Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World War in Iran and Iraq

by Ashley Jackson

This dynamic history is the first to construct a total picture of the experience and impact of World War II in Iran and Iraq. Contending that these two countries were more important to the Allied forces’ war operations than has ever been acknowledged, historian Ashley Jackson investigates the grand strategy of the Allies and their operations in the region and the continuing legacy of Western intervention in the Middle East.

Iran and Iraq served as the first WWII theatre in which the U.S., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. fought alongside each other. Jackson charts the intense Allied military activity in Iran and Iraq and reveals how deeply the war impacted common people’s lives. He also provides revelations about the true nature of Anglo-American relations in the region, the beginnings of the Cold War, and the continuing corrosive legacy of Western influence in these lands

Genres: History, Middle East, World War II, Military History, 20th Century, Iran

432 pages, Hardcover

First published June 26, 2018

Reviews

[Emerson Stokes · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think this book is amazing. It’s a deep and intricate history on a subject not too often heard about in WW2 histories but was incredibly crucial in some aspects (British oil interests, lend-lease supply transportation and being a good area to study political tensions between the Big Three of the Allies being some important things to consider). Outside of WW2 history in general though, it can be seen how modern Iran and Iraq were molded by the consequences of actions taken during and in the aftermath of WW2. Highly recommend this book to anyone looking for a WW2 book that has both a unique subject on a popular topic while also not being too minute or insignificant.

[FellowBibliophile KvK · Rating 5 out of 5]

Superb well-documented history of a crucial front of the war! Along with David Stahel's Kiev 1941 , Jean-Marc Berlière's Police des Temps Noirs: France 1939-1945 , Mark Mazower's Inside Hitler's Greece and Stuart D. Goldman's Nomonhan 1939 , this is one of the only books you need to read to understand the Second World War, so you can spare yourself the expense of James Holland and Ben McIntyre's childish "boys' own" picture books.

This book also disproves Professor Ben Shepherd's argument that "the German army was not so superb as much as the Allies and the Soviets had logistical problems moving troops further towards Germany." Iran is larger than France, Ukraine and Belarus combined and it has a hell of a lot more mountains, yet the British and the Soviets conquered it, with skeleton forces, in less than a month while it took the Soviets years to regain control over Ukraine and Belarus while, after having landed in Normandy on 6 June 1944, the Allies only entered Paris on 19 August 1944. The difference between Iran in August and September 1941 and Ukraine, Belarus and France in 1944 is that the Heer of 1944 was a superb, experienced army while the Artesh of 1941 was not.

In contrast to opportunists Douglas Porch, Andrew Bacevich and Gian Gentile who crapped out extremely sparsely endnoted romance novels about several wars, Professor Jackson's book deals with only one war, but each chapter's endnotes tend to amount to the total endnotes of Porch, Bacevich and Gentile's books. This leave no doubt as to which is the better researched, and thus more reliable, book.

This book demolishes the myth of Rommel, which is worshipped, rather frighteningly, by West Point "historians" like H. R. McMaster. Simply by overlaying the dates of Rommel's "successes" with the Greek, Yugoslav and Iraq campaigns of Wavell, with the Syria, Lebanon and Iran campaigns of Auchinleck--under whom the Caucasus (and thus Iraq and Iran) were also threatened, one can see that Rommel's "successes" were as much, if not more, the result of Britain having to divide its forces between the Western Desert and other theatres than the result of any "genius" on Rommel's part, something the PhD West Point "historian" H.R. McMaster completely failed to understand, which explains why he was such a FUBAR in Trump's first term.

Indeed, the British Government (military and cabinet) documents Professor Jackson cites make it explicitly clear that Churchill and his senior generals hade made the explicit choice of sacrificing the Western Desert if necessary in order to protect the oil and communications links of Iraq and Iran which, unlike the Western Desert, were crucial to Britain's survival in the war. How much of a "genius" could Rommel possibly have been if Churchill and his senior generals had already made the decision that the Western Desert was expedient? It is far from a coincidence that Montgomery forced Rommel to stop, and then retreat, at just about the same time that Churchill and the senior generals cleaved off the Western Desert command from the Iran and Iraq command, ending the shuttling of manpower and other assets between the two.

