was plain for everyone to see. By 13 Ap, fall of Sreb was imminent.
Radio report was accurate. Shortly before midnight, SC adopted Resolution 819 declaring "Sreb and its surrounding" a safe area.
Powell and Chaney believed safe areas would give the seal of approval to ethnic cleansing. Most crucially, there was general agreement within the Bush admin that US could not promote the idea while refusing to contribute troops to protect them.
Which countries with troops on the ground would be willing to abandon the UN impartiality and risk a war with the Serbs.
Following up on Resolution 787, Boutros Ghali requested UN access to NATO contingency plans on safe heavens. Such plans did not exist.
Mrs Ogata pointed out to politicians that both Croats and Serbs made it clear to her that they would regard the boundary of secure zones as the front line.
It was not until March 1993, when the world attn shifted towards embattled town of Sreb that the idea was resurrected.
In 6 hrs of consultations prior to its adoption, a broad consensus was formed in SC that smth needed to be done to prevent Serbs from ethnically cleansing Sreb through brute force.
They made sure Sreb was turned into a safe area as opposed to safe haven, the latter being what was created for Kurds in Iraq. The difference under international law is that safe havens need not depend on consent of the warring parties and could be enforced while safe areas were based on consent.
Within two days of the arrival of the Canadian troops in Srebrenica their government smelt a rat and began to express deep misgivings about the nature of their mission.
Declaring Sreb a safe area was a stop-gap measure which only succeeded in thwarting the Serbs for the interim.
M Albright stated in a press conference Feb 1993 that the plan amounted to rewarding aggression and punishing the victims. She reflected a strongly moralistic strand in the American debate on Bosnia. Its adherents advocated logically a tough, interventionist policy. The same day when she voted for the Resol 824 she conspicuously refused to support a French draft resolution endorsing Vance - Owen plan bc US had other measures in mind.
CH 6
B.Ghali wrote that he wanted to take up the offer made by Dutch gov when UN requested combat troops for safe area protection.
At its high point in early 1994, around 3100 Dutch troops were deployed in&around ex-Yug. All of these deployments - including Sreb - were approved by unanimous votes in parliament.
Majority of Dutch believed that the guilty party (Serbian aggression) should not just be contained but punished. Polls consistently indicated that Dutch favored peace-enforcement in BiH.
Prominent figures in calling for military intervention were former supporters of massive anti-nucl movement of early 1980s.Faber argued that by not offering protection to cities *Sar, Sreb*, where thousands of ppl were trapped&exposed to terror bombardments of Cetniks, intern community was also guilty of this form of genocide.
in a flurry of op-eds Voorhoeve called for military intervention and the establishment of safe havens.
Since they believed that the dominant voices of these debates favoured the Serbs too heavily and as a result rewarded agression, Dutch FM felt a pressing need their voice to be heard. Combat units might open the doors of international diplomacy to them.
general Couzy had 3 concenrs: 1. bureaucratic nature - participation in peace-keeping was not in the institutional self-interest of the army bc it compromised equipment plans.
2. Dutch army was not ready yet. It needed more time to complete transition from conscript based to professional army.
3. Generals were afraid of being sucked into an unwinnable guerrilla conflict.
Prospect of becoming entangled in a second Vietnam, whether justified or not haunted all NATO militaries.
During 1993, a pressure in Parliament for more action increased. Labour Party which was part of the governing coalition, was particularly exasperated by the failure of the international community to combat what they perceived as the major injustice of the war: ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslims.
A fundamental flaw with Dutch DM regarding deployment of combat units to BiH was that it was driven almost exclusively by moral outrage.
Public, parl, gov wanted to do smth about the war. But few considered carefully whether smth that was actually useful could be achieved.
Dutch gov failed to read negative signals emanating frm their NATO allies. DSafe-area resolution had been taken by the Dutch at face value. Few seemed to realize that the actual motivation behind them was to paper over the abandonment of Vance-Owen plan.
Serbs took great care to keeping supplies to a min bc they knew that no modern army could properly function without them.
Dutch could not patrol in their armoured vehicles, had to go on foot instead.
