Eisenhower and Berlin, 1945: The Decision to Halt at the Elbe

Norton Essays in American History

by Stephen E. Ambrose

In the final months of World War II, with the Allied forces streaming into Germany on two fronts, a major decision had to be made: where to draw a stop line to prevent an accidental clash between the Russian and the Anglo-American armies. Behind this decision lay another. Whose forces would be the first to reach Berlin? General Dwight David Eisenhower, supreme commander of the British and American armies, chose to halt at the Elbe River and leave Berlin to the Red Army. Could he have beaten the Russians to Berlin? If so, why didn't he? If he had, would the Berlin question have arisen? Would Germany have been divided as it was? Would the Cold War have assumed a direction more favorable to the West? In a narrative of steady fascination, Stephen E. Ambrose describes both the political and the military aspects of the situation, sketches the key players, explains the alternatives, and considers the results. The result is a sharply focused light on an important question of the postwar world. This paperback edition features a new introduction by the author. Maps

Genres: History, World War II, Nonfiction, Military Fiction

122 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1967

About the author

Stephen Edward Ambrose was an American historian and biographer of U.S. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon. He received his Ph.D. in 1960 from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. In his final years he faced charges of plagiarism for his books, with subsequent concerns about his research emerging after his death.

Reviews

[Evgenia · Rating 5 out of 5]

What began my brief flirtation with military history; I picked this up in an airport bookstore and finished it in one sitting. This book provides a glimpse into the strategy behind a decision in the waning days of World War II—whether the Red Army or the British/American allies should reach Berlin first—whose consequences would shape the world order for decades to come. It also demonstrates the enormously complicated logistical lift it is to do anything on a grand scale. How, for example, do two massive armies that are friendly toward but relatively ignorant of one another avoid slaughtering each other by mistake as they clamor towards Berlin from opposite directions? These are problems I had never considered before, and they made me appreciate that the bureaucrats who solve them are among the unsung heroes of this overly populated and thus necessarily complicated world we live in.

My interest in this genre was, indeed, brief; it ended with the very next book I read by the same author. But Eisenhower and Berlin reminded me of the life-changing and only slightly exaggerated maxim I heard in my early days of college: “everything is interesting”—at least once. I can’t speak to the buffs among you, but for those who want to only dip their toe in military history, this is great water to do it in.

[Daniel · Rating 4 out of 5]

A thought provoking book on what was and what could have been. This book argues that Eisenhower’s decision to avoid “racing the Soviets” to Berlin was justified by the need to allocate resources to the defeat of the Germans, rather than to secure the prestige of taking the German capital. The question that lingers is what if anything could have been done to prevent communist takeovers in Eastern Europe, particularly Czechoslovakia, and ti what extent military leadership had to interpret the intent of political leadership in the US, particularly with a President in physical decline. Churchill seemed more in tune with political reality — particularly Stalin’s menace — than Roosevelt, and the US caricature of Stalin as “Uncle Joe.”

[Michael Anderson · Rating 5 out of 5]

Well argued description and justification of Eisenhower’s decision to leave the invasion of Berlin to the Russians during the last days of World War II in Europe. He wanted to end the war quickly to free up forces for the Japanese theater by quelling German counterforces across the country. Agreements between US, UK, and USSR political leaders were already in place to divide up the country and its capital city, so he decided to let Russia suffer the estimated 100,000 casualties it would take. The US and UK would occupy the city shortly anyway. In the south of Germany, he concentrated on invading Austria and stayed out of Czechoslovakia. In a military sense, all this was correct, and Eisenhower was entirely focused on the military mission. He would have done things differently if his leaders had actually changed the political goals, but they never did officially.

This is a short yet fascinating book. How would the Cold War played if the US/UK forces had moved into Berlin and eastward points before the Russians did? It would make a great alternative history tale, wouldn’t it?

[Joseph · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was a very interesting book, and it discusses Ike's decision not to "race" to take Berlin before the Russians did. His argument was plenty; that they were further away from the start, there was no strategic advantage (the city was more of a symbol as most of the government officials left) and it was more of a political motivation, and it was estimated that over 100K soldiers would probably die. He also indicated that for the past year there were talks about how Germany and Berlin would be divided also, so it didn't matter who got there first. It was a good argument, debate, discussion, etc. This was well written and thoughtful. One thought not mentioned was getting to the city to get all the research and files of the gov scientific and military programs that were being done. Those are the things that should not have gotten into Russian hands. But really good book and I am glad I finally got a chance to read it.

[Davy Bennett · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's been 20+ years since I read this so I'll be necessarily brief.
As a right wing Republican/Libertarian in my 40s and 50s I thought it was a shame for us to hold back. An invitation for the communist Soviets to further evangelize Eastern Europe. I am 1/4 Lithuanian so I probably know a little for about the Eastern Front than most Americans. If you want a quick latter day catch-up on it try Timothy Snyders Bloodlands.
Now that I'm a little more moderate and more cynical about our CIA (Deep State or whatever you want to call it, RIP JFK) and the USSR has collapsed I can see the merit of allowing the Soviets who lost 20 million in the Nazi invasion take Berlin.

Ike was definitely an establishment man. He did more golfing than he did challenging of anything.
I saw his crib in Gettysburg a few months ago.
A guy could do worse.

[Neil · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brief but well researched study on Eisenhower's decision not to invade Berlin at the end of the war in Europe. He's often criticized for not entering Berlin before the Russians, thereby possibly preventing the cities division and years of cold war. Book succinctly explains why Ike's decision was the right one.

[Bert J · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great history details on Eisenhower's constraints and thinking on the end of the war in Germany

Bit dry if you are not into real history -- but I enjoyed the nuanced insights into the situation
Ambrose is a pro

[Dan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very interesting short book on a very focused subject. The decision that, if made differently, could possibly have had a massive effect on post-war Berlin and the Cold War.

[Phil LeDuc · Rating 5 out of 5]

Short, well-argued volume on the Eisenhower's decision to stopping at the Elbe River and not drive for Berlin as WWII neared its end in Europe.

[Allen · Rating 4 out of 5]

4 stars to match Ike's. I had no idea about this part of WWII. It was very interesting.