This also shows that Wavell and Auchinleck were actually competent generals forced to fight a war on two fronts (four, actually, in the case of Wavell), while "Monty" was a spoiled egomaniac who succeeded where Wavell and Auchinleck did not only because Churchill removed the burden or Iraq and Iran from him, leaving him with only one front.

Professor Jackson also points out that the US Persian Gulf Command shipped in and assembled over 400K trucks for the USSR, and how, in 1941 and 1942, 90% of Soviet war materiel came from US Lend Lease. In other words, the engineers and mechanics of US Persian Gulf Command did far more to help defeat the Third Reich than did Ambrose Bierce's "band of brothers." US Persian Gulf Command was far more successful than the US tank regiments which were mauled and torn apart by the 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg at Herrlisheim and by the remnants of the 6th SS Gebirgs Division Nord at Melch and Wingen in January 1945.

Also, as do Christian and Pierre Cyril Pahlavi in Le Pont de la Victoire: l'Iran dans la seconde guerre mondiale , Professor Jackson points out how, contrary to the public proclamations of the Atlantic Charter, FDR told Churchill during the Atlantic Conference that he approved of Britain invading neutral Iran. This shows the "limitations" (or, to put it more accurately, uselessness) of political "scientists" like Sam Ramani and David Shinn who wrote mammoth volumes on Russia and China's relations with Africa, with both of them taking any and all "joint statements" issued at the end of meetings between any of these countries at face value.

Professor Jackson also shows how the British and Soviet invasions of Iran led to mixed occupations and disruptions in the shipment of food from one region to another. This exactly parallels what Professor Mark Mazower reports (in Inside Hitler's Greece ) was happening concurrently in Greece, then split up between Italy (largely), Germany (Athens, some of the islands the border with Turkey) and Bulgaria (Macedonia and other nearby areas.) There was no starvation in Iran on the level of what there was in Greece because the British were able to figure out the logistics of delivering food to affected areas in Iran better than the Italians, Germans and Bulgarians did in Greece.

Lastly, this book is not only more richly endnoted than Porch, Bacevich and Gentile, it also entirely demolishes their theses that Iraq was "unwinnable." Gentile (and Sanchez and Dempsey and Chiarrelli) in Iraq had modern M1A1 Abrams tanks. General Quinan had armoured cars at best, and he had to deal with a flood, something that neither Sanchez nor Dempsey nor Chiarrelli nor Gentile ever had to deal with from 2003 on. General Quinan, and Jumbo Wilson after him, had to deal with, not only internal chaos and invisible insurgents, but, UNLIKE Sanchez, Dempsey, Chiarelli and Gentile, they also had to deal with a) a possible Soviet, and then a possible German invasion from the north, AND b) then readying non-existent port and road infrastructure to get much needed supplies to the USSR which was fighting the Germans only a stone's throw away at Stalingrad.

Professor Jackson also points out that, when General Pownall took over from Jumbo Wilson in 1943, the internal situations in both Iran and Iraq had stabilised , something one can not say about Iraq under Sanchez, Dempsey, Chiarelli and Gentile. Why is this? Quite simply, pace Gian Gentile, having competent officers matters . General Quinan, Jumbo Wilson and General Pownall were, quite simply and frankly, far more competent than Sanchez, Dempsey, Chiarrelli and Gentile, which is why they were able to hold, not just Iraq, but also Iran, with an army overwhelmingly comprised of Indian troops and half-starved sick Polish POWs, completely lacking as much as one of the M1A1 Abrams that Sanchez, Dempsey, Chiarrelli and Gentile had. This is why Douglas Porch and Gian Gentile quite disingenuously never mention the 1941 Iraq Campaign or Amiral Jean Decoux in Indochina during this time in their histories of Vietnam and Iraq.

This book is not only a key book to understanding the Second World War, its unspoken (and perhaps even inadvertent) comparison of the successes of Generals Quinan and Pownall and Field-Marshal Jumbo Wilson with the abject failures of Ricardo Sanchez, "Marty" Dempsey, Peter Chiarrelli and Gian Gentile in Iraq makes it the key book to understanding the 2003-2009 Iraq War as well. Unlike Sanchez, Gentile et al, Quinan and Wilson expected the Iraqis to get antsy, so they seized control of the telegraph and post as well as the Ministry of Education (in Iran as well as in Iraq), and, unlike Sanchez, Dempsey and Chiarrelli, they did not disband the Iraqi Army. As well, Quinan's political advisor, Lyons, was an old orient hand with years of experience in Iraq, in contrast to L. Paul Bremmer, who was a marathon runner who got himself an MBA. That is why Quinan and Wilson could hold Iraq and Iran with only Indian troops and starving Poles where Sanchez, Dempsey, Chiarrelli and Gentile could not hold Iraq alone despite having M1A1 Abrams that Quinan and Wilson never had.

[James Crabtree · Rating 4 out of 5]

During the Second World War the British were fighting for their very survival, and as a result all the resources of the Empire were brought to bear. The British Empire was particularly keen on holding on to Persian Gulf oil.

Although only a footnote at best in most histories, this forgotten front saw intrigue, daring bluffs on the part of the British and strategic overeach on the part of the Axis. With manpower requirements running high, the last thing the British wanted to do was to get into a war in Iraq, but when a coup was staged that briefly brought in a pro-Axis government the British had no choice but to act decisively. Troops from India, armored vehicles from Palestine and RAF aircraft from North Africa rapidly took on the military clique known as the Golden Square and defeated them and the small contingent of Luftwaffe aircraft sent in to help them.

Britain had watched the USSR, anticipating a new front which would see the Soviets invading Iran and possibly Iraq at the behest of their Axis ally. That all turned around after Hitler launched his invasion of the USSR and as a result the Soviets and the British jointly invaded the country in order to open a supply line for the Red Army from the Persian Gulf to the Caucasus... and for the first time the United States became involved in the Middle East in a big way.

This book tells the whole story of the region during WWII and the steps taken to defeat the wavering countries of Iraq and Iran and to provide war material to the Soviets... not to mention how the Polish victims of Stalin's 1939 invasion were freed in Iran and allowed to fight on the side of the Western Allies. Not just are the politics of the war discussed but also the impact that it had on the British, Soviet, American and Polish soldiers who came there... not to mention the difficulties that Allied occupation brought on the Arabs and Persians who lived there.

Well-written; includes a map and many excellent black-and-white photographs.

[Chris Miller · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is a magnificent entry into the World War II bibliography. His research is extensive and his writing is immensley readable. He puts an area that is often treated as a backwater into the central position it was until 1943. He makes his case that Egypt and El Alamein were the edge battles that protected the resource rich center of Iraq and Iran. He also addresses the relationships, not only between the allies, but also the governments and citizens of the 'occupied' countries. Of course, this leads to how things became as they are, and points out opportunities missed. Mr. Jackson has created a great work.

The only negative comment I have for the book is editorial. This is a $30 book. Why was it not made a $35 or $40 book with the addition of a number of maps. For a work of this detail and scope, maps were sorely needed, and the three included (counting the cover), just don't do the job. National Geographic's Lands of the Bible Today, helps, but is cumbersome and time consuming.

[Matthew Griffiths · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is an important effort to further expand our understanding of the Second World War to incorporate an important theatre of the conflict that often only appears as a meeting place between the big three as opposed to the actual role it played of being a vital supply line for the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front. The book is clearly well researched, and its author passionate about the topic. I think the writing struggles a bit in as much as it doesn't flow effortlessly although writing about a prolonged exercise in managing the logistics of a campaign would perhaps tax the skills of the best of writers.

[Jan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Decent overview and explanation of especially British military operations in the Iraq-Iran theather. Seems somewhat obsolescent with regard to the mostly uncritical acceptance of British imperial policies and suffers from apparent bias excluding the P.O.V.'s off the non-British protagonists involved in the conclicts.

[Matthew · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent account of a forgotten theater of the Second World War. An essential book to those wishing to understand more about the Royal Air Force, US Army Air Force, the Lend-Lease Program, and the influence of the evil Nazi Regime in the Middle East. The book covers the majority of the war in this area, starting per-war.

[Gabriel Stein · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very interesting

And excellent and well informed, as well as well written, study of World War II in a crucial theatre of operations. The Iraqi-Iran area was no less important for being almost devoid of serious fighting. This book fills a gap in the history of World War II.

[Greynomad · Rating 4 out of 5]

Incredible history of the conflict in the middle east

[Stephen Boiko · Rating 5 out of 5]

Anglo-Iraq War 1941 and Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran 1941.