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Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony
History records only one peaceful transition of hegemonic the passage from British to American dominance of the international order. What made that transition uniquely cooperative and nonviolent? Does it offer lessons to guide policy as the United States faces its own challengers to the order it has enforced since the 1940s? To answer these questions, Kori Schake explores nine points of crisis or tension between Britain and the United States, from the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to the establishment of the unequal “special relationship” during World War II.Over this period, Safe Passage shows, the United States gradually changed the rules that Britain had established at its imperial height. It was able to do so peacefully because, during the crucial years, Britain and the United States came to look alike to each other and different from other nations. Britain followed America’s lead in becoming more democratic, while the United States, because of its conquest of the American West, developed an imperial cast of mind. Until the end of World War II, both countries paid more attention to their cumulative power relative to other states in the order than to their individual power relative to each other.The factors that made the Anglo-American transition peaceful, notably the convergence in their domestic ideologies, are unlikely to apply in future transitions, Schake concludes. We are much more likely to see high-stake standoffs among competing powers attempting to shape the international order to reflect the starkly different ideologies that prevail at home.
392 pages, Kindle Edition
First published November 27, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 22 of 22 reviews
February 21, 2018
I read this book after listening to Kori on the Deep State Radio podcast for many months. This US history from a different perspective of American hegemony taking over from the British on the world stage. The book relates many instances between the US and Britain which might have ended in war, from Spanish-American war, Oregon boundary and of course WWI and WWII. The British were close to recognizing the Confederacy at one point. Kori leads us through these parts and more of our history with Britain. This book is well written and well worth a read.
May 17, 2018
This is a serious and very impressive work of scholarship that draws from the history of international relations to raise questions about the future relationship between the United States and China. What helps distinguish the work is the quality of the writing. Author Kori Schake is surely the Grand Marshall of the paragraph. Writing instructors everywhere will say "Someone listened to what we said." In nearly every chapter her paragraphs begin with a clear sentence laying out the thesis of the paragraph. This is followed by clearly written supporting statements of fact and opinion, then ended with a strong conclusive sentence. Textbook perfect.
Her theme is the passing of global hegemony from one nation to another. Hegemons do not readily give up their role of setting the rules for the "international order" of states. Harvard's Belfer Center has carefully researched the 16 times in history such a shift has taken place, and only once has that transition occurred peacefully. The exception is when the United States took leadership from Britain. This is the case Schake details in Safe Passage.
The process was slow, taking most of the 19th Century. She charts the course of transfer of leadership through nine "inflection points," of significant interaction between the two nations. They are: the Monroe Doctrine; the Oregon Boundary Dispute; Recognizing the Confederacy; Defining Themselves; the Venezuelan Debt Crises; the War with Spain; World War I; the Washington Naval Treaties; and World War II. These mostly are straightforward, although Defining Themselves refers to how the two countries came to change their national self image myths in a way that tended to make the two countries see one another as similar. The creation of the "special relationship" of the two depended on this, she writes. She first outlines the elements of each inflection point in chapter one, then devotes a detailed chapter to each. Before those detailed chapters, there is chapter two, which deals with international relations theory. It is a bit murky, as theory discussions often become. The point seems to be to diminish the realist view of statecraft to incorporate the more liberal approach advocated by other writers she cites.
Her exposition of the inflection points is quite informative as it treats of the widely different cultures involved, the national interests at stake, and the changes altering both countries. She selects the Monroe Doctrine as her starting point because it is the first instance of the Americans formulating a foreign policy (apart from the whole American Revolution thing). The British favored the American stance, even though they would effectively supply the "muscle" for enforcement. Keeping new colonial masters out of the Western hemisphere meant open markets for British manufactures.
The question of Britain recognizing the Confederacy apparently was a close run event. The British elite felt quite comfortable with the plantation owners as a class, so there was strong pressure to recognize the Confederacy in some fashion. The constraint against this was that the British workers who lacked the right to vote, admired the broad availability of the franchise in the Union. Thus, there was reluctance of British politicians to affront the workers and give rise to a revolution at home. The author explains how the immigrants in America influenced their family and friends still in Britain. She also notes how Lincoln and others considered spurring discontent in Ireland and Scotland if Britain recognized the Southern rebel government. The American immigrants and enfranchised workers effectively "restrained a stronger power from acting on the logic of its interests out of concern for the domestic repercussions the United States was uniquely in a position to engender."
