Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World

by Jack A. Goldstone

What can the great crises of the past teach us about contemporary revolutions? Jack Goldstone shows the important role of population changes, youth bulges, urbanization, elite divisions, and fiscal crises in creating major political crises. Goldstone shows how state breakdowns in both western monarchies and Asian empires followed the same patterns, triggered when inflexible political, economic, and social institutions were overwhelmed by cumulative changes in population structure that collided with popular aspirations and state-elite relations. Examining the great revolutions of Europe--the English and French Revolutions--and the great rebellions of Asia, which shattered dynasties in Ottoman Turkey, China, and Japan, he shows how long cycles of revolutionary crises and stability similarly shaped politics in Europe and Asia, but led to different outcomes.

In this 25th anniversary edition, Goldstone reflects on the history of revolutions in the last twenty-five years, from the Philippines and other color revolutions to the Arab Uprisings and the rise of the Islamic State. In a new introduction, he re-examines his pioneering look at the role of population changes--such as rising youth cohorts, urbanization, shifting elite mobility--as continuing causal factors of revolutions and rebellions. The new concluding chapter updates his major theory and looks to the future of revolutions in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa.

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, Society, Social Science, World History

600 pages, Hardcover

First published March 3, 1991

About the author

Jack A. Goldstone is an American sociologist and political scientist, specializing in studies of social movements, revolutions, and international politics. He is an author or editor of 13 books and over 140 research articles. He is recognized as one of the leading authorities on the study of revolutions and long-term social change. His work has made foundational contributions to the fields of cliodynamics, economic history and political demography. He was the first scholar to describe in detail and document the long-term cyclical relationship between global population cycles and cycles of political rebellion and revolution. He was also a core member of the “California school” in world history, which replaced the standard view of a dynamic West and stagnant East with a ‘late divergence’ model in which Eastern and Western civilizations underwent similar political and economic cycles until the 18th century, when Europe achieved the technical breakthroughs of industrialization. He is also one of the founding fathers of the emerging field of political demography, studying the impact of local, regional, and global population trends on international security and national politics.

Goldstone is currently the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Professor in the School of Public Policy at George Mason University. He has also worked as a consultant of the US government, for example, serving as chair of the National Research Council's evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and Director of the Research Laboratory in Political Demography and Macrosocial Dynamics at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration in Moscow.

His academic awards include the American Sociological Association Distinguished Scholarly Publication Award, for 'Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World,' the Arnaldo Momigliano Award of the Historical Society, and seven awards for 'best article' in the fields of Comparative/Historical Sociology, Political Sociology, Social Theory, and Collective Behavior and Social Movements. He has won fellowships from the Council of Learned Societies, the U.S. Institute of Peace, the MacArthur Foundation, the Australian Research School of Social Sciences, the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, and is an elected member of the Council on Foreign Affairs and the Sociological Research Association. He has been the Richard Holbrooke Visiting Lecturer at the American Academy in Berlin, the Crayborough Lecturer at Leiden University, and a Phi Beta Kappa National Visiting Scholar.

Reviews

[W · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book is a lot more interesting than its title suggests. It argues that the crises of state that set off the English Civil War and the French Revolution had primarily DEMOGRAPHIC causes: rising populations caused rising prices of necessities, which reduced the real wages of the masses and strained state finances to the point of insolvency; but, most originally, it argues population growth and falling wages together wound up the competition to join and stay among the elite, which alone enjoyed a rising standard of living on the basis of rising prices and falling wages. Revolution broke out when marginal factions of a fractured, anxious elite allied with impoverished masses to reshape a bankrupted state in line with their ideologies: the State's power to maintain order collapsed in three connected ways at once. He finds falling real wages and a fierce struggle for elite credentials and positions (indexed on university admissions, even in the 17th century!) presaged crisis: a lesson for the US and UK today. (The parallel with modern times is obviously not exact, but automation and global free trade have in a different way caused an effective glut of labour compared to capital.)

