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Jihad & Co.: Black Markets and Islamist Power
For two decades, militant jihadism has been one of the world's most pressing security crises. In civil wars and insurgencies across the Muslim world, certain Islamist groups have taken advantage of the anarchy to establish political control over a broad range of territories and communities. In effect, they have built radical new jihadist proto-states. Why have some ideologically-inspired Islamists been able to build state-like polities out of civil war stalemate, while many other armed groups have failed to gain similar traction? What makes jihadists win? In Jihad & Co., Aisha Ahmad argues that there are concrete economic reasons behind Islamist success. By tracking the economic activities of jihadist groups in Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan, Mali, and Iraq, she uncovers an unlikely actor in bringing Islamist groups to the local business community. To illuminate the nexus between business and Islamist interests in civil war, Ahmad journeys into war-torn bazaars to meet with both jihadists and the smugglers who financed their rise to power. From the arms markets in the Pakistani border region to the street markets of Mogadishu, their stories reveal a powerful economic logic behind the rise of Islamist power in civil wars. Behind the fiery rhetoric and impassioned, ideological claims is the cold, hard cash of the local war economy. Moving readers back and forth between mosques, marketplaces, and battlefields, Ahmad makes a powerful argument that economic savvy, as much as ideological fervor, explains the rise of militant jihadism across the modern Muslim world.
329 pages, Kindle Edition
Published August 4, 2017
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Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
May 15, 2018
Jihad and Co.: Black Markets and Islamic Power, by Aisha Ahmad, is an interesting examination on the connections between Islamic business and market interests (the bazaar's) and the rise of Islamic militant groups. The book uses two countries, Afghanistan and Somalia, as case studies, looking closely at their markets (including the grey and black markets), there internal politics, and the composition of insurgent groups and how they interact with business interests in the region. This book was very interesting, as it looks at how Islamic groups receive a large portion of their funding, and how they often achieve a large degree of public popularity as they take power. The book then goes on to analyze these Islamist proto-states, and how they ultimately collapse.
The book has two central points on why business interests seem to end up supporting Islamist groups.
1. Islam and Islamic conservatism is an important social lubricant, especially in fractured or failed states like Afghanistan and Somalia. Being seen as a devout Muslim business person is good for business.
2. Supporting Islamic groups like the Taliban and the Islamic Courts Union or ICU (political wing of Al-Shabaab) is often cheaper than paying of warlords.
Being perceived as adhering to ones faith is very important in Afghanistan and Somalia, and many other Islamic countries. It is often perceived as a sign of trustworthiness, and is a good way to ensure business deals and ties remain close. Islam also crosses the tribal and ethnic divide. Failed states like Afghanistan and Somalia often fracture along ethnic or tribal lines, and therefore Islam can be a common uniting factor. Need to ship goods through a rival clans territory? You may have to pay exorbitantly high amounts of money at roadside checkpoints to ensure your goods arrive safely at there destination. One of your rival clans business' may not have to pay such prices, thus undercutting your profit margins and increasing your competitors advantage. However, making connections with local religious leaders can help bridge this divide, and ensure your goods safe passage based upon common religious considerations. This need for perception is useful to Islamic groups looking to take power. A good religious business person will donate to local religious charities or mosques, and would find it useful to give to religiously minded groups like the Taliban or the ICU. This ensures a steady stream of funding to these groups, processed and passed through local charity groups or religious schools or institutions.
Second, support for Islamic groups is often cheaper than doing business in a fractured state. Islamic groups have the ability, as mentioned above, to transcend ethnic or tribal boundaries in receiving support and funding. This is also true for recruitment. Islamic groups are able to blend ethnic groups together in exchange for furthering there religious ideals. This means they can integrate militias and fighters from across warring parties in the name of a common cause. This was true for the Taliban, and for the ICU, as they sought to decrease the chaos of anarchy and reduce the impact of warlordism on the local population. For a business person, this ultimately comes down to reducing the price of shipping there goods. In a war torn country like Afghanistan or Somalia, shipping goods is expensive, as one needs to ship through dangerous terrain marked by militia checkpoints and corruption. This means that shipping product from point A to point B means paying X amount of money at each checkpoint, drastically increasing the cost of goods - which is in turn passed on to the consumers at a local level. This can lead to goods shortages, and high prices on commodities.