Venezuela faced debt crises in 1895 and 1903 risking war with European nations wanting repaid. German and British ships fired on Venezuelan ships and facilities but backed off when the United States invoked the Monroe Doctrine in a broader variant. Then, "Britain took the measure of American power and chose to no longer contest it as it had previously." This marked a turning point in British thinking. They came to accept the rising power of the Americans, but hoped to use that power to further their own interests.
The war with Spain brought the United States elements of an overseas empire, not only in the Caribbean, but in the Pacific with the Philippines and Guam, but also with the separate addition of Hawaii. The British abetted the naval actions of the Americans against the Germans in Manila Harbor. where the Germans were attempting to secure a naval base.
The entry of the United States in World War I, and the vigorous role they played in the Peace Treaty at the end of the war, clearly indicated that the upstart nations was a true global power. The postwar Washington conference on Naval Treaties saw the Americans achieve parity with Britain in battleships and other heavy naval systems. Britain had lost its role as hegemon and the United States had gained that status.
World War II saw the furthering of this dominance by the United States by virtue of its economic capacity, its newfound confidence, and the fact that all other contenders had been flattened by the war. The Marshall plan provided for the start of recovery for both allies and enemies. The United States was now imposing its own sense of vision and purpose on the international order. The transfer of hegemony was completed without war between the powers.
"The experience of the passage from British to American hegemony suggests that a peaceful transition form American to Chinese hegemony is highly unlikely." Schake asserts this in her introduction, then returns with a few pithy pages of discussion in her conclusion. She anticipates that China will make changes in the international order to reflect its own government philosophy, as the United States did. Unfortunately China's philosophy "does not hold the wielders of power accountable to the public by either election or journalism." Under the Chinese model, the international order would be "very different" from what America imposed. "It would encourage and support other authoritarian governments politically, financially, and socially. It would penalize states for interfering in the internal practices of repressive governments. It would offer privileged access to state-associated commercial concerns."
She concludes, " China lacks an ideology likely to appeal to America in the seductive way America's ideology appealed within Britain and beyond. Without such an ideology, any hegemonic transition will require imposition by force."
Although the prospect she envisions is unseemly, the book is well worth study by those interested in the world to come.
Her theme is the passing of global hegemony from one nation to another. Hegemons do not readily give up their role of setting the rules for the "international order" of states. Harvard's Belfer Center has carefully researched the 16 times in history such a shift has taken place, and only once has that transition occurred peacefully. The exception is when the United States took leadership from Britain. This is the case Schake details in Safe Passage.
The process was slow, taking most of the 19th Century. She charts the course of transfer of leadership through nine "inflection points," of significant interaction between the two nations. They are: the Monroe Doctrine; the Oregon Boundary Dispute; Recognizing the Confederacy; Defining Themselves; the Venezuelan Debt Crises; the War with Spain; World War I; the Washington Naval Treaties; and World War II. These mostly are straightforward, although Defining Themselves refers to how the two countries came to change their national self image myths in a way that tended to make the two countries see one another as similar. The creation of the "special relationship" of the two depended on this, she writes. She first outlines the elements of each inflection point in chapter one, then devotes a detailed chapter to each. Before those detailed chapters, there is chapter two, which deals with international relations theory. It is a bit murky, as theory discussions often become. The point seems to be to diminish the realist view of statecraft to incorporate the more liberal approach advocated by other writers she cites.
Her exposition of the inflection points is quite informative as it treats of the widely different cultures involved, the national interests at stake, and the changes altering both countries. She selects the Monroe Doctrine as her starting point because it is the first instance of the Americans formulating a foreign policy (apart from the whole American Revolution thing). The British favored the American stance, even though they would effectively supply the "muscle" for enforcement. Keeping new colonial masters out of the Western hemisphere meant open markets for British manufactures.