The argument for the importance of these factors in the French Revolution is very powerful. Goldstone shows how each of the three estates at the Estates General split according to the pattern of winners and losers from the intra-elite conflicts within each class.

However, the argument for one factor in the state breakdown that set off the English Civil War seems under-powered, namely the role of intra-elite competition. Goldstone shows that there was fierce turnover and competition among elites, but he does not manage to show that this competition was a decisive factor in the collapse of elite consensus over how to handle Charles I. He argues (p. 123) that the context of elite competition made consensus difficult to achieve, and that local elites used the great split of the national elite between Royalists and Parliamentarians as an opportunity to ramp up pursuit of their local conflicts over status and influence. However, he only quotes and cites a few other historians, and the cited works only really serve to show how little we know about what drove local allegiances in the Civil War. He does not therefore manage to demonstrate that general, contextual elite conflict was more fundamental a cause of the breakdown than the more obvious ideological, constitutional, legal and religious differences. There is not a strong enough link drawn between general local elite conflict, which comes across as somewhat empty of content, and the actual issues that divided the sides in the Civil War. It is not really enough to say that general elite conflict made the religious ideology of Puritanism more 'salient' to some involved in such conflict when historians have not been able to use allegiance in local conflicts to predict local elites' side-taking in the crisis. Goldstone may be right, but a lot stronger evidence and argument are required.

[David Mccracken · Rating 5 out of 5]

Masterful. A lot of very well-written words to repeatedly elucidate a relatively simple core argument: population growth had multiple cascading impacts on pre-industrial agrarian societies (inflation, elite competition, rural unrest, calls for moral order) and worldwide surges of population growth in the early 17th and late 18th centuries led to the wave of revolutions highlighted by the English Civil War and the French Revolution. Similarly, population stability in the late 17th and early 18th century led to widespread government stability as well.

The book sets itself up as an extension of Theda Skocpol's earlier work (which I now want to read) and as against Marxist reads of the English and French revolutions.

(Read based on a recommendation on Twitter from Mike Duncan in the context of his Revolutions Podcast.)

[Walter Cavinaw · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of my favorite books and a must read for anyone interested in economics, politics, history, human behaviour and society. The author describes his research into the process of state breakdown & revolution, and creates a theory and model of how it occurs called Structural Demographic Theory.

There were a number of state crises and breakdowns across the world in the early modern period (1600-1850). These were clustered into the late 16th and early 17th century (English Revolution, the Fronde, Ming-Qing transition, Catalan revolt) and the late 18th through the first half of the 19th century (also called the age of revolution including the French Revolution, Meiji restoration). In all state breakdowns, except the Meiji restoration, the same demographic trends created three factors causing the state crisis and subsequent breakdown:

a state financial crisis as a result of large deficits and an inability to meet its obligations.
intra-elite competition and conflict
a high potential for mobilizing popular groups due to low real wages, poor governance and youth bulges.
Due to declining mortality, in particular infant mortality, populations grew significantly across the world. This increased demand could only be met by marginally productive land and created large price increases. The simultaneous increased labor supply and increased prices pushed down real wages. Low real wages set the stage for mass mobilization potential and pushed people to migrate to urban areas.

Population growth also had negative consequences for wealthy families. Larger families resulted in the dilution of family wealth or in marginal sons without wealth. The growth in the economy also created potential for new families to enter the elite class by taking advantage of expanding markets. The new elites and old elites competed for positions in the fields of law and politics creating a boom in credentialing. Often barriers were put in place by those seeking to protect their status, creating additional conflict.

Higher prices and bigger populations were also at the root of state crises. Greater populations created a need for bigger armies and a larger class of elites created more demand for positions in law and politics. This and higher prices for basic goods drove up real expenditures. At the same time the tax system was not reformed to tax newly emerging industries of the economy so revenue did not grow in proportion to spending. Governments had to rely more and more on borrowing until something broke.

He describes in great detail how each factor played into the english and french revolutions and also how these differed from concurrent crises in Spain and Germany. He also draws a connection between eastern state breakdowns in the Ottoman empire and during the Ming-Qing transition. Although these are not commonly put together with Western revolutions he argues that they are caused by the same dynamics, only the outcome was different.

Next he looks at the role of ideology, or the cultural framework, in order to understand why the outcome of the english revolution and subsequent development was so different than the two eastern revolutions. In the case of the english revolution, the continued tension between ideologies after the state breakdown and reconstruction created an environment of tolerance. Whereas in the chinese, spanish and ottoman reconstruction the elites regained control and were able to enforce ideological conformity. This reduced the dynamism of the society. While his view on this topic aligns with mine, I am still don't feel comfortable that its the right answer. Could enforced political ideology really stomp out the scientific movement if it started in china? I need to keep looking for answers that challenge this view. It has implications for today, where the most free society and the society with an enforced conformity are battling for technological dominance.

The last part of the book was my least favorite. He looks to the future, with some successful predictions (the book was written in 1991) but also with too much pessimism. He believed living standards would fall and I think it is incredibly difficult to argue that things are worse now than they are back then. He also has some policy prescriptions which I think are not totally coherent with all the research he laid out in the first 90% of the book. He puts the blame to selfish elites who care more about themselves than society because they push back against the government.

I don't know why but I find that a large number of non-fiction books have a similar pattern of great ideas and research up until the last chapter. In the last chapter they try to argue why their research shows they are right about some (usually political) belief and everyone else is making the world worse for not agreeing.

Regardless, this is still one of the best books I have read on history because it creates a useful theory to explain the past, present and future in an intuitive and way with empirical backing. It's also complementary to Fischer's book on Price Waves because they are basically describing the same phenomena and patterns. I am excited to work through more of Peter Turchin's books now that I have read this book which is at the root of cliodynamics. I think there is a lot of potential to connect this to other aspects of financial markets such as currency collapses (caused by the same factors as state bankruptcies).

[Ginger Griffin · Rating 5 out of 5]

The brutal math and mechanics of revolutions. This book focuses on events in the pre-industrial era, but the basic principles are still broadly applicable today. Earlier revolutions just made the dynamics more stark because they played out in societies that had fewer resources, and thus lived closer to the edge of privation.

The major revolutions discussed here (the Puritan Revolution in 17th century England, the French Revolution of 1789, the Ottoman Crisis in Asia Minor, and the Ming-Qing Transition in China) all followed the same pattern: Revolution started with demography.

Until relatively recent times, human populations grew slowly, and often fell during epidemics. That's largely because rates of mortality among young children were staggeringly high across all levels of society, typically from infectious disease. (For just one -- admittedly extreme -- example, consider Michel de Montaigne, one of the wealthiest and most prominent men in 16th century France: He lost 5 of his 6 children in infancy.) The horrific death rate among the youngest generally kept populations from rising much, if at all. But a slight let-up in disease burden might allow more children to survive, creating a youth bulge. Within a few years, an unusually large number of young people would be looking for work within an inelastic agrarian economy (many being drawn to cities, where they formed a potentially combustible mass). Food prices would inevitably rise as a larger population pressed down on the low crop yields of pre-modern agriculture.

Then the revolutionary spiral would set in. Rulers were forced to pay more to feed their armies (depleting the royal coffers), while the poorest were pushed to the edge of starvation. Rulers then sought to address their fiscal shortfall through higher taxes on landowners, who formed the traditional elites of their societies. This angered the elites (who passed the higher taxes down to their already burdened tenants and workers).

Even with sharp tax increases, the land base could not provide enough revenue. So rulers turned to selling noble titles and lucrative government offices. The buyers typically were merchants who had grown wealthy on trade and manufacture. The influx of nouveau nobles and office holders further angered the old elites, who saw their privileges being eroded. Disgruntled elites eventually split among themselves, with some openly rebelling against their rulers and whipping up violent revolt among the poorer classes, who had ample grievances to fuel their anger. (Revolutionaries were particularly likely to be younger sons of the elite classes who, in less straitened times, might have been able to find positions that suited them.)