A group like the Taliban or the ICU, however, can provide protection to local business people by removing checkpoints, defeating local warlords, and if they take power, implementing state-like taxes as opposed to ad-hoc and unpredictable payments that a warlords checkpoints would demand. This reduces the cost of doing business, and ensures goods can arrive at destinations at an acceptable and saleable price. Ahmad makes use of large amounts of statistical data, both in terms of the cost of goods, and the perception of ease of doing business by local merchants, and shows that the data backs up these claims.
Ahmad expands upon these points by examining the fine details on the political aspects of how Islamic groups can rise. She goes over the history of the Taliban, as they emerged to combat ethnic violence initiated by fractured tribal groups. They emerged as a clear winner after securing supply lines to Pakistan from rival warlords. Upon taking over these routes, they quickly closed down the checkpoint system that had been used as a tool to rob caravans, and set up a system of taxation at the borders. This drastically reduced the price of goods in Afghanistan, and allowed an easing of doing business. In Somalia, the ICU arose as a way to keep the peace at local levels, and these courts were originally fractured. They began to receive donations from local business peoples as charitable donations, and to ensure a functional judicial presence existed. The courts soon united politically and along religious lines, and created an armed wing (Al-Shabaab), to keep the peace. This quickly grew into a powerful rival group, that was able to successfully defeat local warlords for a time and reunite much of Somalia.
The success of these groups lies in there ability to transcend ethnic divides, and unite along religious lines. They reduce the cost of doing business by increasing the stability of the state, and ensuring a more consistent form of taxation. However, both the Taliban and ICU eventually fell apart - both under international pressure. Ahmad argues that while they are good at uniting various groups together, they have difficulty surviving past this point. For one, they are quite poor diplomats, and both the Taliban and ICU were unable to secure long term political protection from outside states. Both irked the global superpower, the US, for there support and ties to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Although both the Taliban and ICU reached out for support, and were less extremist in the past, they ultimately failed to purge support for extremist elements, and thus were unable to secure international acceptance as governors of a state. This lead to military action against both parties, and the eventually collapse of there rule and return to insurgency warfare. A second function of failure is how they interact with the business community after they take power. both the Taliban and ICU imposed harsh social measures on local populations, including the banning of popular trade goods like cigarettes, khat, and so on. This cut the profits of many local merchants and smugglers, who looked elsewhere for parties to support. Both parties also tried to reduce their reliance on trading in illicit goods, like heroin or weapons, which also disrupted established supply lines and irked merchants in the region. This slow collapse of internal support, coupled with international pressure, was often too much for these proto-states, and led to a collapse and return to warlordism.
Ahmad has written an excellent case study on Afghanistan and Somalia. The examination of the ties between business and the rise of Islamic militant groups is interesting and insightful. The book is well sourced and researched, and Ahmand provides numerous data sets and external sources with quality primary research gathered on the ground in Afghanistan and Somalia. This book is surprising in its depth, and was quite an interesting read on how Islamic groups are able to quickly and effectively overcome ethnic factionalism and take power - albeit relatively briefly. Another case study could be made out of the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, which faced similar issues of state collapse, and were able to briefly create a centralized proto-state in response, based upon extremist interpretations of a religion. This was a useful and timely book, and I could easily recommend it to those interested in reading on insurgent groups.
The book has two central points on why business interests seem to end up supporting Islamist groups.
1. Islam and Islamic conservatism is an important social lubricant, especially in fractured or failed states like Afghanistan and Somalia. Being seen as a devout Muslim business person is good for business.
2. Supporting Islamic groups like the Taliban and the Islamic Courts Union or ICU (political wing of Al-Shabaab) is often cheaper than paying of warlords.
Being perceived as adhering to ones faith is very important in Afghanistan and Somalia, and many other Islamic countries. It is often perceived as a sign of trustworthiness, and is a good way to ensure business deals and ties remain close. Islam also crosses the tribal and ethnic divide. Failed states like Afghanistan and Somalia often fracture along ethnic or tribal lines, and therefore Islam can be a common uniting factor. Need to ship goods through a rival clans territory? You may have to pay exorbitantly high amounts of money at roadside checkpoints to ensure your goods arrive safely at there destination. One of your rival clans business' may not have to pay such prices, thus undercutting your profit margins and increasing your competitors advantage. However, making connections with local religious leaders can help bridge this divide, and ensure your goods safe passage based upon common religious considerations. This need for perception is useful to Islamic groups looking to take power. A good religious business person will donate to local religious charities or mosques, and would find it useful to give to religiously minded groups like the Taliban or the ICU. This ensures a steady stream of funding to these groups, processed and passed through local charity groups or religious schools or institutions.