The question of Britain recognizing the Confederacy apparently was a close run event. The British elite felt quite comfortable with the plantation owners as a class, so there was strong pressure to recognize the Confederacy in some fashion. The constraint against this was that the British workers who lacked the right to vote, admired the broad availability of the franchise in the Union. Thus, there was reluctance of British politicians to affront the workers and give rise to a revolution at home. The author explains how the immigrants in America influenced their family and friends still in Britain. She also notes how Lincoln and others considered spurring discontent in Ireland and Scotland if Britain recognized the Southern rebel government. The American immigrants and enfranchised workers effectively "restrained a stronger power from acting on the logic of its interests out of concern for the domestic repercussions the United States was uniquely in a position to engender."
Venezuela faced debt crises in 1895 and 1903 risking war with European nations wanting repaid. German and British ships fired on Venezuelan ships and facilities but backed off when the United States invoked the Monroe Doctrine in a broader variant. Then, "Britain took the measure of American power and chose to no longer contest it as it had previously." This marked a turning point in British thinking. They came to accept the rising power of the Americans, but hoped to use that power to further their own interests.
The war with Spain brought the United States elements of an overseas empire, not only in the Caribbean, but in the Pacific with the Philippines and Guam, but also with the separate addition of Hawaii. The British abetted the naval actions of the Americans against the Germans in Manila Harbor. where the Germans were attempting to secure a naval base.
The entry of the United States in World War I, and the vigorous role they played in the Peace Treaty at the end of the war, clearly indicated that the upstart nations was a true global power. The postwar Washington conference on Naval Treaties saw the Americans achieve parity with Britain in battleships and other heavy naval systems. Britain had lost its role as hegemon and the United States had gained that status.
World War II saw the furthering of this dominance by the United States by virtue of its economic capacity, its newfound confidence, and the fact that all other contenders had been flattened by the war. The Marshall plan provided for the start of recovery for both allies and enemies. The United States was now imposing its own sense of vision and purpose on the international order. The transfer of hegemony was completed without war between the powers.
"The experience of the passage from British to American hegemony suggests that a peaceful transition form American to Chinese hegemony is highly unlikely." Schake asserts this in her introduction, then returns with a few pithy pages of discussion in her conclusion. She anticipates that China will make changes in the international order to reflect its own government philosophy, as the United States did. Unfortunately China's philosophy "does not hold the wielders of power accountable to the public by either election or journalism." Under the Chinese model, the international order would be "very different" from what America imposed. "It would encourage and support other authoritarian governments politically, financially, and socially. It would penalize states for interfering in the internal practices of repressive governments. It would offer privileged access to state-associated commercial concerns."
She concludes, " China lacks an ideology likely to appeal to America in the seductive way America's ideology appealed within Britain and beyond. Without such an ideology, any hegemonic transition will require imposition by force."
Although the prospect she envisions is unseemly, the book is well worth study by those interested in the world to come.
September 21, 2019
Schake’s thesis: “America faces challenges to the international order of its making — in particular the rise of China. The experience of the passage from British to American hegemony suggests that a peaceful transition from American to Chinese hegemony is highly unlikely. The passage was testy and contingent even between two countries with many more commonalities. If this earlier transition is illustrative, hegemony with Chinese characteristics will not hue to the rules of order established by the United States. Instead should it become the hegemon, China will project onto the international order its own domestic ideology, just as America has.... Perhaps that is the most worrisome lesson for America as it contemplates other rising powers: future hegemony, no matter how much commonality they exhibit through the passage of power from one state to another, will eventually seek to remake the international order in their own image, just as the United States has.” This makes sense on the assumption that China has the same sort of messianic, even millenarian (and thus proselytizing) political culture that America does — which it does not. In fact, China sees the world more in terms of itself as the Middle Kingdom of all under heaven (tianxia).