Serbs regualrly refused clearance for convoys to exit the enclave, or at least held them up.
During 1994, total of 5858 tons were delievered by 122 convoys, by the end of the year there were increasing shortages.
Dutch were not at all impressed by the behaviour of the Bosnian army. Many of the soldiers had little sympathy for the Muslims.
On Feb 18, 1995 the last convoy of diesel fuel was allowed in.
Onlymonce, on June 20 did some more fuel arrive - pitiful 12000 l that lasted fewer than 6 days.
Dutch were so preoccupied with the rotation of Dutchbat that they failed to recognize the signs that the war in BiH was changing
inexorably during summer 1995, and that with each passing day a Serb offensive against Sreb enclave was growing more likely.
CH 7
In Feb 1995 Americans secretly had communications equipment flown into Tz which would enable BA to coordinate offensive op between larger units.
Since UN forces were not strong enough to defend themselves in enclaves, there existed an understanding they would have to rely on air power to deter attacks.
R.Smith hoped that logic&strength of his arguments would do the job. His analysis seemed too catastrophic to be beliveable, let alone palatable. Many responded by reasserting their blanket faith in air power.
August 24, 2018
I’m a Bosnian refugee.
This book had three stages for me.
1) Depressing
2) Frustrating
3) Angry
The last two were mostly due to the lack of help. Recommend reading the book to inform people of the brutal atrocity Bosnian had to live through and survive.
This book had three stages for me.
1) Depressing
2) Frustrating
3) Angry
The last two were mostly due to the lack of help. Recommend reading the book to inform people of the brutal atrocity Bosnian had to live through and survive.
August 7, 2007
Terrifying to think that this was all going on while I was living just over there in Germany - a 10 hour drive away. I will never understand man's ability - desire - drive - to be cruel to his fellow man. We, as a species, seem uniquely suited to such cruelty.
December 28, 2025
Detailed analysis of the Balkan war in the Bosnian eastern enclave ‘safe areas’, from a Dutch perspective, as they were the main neutral troops on the ground. Interesting insight into the huge amount of military and political investment into wars and both how well and how poorly huge political machines can interact in these tense situations. Terrifying that ultimately there was delays and stalling from the West until the Serbian troops on the ground simply ‘removed’ the moral issues faced by the UN and NATO via ethnic cleansing, leaving them ‘Scot-free’ to then make peace deals. Eye-opening.
December 13, 2018
A great analysis of the factors that led to the genocide in Srebrenica that is told with compassion and understanding.
March 27, 2022
This sh*t is pretty messed up, man...
August 21, 2013
Short, clear, even-handed.
In July, 1995 the Bosnian Serb Army under command of General Ratko Mladic conquered the laughably-denominated "safe area" of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia, separated the women from the men, and then systematically slaughtered 8000 Muslim men. Thus, for the fourth time in the 20th Century, Christians carried out mass murder, on religious grounds, of non-Christians. The United Nations, whose charter makes it the protector of international peace and security and human rights, failed dismally for about the 200th time since its founding in 1945 (Cambodia and Rwanda are only two of the most grisly other failures).
It is fitting that this admirable book should be written by two Dutch academics, as the UN contingent in Srebrenica was a Dutch airborne battalion. Its performance was nothing to celebrate, but the Netherlands deserves credit for being the only country willing to put soldiers there. (The Clinton administration made loud moralistic noises, but contributed not a single soldier on the ground.) And in defense of the Dutch battalion, its position was made impossible by the cumbersome, timid, compromise-driven UN command structure. At the Serbs' insistence, it was allowed no heavy weapons and--incredibly--was refused helicopters, making re-supply possible only at the suffrance of the Serbs, who controlled all the ground routes in and out. The UN resolutions authorizing their presence were vague and contradictory, appearing to allow force only in defense of the UN personnel themselves, not the Bosnians. NATO was willing to supply fighter-bombers, but the UN authorization process was so gelatinous that air power never figured into the events in any significant way. The Dutch presence could be called worse than useless, because it lent the appearance of safety to an enclave that was, in the circumstances, indefensible; and led the outgunned Bosnians to rely on it.
For eighteen years, forensic teams have combed the surrounding hills and meadows, painstakingly recovering and identifying the victims' bodies. Only about half have been found. They have been re-interred in a cemetery across the road from the abandoned battery factory in the village of Potocari that the Dutch used as their headquarters. The four thousand or so headstones instill silence in all who visit. (The battery factory has been preserved as it was, down to the soldiers' graffiti.)
This book was written scarcely a year after the events. Its clear, thoughtful account holds up very well, not just recounting the conquest and massacre, but the larger picture as well. First-rate.
In July, 1995 the Bosnian Serb Army under command of General Ratko Mladic conquered the laughably-denominated "safe area" of Srebrenica in Eastern Bosnia, separated the women from the men, and then systematically slaughtered 8000 Muslim men. Thus, for the fourth time in the 20th Century, Christians carried out mass murder, on religious grounds, of non-Christians. The United Nations, whose charter makes it the protector of international peace and security and human rights, failed dismally for about the 200th time since its founding in 1945 (Cambodia and Rwanda are only two of the most grisly other failures).
It is fitting that this admirable book should be written by two Dutch academics, as the UN contingent in Srebrenica was a Dutch airborne battalion. Its performance was nothing to celebrate, but the Netherlands deserves credit for being the only country willing to put soldiers there. (The Clinton administration made loud moralistic noises, but contributed not a single soldier on the ground.) And in defense of the Dutch battalion, its position was made impossible by the cumbersome, timid, compromise-driven UN command structure. At the Serbs' insistence, it was allowed no heavy weapons and--incredibly--was refused helicopters, making re-supply possible only at the suffrance of the Serbs, who controlled all the ground routes in and out. The UN resolutions authorizing their presence were vague and contradictory, appearing to allow force only in defense of the UN personnel themselves, not the Bosnians. NATO was willing to supply fighter-bombers, but the UN authorization process was so gelatinous that air power never figured into the events in any significant way. The Dutch presence could be called worse than useless, because it lent the appearance of safety to an enclave that was, in the circumstances, indefensible; and led the outgunned Bosnians to rely on it.
For eighteen years, forensic teams have combed the surrounding hills and meadows, painstakingly recovering and identifying the victims' bodies. Only about half have been found. They have been re-interred in a cemetery across the road from the abandoned battery factory in the village of Potocari that the Dutch used as their headquarters. The four thousand or so headstones instill silence in all who visit. (The battery factory has been preserved as it was, down to the soldiers' graffiti.)
This book was written scarcely a year after the events. Its clear, thoughtful account holds up very well, not just recounting the conquest and massacre, but the larger picture as well. First-rate.
October 17, 2008
A calmy-told narration in harrowing detail of a truly horrendous chain of events. It strains my personal credulity to believe that these events went on in my lifetime, under the watchful gaze of the same world that so universally proclaimed "Never Again" after the end of World War II and all the atrocities that were perpetrated under the Third Reich. This work is impressive in the detached, journalistic tone it maintains throughout.
October 19, 2016
Excellent book on a horrifying time in the history of the world. One where the world watched until almost too late. That is becoming rather a them every generation or so. Armenia, the Holocaust, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and now Syria. Lots of other places that I have not mentioned, but we always say never forget! Yet...
October 10, 2024
A dispassionately detailed account of the events that led to the massacre at Srebrenica. None of the parties involved escape the author's assessing eye: Honig holds up the actions of each faction and key decision-maker to be scrutinized and presents the reader with a complex landscape of culpability and cause-and-effect.
August 7, 2014
Extremely dry and not put together terribly well; its biggest strength was its quoting of primary source documents, and there were not nearly enough used.
April 25, 2018
Fantastic analysis of the tragic events that led up to the genocide in Srebrenica. Reads as a true-crime novel, yet has the nuance and objectivity of an academic study.
June 16, 2015
Jaku doplněk k Vulliamymu dobrý, samostatně by mi to asi nestačilo. Dost technický, dost zaměřený na jednání mezinárodního společenství.
August 30, 2015
Vyborna kniha, hrozne citanie.
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