Interestingly, all these pre-industrial societies might have been able to avoid revolution if they had broadened their tax bases, because trade and manufacture were generating enough income to provide adequate revenue. But they were unable to adjust away from their traditional emphasis on land taxation -- probably because they could not fully grasp what was happening. Economics and demography barely existed as fields of study at the time. It's only with the painstaking work of modern historians, digging through old records and carefully piecing the story together, that we now have a clearer picture.

How about the role of ideology in revolutions? Grand slogans like "liberté, egalité, fraternité" get all the attention, but they're as much a consequence as a cause of revolution. The initial rebellions were often limited in their aims. But as the old order fell and revolutionaries gained power, they vied among themselves for leadership -- becoming more radical as a way to gain further support among the masses.

Comparing the Puritan and French Revolutions throws an interesting light on the function of ideology: The Puritans, fired by religious zeal, aimed to create a community of saints. The French revolutionaries proclaimed secular values and attacked the church. But both societies eventually reverted largely to their pre-revolutionary status, with restoration of their old monarchical families to the throne. Nonetheless, the long-term impact of their revolutionary ideologies lingered, forming part of their national mythology.

Modern society has attenuated the impact of poverty and inequality. Outright food shortages, for instance, usually occur only with wartime blockades or extreme government mismanagement. But the tendency for elites to suck up most of their society's wealth seems to be a constant of human history. (For more on this, see _The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century_ by Walter Scheidel.) And the dynamics of revolution are much the same today as they were in 1640. Those at the bottom generally lack the resources to organize a rebellion on their own. That still takes elite encouragement (and is helped along greatly if the relatively prosperous middle classes join the fight). As the author notes, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Arab Revolutions of 2010-11 closely followed the pattern outlined in this study.

Goldstone's book has become a classic that is now widely studied. Are some who've learned from it now trying to turn Russia's elites against Vladimir Putin by imposing economic sanctions that damage the country's oligarchs?

[Geoffrey Kinsey · Rating 1 out of 5]

While his emphasis on the impact of population growth is revealing, the analysis is less original than he (repeatedly) claims and depends on selective and inconsistent findings. He neglects, for example, any mention of the American Revolution as a proximate trigger for the French Revolution and the general likelihood that one revolution can trigger another; an alternate explanation for why they appear to be (somewhat) clustered.

There are multiple instances of assuming "correlation is causality". In discussing prices, he confusingly mixes real and nominal growth, so that the impact (on royal borrowing, for example, which could be helped by inflation) is dubious.
His assertions are therefore hardly more convincing than those of rival historians that he dismisses.

The effort to confirm the thesis leads to the rigid thinking he (too frequently) decries in the works of others. To prove his point, he neglects to convey the large uncertainly in data relating to food prices and population from centuries ago, sometimes pretending the precision is valid to tenths of a percent(?!) This kind of precision is hardly credible even in current economic data.

For another example, while wars in this period were often entirely discretionary, Goldstone declares that they were, "an activity that could only rarely be avoided." Had monarchs indulged in less adventurism, might the apparent alignment of a couple of the crises have vanished? An inconsistency here is that, if conflict between monarchs was so unavoidable, why would (other) conflicts between elites ever be a surprising (or only cyclical) occurrence?

His ending commentary is timely in 2020.

[Daniel Cunningham · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book... 6 stars. I need to go back and decrease all my other ratings so that I can appropriately rate this book. It's a bit dense, but everyone should take the time to read this.

[Karl-Mikael Syding · Rating 3 out of 5]

Some quite interesting ideas, and a very detailed account of a few key revolutions and their causes (mainly demographics) between 1500-1850.

[Evan Fraser · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an extraordinary book that provides a compelling account of the similarities between English, French and Russian revolutions. The empirical analysis is rich and the introduction provides a lucid defense of comparative history.

[Brandon Torres · Rating 5 out of 5]

Goldstone's heavy-handed liberalism is irksome, but this book is a significant contribution to the scientific study of history.