“Wilson... had found the key that would eventually become the basis for American hegemony: remaking the international order into a values-drenched simulacrum of the United States. Only when the political principles by which Americans purported to live could be universalized would American power be harnessed toward establishing order.” (13)
“The peaceful transition [from Britain to the US] was a highly contingent outcome, unlikely to be replicable. The probability is very small of starts aligning such that both the rising and relatively declining power each possesses and recognizes in the other cimilarities, consider them distinguishing from all others, and fosters unique trust that enables a shifting of power without violence. The British to American transition also cautions against optimism that a rising power will become a ‘responsible stakeholder.’ Washington’s hopefulness that it can find a formula for a powerful and prosperous China probably underestimates just how much at variance with America’s notions of responsibility China’s notions of responsibility are, or to whom the Chinese government considers itself responsible. Great Britain was the society most like American in the late 19th and rarely 20th centuries, sharing related populations, common history, similar language, political philosophies that emerged from the European enlightenment, and cultures easily accessible to the broad population. America is likely to be far more different from potential hegemonic challengers than it was different from Britain.... A peaceful transition from Great Britain to the United States would almost certainly have been contested by violence without the cultural similarities the two countries shared in the nineteenth century.” (18-19, 38)
“The nature of the state is central to understanding why America was different from the established order at the time of its ascendency, the new type of threat it posed to states constituted less democratically, why Britain and America found the basis for cooperation, and ultimately why America did not hew to the special relationship it had with Britain but sought to transform international relations by urging adoption more generally of its form of domestic governance.” (22)
“Control alone is adequate to define hegemony. The amount of force hegemony requires is a useful measure of sustainment, but not definitional. It may be despotism, and an inferior model of Rome’s more efficient imperium of making subjects out of the conquered, or a Pax Americana of consensual association, but control is sufficient for establishing and enforcing the rules of international order.” (24)
“While the two are often conflated, hegemony is not synonymous with empire, the difference being that empire is the direct administration of different communities from an imperial center and hegemony is the ability of some power or authority to lay down the law about external relations between states in the international system, while leaving them domestically independent.” (32)
It almost went badly wrong on numerous occasions in the UK/US transition, largely because “British statesmen were appalled at the type of government on display in America.” (275)
“In stark terms, the lessons of the British to American case for future hegemonic transitions are four: (1) the prospects for a peaceful hegemonic transition are small even in the most conductive circumstances; (2) differences in political culture and structure of government make an American to Chinese hegemonic transition much less likely to be peaceful; (3) America is making the same strategic choice with China that Great Britain did with a rising America, that it can be induced to comply with extant rules; and (4) America ought to expect that a hegemonic China will rewrite the rules to reflect its domestic political culture, just as America itself did.” (272) I’m with Schake except on the last point, for the reasons of strategic culture (tianxia) mentioned above.
“America’s ability to reach into other countries’ domestic politics, and the comparative difficulty of other countries being able to affect a more kaleidoscopic American body politic, provided a significant bargaining advantage in American foreign policy.” (277) Of course, with today’s closed communication system and authoritarian politician system in China versus the open communications system and democratic political system in the United States, the reverse logic applies in the 21st century: China is much more likely to be effective interfering in American politics than the U.S is to be interfering in Chinese politics.
“If prevention of war is the metric... a Fukuyama orientation of American policy [could] prove essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between America and CHina should it occur.” (287) “The American order will succeed or fail along Fukuyama lines: either the United States will prove right that free people and free markets are the sole basis for sustaining prosperity and political power, and China will either fail to continue rising or become indistinguishable from other states in the American order, or China will prove resistant to the attractions of liberalism and overtake America as the hegemon. If the Chinese model sustains itself, then a dominant China is likely to recast the rules in ways that extrapolate to the international order its domestic ideology, just as America did. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics would be a very different international order from the one that American has fostered with its hegemony.” (291)
“Wilson... had found the key that would eventually become the basis for American hegemony: remaking the international order into a values-drenched simulacrum of the United States. Only when the political principles by which Americans purported to live could be universalized would American power be harnessed toward establishing order.” (13)