Second, support for Islamic groups is often cheaper than doing business in a fractured state. Islamic groups have the ability, as mentioned above, to transcend ethnic or tribal boundaries in receiving support and funding. This is also true for recruitment. Islamic groups are able to blend ethnic groups together in exchange for furthering there religious ideals. This means they can integrate militias and fighters from across warring parties in the name of a common cause. This was true for the Taliban, and for the ICU, as they sought to decrease the chaos of anarchy and reduce the impact of warlordism on the local population. For a business person, this ultimately comes down to reducing the price of shipping there goods. In a war torn country like Afghanistan or Somalia, shipping goods is expensive, as one needs to ship through dangerous terrain marked by militia checkpoints and corruption. This means that shipping product from point A to point B means paying X amount of money at each checkpoint, drastically increasing the cost of goods - which is in turn passed on to the consumers at a local level. This can lead to goods shortages, and high prices on commodities.
A group like the Taliban or the ICU, however, can provide protection to local business people by removing checkpoints, defeating local warlords, and if they take power, implementing state-like taxes as opposed to ad-hoc and unpredictable payments that a warlords checkpoints would demand. This reduces the cost of doing business, and ensures goods can arrive at destinations at an acceptable and saleable price. Ahmad makes use of large amounts of statistical data, both in terms of the cost of goods, and the perception of ease of doing business by local merchants, and shows that the data backs up these claims.
Ahmad expands upon these points by examining the fine details on the political aspects of how Islamic groups can rise. She goes over the history of the Taliban, as they emerged to combat ethnic violence initiated by fractured tribal groups. They emerged as a clear winner after securing supply lines to Pakistan from rival warlords. Upon taking over these routes, they quickly closed down the checkpoint system that had been used as a tool to rob caravans, and set up a system of taxation at the borders. This drastically reduced the price of goods in Afghanistan, and allowed an easing of doing business. In Somalia, the ICU arose as a way to keep the peace at local levels, and these courts were originally fractured. They began to receive donations from local business peoples as charitable donations, and to ensure a functional judicial presence existed. The courts soon united politically and along religious lines, and created an armed wing (Al-Shabaab), to keep the peace. This quickly grew into a powerful rival group, that was able to successfully defeat local warlords for a time and reunite much of Somalia.
The success of these groups lies in there ability to transcend ethnic divides, and unite along religious lines. They reduce the cost of doing business by increasing the stability of the state, and ensuring a more consistent form of taxation. However, both the Taliban and ICU eventually fell apart - both under international pressure. Ahmad argues that while they are good at uniting various groups together, they have difficulty surviving past this point. For one, they are quite poor diplomats, and both the Taliban and ICU were unable to secure long term political protection from outside states. Both irked the global superpower, the US, for there support and ties to terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda. Although both the Taliban and ICU reached out for support, and were less extremist in the past, they ultimately failed to purge support for extremist elements, and thus were unable to secure international acceptance as governors of a state. This lead to military action against both parties, and the eventually collapse of there rule and return to insurgency warfare. A second function of failure is how they interact with the business community after they take power. both the Taliban and ICU imposed harsh social measures on local populations, including the banning of popular trade goods like cigarettes, khat, and so on. This cut the profits of many local merchants and smugglers, who looked elsewhere for parties to support. Both parties also tried to reduce their reliance on trading in illicit goods, like heroin or weapons, which also disrupted established supply lines and irked merchants in the region. This slow collapse of internal support, coupled with international pressure, was often too much for these proto-states, and led to a collapse and return to warlordism.
Ahmad has written an excellent case study on Afghanistan and Somalia. The examination of the ties between business and the rise of Islamic militant groups is interesting and insightful. The book is well sourced and researched, and Ahmand provides numerous data sets and external sources with quality primary research gathered on the ground in Afghanistan and Somalia. This book is surprising in its depth, and was quite an interesting read on how Islamic groups are able to quickly and effectively overcome ethnic factionalism and take power - albeit relatively briefly. Another case study could be made out of the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, which faced similar issues of state collapse, and were able to briefly create a centralized proto-state in response, based upon extremist interpretations of a religion. This was a useful and timely book, and I could easily recommend it to those interested in reading on insurgent groups.
