Charles Taylor, like many of us, has deep misgivings about postmodern culture. He highlights some of the typical culprits attributed to contemporary ennui and societal breakdown. Individualism, instrumental reason, loss of freedom, subjectivism, neutral liberalism, moral relativism. These are all inextricably linked both epistemologically and ethically, and whatever place we have arrived at in the realm of the reigning ethics that have dug their way into our modern consciousness is probably some admixture of these things.
The pursuit of actual authenticity has been warped because of Western society's prevailing social disposition that orients towards industrialization or technology, which sets a precedent for a calculative approach to life and fundamentally alters lived experience. According to Taylor, the primary question is why people, who were once almost exclusively actuated by moral considerations, are now compelled by things entirely severed from the metaphysical.
The general thrust of the book is Taylor's presentation of authenticity as a noble and morally legitimate aim that is not, in and of itself, automatically narcissistic but which can, if galvanized by the wrong ideas, morph into something debased, degraded, or trivial. It shouldn't be celebrated when it has collapsed into these diminished forms simply because freedom has been exercised. In other words, the pursuit of something on one's own terms, whatever it may be, does not necessarily mean said thing is justified in moral terms. And these terms are precisely the thing that endows something with meaning or a kind of metaphysical weight, which is unevenly distributed across the variety of pursuits and choices that we make, forging a hierarchy of values. Taylor links this to his concept of 'horizons of significance' - the idea that our actions, consciously or unconsciously, play out against multitudinous and diverse backgrounds of meaning (existing simultaneously) where they are only conferred moral significance based on the fulfillment of their respective ethical demands - these demands vary in magnitude and rigor, granting them different degrees of significance. These models of meaning are where genuine value systems can become legible to their practitioners and, in a world where the "only remaining value is choice itself," the contradiction between Taylor's concept and the contemporary consensus on individual morality could provide a lot of clarity.
Whenever we come to recognize ourselves as moral agents, and I believe this is a much slower and more arduous process than people realize, true authentic responsibility begins. Rather than a single phenomenological experience, it usually presents itself in a flux of deeply private, secret acknowledgements that fashions us into something other than mere observers. We become vested with a type of moral and therefore creative power because of this self-discovery. Just as Saint Augustine "saw the road to God as passing through our own reflexive awareness of ourselves" apprehending oneself grants moral and creative power. The former necessarily precedes the latter, functioning as a kind a foundation for the trajectory of those creative powers to unfold.
Yet problems arise when agency becomes detached from its moral underpinnings. We hear lots of seemingly updated language supplanting what are commonly held to be the traditional pillars of morality. And this seems normal enough or even a cause to be celebrated, considering everything else in society is rapidly changing as well.
But if moral values are analogous to technological, social, or economic change, then they become fungible as well, taken up or discarded at will, a relativism that implicitly suggests the equivalency of all things. So you can, in good conscience, chose anything without any process of justification other than that which you have to make to yourself. The moral ideal(s) are no longer the nucleus of the human personality, rather the individual becomes the core on which constantly new arbitrary values are grafted.
A lot can be said about having arrived at this point of fixation on identity. Some will point to the social upheaval of the sixties, which very successfully usurped a lot of the primary cultural values, whose consequences we are still dealing with today. And perhaps disruptions like these shouldn't be seen as aberrations within American liberal democracies but the full realization of the reigning ethos. Rather than moments that punctuate experienced freedom, they stand as teleological beacons that contain within them the animating principle of democratic freedom; that being an overcoming of social or cultural limitations restrictive to fully realized human freedom.
The Triumph of the Therapeutic - A Theory of Modern Religion
Therapy culture exists as a kind of barnacle on the side of the medicine, attempting and very much succeeding in insinuating itself into the domain of empiricism and pathology generally reserved for the hard sciences, which then grants it a kind of prestige and legitimacy, both precursors for high sociocultural status. In a sense, it impersonates medicine through its use of quantifiable metrics and pathologization (both imprecise and highly questionable).
And the undeniable secularization of society has meant the therapeutic mode has become the predominant one for understanding sociocultural dynamics and even more significantly, deeply moral questions, and therefore it's no surprise that the profession is utilized to either deploy or sanction traditionally shitty ideas, and transform them into palatable if not highly desirable pseudo philosophies.
The logic of therapy, obviously wanting to sustain and aggrandize itself as a professional class and also just as a matter of economic necessity, is ultimately grounded in a kind of voyeuristic culture of affirmation. Its practitioners must respect their patients and maintain them as clients by affirmatively accepting their subjective judgements no matter how bad they are. In other words, it's an inversion of the artistic mandate to reflexively assume you're contending with an unreliable narrator and instead, replacing them with an unassailable, unimpeachable protagonist, a fastidious, fully conscientious chronicler of personal narrative. This very much parallels the market's injunction that 'the customer is always right' seeing as how this is a decree that affirms, in all instances, the subjective judgments of the consumer in order for consumption to continue unabated.
As with all things relating to the zeitgeist and its related cultural shifts, there has naturally been a kind of informal, albeit highly influential vocabulary that has seeped out of the psychoanalytic tradition of contemporary therapeutic quarters. It's sort of like a linguistic scaffolding, where words become symbols and symbols become either paramount or insignificant based on certain cultural ratification processes. This isn't anything new, it's always been the origin point of civilizations and trajectory of cultures. The difference is that the power to consecrate is no longer reserved for religion, it actually comes from the realm of professional expertise and technical reason.
By wedding ourselves so intimately to reason as the final arbiter of all things, including the moral, we become a sort of instrumentalized vessel, trapped within a paradigm of practicality and dry calculation, thereby making all relationships and obligations fundamentally transactional in nature, since this is what the logic demands. This is the fundamental ethic of authenticity today.
Within this modern hellscape you may have to endure such catchphrases like "living your best life" or "YOLO." These types of things are usually uttered ironically but they have become cultural catchphrases for the simple fact that they carry within them the animating principle of the contemporary world. And as we know, much can be gleaned from the gutter of popular culture and what ideas it's smuggling in under the guise of humor. Everything now coalesces around the individual as the normative subject of all discourse. YOU are living YOUR best life and that YOU only live once.
And this meets no resistance from the new therapeutic religion because it has no higher aim or ideal other than obsessive self-fulfillment and egoistic indulgence, which "seems to recognize few external moral demands or serious commitments to others" if they happen to be in conflict with one's personal development. It grants preeminence of the self and advocates for whatever burgeoning desires, ambitions, motivations that emerge in the individual and that could be antithetical or in conflict with the concepts, duties, or obligations that previously anchored a person. This makes it intrinsically antisocial, yet its genesis and perpetual reformulations advance from presumably higher, more sophisticated, and more credentialed cultures of academia and science, whose rejection of metaphysical abstraction for a supposedly more rigorous and concrete form of truth naturally provides justification and absolution that meets the standard of postmodern ethics. And because it descends from such intellectual, cultural, and philosophical heights, it gives these ideas "a certain patina of deeper philosophical justification."
"...they tend to see fulfillment as just of the self, neglecting or delegitimizing the demands that come from beyond our own desires or aspirations, be they from history, tradition, society, nature, or God; they foster, in other words, a radical anthropocentrism."
This new religion desecrates and destroys, atomizes and diminishes relationships, bonds, communities, and any higher ideal required to uphold them. Its compatibility with other proto-religious commitments like neoliberalism, the market economy, and consumption make it wholly inhuman, indiscriminately extirpating humanity, so that it may be more fully consummated with the postmodern sacred.