“The peaceful transition [from Britain to the US] was a highly contingent outcome, unlikely to be replicable. The probability is very small of starts aligning such that both the rising and relatively declining power each possesses and recognizes in the other cimilarities, consider them distinguishing from all others, and fosters unique trust that enables a shifting of power without violence. The British to American transition also cautions against optimism that a rising power will become a ‘responsible stakeholder.’ Washington’s hopefulness that it can find a formula for a powerful and prosperous China probably underestimates just how much at variance with America’s notions of responsibility China’s notions of responsibility are, or to whom the Chinese government considers itself responsible. Great Britain was the society most like American in the late 19th and rarely 20th centuries, sharing related populations, common history, similar language, political philosophies that emerged from the European enlightenment, and cultures easily accessible to the broad population. America is likely to be far more different from potential hegemonic challengers than it was different from Britain.... A peaceful transition from Great Britain to the United States would almost certainly have been contested by violence without the cultural similarities the two countries shared in the nineteenth century.” (18-19, 38)
“The nature of the state is central to understanding why America was different from the established order at the time of its ascendency, the new type of threat it posed to states constituted less democratically, why Britain and America found the basis for cooperation, and ultimately why America did not hew to the special relationship it had with Britain but sought to transform international relations by urging adoption more generally of its form of domestic governance.” (22)
“Control alone is adequate to define hegemony. The amount of force hegemony requires is a useful measure of sustainment, but not definitional. It may be despotism, and an inferior model of Rome’s more efficient imperium of making subjects out of the conquered, or a Pax Americana of consensual association, but control is sufficient for establishing and enforcing the rules of international order.” (24)
“While the two are often conflated, hegemony is not synonymous with empire, the difference being that empire is the direct administration of different communities from an imperial center and hegemony is the ability of some power or authority to lay down the law about external relations between states in the international system, while leaving them domestically independent.” (32)
It almost went badly wrong on numerous occasions in the UK/US transition, largely because “British statesmen were appalled at the type of government on display in America.” (275)
“In stark terms, the lessons of the British to American case for future hegemonic transitions are four: (1) the prospects for a peaceful hegemonic transition are small even in the most conductive circumstances; (2) differences in political culture and structure of government make an American to Chinese hegemonic transition much less likely to be peaceful; (3) America is making the same strategic choice with China that Great Britain did with a rising America, that it can be induced to comply with extant rules; and (4) America ought to expect that a hegemonic China will rewrite the rules to reflect its domestic political culture, just as America itself did.” (272) I’m with Schake except on the last point, for the reasons of strategic culture (tianxia) mentioned above.
“America’s ability to reach into other countries’ domestic politics, and the comparative difficulty of other countries being able to affect a more kaleidoscopic American body politic, provided a significant bargaining advantage in American foreign policy.” (277) Of course, with today’s closed communication system and authoritarian politician system in China versus the open communications system and democratic political system in the United States, the reverse logic applies in the 21st century: China is much more likely to be effective interfering in American politics than the U.S is to be interfering in Chinese politics.
“If prevention of war is the metric... a Fukuyama orientation of American policy [could] prove essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between America and CHina should it occur.” (287) “The American order will succeed or fail along Fukuyama lines: either the United States will prove right that free people and free markets are the sole basis for sustaining prosperity and political power, and China will either fail to continue rising or become indistinguishable from other states in the American order, or China will prove resistant to the attractions of liberalism and overtake America as the hegemon. If the Chinese model sustains itself, then a dominant China is likely to recast the rules in ways that extrapolate to the international order its domestic ideology, just as America did. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics would be a very different international order from the one that American has fostered with its hegemony.” (291)
July 29, 2025
I got to see Kori Schake talk about this book (and got the book for free), so this was near the top of my read list in terms of geopolitics-oriented books this summer. I found the topic to be fascinating and engaging, and the book to be unlike many of its peers that trace recent political history to ultimately dump an ideological thesis in the closing chapter. This book truly deserves its use of historical events to support its overarching narrative, using a series of interactions (some well-known, some less so) between the War of 1812 and the Cold War to examine how the British Empire peacefully surrendered its global hegemony to a rising, assertive United States. I learned a lot about rather obscure episodes of American history, such as the Oregon boundary dispute and the Venezuelan debt crisis, along with brushing up on my 19th-century American history more broadly (e.g., the Monroe Doctrine and its actual enforcement in the Western Hemisphere). This also allowed me to recontextualize many of the historical events that I was already familiar with, such as the Spanish-American War, the possibility of foreign intervention in the American Civil War, and the Washington Naval Treaties during the interwar period.
I do wish Schake spent more time on the implications of this transition on the prospect of a rising China and a retreating America (her general argument is clear and well-supported, but only about <5% of the actual book content). Her transformation of the discussion of hegemony into a discussion about admitting Chinese international students into American universities was also interesting and worth expanding on. Overall, this was a great read (and is one of the prettier hardcover books that I own - I love the turquoise sleeve with a political cartoon on the front, the font choices, and how well it contrasts with my Princeton University Libraries bookmark). I just wish this book were longer.
I do wish Schake spent more time on the implications of this transition on the prospect of a rising China and a retreating America (her general argument is clear and well-supported, but only about <5% of the actual book content). Her transformation of the discussion of hegemony into a discussion about admitting Chinese international students into American universities was also interesting and worth expanding on. Overall, this was a great read (and is one of the prettier hardcover books that I own - I love the turquoise sleeve with a political cartoon on the front, the font choices, and how well it contrasts with my Princeton University Libraries bookmark). I just wish this book were longer.
January 21, 2019
A thorough examination of the peaceful transition of world power between the United States and Great Britain. Schake discusses nine specific events that aided this passage.
January 16, 2019
This is a terrific expansive review by Kori Schake of one of the handful of exceptions to the Thucydides's Trap, the challenge of an ascending America to a well established Britain.
Luckily I had already read "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?" by Graham Allison which outlined 16 instances of an ascending power challenging the established power, 12 of which ended in war. While the Allison book does include the America versus Britain transition, it does not go into great depth or recognise as many historical touch points as Schake's book does.
Schake demonstrates in her thorough and thoughtful analysis the number of times that America and Britain could have fallen into the trap but didn't, usually due to the more 'mature' foreign policy of Britain than the 'righteous' foreign policy of America (in that sense it reminded me of a parent trying to deal with a child and teenager growing into adulthood and then surpassing the parent).
I withheld a star for a couple of reasons. I think Schake should have provided more context to emphasise how remarkable the "Safe Passage" really was by providing a brief overview of the 16 examples of the Thucydides's Trap instead of the single footnote on page one of her book. Frankly, I would have preferred that to the extended discourse in Chapter 2 of how other writers have gotten their analysis wrong. I also found the repetition in chapters (dateline, synopsis of chapter followed by in depth analysis of the synopsis tiresome after a while). However my own personal quibbles shouldn't keep you from reading this great book.
Finally, I was thrilled to find Schake referencing one of my favourite books "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers" by Paul Kennedy which I have steadfastly refused to remove from my home library. I would definitely recommend it as well as the Graham Allison book mentioned above. The 21st century China versus America transition will be faced by our children and grandchildren and another "Safe Passage" is not likely to be something that historians will be writing about.
Luckily I had already read "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?" by Graham Allison which outlined 16 instances of an ascending power challenging the established power, 12 of which ended in war. While the Allison book does include the America versus Britain transition, it does not go into great depth or recognise as many historical touch points as Schake's book does.
Schake demonstrates in her thorough and thoughtful analysis the number of times that America and Britain could have fallen into the trap but didn't, usually due to the more 'mature' foreign policy of Britain than the 'righteous' foreign policy of America (in that sense it reminded me of a parent trying to deal with a child and teenager growing into adulthood and then surpassing the parent).
I withheld a star for a couple of reasons. I think Schake should have provided more context to emphasise how remarkable the "Safe Passage" really was by providing a brief overview of the 16 examples of the Thucydides's Trap instead of the single footnote on page one of her book. Frankly, I would have preferred that to the extended discourse in Chapter 2 of how other writers have gotten their analysis wrong. I also found the repetition in chapters (dateline, synopsis of chapter followed by in depth analysis of the synopsis tiresome after a while). However my own personal quibbles shouldn't keep you from reading this great book.
Finally, I was thrilled to find Schake referencing one of my favourite books "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers" by Paul Kennedy which I have steadfastly refused to remove from my home library. I would definitely recommend it as well as the Graham Allison book mentioned above. The 21st century China versus America transition will be faced by our children and grandchildren and another "Safe Passage" is not likely to be something that historians will be writing about.
March 2, 2021
Long overdue, this was my weekend reader for the last year. So I chipped away, but I’m glad I did. The other books I’ve read alongside have only amplified the historical context of this interesting and unique period in human history, the rise of Pax Americana.
Kori Schake does an amazing job laying the groundwork of her research and provides a superior in depth analysis of the period in history from the mid 1800s and ties the threads through to today’s rise of China and the relationship with the US. There are some striking similarities in any rising power, and too often our view of the present status taints the view of the history of the US. Put bluntly, the US blew up the old world order and was not subtle about it at all.
One of the most interesting points that I gleaned was the ability of Britain to have influence over this transition. Though not without bloodshed or conflict, it was relatively peaceful, and Britain was shrewd enough to parlay American power in their favor as the latter rose.
Essentially, Britain was able to swallow their pride and act pragmatically as they saw what was happening. Could America do so if we see the same fate occurring (and odds are it will occur, sooner rather than later). The conditions would have to be ideal, and America would need steadier hands, and a more deft touch. That would require deeper study and understanding of the rising power. Concomitantly, the domestic politics would need to have some alignment as well.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a happy ending with this story. The question remains, if a conflict looms as history has shown (vis a vis great power transition) what does that look like? Will war and conflict in the future remain bound by violence and bloodshed? Or will it somehow evolve?
Kori Schake does an amazing job laying the groundwork of her research and provides a superior in depth analysis of the period in history from the mid 1800s and ties the threads through to today’s rise of China and the relationship with the US. There are some striking similarities in any rising power, and too often our view of the present status taints the view of the history of the US. Put bluntly, the US blew up the old world order and was not subtle about it at all.
One of the most interesting points that I gleaned was the ability of Britain to have influence over this transition. Though not without bloodshed or conflict, it was relatively peaceful, and Britain was shrewd enough to parlay American power in their favor as the latter rose.
Essentially, Britain was able to swallow their pride and act pragmatically as they saw what was happening. Could America do so if we see the same fate occurring (and odds are it will occur, sooner rather than later). The conditions would have to be ideal, and America would need steadier hands, and a more deft touch. That would require deeper study and understanding of the rising power. Concomitantly, the domestic politics would need to have some alignment as well.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a happy ending with this story. The question remains, if a conflict looms as history has shown (vis a vis great power transition) what does that look like? Will war and conflict in the future remain bound by violence and bloodshed? Or will it somehow evolve?
April 6, 2023
Kori Shake claims that Safe Passage is not a book of international relations theory. According to her framework, it is rather about the choices states make during hegemonic transition. The case study of the United States and Britain is distinctive for its peaceful handing of the baton and is of particular interest for the next transition of hegemonic power. Nevertheless, international relations theory is the foundational center towards which the arrows of her arguments point. The three principal theories of international relations are operative in Shake’s work: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Shake employs a number of pithy historical and political case studies to substantiate her arguments. The examples of the Monroe Doctrine, America’s Civil War, and Manifest Destiny are particularly relevant as they animate Shake’s application of international relations theory to her argument. Although Safe Passage interweaves competing international relation theories to explain the unprecedented peaceful transfer of hegemonic power between the United States and Britain, Shake’s constructivist analysis offers the most compelling evidence for the thesis, and in fact, illuminates the weaknesses of the realist and liberal approach to the study of this transition.
January 13, 2019
Excellent book. I learned so much from Kori's overview of this critical passage in history. She is a very talented writer - concise, eloquent, clear, and descriptive all at once. A few takeaways:
1. Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was broad, nebulous and changing (e.g., Grover Cleveland's administration)
2. American treatment of native Americans a la Manifest Destiny proved it an illiberal democracy at the turn of the 19th century. America became more liberal as its power grew.
3. US threat to British hegemony was as much one of economic and military power as a question of values and their influence on British domestic politics.
4. Condescension toward a rising power by a primary power can provoke nationalist sentiment and unite political support within the rising power for more assertive policies (e.g., PM Salisbury & Pres. Cleveland)
5. If Beijing replaces Washington as the hegemon, America ought to expect China to try to rewrite the rules of the international order in its own image, just as the US did.
1. Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was broad, nebulous and changing (e.g., Grover Cleveland's administration)
2. American treatment of native Americans a la Manifest Destiny proved it an illiberal democracy at the turn of the 19th century. America became more liberal as its power grew.
3. US threat to British hegemony was as much one of economic and military power as a question of values and their influence on British domestic politics.
4. Condescension toward a rising power by a primary power can provoke nationalist sentiment and unite political support within the rising power for more assertive policies (e.g., PM Salisbury & Pres. Cleveland)
5. If Beijing replaces Washington as the hegemon, America ought to expect China to try to rewrite the rules of the international order in its own image, just as the US did.
January 14, 2019
Few books reward the reader by being, all at once, pleasant to read, deeply informative, and frequently surprising. "Safe Passage" scores high marks on all three. If you read mainly for pleasure or because you enjoy history, it's a great pick. But if you want to understand the world today and to have a contextual framework for understanding some of the epic, generational-scale events unfolding around this complex and fast-changing world, then read this book without delay. With a very light touch, Kori Schake will guide you toward convincing yourself that the future of the world really does depend on choices being made by diplomats, leaders of state, and ordinary voters right now. The future is a choice, and we are obligated to make our choices with the full knowledge of history.
Incidentally, I had the pleasure of interviewing Kori Schake on my radio show last March. Find the interview here: https://whoradio.iheart.com/featured/...
Incidentally, I had the pleasure of interviewing Kori Schake on my radio show last March. Find the interview here: https://whoradio.iheart.com/featured/...
July 11, 2023
This is an excellent, well-researched and well presented book. You get a different perspective on American history and the transfer of hegemony from Great Britain to America.
It’s refreshing to read something that objectively looks at history and doesn’t play favourites. It also felt like a flashback to honours history and I felt an overwhelming urge to start cramming for an exam 😂 It is the only reason I didn’t give five stars. It’s near enough an academic text so you can’t just pick it up and read it, you will need quiet space to focus.
Bottom line: five star writing but pack a dictionary
It’s refreshing to read something that objectively looks at history and doesn’t play favourites. It also felt like a flashback to honours history and I felt an overwhelming urge to start cramming for an exam 😂 It is the only reason I didn’t give five stars. It’s near enough an academic text so you can’t just pick it up and read it, you will need quiet space to focus.
Bottom line: five star writing but pack a dictionary
March 11, 2025
An amazing book that highlights the key events shaping the U.S.-Great Britain relationship and explains their peaceful hegemonic transition. Schake does a great job exploring this dynamic beyond just balance-of-power politics, also diving into each nation’s cultural consciousness and perception of the other. She argues that this transition wasn’t solely the result of the 'special relationship' but also the fortunate timing of major events. It raises skepticism that such a peaceful transition could happen again, given just how many factors had to align.
June 14, 2022
Schake argues that the only peaceful transfer of power between hegemonies was from the British to the American... and even that transfer of power was a little rougher than planned.
Why I started this book: Professional Reading title, cool cover...
Why I finished it: This was a long slog for me. The best chapters were the introduction and epilogue, as Schake summed up the entire argument and book clearly and succinctly.
Why I started this book: Professional Reading title, cool cover...
Why I finished it: This was a long slog for me. The best chapters were the introduction and epilogue, as Schake summed up the entire argument and book clearly and succinctly.
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August 6, 2018A very good description of the delicate transfer of power between Great Britain and the United States. The book is packed with many deep insights that take careful reading. The author does a good job of revealing parts of history that don't follow the classic mythology of the US-UK special relationship.
May 10, 2020
Kori Schake does a great job in highlighting the key moments of hegemonic transition between UK to US. Written to focus on the uniqueness of this peaceful transition it warns against certain actions by the United States in it's relationship with a rising China.
November 5, 2025
A prescient, insightful, and rigorous analysis of the sole peaceful hegemonic transition, and a thoughtful application of constructivist thought to realist interpretations of hegemony and global order. A necessary read for strategic thinkers.
January 15, 2019
Recommend reading this with Graham’s Destined for War, and Kissinger’s Diplomacy.
An insightful look at the conditions that made for peaceful transition of hegemony.
An insightful look at the conditions that made for peaceful transition of hegemony.
June 29, 2019
Very stimulating, albeit a tad repetitive. I didn’t agree with some of the author’s points but it made me think!
July 31, 2020
Not much fun but learned a lot.
Strong conclusion.
Strong conclusion.
December 30, 2022
It's a good book.
February 11, 2018
Good overview of US-UK relations from the 1820s to the 1940s. The book provided information on a few issues/crises that I've read little about. Overall, well written and pretty interesting.
February 24, 2018
This book had an excellent balance of details to keep the policy milestones engaging. Quick read with lots of interesting facts and predictions for the future. Very academic writing style.
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