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Fascism in Spain, 1923-1977
Fascism in Spain, 1923–1977, by celebrated historian Stanley G. Payne, is the most comprehensive history of Spanish fascism to appear in any language. This authoritative study offers treatment of all the major doctrines, personalities, and defining features of the Spanish fascist movement, from its beginnings until the death of General Francisco Franco in 1977.
Payne describes and analyzes the development of the Falangist party both prior to and during the Spanish Civil War, presenting a detailed analysis of its transformation into the state party of the Franco regime—Falange Española Tradicionalista—as well as its ultimate conversion into the pseudofascist Movimiento Nacional. Payne devotes particular attention to the crucial years 1939–1942, when the Falangists endeavored to expand their influence and convert the Franco regime into a fully Fascist system. Fascism in Spain helps us to understand the personality of Franco, the way in which he handled conflict within the regime, and the reasons for the long survival of his rule. Payne concludes with the first full inquiry into the process of “defascistization,” which began with the fall of Mussolini in 1943 and extended through the Franco regime’s later efforts to transform the party into a more viable political entity.
Payne describes and analyzes the development of the Falangist party both prior to and during the Spanish Civil War, presenting a detailed analysis of its transformation into the state party of the Franco regime—Falange Española Tradicionalista—as well as its ultimate conversion into the pseudofascist Movimiento Nacional. Payne devotes particular attention to the crucial years 1939–1942, when the Falangists endeavored to expand their influence and convert the Franco regime into a fully Fascist system. Fascism in Spain helps us to understand the personality of Franco, the way in which he handled conflict within the regime, and the reasons for the long survival of his rule. Payne concludes with the first full inquiry into the process of “defascistization,” which began with the fall of Mussolini in 1943 and extended through the Franco regime’s later efforts to transform the party into a more viable political entity.
648 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1999
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About the author
Stanley G. Payne
81 books104 followersStanley G. Payne is a historian of modern Spain and European Fascism at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He retired from full time teaching in 2004 and is currently Professor Emeritus at its Department of History.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
July 12, 2015
Staney G. Payne is one of the founders of fascist studies, and this was his last reexamination of the Falange and its leadership from its birth in the twenties until the final death of the movement with Franco. Payne utilizes his own research, but also integrates many secondary studies, mostly written in Spanish, to provide a synthetic work in English that corrects old errors and outlines a solid and believable history superior to anything else up to that point. The work is chronological, with chapters dedicated to significant periods and broken into thematic sections to demonstrate the development of different aspects of the movement. Attention is given to significant individuals (Jose Antonio Prima de River, Ledesma, Hedilla, Serrano Suner and others) and ideological concepts (Patria, national syndicalism, the position of the party vis-a-vis the church, etc).
The final analysis discovers that fascism was actually comparatively weak in Spain, as against other European nations at the time, with no mass support and limited electoral appeal even at its high point, and only became significant due to participation in the Spanish Civil War and the support of the true fascist nations (Italy and Germany) in winning that war. Franco, while he was sympathetic to the Axis and was certainly a right-wing authoritarian dictator, never cared much for fascist ideology, and only used the Falange as a prop for his own power, never giving it the opportunity to experiment with fascist solutions to Spanish political problems. Once the Second World War had ended, Franco quickly de-fascistized the regime, only occasionally giving crusts of encouragement to the movement leaders he saw as loyal and quickly stifling any resurgent fascist opposition.
For scholars familiar with the study of fascism, none of these conclusions should be new or surprising, although a lay audience might find them so. The association of Franco with fascism kept Spain out of NATO for years and has influenced the Left and its understanding of Spanish history. In setting Franquismo apart from Falangism, Payne is following a standard scholarly concensus (one which he himself helped to form in the 1960s), but those new to the field may have difficulty understanding the difference from this text. He does not spend much time providing a theoretical analysis or introducing the reader to debates over the “fascist minimum.” He mentions “palingenesis” at one point, but gives no introduction to Roger Griffin and his approach to the definition of fascism – you have to be “in on it” to get it.
I had a few criticisms of certain citations, in particular points where he cited his own interviews with Movement veterans in the 1950s, no doubt part of the work he did on his dissertation. While these interviews make interesting evidence, they can hardly be seen as conclusive and I think should have been more clearly noted in the text, with statements like “according to his own recollection,” or “as an aging veteran remembered many years later.”
These points are relatively minor, however, and for those with some background and understanding of the context, this is a delightful and fascinating text.
The final analysis discovers that fascism was actually comparatively weak in Spain, as against other European nations at the time, with no mass support and limited electoral appeal even at its high point, and only became significant due to participation in the Spanish Civil War and the support of the true fascist nations (Italy and Germany) in winning that war. Franco, while he was sympathetic to the Axis and was certainly a right-wing authoritarian dictator, never cared much for fascist ideology, and only used the Falange as a prop for his own power, never giving it the opportunity to experiment with fascist solutions to Spanish political problems. Once the Second World War had ended, Franco quickly de-fascistized the regime, only occasionally giving crusts of encouragement to the movement leaders he saw as loyal and quickly stifling any resurgent fascist opposition.
For scholars familiar with the study of fascism, none of these conclusions should be new or surprising, although a lay audience might find them so. The association of Franco with fascism kept Spain out of NATO for years and has influenced the Left and its understanding of Spanish history. In setting Franquismo apart from Falangism, Payne is following a standard scholarly concensus (one which he himself helped to form in the 1960s), but those new to the field may have difficulty understanding the difference from this text. He does not spend much time providing a theoretical analysis or introducing the reader to debates over the “fascist minimum.” He mentions “palingenesis” at one point, but gives no introduction to Roger Griffin and his approach to the definition of fascism – you have to be “in on it” to get it.
I had a few criticisms of certain citations, in particular points where he cited his own interviews with Movement veterans in the 1950s, no doubt part of the work he did on his dissertation. While these interviews make interesting evidence, they can hardly be seen as conclusive and I think should have been more clearly noted in the text, with statements like “according to his own recollection,” or “as an aging veteran remembered many years later.”
These points are relatively minor, however, and for those with some background and understanding of the context, this is a delightful and fascinating text.
December 26, 2016
Look, I'm not going to finish this thing by reading it from cover to cover. So I might as well put it in the 'Read' category and return it to the shelf. Fact is, it's a reference book. You want to know about the origins of Falangist Spain, the Civil War, etc., it's all here. You need details, this one's got them. It also has quite a few photos to help you put faces to names. It's very useful for figuring out the aristocratic roots of the Spanish variety of fascism as opposed to its German counterpart. Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera comes across as a true believer, only minimally cynical. I'll go ahead and give it 4 stars. What the hell.
December 7, 2025
Heavier on political intrigues and lighter on what they actually did; perhaps one should expect that about a small, insignificant, and easily usurped political movement. But contains many historical facts that should escape the memory hole, including:
Extended quotes describing Hitler's thoughts of Franco and his regime, including Hitler scheming about "when the time comes to overthrow this regime controlled by priests." (pp 373-4):
In his after-dinner conversation with subordinates on 19 February [1942], he lamented that the Communist menace had forced him to intervene in Spain, where “the clergy ought to have been exterminated” in the best interests of the country. Later, on 5 June, he declared himself stupefied by Franco’s religious obscurantism, adding: “I am following the evolution of Spain with the greatest skepticism, and have already made the decision that, though I may eventually visit any other European country, I shall never go to Spain.” “Conflict between the Church and Franco’s regime was inevitable, and so possibly was a new revolution.” Informed a few minutes later that only a few Falangist leaders had been permitted to wear blue shirts during the last Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, he added: “Something like that clearly shows that the Spanish state is headed towards disaster … If a new civil war breaks out, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the Falangists having to make common cause with the Reds to free themselves from the clerical-monarchist trash.” There would obviously be no German encouragement for Don Juan, even though Hitler was beginning to think that Franco was only slightly better. ... During the after-dinner conversation at his headquarters on 7 July, the Führer observed: "One must take care not to place the regime of Franco on a level with National Socialism or Fascism."
Spain as a refuge for tens of thousands of Jews fleeing National Socialism (footnote 105 from chapter 11):
"Despite the frequent frothings of anti-Semitic propaganda in the Falangist press, the policy of the Spanish government and its diplomatic representatives toward Jews was relatively positive. Altogether, during the first part of the war, some 30,000 Jews from occupied Europe had received safe passage through Spain, and there is no evidence that any Jew who reached Spanish soil was turned back to German authorities. Approximately 7,500 more may have passed through between 1942 and 1944. During the later phases of the SS roundup in Hungary and the Balkans, Spanish consular officials managed to provide protection (through citizen passports) to more than 3,200 additional Jews, many of the latter Sephardic. ... In addition, the 14,000 Jews residing in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco were not only protected but received reaffirmation of Spanish nationality, so that a number of Sephardic Jews in French Morocco emigrated to the Spanish zone."
Extended quotes describing Hitler's thoughts of Franco and his regime, including Hitler scheming about "when the time comes to overthrow this regime controlled by priests." (pp 373-4):
In his after-dinner conversation with subordinates on 19 February [1942], he lamented that the Communist menace had forced him to intervene in Spain, where “the clergy ought to have been exterminated” in the best interests of the country. Later, on 5 June, he declared himself stupefied by Franco’s religious obscurantism, adding: “I am following the evolution of Spain with the greatest skepticism, and have already made the decision that, though I may eventually visit any other European country, I shall never go to Spain.” “Conflict between the Church and Franco’s regime was inevitable, and so possibly was a new revolution.” Informed a few minutes later that only a few Falangist leaders had been permitted to wear blue shirts during the last Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, he added: “Something like that clearly shows that the Spanish state is headed towards disaster … If a new civil war breaks out, I wouldn’t be surprised to see the Falangists having to make common cause with the Reds to free themselves from the clerical-monarchist trash.” There would obviously be no German encouragement for Don Juan, even though Hitler was beginning to think that Franco was only slightly better. ... During the after-dinner conversation at his headquarters on 7 July, the Führer observed: "One must take care not to place the regime of Franco on a level with National Socialism or Fascism."
Spain as a refuge for tens of thousands of Jews fleeing National Socialism (footnote 105 from chapter 11):
"Despite the frequent frothings of anti-Semitic propaganda in the Falangist press, the policy of the Spanish government and its diplomatic representatives toward Jews was relatively positive. Altogether, during the first part of the war, some 30,000 Jews from occupied Europe had received safe passage through Spain, and there is no evidence that any Jew who reached Spanish soil was turned back to German authorities. Approximately 7,500 more may have passed through between 1942 and 1944. During the later phases of the SS roundup in Hungary and the Balkans, Spanish consular officials managed to provide protection (through citizen passports) to more than 3,200 additional Jews, many of the latter Sephardic. ... In addition, the 14,000 Jews residing in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco were not only protected but received reaffirmation of Spanish nationality, so that a number of Sephardic Jews in French Morocco emigrated to the Spanish zone."
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews