Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not

Cambridge Studies in Economics, Choice, and Society

by Jared Rubin

For centuries following the spread of Islam, the Middle East was far ahead of Europe. Yet, the modern economy was born in Europe. Why was it not born in the Middle East? In this book Jared Rubin examines the role that Islam played in this reversal of fortunes. It argues that the religion itself is not to blame; the importance of religious legitimacy in Middle Eastern politics was the primary culprit. Muslim religious authorities were given an important seat at the political bargaining table, which they used to block important advancements such as the printing press and lending at interest. In Europe, however, the Church played a weaker role in legitimizing rule, especially where Protestantism spread (indeed, the Reformation was successful due to the spread of printing, which was blocked in the Middle East). It was precisely in those Protestant nations, especially England and the Dutch Republic, where the modern economy was born.

Genres: History, Economics, Nonfiction, Middle East, Religion, Islam, Politics

296 pages, Paperback

First published February 1, 2017

Reviews

[Tarek Amr · Rating 5 out of 5]

I brief, I cannot recommend this book enough, and although I read it on Kindle, I am planning to buy a paper copy so I can lend it to any of my friends who wants to read it. I also hope it gets translated into Arabic; since we have the ban on the printing press lifted already, wink wink.

I wrote a longer review here for those who are interested in knowing more about the book before buying it.
https://medium.com/@gr33ndata/why-the...

[Jukka Aakula · Rating 5 out of 5]

There certainly exist plenty of books on the subject "Why the West succeeded but not the Middle East" - this book, however, is one by a student and coworker of Avner Greif and Timur Kuran - both being the best experts in the economic history of the Middle East and especially the history of the divergence of Europe and the Middle East starting in the late middle ages.

Rubin describes a theory of development and economic reform. How much the rulers of the state reform the economy depends according to Rubin on which agents (military, nobility, priesthood, the bourgeois, the people/democracy,...) the ruler uses as propagating the legitimacy of their rule. E.g. if it is the priesthood and religious elite who do the legitimization, the economic policy is hardly optimal for an increase in welfare. Reforms are scarce.

Why is it optimal e.g. for Middle Eastern rulers to choose the religious agents as propagating agents - even today - is discussed widely. Other cases such as the Protestant countries Britain and Netherlands and Catholic Spain are discussed thoroughly. Why did the Spanish rulers of 15th to 17th centuries not take the economic elite to the bargaining table but instead relied on gold coming from New World and used the religious agents for propagating legitimacy - pretty much like the Middle Easter rulers rely on oil and religious elite? Why did the Reformation decrease the power of the priesthood - and made the religious elite less of an option as a propagating agent?

Slightly abstract theory on a generic level but makes sense when examples are discussed. E.g. why did the Ottomans forbid the printing until the 18th century but only for Arabic scripts - not for the minority scripts (Greece, Jewish, Armenian).

[Kamil Salamah · Rating 5 out of 5]

A most objective book on the subject I have read to date. The summation is simple: the timeliness of adopting and advancing of the right propagators for legitimacy to be in power. Those that failed to do so( such as the Ottoman and Spanish Empire) regressed, while those who did such as the Danes and Northern Europe( England etc) excelled in all fields to create successful nations.

Neither Christianity nor Islam as religions are the reasons of failure or success. Greed to remain in power and the exclusion of the "other" is at the heart of failing nations and empires. Inclusion strengthens nations building while exclusion and extractive practices weaken and destroy those that practice it.

Till the Middle East evolves to have inclusive systems of governance, it will remain backwards and in turmoil.

[Walter Cavinaw · Rating 4 out of 5]

The author creates a model describing how rulers stay in power and uses it to help explain some of the factors that allowed England and the Netherlands to grow, while Spain and the Ottoman empire stagnated.

Rulers can propagate rule by bargaining with propagating agents who influence the actions and beliefs of the population either through legitimizing the ruler (through religion or economic support) or by coercion. Th ruler will implement rules and laws that benefit these propagating agents in return for their support.

He argues that the Islamic and Spanish rulers relied much more heavily on religious legimitacy. The Islamic world was unable to adjust to changes in the economic situation over time, because the religious institutions opposed it. The author goes into great detail on how the Islamic religious institutions opposed interest-bearing loans and the printing press, which were crucial to European development.

In contrast to the Islamic world, northwestern European states increasingly relied on economic actors to propagate rulers at the expense of the religious elite. The protestant reformation was important in this process and relied on the printing press for it to spread rapidly. Printing was important to the secular parts of the universities so suppressing it wasn't reasonable.

The arguments made throughout the book were focused on processes and knock-on effects. Unlike other books on macro-history, the author didn't try to oversimplify history to fit his narrative and I really appreciated this about the book. There are some things I will have to revisit in the future. For example I am not entirely convinced by his arguments that Islamic finance was inferior, and I would like to understand better why universities were so important even before the printing press.

Overall, this book was an eye opener for me as it tied together a few loose threads from my other readings on "The great divergence" and provided a great analytical tool for understanding the incentives and actions of elites and rulers. To be honest, before this book I wasn't even sure what 'elite' meant in historical context. Now I understand it was essentially those people who could influence the beliefs and actions of the population (maybe akin to today's influencers).

One thing I am excited about is that his model is complementary to Goldstone's structural demographic theory. In fact it's probably a necessary puzzle piece to understand the process of state breakdown. The model relates to the three necessary conditions of revolution in the SDT:
- *inter-elite conflict*: If some elites don't legitimize the ruler, or worse they start legitimizing someone else, then the prevailing ruler has a diminished claim to rule.
- *popular discontent*: If the rules implemented by the ruler (in favor existing elite) lead to hardship beyond some threshold then the population will no longer follow the advice of elite who are legitimizing the ruler and the ruler loses his ability to propagate rule.
- *fiscal crisis*: If the ruler and the propagating agents are doing a poor job, the state will eventually run into fiscal problems. At this point they need resources from the economic elite who can either increase their influence in policymaking, or can force structural reform.

Understanding the connection between the ruler propagation model and SDT can probably also help us understand why some revolutions lead to growth inducing reform and some to violent destruction.

[Seth Benzell · Rating 5 out of 5]

Video interview with Andrey Fradkin of the author (Jared Rubin of Chapman University) here: https://youtu.be/I00JnPmV7Y8

[Maram Mazen · Rating 5 out of 5]

Instead of going to extremes of: religions and structures around did had all the impact or zero impact on regions where they spread, the authors here analyze and provide a novel way of viewing the religious impact by analyzing the political structures around Islam and Christianity during their early years.

The authors also stay away from the narrative that Europe was destined to be wealthy, and instead also analyzed what may have lead to that. They also stay away from the narrative of the word-working protestant when analyzing Europe.. and instead they look at the political structures around the spread of Christianity in Europe, as well as how universities were supported and the impact of technologies such as printers.

[Ronan Lyons · Rating 4 out of 5]

A book which combines two fascinating questions. Firstly, how do those in power legitimate that power? Rubin outlines three main groups/elites that historically have legitimated and propagated power: religious, military and economic.

The second question is why the Industrial Revolution, and with it humanity's escape from living at or near subsistence, happened in Northwest Europe, given it has for so much of human history been a backwater.

Rubin finds the answer to the second question in an historical account of the first and in particular transitions in how power was propagated in NW Europe. In short, the printing press enabled "yet another" reform movement in the Catholic Church, in the 1510s and 1520s, to become something much bigger, ultimately replacing religious legitimation with legitimation by an economic elite. Rubin goes into detail for four countries to explain this link: England, the Dutch Republic, Spain and the Ottoman Empire.

I think this book is very strong on its core thesis: that, due to path dependency, quirks or small differences in Islam and Christianity in their early centuries grew into major differences over the centuries, effectively enabling an economic elite to replace a religious one in Europe but not the Middle East.

It does seem a bit odd, though, that a book on how humans "got rich" doesn't mention coal once, for example, the sheer abundance of which in Britain surely had a critical role. So for me, that's the book's weakness: it seems to assume that once the economic elite got a central role in power, prosperity was inevitable. I'm not sure that's true - but in fairness to the author, I understand he has a new book coming soon which will go into these arguments in more detail.

[Lynne]

Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did NotThis is a well-researched but very readable addition to the argument about the building of a society that is able to support all of its citizens in comfort. This large question is addressed in the smaller question reflected in the title. The key factor is that decentralized control allowed the innovation necessary to success. Rubin demonstrates this with several major advances that contributed to the wealth of the western world. In each case, the role of religion in maintaining the ruler's power differed between the Islamic and Christian world. While the Islamic religion supported the most conformist rulers, the predominantly Christian countries were more likely to have a healthy tension between religious leaders and civic leaders. This tension promoted compromise and acceptance of new ideas key to advancement.
The book is the result of many years of research. However, the results are presented in easily-followed tables and graphs and the arguments are clear and thorough, resulting in a very accessible book for anyone interested in improving government, curing poverty, the history of the middle east, or in comparisons of religions.

[Benji · Rating 4 out of 5]

'Laws and policies are the outcomes of interest, since they have a direct effect on a society’s economic success (or lack thereof). The enacted laws and policies reflect the interests and the bargaining power of the relevant parties. This is the primary reason I argue that religious legitimacy is bad for economic growth in the long run. It is not that religion is uniquely bad for economic growth, it is simply that religious authorities – just like any other interest group – do not exactly push for policies that unleash economic growth. A more important implication of the framework is that giving the economic elite a seat at the bargaining table can be good for long run economic growth. This is not because the economic elite have the general welfare of society in mind when bargaining with the ruler, but because the types of things they self-interestedly tend to benefit most from – such as reasonably secure property rights, certain types of public goods, impartial jurisprudence – also benefit the economy as a whole. This does not entail that having some oligarchy of economic elites would be the ideal form of governance; the economic elite also like bad things (such as monopolies for their favored industries), and when they have too strong a say in government stagnation is likely to occur. It does indicate, however, that a society where the economic elite have no seat at the bargaining table (or a small one) is likely to stagnate in the long run.'

[Jonathan Menefee · Rating 5 out of 5]

I am not going to lie to you the potential reader; this book is a bit dense. It is, of course, intended for graduate level students in economics, but I think that undergrads would get a lot out of it. However, I can say as someone who was done with his B.A. long ago and in graduate school for something that does not resemble economics the book is great. I enjoyed the breakdown of both the religious overtones to Europe and the Middle East as well as the political and financial reasons that led to us having the current state of affairs. A great read if you want a deeper understanding for why people suffer from a less developed and diversified economy in one part of the world versus another. Read it and be smarter because of it. Also, feel accomplished that you read something no one else will be aware of and make you look like a deep thinker who knows a secret access point to academia they may just be jealous of; or think you are a complete nerd. Either way, you will feel great about your accomplishment.

[Mehmet Kalaycı · Rating 4 out of 5]

I found the author's hypotheses relevant, but I would have preferred an even more in-depth book, as the ideas the author brings to the table are convincing. In short, it's an explanation of the economic development of the West and the East through institutional and religious actors. He explains this on the basis of the great powers such as England, the Netherlands, Spain and the Ottoman Empire.

[Marc · Rating 3 out of 5]

Although the game theoretic framework used by the author is the right one, his almost exclusive focus on religious legitimacy is excessive. This sometimes lead to contradictions and inconsistencies. So a little disappointing on the content. As for the form, this is one of those books written by academics with as much literary sense as a bedbug.

[João · Rating 4 out of 5]

The theoretical framework is fantastic and useful not only to understand the great divergence but the choices of political actors as well. The historical overviews were nice but I didn't care that much for them (not that they were bad, but I was only interested in the framework itself).

[بهاء قطان · Rating 4 out of 5]

Although it was boring for me its information worth reading.