In some ways fascinating, and in others oddly tedious, this is a book with a great core idea that could have used A. A more rigorous edit. and B. A rethinking and broadening of its purpose.
When you see this title what, do you think the book would be about? My guess was that it was a sort of dual biography through which the lives of Nasser and Qutb would be used as vehicles to explore Egypt's and the Middle East's seemingly interminable struggle between Islamists and nationalists. The book sort of does that, but its real focus is the relationship of Nasser's Free Officers Movement and the Brotherhood. This is not a bad topic for a book, but the title really makes it seem like a different book.
I also thought this book would be more appealing to a wider audience, given that Nasser, Qutb, and the clash between these forces is really interesting and relevant. The text, however, is really only for academics, and maybe even specialists in MIddle Eastern history. It is loaded down with unnecessary academic jargon (subjectivities, an endless stream of -ation words), it is quite long, and a huge portion of it (like the last 2 hours of the audiobook) is devoted not to how this clash made modern Arab politics but to an extended critique of the Muslim Brotherhood's insular and authoritarian leadership. Furthermore, the biographical sections of this book are just not as compelling as they could be. You get a sense of what these titanic figures thought and did politically, but not who they were as people. There's also really not that much about even their brief period of rule in Egypt, which I was most interested in hearing about. This book just didn't put enough thought into who its audience would be and what a wider audience might want to hear. That makes it surprisingly narrow in appeal.
That's a lot of criticizing. I do want to emphasize the value of Gerges' main argument that the origins of this clash are really more political (in the sense that they are about a power struggle) than ideological. Of course, these groups obviously have ideological differences, but originally they cooperated to bring about the defeat of imperialism and the fall of the monarchy. Nasser then turned on and tried to control the Brotherhood, causing a split between accommodationists in the movement and radical resisters who eventually came to have Qutb as their figurehead. This is an important reminder that Arab/Muslim politics are, well, politics; they are not all wild-eyed fanatics driven inexorably and inflexibly by dogma to kill each other. Gerges subtly undermines that stereotype; if only the book was written for a wider audience, it could have a much bigger effect on the way people see Arab politics.
The other really interesting point from this book was a rethinking of the Arab world's shift from Arab nationalism to Islamism as the dominant ideological/political form. Gerges says that the whole idea that the 1967 defeat killed Arab nationalism is overblown. This defeat of course crushed the movement's credibility in many ways, and was emotionally devastating, but the real causes of this shift were the continual repression, corruption, and inequality of the Nasserist and then Sadat-ist systems. Even more important was Sadat's co-opting of religion to build his legitimacy; Sadat encouraged the flourishing and organizing of "moderate" Islamic groups as the only permitted civil society groups. Sadat allied with the Brotherhood to crush other forms of political resistance, so it makes a lot of sense that his quid pro quo with them (which blew up in his face in the form of his own assassination) fueled the ascendence of political Islam.
I definitely learned a lot about Egyptian history in this book, and a good deal more about Nasser (a much more paranoid and ruthless dictator than I realized) and Sadat (a figure seemingly driven as much by insecurity at his own failures as blind fanaticism, although he was a true fanatic at the end of his life). This book just leaves me with a weird feeling. I was into some parts of it, and I basically tuned out other massive stretches. I think the general reader, like an undergrad history major or informed general dude, just wouldn't have the patience for the length, depth, and language of this book, so I can only recommend it to people who study the Middle East at the graduate level or above.