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How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War
A description of the military operations of the Civil War includes analyses of the leadership and strategies of both sides of the conflict
784 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1983
About the author
Herman Hattaway
14 books4 followersHerman Hattaway was a professor emeritus of history and religion studies at the University of Missouri-Kansas City.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
March 1, 2012
Very persuasive. Strictly a military history, from the opening of hostilities until the surrender of the remaining confederate armies. Very much a necessary supplement to the fine political history of Battle Cry of Freedom, which is not very detailed on military matters, even though it has nice set-piece battlefield maps. Readers of McPherson will therefore understand the result of Shiloh, say, especially its political ramifications, but may not necessarily come away with an understanding of the military reasons that an engagement occurred at Shiloh, that the result was caused by a specific list of factors, and that the result led to a number of strategic and logistical problems for the respective belligerents.
Text is sufficiently detailed to begin with a discussion of a treatise that Beauregard wrote, regarding napoleonic and jominian concepts. Text deploys these concepts throughout, as most of the relevant strategists were trained in Napoleonic warfare, as interpreted by Jomini: decisive battle doctrine, analyzed on the basis of interior/exterior lines of operation, with the object to bring about concentrations of forces at the appropriate place, ideally on the enemy’s tactical rear through the use of well-timed turning movements.
Battles are therefore analyzed on the basis of interior/exterior distinction, with certain engagements held out as archetypal applications of doctrine, such as Lee’s victory at Chancellorsville.
What hiccoughs the Napoleonic doctrine is a half century technological evolution, primarily railroads and rifles. The former allows unprecedented scope in concentration doctrine as well as an expansion of the interior/exterior distinction to continental scale. The latter renders cavalry irrelevant except as skirmishers or raiders, and also makes tactical defense virtually impervious to frontal assault, especially when combined with the West Point doctrine regarding entrenchments popular at the time of the Mexican War, when most of the pertinent commanders learned warfare.
We see, then, many horrible battles wherein Napoleonic turning maneuvers are attempted--and quite a few succeed --but nevertheless success rarely results in annihilation, such as Napoleon achieved at Austerlitz-Ulm and Jena-Auerstedt. The primary exceptions are Grant’s destruction of Floyd at Fort Donelson, Grant’s defeat of Pemberton at Vicksburg, and Grant’s capture of Lee at Appomattox. Authors identify these all as special circumstances: the first two involve strategic blunders by the defensive commander (as opposed to tactical blunders), and the third represents complete logistical exhaustion.
Lee’s surrender (which was not the final confederate surrender of the war) represented an important political objective for the federal army, as Lee had frustrated Union attempts to deliver a knockout at Richmond for 4 years. In that context, the tactical defeats at Antietam and Gettysburg represent, in the opinion of Lee and Davis, strategic and logistical successes--Lee was able to supply his army off of Union supplies and keep the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond.
The south’s planners assumed that Richmond was the objective of the northern war effort, and so believed that holding out long enough would force the north politically to concede defeat, or force third states to become involved on behalf of southern independence. This amounts to a macro-strategic blunder insofar as the plan initiated by Halleck and matured by Grant was to choke out the South’s logistics--first through conquest of the western rivers along with blockades and conquest of maritime ports, and the through the institution of chevauchee-style infantry raids, especially under Sherman. The distinction is that a penetration is a movement by an army wherein the army moves along its own logistics line and is never out of communication with its rear. A raid, by contrast, moves out of communication and must subsist on enemy supply. The raid is therefore by necessity temporary, and usually has the purpose of sabotage or distraction or whatever. Raids of this type were important throughout the war, especially early on in the hands of Confederate cavalry, which disrupted Grant’s first attempt at Vicksburg and kept that fort in Southern hands for an additional year (Lee‘s incursions that resulted in Antietam and Gettysburg were deliberate raids, with no intention to conquer anything). Grant’s innovation was to send an entire army under Sherman on an infantry raid through the core of the deep South with no intention to enter and return, but rather to enter and keep moving, destroying rails and industry and agriculture as it moved. As it never was intended to stay in one spot, it need not be in communication with the logistical center.
Though Clausewitz is merely mentioned in notes, the analysis that author presents (as opposed to the recitation of how the commanders in context interpreted the war) is thoroughly clausewitzian, thinking in terms of the center of gravity. A good example occurs in the discussion of the Middle Tennessee theatre mid-war, when the Union commander (Rosecrans? Buell?) has the option of engaging Kirby Smith in the Cumberland Gap, or going to trounce some railroads near Knoxville; the declination of battle to do logistical damage is given the thumbs-up by author. Text rehabilitates McClellan to a certain extent, providing a strategic and logistical explanation for his perceived dilatory negligence; McClellan's ideas are vindicated somewhat by Grant's Virginia campaign in 1864, which produced staggering Union losses in the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg.
Nice footnote at the end of the Vicksburg-Gettysburg chapter, which argues that these Northern victories may have been politically important, but have been militarily overestimated. Sure, Vicksburg resulted in Union control of the Mississippi and destroyed a decently sized southern army (armies of the period are considered indestructible under normal circumstances). But the war continued nevertheless for two more years--so the summer of ‘63 should not be regarded as dispositive.
Great tactical and operational-level maps for large and small engagements. Coverage of all major battles. Great appendix on military theory. Contains biographical vignettes on all major commanders. Contains discussion of command structure and general staffs, recruitment of troops, logistical systems, armaments, and so on. One great little irony is that the South, which was created on a states’ rights ideology, instituted national conscription almost immediately, whereas the North left conscription to the states until halfway through the war. This gave the South something of an advantage in effective recruitment, which nullified initially the north’s population advantage.
Recommended.
Text is sufficiently detailed to begin with a discussion of a treatise that Beauregard wrote, regarding napoleonic and jominian concepts. Text deploys these concepts throughout, as most of the relevant strategists were trained in Napoleonic warfare, as interpreted by Jomini: decisive battle doctrine, analyzed on the basis of interior/exterior lines of operation, with the object to bring about concentrations of forces at the appropriate place, ideally on the enemy’s tactical rear through the use of well-timed turning movements.
Battles are therefore analyzed on the basis of interior/exterior distinction, with certain engagements held out as archetypal applications of doctrine, such as Lee’s victory at Chancellorsville.
What hiccoughs the Napoleonic doctrine is a half century technological evolution, primarily railroads and rifles. The former allows unprecedented scope in concentration doctrine as well as an expansion of the interior/exterior distinction to continental scale. The latter renders cavalry irrelevant except as skirmishers or raiders, and also makes tactical defense virtually impervious to frontal assault, especially when combined with the West Point doctrine regarding entrenchments popular at the time of the Mexican War, when most of the pertinent commanders learned warfare.
We see, then, many horrible battles wherein Napoleonic turning maneuvers are attempted--and quite a few succeed --but nevertheless success rarely results in annihilation, such as Napoleon achieved at Austerlitz-Ulm and Jena-Auerstedt. The primary exceptions are Grant’s destruction of Floyd at Fort Donelson, Grant’s defeat of Pemberton at Vicksburg, and Grant’s capture of Lee at Appomattox. Authors identify these all as special circumstances: the first two involve strategic blunders by the defensive commander (as opposed to tactical blunders), and the third represents complete logistical exhaustion.
Lee’s surrender (which was not the final confederate surrender of the war) represented an important political objective for the federal army, as Lee had frustrated Union attempts to deliver a knockout at Richmond for 4 years. In that context, the tactical defeats at Antietam and Gettysburg represent, in the opinion of Lee and Davis, strategic and logistical successes--Lee was able to supply his army off of Union supplies and keep the Army of the Potomac away from Richmond.
The south’s planners assumed that Richmond was the objective of the northern war effort, and so believed that holding out long enough would force the north politically to concede defeat, or force third states to become involved on behalf of southern independence. This amounts to a macro-strategic blunder insofar as the plan initiated by Halleck and matured by Grant was to choke out the South’s logistics--first through conquest of the western rivers along with blockades and conquest of maritime ports, and the through the institution of chevauchee-style infantry raids, especially under Sherman. The distinction is that a penetration is a movement by an army wherein the army moves along its own logistics line and is never out of communication with its rear. A raid, by contrast, moves out of communication and must subsist on enemy supply. The raid is therefore by necessity temporary, and usually has the purpose of sabotage or distraction or whatever. Raids of this type were important throughout the war, especially early on in the hands of Confederate cavalry, which disrupted Grant’s first attempt at Vicksburg and kept that fort in Southern hands for an additional year (Lee‘s incursions that resulted in Antietam and Gettysburg were deliberate raids, with no intention to conquer anything). Grant’s innovation was to send an entire army under Sherman on an infantry raid through the core of the deep South with no intention to enter and return, but rather to enter and keep moving, destroying rails and industry and agriculture as it moved. As it never was intended to stay in one spot, it need not be in communication with the logistical center.
Though Clausewitz is merely mentioned in notes, the analysis that author presents (as opposed to the recitation of how the commanders in context interpreted the war) is thoroughly clausewitzian, thinking in terms of the center of gravity. A good example occurs in the discussion of the Middle Tennessee theatre mid-war, when the Union commander (Rosecrans? Buell?) has the option of engaging Kirby Smith in the Cumberland Gap, or going to trounce some railroads near Knoxville; the declination of battle to do logistical damage is given the thumbs-up by author. Text rehabilitates McClellan to a certain extent, providing a strategic and logistical explanation for his perceived dilatory negligence; McClellan's ideas are vindicated somewhat by Grant's Virginia campaign in 1864, which produced staggering Union losses in the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, Petersburg.
Nice footnote at the end of the Vicksburg-Gettysburg chapter, which argues that these Northern victories may have been politically important, but have been militarily overestimated. Sure, Vicksburg resulted in Union control of the Mississippi and destroyed a decently sized southern army (armies of the period are considered indestructible under normal circumstances). But the war continued nevertheless for two more years--so the summer of ‘63 should not be regarded as dispositive.
Great tactical and operational-level maps for large and small engagements. Coverage of all major battles. Great appendix on military theory. Contains biographical vignettes on all major commanders. Contains discussion of command structure and general staffs, recruitment of troops, logistical systems, armaments, and so on. One great little irony is that the South, which was created on a states’ rights ideology, instituted national conscription almost immediately, whereas the North left conscription to the states until halfway through the war. This gave the South something of an advantage in effective recruitment, which nullified initially the north’s population advantage.
Recommended.
January 14, 2012
A very solid overview of exactly what the title indicates: how the North won the Civil War. Divided into easily understandable sections, it allows you to process a very complex affair.
February 16, 2015
How the North Won describes the Civil War from the point of view of military strategy as practiced in the mid-Nineteenth Century. Much of the war’s events one would know from reading Shelby Foote, Bruce Catton, and others and the battles themselves, how divisions and brigades were placed and what happened to them, are only briefly described. If the reader doesn’t know about interior and exterior lines, lines of communication, and turning the enemy, he will by the time he reaches page 700. There is an appreciation of General Halleck as a strategist I haven’t encountered before, and learned that “going for General Lee’s army” didn’t start with General Grant. Much of the Union’s success came from raids, which Hattaway and Jones describe as a foray into enemy territory not meaning to stay at any one spot (having to garrison it), and not meant to be confused with a penetration meant to stay. And here I thought of raids as nearly solely the province of Generals Forrest and Morgan! The Union closed down the salt factories along the coast, raided Meridian, Miss., Selma, Ala., shut down the major Southern railroads, and General Sherman…. In short, it was Grant’s strategy to win by operating on the Confederacy’s logistical infrastructure and finally won by doing so and with three major turning movements: Ft. Donelson, Vicksburg, and Appomattox. Jeff Davis and the Confederate high command don’t come off as inept as readers may have been led to believe. Operating on interior lines, they concentrated their major forces on railroad lines and were able to pull off some rapid concentrations to counter threats, such as at First Manassas, the Seven Days, the relief of Chattanooga (1862), and Chickamauga. There is also good information on the upper echelon staffs to assist Lincoln and Stanton with their strategic decisions. Footnotes are at the end of each chapter (preferable to the back of the book thinks I).
April 9, 2025
the authors describe the strange military situation of the 1860s: the rifle-musket has made dug-in infantry mostly invulnerable to flanking and cavalry charges, large swathes of the countryside are unable to support armies of the size necessary to take territory, and wagons can only travel a few days with any amount of supplies, before the amount of animal feed they need to carry outweighs the supplies they would be transporting. the telegraph and the railroad has made troop concentration across multiple states relatively easy. dug-in armies with a supply of food, ammunition and shoes can hold far larger enemy concentrations in place indefinitely.
this means that large army movements intending to permanently occupy territory can only be supported by a high-throughput supply connection, meaning water or a sturdy railroad protected from sabotage, and directly attacking the enemy is likely to lead to a defeat or a barren victory. the only large-scale surrenders or disintegrations of armies come after supplies have been cut off and starvation has set in (vicksburg), or morale has dropped to a critical point due to futile assaults and loss of territory (hood's army after nashville).
the south, with far less manpower, almost no navy or manufacturing capacity, still had several advantages: they knew exactly where the high-supply areas and railroads were and could thus predict Union campaigns, they were on the defensive, and they had the advantage of only having to survive, not invade the north or even defeat Union armies. they also had a much harsher and more effective conscription regime than the north. northern commanders had to worry about their army losing huge chunks of its veteran strength due to enlistments expiring, but the confederacy conscripted everyone possible for the duration of the war.
the strategy the north eventually adopted was to gradually conquer areas where the south could draw supplies and recruits from, conduct army-size raids to deny the south supplies in areas it wasn't productive to control permanently, attack the south's railway network and ports to minimize their ability to concentrate troops and smuggle supplies in, and abolish slavery in areas it controlled or raided. in other words, directly attacking lee a few miles from washington wasn't really part of the program. each area the south lost weakened the entire war effort because supplies became harder to come by and troops recruited from that area frequently deserted, and the Union gained intelligence and motivated troops in the form of former slaves. deception and effective logistics enabled the tactical victories that brought one army into the rear of the other and forced the defender to become the attacker, but this was always a gamble.
political considerations in the north demanded direct attacks on confederate armies, like grant's overland campaign. political considerations in the south demanded 'gallant' army-sized raids to demoralize the north, like lee to gettysburg and hood to nashville, both disasters.
this means that large army movements intending to permanently occupy territory can only be supported by a high-throughput supply connection, meaning water or a sturdy railroad protected from sabotage, and directly attacking the enemy is likely to lead to a defeat or a barren victory. the only large-scale surrenders or disintegrations of armies come after supplies have been cut off and starvation has set in (vicksburg), or morale has dropped to a critical point due to futile assaults and loss of territory (hood's army after nashville).
the south, with far less manpower, almost no navy or manufacturing capacity, still had several advantages: they knew exactly where the high-supply areas and railroads were and could thus predict Union campaigns, they were on the defensive, and they had the advantage of only having to survive, not invade the north or even defeat Union armies. they also had a much harsher and more effective conscription regime than the north. northern commanders had to worry about their army losing huge chunks of its veteran strength due to enlistments expiring, but the confederacy conscripted everyone possible for the duration of the war.
the strategy the north eventually adopted was to gradually conquer areas where the south could draw supplies and recruits from, conduct army-size raids to deny the south supplies in areas it wasn't productive to control permanently, attack the south's railway network and ports to minimize their ability to concentrate troops and smuggle supplies in, and abolish slavery in areas it controlled or raided. in other words, directly attacking lee a few miles from washington wasn't really part of the program. each area the south lost weakened the entire war effort because supplies became harder to come by and troops recruited from that area frequently deserted, and the Union gained intelligence and motivated troops in the form of former slaves. deception and effective logistics enabled the tactical victories that brought one army into the rear of the other and forced the defender to become the attacker, but this was always a gamble.
political considerations in the north demanded direct attacks on confederate armies, like grant's overland campaign. political considerations in the south demanded 'gallant' army-sized raids to demoralize the north, like lee to gettysburg and hood to nashville, both disasters.