November 18, 2017
In this intensively researched and scholarly (and yet grittily down-to-earth) book, Aisha Ahmad explores the complex relationships that have enabled jihadist groups such as ISIL to thrive and build state-like regimes while others have failed. In a civil war economy, doing business is dangerous, difficult and expensive. Each warring faction sets up their own checkpoints, their own protection rackets. Merchants, be they legitimate or otherwise are extorted over and over, paying tolls and protection money to multiple factions; and the protection offered is unreliable. The Jihadis offer the merchant a better deal: Pay just once, at a lower price and the protection is backed by well-armed and well-trained forces. A beneficial relationship develops whereby the cost of doing business is reduced and the Jihadis have a steady source of income. Over time, rival factions are eliminated and the Jihadis gain full control, acting as a de facto government. Western powers, seeking to develop an ally on the ground to oppose the Jihadis, make the mistake of supporting some of the traditional warlords whose corruption and abuse of power caused the populace to support Jihadis in the first place (case in point: Afghanistan). So the situation repeats, with the conditions often being worse than before.
Ahmad offers no magic solution but proposes several practical actions: Incentivize the business class; engage the support and counsel of local experts who understand the dynamics; and exercise restraint in interfering in the Muslim world.
Ahmad offers no magic solution but proposes several practical actions: Incentivize the business class; engage the support and counsel of local experts who understand the dynamics; and exercise restraint in interfering in the Muslim world.
February 8, 2020
Exceptional book. If you want to understand how the Taliban, ICU, and proto-states take power and retain it in the face of powerful opposition this is the book. In my opinion this is the key book to read to understand our failure to win in Afghanistan the last 18 years - with significant implications for other places.
The book is written like a doctoral thesis - but is engaging and easy to understand. The author writes in clear prose with compelling conclusions.
She shows convincingly how Jihadi Islamism and capitalism in immature or failed states can be symbiotic in the early stages of proto-state building and how the necessary state-like behavior of the Jihadis can make them difficult to dislodge.
The author is overly sympathetic to Jihadis in my view - but it likely assists her in data collection. A must-read for intelligence officers studying insurgency in my opinion.
The book is written like a doctoral thesis - but is engaging and easy to understand. The author writes in clear prose with compelling conclusions.
She shows convincingly how Jihadi Islamism and capitalism in immature or failed states can be symbiotic in the early stages of proto-state building and how the necessary state-like behavior of the Jihadis can make them difficult to dislodge.
The author is overly sympathetic to Jihadis in my view - but it likely assists her in data collection. A must-read for intelligence officers studying insurgency in my opinion.
March 9, 2018
The literature around islamic terrorism,afghanistan, terror funding is dominated by western authors ,specifically american authors. aisha ahmad in this book provides a point of view which is different,and as a pakistani her views are brilliant!.
in this book she argues the rise of taliban and other islamic extremists is due to support from the business class. she analyzes the link between business class and extremist organizations in the rise of islamic proto-states. she gives case study examples of afganistan (rise of taliban),somalia(islamic union of courts). she also analyzes how foreign interventions have worsened the situation.
this book is a must for understanding how islamic proto states arise out of chaos and the hand of business in their rise.
in this book she argues the rise of taliban and other islamic extremists is due to support from the business class. she analyzes the link between business class and extremist organizations in the rise of islamic proto-states. she gives case study examples of afganistan (rise of taliban),somalia(islamic union of courts). she also analyzes how foreign interventions have worsened the situation.
this book is a must for understanding how islamic proto states arise out of chaos and the hand of business in their rise.
February 18, 2019
Cogent discussion of the local dimension of funding provided to the radical Islamic proto-states. This provides a wider lens for looking at the facilitation provided by local economics as one looks at the support. The author provides models worth assimilating. The models also supply an understanding of the risk of re-emergence of an ISIS 2.0 within Iraq and Syria as multiple actors currently operating in the area provides some of the same ingredients highlighted in this book.
That being said the local business model is at times presented as an almost unitary cause. Much more likely that it is a required condition but not the only one required.
That being said the local business model is at times presented as an almost unitary cause. Much more likely that it is a required condition but not the only one required.
April 24, 2020
Ahmad is a person made deeply immoral by the current economic system. So he has to do what the bosses ask of him or he'll be out and another token Muslim will be brought in place. Hence, what's the cause of Jihad? Those areas still not controlled by the mostly White aristocrats. War, travel restrictions, nothing counts, as those issues are generated by the god to whom Ahmad has to bow. How about the weapons? Munition? All made in the powerful countries that bring war to the far reaches of the World. Sad.
April 27, 2020
I enjoyed the IR and comparative contributions this book is making. Her model shows that the sources of support for jihadi groups lay with the business model of local economies. I recommend this book because it shows support for jihadi movements is more economic than ideological.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews