This is a good read for our time, as family policy rises in political prominence. Carlson argues that "'family' and 'religiously-grounded community' . . . served in the twentieth century as the dominant imagery for American self-understanding." (xi) To him, “the powerful images surrounding the family and related natural communities seem properly American,” and he shows how family defined American life and vice-versa throughout history. (258) People on the left might look at Carlson’s background and shudder, but this sensible history generally avoids polemics. Carlson is at his best when he digs up surprising historical facts and dives into movements that today seem incongruous with the two parties in power.
He begins with the early 1900s, convincingly arguing that Theodore Roosevelt sought to build a new American identity based on family and not, like some historians posit, on racial lines. (3) Carlson argues that Teddy's mention of "race" was more expansive, covering Americans as an ethnicity. Roosevelt tied American nationalism to birthrates and advocated policies like differential taxation for child-rearing families. Today, JD Vance and others on the new right pursue the same narrative and some of the same policies.
Carlson moves on to describe how German-American family values permeated the broader culture and melded with the rising trend of Settlement Houses. Together, they forged an integrationist American culture that rejected old xenophobia and united around support for strong family units. (27) This movement, largely led by women, birthed (pun intended) numerous programs to help expecting mothers and babies. America's self-understanding became more communitarian, which further precipitated legislation like the Sheppard-Tower act. Interestingly, the American Medical Association teamed up with corporate interests and equity feminists to oppose legislation to help mother and babies. (81)
The New Deal built on this pro-family culture to enact policy supporting families. Carlson points out in this section that the New Deal was socially conservative in many ways, with its central focus being on a family wage allowing one parent to work and the other to stay home. (88, 98) Maternalist feminists and their ilk, like Frances Perkins, piloted New Deal programs with this goal in mind. Once again, the opposition was composed of both more liberal feminists and corporations. But the New Deal FDR administration successfully enacted NIRA, Subsistence Homesteads, Emergency Work Projects, and other programs in ways that furthered this “family wage” goal. New Deal programs, including Social Security, actively disincentivized non-traditional family arrangements. (115) This chapter was particularly policy-focused and cuts against the common narrative of the New Deal as purely progressive. Indeed, in a different way than Peter Viereck, Carlson suggests that the New Deal sought to conserve.
The remainder of the book was less memorable to me, and seemed more amorphous. The next chapter covers how Henry Luce and Life magazine elevated the American family as part of the country’s postwar ethos in a time when Americans struggled to define themselves. He sought to build a new American order based on Christianity, freedom, and economic advancement. (148) In turn, Carlson claims, this new “value consensus” played out in American foreign policy. (178-180) While the point makes sense intuitively, I found this chapter lacked connections between intellectual ruminations on family and policy and actual policy impacts. This contrasts with the New Deal chapter, which strongly linked the two.
As the 1960s turned over into the 1970s, rising threats—to Carslon, the Sexual Revolution and neo-Malthusianism, began to threaten the national centrality of family. (208-209) Vietnam and other battles further gnawed at the ties sustaining this national consensus. And in the 1970s, this culminated in the left choosing equity feminism instead of maternalist feminism, with “pro-family progressivism mount(ing) its last stand.” (232) In Carlosn’s telling, equity feminists moved into the Democratic party during this time as social conservatives shifted Republican. (244) See Daniel William’s book and Mark Stricherz’s books for a great tale of how this happened. All the while, the maternalist perspective faded—major institutions advanced a more liberatory view, and the economy had by then moved away from the family wage system. President Reagan advanced some pro-family policies merged with pro-market ones (249-250), reflecting the Republicans’ fusionist approach.
Carlson concludes on a strong note, reminding us all about what matters most. “Only natural and internalized restraints-respect for motherhood, sanctification of the family, concern for the home economy, esteem for the natural communities that shelter families-can hold the modern American corporate state in balance with human values, in domestic matters as well as in foreign adventures and trade.” (259)
As Pope Leo XIII stated in Rerum Novarum, the family “has rights and duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State.” Id. at 12. The state must support, but not displace or absorb the individual or the family. Id. at 35. Catholic Social Teaching, which heavily influences Carlson, has always put family at the center of a healthy and functioning society. For the reasons Carlson notes, we’ve lost sight of that at various times over history. I might quibble with some of why he thinks family has slipped by the wayside, but his conclusion is correct.
The times may seem difficult, yet with a new Pope Leo, and politicians once again talking about supporting families, I feel hopeful. Republicans are implementing Baby Bonds (an exciting policy) and Democrats advocate for more paid leave. In both parties, a pro-housing agenda promises to perhaps finally lower housing prices. We’re in a unique moment, and perhaps Americans can tap into the country’s long history of supporting families, a history Carlson recounts well.