March 7, 2016
Undaunted by the book's more than 700 pages of main text and explanatory and statistical appendices, which make use of fundamental insights about tactics, strategy, and logistics, as well as the use of Lancaster's power rule on the effectiveness of military units, I requested this book from one of our area's local library systems. The book ended up not being precisely what I expected. As someone who not infrequently reads books that seek to delve into the causes of victory or defeat in wars [1], I expected this book to look at various reasons or arguments about how (and why) the North won. And, to be sure, the book's authors did discuss these matters, at least somewhat. However, the book ended up being more of a straightforward narrative history, albeit a fairly technical one that is most of interest to those who already have a working knowledge of the historiography of the Civil War and who appreciate a narrative history of the Civil War that focuses on issues of strategy and logistics [2], that has fairly dense prose but is livened up by the witty quotes of generals as well as of historians like Bruce Catton [3], which makes this book enjoyable to read, full of thought-provoking revisionist history, but not quite the book I had expected.
In terms of its structure and contents, the authors take the conventional course of the Civil War, from Fort Sumter to just after Appomattox, and divide it up into twenty chapters, together taking over 700 pages for the main narrative, averaging around 35 pages apiece. Some of these chapters are narrative in nature, taking a look at various battles or campaigns, paying a great deal of attention to the Western and Trans-Mississippi fronts of the war as a way of demonstrating the interconnection between these areas of the war, in contrast to the usual histories that focus only on the largely indecisive Eastern front. For example, the book contains several chapters that talk about the simultaneous advances in early 1862 for both Grant and McClellan and the Southern response to these at Shiloh as well as Fair Oaks and the Seven Days' battles. The author also discusses the Union Offenses at the end of 1862 that culminated in the sanguinary repulses at Frederickburg, Chickasaw Bluffs, and Stones' River, and, more happily for the Union, the symphony of Vicksburg, Tullahoma, and Gettysburg, as well as the final simultaneous advances that led to Union victory in 1864. On the other hand, besides these chapters that connect the various penetrations and raids and counterraids and frontal assaults and turning movements and the like, the authors also intersperse chapters that deal with matters of high command, logistics and strategy, and they close with a chapter on soldiers and civilians that point out the various political and military-strategic concerns of the Union and Confederacy.
The book is a worthwhile one, although it demands a substantial investment of time and attention, and is the sort of book that would work best for a graduate level course on military history, or a historical course at a military college. The author's revisionist claims, taken from a high-level view that praises Lincoln for his political savvy, show Bragg to have been a better general than he is thought to be, point to the importance of the Western concentration blog of Confederate generals that was at times opposed to Lee's efforts to focus on the indecisive Eastern front, and that point to the continual difficulty faced by Confederates in finding sufficiently competent generals to lead armies given their unsettling interpersonal drama and their prickly demands for honor and dignity. In the main, the authors do, at least implicitly, provide some reasons for Northern victory, and they are not so unconventional or unimportant after all: superior naval strength, a larger pool of talent for leading armies competently and providing essential staff duties, greater strength in logistics, more politically savvy civil and military leadership. Those who take the time to read this book to its end will likely find much more to respect about the balancing act that many leaders took, as well as have more to ponder and reflect on when it comes to balancing military and political matters and showing concern for issues of logistics, areas that are all often by forgotten by the large population of armchair generals that exist.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[2] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[3] Some of Catton's quotes are particularly felicitous:
"It was a test of what men can nerve themselves to attempt and what they can compel themselves to endure, and at shattering cost it proved that the possibilities in both directions are limitless (407)."
Or take this description of Ulysses S. Grant by Assistant Secretary of War Dana:
"Grant was an uncommon fellow--the most modest, the most disinterested, and the most honest man I ever knew, with a temper that nothing could ever disturb, and a judgment that was judicial in its comprehensiveness and wisdom. Not a great man, except morally, not an original or brilliant man, but sincere, thoughtful, deep, and gifted with courage that never faltered. When the time came to risk all, he went in like a simple-hearted, unaffected, unpretending hero, whom no ill omens could deject and no triumph unduly exalt. A social, friendly man, too, fond of a pleasant joke and also ready with one; but liking above all a long chat of an evening, and ready to sit up with you all night (369)."
Or take this frankly racist poem that fits the mood of the Union army about the enlistment of black troops well, coming from Lt. Col Charles G. Halpine, a staff officer for General Hunter:
"Some tell us 'tis a burnin' shame
To make the naygers fight;
And that the thrade of being' kilt
Belongs but to the white;
But as for me, upon my sowl!
So liberal are we here,
I'll let Sambo be murthered instead of myself,
On every day in the year (271)."
In terms of its structure and contents, the authors take the conventional course of the Civil War, from Fort Sumter to just after Appomattox, and divide it up into twenty chapters, together taking over 700 pages for the main narrative, averaging around 35 pages apiece. Some of these chapters are narrative in nature, taking a look at various battles or campaigns, paying a great deal of attention to the Western and Trans-Mississippi fronts of the war as a way of demonstrating the interconnection between these areas of the war, in contrast to the usual histories that focus only on the largely indecisive Eastern front. For example, the book contains several chapters that talk about the simultaneous advances in early 1862 for both Grant and McClellan and the Southern response to these at Shiloh as well as Fair Oaks and the Seven Days' battles. The author also discusses the Union Offenses at the end of 1862 that culminated in the sanguinary repulses at Frederickburg, Chickasaw Bluffs, and Stones' River, and, more happily for the Union, the symphony of Vicksburg, Tullahoma, and Gettysburg, as well as the final simultaneous advances that led to Union victory in 1864. On the other hand, besides these chapters that connect the various penetrations and raids and counterraids and frontal assaults and turning movements and the like, the authors also intersperse chapters that deal with matters of high command, logistics and strategy, and they close with a chapter on soldiers and civilians that point out the various political and military-strategic concerns of the Union and Confederacy.
The book is a worthwhile one, although it demands a substantial investment of time and attention, and is the sort of book that would work best for a graduate level course on military history, or a historical course at a military college. The author's revisionist claims, taken from a high-level view that praises Lincoln for his political savvy, show Bragg to have been a better general than he is thought to be, point to the importance of the Western concentration blog of Confederate generals that was at times opposed to Lee's efforts to focus on the indecisive Eastern front, and that point to the continual difficulty faced by Confederates in finding sufficiently competent generals to lead armies given their unsettling interpersonal drama and their prickly demands for honor and dignity. In the main, the authors do, at least implicitly, provide some reasons for Northern victory, and they are not so unconventional or unimportant after all: superior naval strength, a larger pool of talent for leading armies competently and providing essential staff duties, greater strength in logistics, more politically savvy civil and military leadership. Those who take the time to read this book to its end will likely find much more to respect about the balancing act that many leaders took, as well as have more to ponder and reflect on when it comes to balancing military and political matters and showing concern for issues of logistics, areas that are all often by forgotten by the large population of armchair generals that exist.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[2] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.wordpress...
[3] Some of Catton's quotes are particularly felicitous:
"It was a test of what men can nerve themselves to attempt and what they can compel themselves to endure, and at shattering cost it proved that the possibilities in both directions are limitless (407)."
Or take this description of Ulysses S. Grant by Assistant Secretary of War Dana:
"Grant was an uncommon fellow--the most modest, the most disinterested, and the most honest man I ever knew, with a temper that nothing could ever disturb, and a judgment that was judicial in its comprehensiveness and wisdom. Not a great man, except morally, not an original or brilliant man, but sincere, thoughtful, deep, and gifted with courage that never faltered. When the time came to risk all, he went in like a simple-hearted, unaffected, unpretending hero, whom no ill omens could deject and no triumph unduly exalt. A social, friendly man, too, fond of a pleasant joke and also ready with one; but liking above all a long chat of an evening, and ready to sit up with you all night (369)."
Or take this frankly racist poem that fits the mood of the Union army about the enlistment of black troops well, coming from Lt. Col Charles G. Halpine, a staff officer for General Hunter:
"Some tell us 'tis a burnin' shame
To make the naygers fight;
And that the thrade of being' kilt
Belongs but to the white;
But as for me, upon my sowl!
So liberal are we here,
I'll let Sambo be murthered instead of myself,
On every day in the year (271)."
December 19, 2022
Good but frankly not great. While the military focus is narrow, they leave out a lot of naval, guerrilla, and far west details that would be better for a holistic military view of the war. The endless repetition of who attempted a turning movement on whom isn't really that interesting, and the strictly operational focus really hurts the narrative. It becomes tedious repetition.
Some more tactics wouldn't have been amiss either, or how technology influenced said tactics. They go into it a little by describing how Napoleonic battles of annihilation were no longer possible, but it could have been explored in more depth.
I guess overall the war of maneuver mattered more in the end, and so the focus on the major operational movements makes sense, but I expected more from such a weighty tome. There were no surprises in the narrative at all.
It is exhaustive in terms of the major battles, but the actual descriptions end up being quite bland. Shiloh had probably the best description, showing what an absolute mess that battle was (and probably inspiring von Moltke's quip that the US Civil War was nothing but "a series of armed mobs chasing each other around the countryside from which nothing can be learned").
Battle Cry of Freedom is still the best single-volume exploration of the Civil War.
Some more tactics wouldn't have been amiss either, or how technology influenced said tactics. They go into it a little by describing how Napoleonic battles of annihilation were no longer possible, but it could have been explored in more depth.
I guess overall the war of maneuver mattered more in the end, and so the focus on the major operational movements makes sense, but I expected more from such a weighty tome. There were no surprises in the narrative at all.
It is exhaustive in terms of the major battles, but the actual descriptions end up being quite bland. Shiloh had probably the best description, showing what an absolute mess that battle was (and probably inspiring von Moltke's quip that the US Civil War was nothing but "a series of armed mobs chasing each other around the countryside from which nothing can be learned").
Battle Cry of Freedom is still the best single-volume exploration of the Civil War.
November 12, 2020
This is a good overall military history of the Civil War. It focuses more on the logistics based strategy of the various campaigns than the battles themselves.
The book takes a very high level approach, dealing a great deal with the high level administration choices made by each side. These are interesting and informative to the overall story, but I sometimes think maybe a lot of the detail should have been spun out into a book of its own, or at least better segregated into their own chapters. As it is, the overall narrative of the progression of the war is sometimes interrupted for lengthy stretches by discussions on how the departmental and staff structures of the two sides developed during the war, and the strengths and weaknesses that resulted.
Still, it's a minor complaint for what is otherwise an excellent book.
I would suggest that anyone new to military terms like "lines of operation" or "turning movements" should probably first read Appendix A before proceeding with the rest of the book, as it goes over several concepts that are regularly referred to throughout the book.
The book takes a very high level approach, dealing a great deal with the high level administration choices made by each side. These are interesting and informative to the overall story, but I sometimes think maybe a lot of the detail should have been spun out into a book of its own, or at least better segregated into their own chapters. As it is, the overall narrative of the progression of the war is sometimes interrupted for lengthy stretches by discussions on how the departmental and staff structures of the two sides developed during the war, and the strengths and weaknesses that resulted.
Still, it's a minor complaint for what is otherwise an excellent book.
I would suggest that anyone new to military terms like "lines of operation" or "turning movements" should probably first read Appendix A before proceeding with the rest of the book, as it goes over several concepts that are regularly referred to throughout the book.
August 14, 2020
In a word, masterful. A piercing strategic analysis and an excellent operational narrative. If you only read one military history of the American Civil War, read this one.
March 30, 2013
How the North Won is excellently subtitled ("A Military History of the Civil War"). Politics, social concerns, etc., are pushed into the background and only mentioned in connection with their direct impacts on military planning and operations.
The authors do a first-rate job of analyzing all of the major campaigns of the war by both sides (including ones that didn't happen, or that didn't happen as planned) in the light of the military knowledge and theory of the time. If you've ever wondered "Why did General Gray move to the right instead of the left?" or "Why did General Blue delay before moving on the city?", this book is likely to give you terrific insight as to why.
