Part One: Theory
Incredibly tough and boring read for pretty much the entirety of part one. At times I considered ending my reading of the book but was determined to give it more of a chance. Soros attempts to explain his concept of reflexivity in potentially the hardest possible way to understand (or maybe I am just slow). There were sparse moments of entertainment along the way but few and far between. In all fairness, I would struggle to explain reflexivity as well, but I’ll try to do my best now for the sake of my own understanding. There are two parts of reflexivity, the cognitive function and participating function, that constantly feed off each other. The cognitive function is how people see the world; The participating function is how people act based on that belief. These two functions lead to boom/bust cycles since they are self fulfilling. For example, people believe Microsoft stock will rise —> stock rises due to purchasing of the stock —> higher stock price lowers cost of capital and makes acquisitions easier —> easier path to growth leads to an even more inflated stock price —> fundamentals improved due to increased stock price. Eventually this self-fulfilling process strays so far from its fundamentals or there is a large catalyst that uncovers the misevaluation. As a result, the bust shows up in a harsher and steeper drop than the boom could have ever imagined (often dropping too low resulting in jump back up to the fair value after the bottom out).
Part Two: Historical Perspective
Part two was slightly less boring than part one, only due to the fact that at least history is discussed, which I find decently interesting. Soros did his best to make it as boring as part one. Not much to discuss here as Soros just discusses how reflexivity has shown up within various historical boom/bust cycles. The main one that stuck out to me was the conglomerate boom of the 1960s. Soros explanation gave a clear and easy to understand explanation of how reflexivity led to the boom/bust of the conglomerate boom. I will explain it for my own practice and understanding. Investors believed that diversification across unrelated businesses reduced risk and earnings growth was all that mattered —> conglomerates would finance acquisitions through issuance of stock at high multiples —> the corporations that were acquired would see immediate multiple expansion and the conglomerates would report EPS growth (there was no natural growth as it was all through acquisitions). This process fed on itself as higher stock prices led to cheaper financing to purchase more corporations that would raise EPS in turn raising stock prices. Eventually when the stock price strayed too far from the fundamentals the boom cycle ended, the bust began, multiples compressed, and the process fed on itself much more viciously and rapidly in reverse.
Part Three: The Real-Time Experiment
I found part three to be the most engaging of the first three parts. The core idea of part three is that we follow along with Soros as he is making his investment decisions and as he is reading market sentiment. The process began with his explanation of what he called Regan’s Imperial Cycle, where emerging countries’ unfortunate debt obligations were compounded by a strong US economy, high interest rates, a strong dollar, and strong foreign flows into the US which was a reflexive process that fed on itself. The reflexive process made it nearly impossible for the debtor countries to pay their interest payments as the dollar got stronger and their currency weaker in comparison. This idea was the thesis that Soros predicated many of his initial positions on but quickly and often adapted this positions to the ever changing global macroeconomic conditions. Phase one of his real-time experiment was extremely profitable, the most profitable period of the Quantum Fund in its existence; phase two was nowhere near as profitable, underperforming almost every benchmark. No matter the profitability of the phase, it was most interesting to view his decision making process in real time and see the relationships and connections he makes across asset classes. It was also interesting to see how often his investment thesis on the global scale changed (practically monthly). Part three is the most differentiated aspect of this book when compared to other finance books. In no other book have I been taken along for the ride of reading the fundamentals and market sentiment like Soros does in The Alchemy of Finance.
Part Four: Evaluation
Part four helps to support Soros’ initial statements about how the social sciences need to be studied in a completely different fashion than the natural sciences are studied. Natural sciences are able to use processes, such as the scientific method or the D-M method, to come to their objective conclusions. The social sciences attempt to use a similar paradigm, like the random walk hypothesis, but it fails to recreate what the natural sciences can prove. Natural sciences use objective facts to prove their hypothesis and are true irrespective of what the participants do. It is science. On the other hand, the social sciences, such as the financial markets, are dependent on the prevailing biases of the participants, so the financial markets are self-validating (reflexive) and never come to objective conclusions. What market participants believe is true comes to fruition and what becomes true then effects further beliefs. Obviously, this is only true until an inevitable bust occurs where market participants did not have the foresight to see. I appreciate Soros’ view of how social sciences need to be treated differently than natural sciences. Economists do not need to create rules, such as Newton’s Laws, to try and seem as sophisticated as the chemists and astrophysicists of the world. It is a different game and needs different rules.
Part Five: Prescription
Soros spends most of part five dishing out critiques and solutions pertaining to the current world he lived in. Some of his ideas are an international central bank, international currency (tied to the price of oil), and the destruction of OPEC which in turn would create a new system connected to the international theme. He then goes on to discuss the crash of 1987 and why Japan is soon going to surpass the US as the world leader. By the end of the book, I was starting to get fed up with Soros’ sense of self-importance. Obviously he has had tremendous success but he takes himself all too serious. I had to let out a chuckle when he actually referred to himself as some sort of god. We can now look back on his statement that Japan will surpass the US as the world number one and laugh because that clearly did not come to fruition.
Overall, I enjoyed his real-time experiment the most. If I were to read this book again, I would probably only read part three. Seeing the macro connections Soros is able to make between changes in various countries’ economies was super insightful. The rest of the book is Soros going on tangents that are hard to understand and contain way too many semicolons. I think I also just struggled to read portions because there is a strong philosophical connection in his writing, and I am not as apt in understanding philosophy lingo as I am with understanding his discussions about financial markets.