Many apparent "blunders" show themselves as good plans frustrated by the better plans of the other side, making the true blunders stand out in stark relief. The authors provide excellent interpretations and analyses of the performance of both presidents as military strategists, the weaknesses and strengths of their staffs, and similar views of all of the major armies and commands.
Simple but effective maps are included in the body of the text at appropriate points (though the reader may want to have an overall map or atlas handy to fit them all into place), and a great appendix provides a first-rate summary of the methodology of strategy and military analysis.
If you want to learn the purely military side of the Civil War, this is *the* book to read.
The authors do a first-rate job of analyzing all of the major campaigns of the war by both sides (including ones that didn't happen, or that didn't happen as planned) in the light of the military knowledge and theory of the time. If you've ever wondered "Why did General Gray move to the right instead of the left?" or "Why did General Blue delay before moving on the city?", this book is likely to give you terrific insight as to why.
Many apparent "blunders" show themselves as good plans frustrated by the better plans of the other side, making the true blunders stand out in stark relief. The authors provide excellent interpretations and analyses of the performance of both presidents as military strategists, the weaknesses and strengths of their staffs, and similar views of all of the major armies and commands.
Simple but effective maps are included in the body of the text at appropriate points (though the reader may want to have an overall map or atlas handy to fit them all into place), and a great appendix provides a first-rate summary of the methodology of strategy and military analysis.
If you want to learn the purely military side of the Civil War, this is *the* book to read.
March 27, 2011
How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War by Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones is a scholarly look at the Civil War. Hattaway and Jones have produced a great book on Civil War logistics, planning, and administration. They authors seem to focus more on the logistics and strategy side over the tactical side. The book was very good, but at times, it was a dry recitation of chronology, dull facts, and statistics. I had to force my way to complete the book, and it took two attempts to get it read. Most copies of the book will collect dust on some university library bookshelf. It is too deep and too dry for most readers. Better to borrow this book from your library than spend your money purchasing the book. Read in April - June 2005 by Jimmie A. Kepler.
July 28, 2016
This brilliant analysis resonates because I also read "Why the South Lost the Civil War". I had learned all avout mid-nineteenth century military theory after completing a semester of The American Way of War at the USAF Academy. We learned how formations (corps/divison/brigade) introduced by Napoleon gave mass armies unprecedented tactical flexibility. Munitions improved too and the rifled musket extended the infantry's reach. So during the American Civil War, armies could be maneuvered rapidly along with their defensive firepower that it became impossible to destroy one unless the opposing command made exceptional mistakes. Hattaway explains these facts in his exceptional treatment.
July 30, 2013
A five-star effort in terms of substance, but the slightly tedious style of the material pulls the rating down a tad. First-rate research, offered in exhaustive detail. Less a book to just sit down and read and more a sourcebook to consult, though the presentation of content is coherent enough that one could sit down and read it through - with a sufficiency of patience and determination. Still, indispensable in terms of coming to a deeper understanding of the strategic elements of the Civil War. A must for any serious scholar.
March 16, 2009
As a pure military history, this is extremely informative, especially for those who want to learn about mid-19th-century tactics and strategy. It soberly distinguishes between what the generals on both sides thought they were doing and what they were actually doing, and challenges several classic assumptions about the way the war was fought (e.g., the effectiveness of artillery). A little dry, but a very solid book.
July 23, 2011
This is an in-depth study of the strategies and tactics of the Union affected the outcome of the American Civil War. There are discussions about the Union leaders and how they achieved their positions and what they did afterwards. Very little attention is paid to the resource advantage of the North.
January 12, 2011
Excellent reference. Offers a contextual perspective on the inner workings of the Union command structure of the Civil War which is often overlooked in standard histories. Hardly flawless, but still as good as you're likely to find.
July 15, 2014
Very in depth, not for the casual Civil War reader. Focuses on the evolving military strategy of the Union army as well as its response to the strategies of the Confederate armies.
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