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Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia
What really happened in Russia after the end of the Soviet Union, and how badly experts and the media misjudged it. Failed Crusade is a deeply informed and passionate call for a fundamentally different American-Russian relationship in the post-Yeltsin era. Author Stephen Cohen shows that what US officials and other experts call "reform" has for most Russians been a catastrophic development―namely the unprecedented demodernization of a twentieth-century country―and for the United States the worst foreign policy disaster since Vietnam. What emerges is an alarming analysis of nuclear-laden Russia after 1991, representing an even greater threat to our national security than during the Cold War, and an indictment of American journalists and policy makers who failed to see or report the truth about the complicity of U.S. policy in a great human tragedy.
366 pages, Paperback
First published September 13, 2000
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About the author
Stephen F. Cohen
24 books74 followersStephen F. Cohen was Professor Emeritus of Politics at Princeton University, where for many years he served as director of the Russian Studies Program, and Professor Emeritus of Russian Studies and History at New York University. He grew up in Owensboro, Kentucky, received his undergraduate and master’s degrees at Indiana University, and his Ph.D. at Columbia University.
Cohen’s other books include Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography; Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917; Sovieticus: American Perceptions and Soviet Realities; (with Katrina vanden Heuvel) Voices of Glasnost: Interviews With Gorbachev’s Reformers; Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia; Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War; and The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin.
For his scholarly work, Cohen received several honors, including two Guggenheim fellowships and a National Book Award nomination.
Over the years, he was also a frequent contributor to newspapers, magazines, television, and radio. His “Sovieticus” column for The Nation won a 1985 Newspaper Guild Page One Award and for another Nation article a 1989 Olive Branch Award. For many years, Cohen was a consultant and on-air commentator on Russian affairs for CBS News. With the producer Rosemary Reed, he was also project adviser and correspondent for three PBS documentary films about Russia: Conversations With Gorbachev; Russia Betrayed?; and Widow of the Revolution.
Cohen visited and lived in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia regularly for more than forty years.
(source: Amazon)
Cohen’s other books include Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution: A Political Biography; Rethinking the Soviet Experience: Politics and History Since 1917; Sovieticus: American Perceptions and Soviet Realities; (with Katrina vanden Heuvel) Voices of Glasnost: Interviews With Gorbachev’s Reformers; Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia; Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War; and The Victims Return: Survivors of the Gulag After Stalin.
For his scholarly work, Cohen received several honors, including two Guggenheim fellowships and a National Book Award nomination.
Over the years, he was also a frequent contributor to newspapers, magazines, television, and radio. His “Sovieticus” column for The Nation won a 1985 Newspaper Guild Page One Award and for another Nation article a 1989 Olive Branch Award. For many years, Cohen was a consultant and on-air commentator on Russian affairs for CBS News. With the producer Rosemary Reed, he was also project adviser and correspondent for three PBS documentary films about Russia: Conversations With Gorbachev; Russia Betrayed?; and Widow of the Revolution.
Cohen visited and lived in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia regularly for more than forty years.
(source: Amazon)
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
May 20, 2014
THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA AND THE 1990'S
Stephen Cohen's "Failed Crusade" (2000) is a vigorous critique of the United States policy towards Russia in the 1990's. In Cohen's view the ostensible aim of that policy was to turn Russia into a free market economy overnight (termed shock therapy it was entirely shocking and far from being therapeutic) that was happy to play second fiddle to U.S. power at the global level, and even within its own region. That aim was completely unrealistic: shock therapy, if not designed to fail (a viewpoint Cohen flirts with on a couple of occasions before moving smartly on), was an utterly unrealistic way of reforming the Russian economy in the post-Soviet era. The ensuing poverty and misery effected over three quarters of the population, brought millions to early graves, and devestated Russia's industrial capacity, public services, and social fabric during the period Cohen reviews.
The book is structured into three parts. The first is an extended essay that thoroughly debunks the simplistic notions of Russia and reform that became the accepted wisdom of the majority of journalists, academics and politicians. This fine debunking is marred by Cohens habit of referring to those he's quoting as a prominent journalist, or a notable historian and leaving their actual names (the usual crowd - Thomas Friedman, Jeffrey Sachs, John Lloyd, etc) languishing in the end notes.
The second part is a collection of short articles Cohen wrote during the 1990's. There is a degree of overlap between them but its hardly fatal. Each article is coupled with a postscript commenting on how the issues written about developed up to the date of publication. The final part is Cohens ideas for how the United States should work with the Russians, namely to stop supporting the shock therapists neo-liberal cum kleptocratic destruction of the economy, and allow the Russians themselves to decide how to develop. Additionally they should provide fiscal support for them to do so, as well as to safely manage their nuclear weapons and power stations. These words were wasted on the soon to be president George W Bush but provide an idea of how a constructive, rational policy vis-a-vis Russia could have been shaped. Perhaps Cohen is being naive to think such a policy was ever going to be possible?
Cohen writes clearly, convincingly and with real feeling in this damning indictement of U.S. policy towards Russia in the 90's, and the tawdry intellectual climate that sustained and celebrated it. He makes it clear that what in fact was being celebrated was the de-development of an industrial nation, the mass impoverishment of its people, and the dashing of their democratic hopes. It is well worth reading, as is Jonathan Steele's "Eternal Russia" which covers the history of the Gorbachev years and the early Yeltsin years.
Stephen Cohen's "Failed Crusade" (2000) is a vigorous critique of the United States policy towards Russia in the 1990's. In Cohen's view the ostensible aim of that policy was to turn Russia into a free market economy overnight (termed shock therapy it was entirely shocking and far from being therapeutic) that was happy to play second fiddle to U.S. power at the global level, and even within its own region. That aim was completely unrealistic: shock therapy, if not designed to fail (a viewpoint Cohen flirts with on a couple of occasions before moving smartly on), was an utterly unrealistic way of reforming the Russian economy in the post-Soviet era. The ensuing poverty and misery effected over three quarters of the population, brought millions to early graves, and devestated Russia's industrial capacity, public services, and social fabric during the period Cohen reviews.
The book is structured into three parts. The first is an extended essay that thoroughly debunks the simplistic notions of Russia and reform that became the accepted wisdom of the majority of journalists, academics and politicians. This fine debunking is marred by Cohens habit of referring to those he's quoting as a prominent journalist, or a notable historian and leaving their actual names (the usual crowd - Thomas Friedman, Jeffrey Sachs, John Lloyd, etc) languishing in the end notes.
The second part is a collection of short articles Cohen wrote during the 1990's. There is a degree of overlap between them but its hardly fatal. Each article is coupled with a postscript commenting on how the issues written about developed up to the date of publication. The final part is Cohens ideas for how the United States should work with the Russians, namely to stop supporting the shock therapists neo-liberal cum kleptocratic destruction of the economy, and allow the Russians themselves to decide how to develop. Additionally they should provide fiscal support for them to do so, as well as to safely manage their nuclear weapons and power stations. These words were wasted on the soon to be president George W Bush but provide an idea of how a constructive, rational policy vis-a-vis Russia could have been shaped. Perhaps Cohen is being naive to think such a policy was ever going to be possible?
Cohen writes clearly, convincingly and with real feeling in this damning indictement of U.S. policy towards Russia in the 90's, and the tawdry intellectual climate that sustained and celebrated it. He makes it clear that what in fact was being celebrated was the de-development of an industrial nation, the mass impoverishment of its people, and the dashing of their democratic hopes. It is well worth reading, as is Jonathan Steele's "Eternal Russia" which covers the history of the Gorbachev years and the early Yeltsin years.
March 20, 2024
I long ago abandoned the so called legacy news organizations (TV networks, NY Times, etc.) for accurate reporting. Too many times I found they were not reporting a story in full, reporting as if approval from Washington was required, or not reporting a story at all. Instead, I look to alternatives, in particular to people who know what they are talking about from familiarity with the subject and who have a skeptical approach. Stephen Cohen is professor of Russian studies and history at New York University and author of several books on Russia and the Soviet Union. I came across him in an article about the standoff in the Ukraine.
Failed Crusade is an account and critique of the years immediately following the end of the USSR, when there was a heady feeling of victory in the United States and an aggressive drive to make over Russia on the US model. Predictably it followed the usual course of US interventions in other countries: go in with a know-it-all attitude, disregard local conditions, disregard local advice, disregard corruption, enable US banks to make large and risky loans, buy things up where possible then watch the whole thing fall apart, bail out the bank loans, deny responsibility and blame the dazed victim.
Between 1991 and 2000 (book written in 2001) the above routine was followed in Russia. Oligarchs bought up state industries for a song and what might have been a gradual changeover to a market economy was a mad rush that ended in the collapse of the Russian economy, default on loans and terrible times for the man on the street, no money to make payrolls and a big drop in life expectancy. Boris Yeltsin, who presided over the period was feted by the United States as the savior of Russia though he disbanded an elected parliament with armed force. He hand picked Vladimir Putin as his successor because Putin could be certain not to come after Yeltsin for what he had done while in office.
The book uses a very effective technique in part 2. Essays that Cohen wrote for various US magazines are reproduced, each one followed by a report on what happened in the period after the essay was published. You might say it is merely "I told you so!" in print, but in this case it works well because Cohen's knowledge of the subjects he handles is deep and his accuracy in seeing the situation for what it was, impressive. He knows the details and reports them.
The overall theme of the book is that the United States approach was foolishly superficial and rushed at a time when it should have used the greatest caution. The opportunity was lost in sharp contrast to the long term bond established by the Marshall Plan after WW2. As a result came hostility from Russians that could have been avoided. Today, Cohen continues to appear with the same message of caution, care and a plea for understanding Russia's position in the world rather than turning it into an enemy when it need not be one.
The kind of reasonable thinking found in this book is a good example of the kind present in the foreign service of the State Department prior to the US attack on Iraq - thinking that was rejected out of hand in the rush to war. Cohen is not the only thinking man, there are many available if Washington wanted to listen. Unfortunately, those at the top develop an agenda that does not look for analysis and skepticism. Those with grand ideas eager for action ignore the advice that could save so much grief and money.
Failed Crusade is an easy read by a man making a persuasive case. Anyone who wonders why we are right back to making a villain of Russia and why Russia has not become a version of the US in Asia should read it.
Failed Crusade is an account and critique of the years immediately following the end of the USSR, when there was a heady feeling of victory in the United States and an aggressive drive to make over Russia on the US model. Predictably it followed the usual course of US interventions in other countries: go in with a know-it-all attitude, disregard local conditions, disregard local advice, disregard corruption, enable US banks to make large and risky loans, buy things up where possible then watch the whole thing fall apart, bail out the bank loans, deny responsibility and blame the dazed victim.
Between 1991 and 2000 (book written in 2001) the above routine was followed in Russia. Oligarchs bought up state industries for a song and what might have been a gradual changeover to a market economy was a mad rush that ended in the collapse of the Russian economy, default on loans and terrible times for the man on the street, no money to make payrolls and a big drop in life expectancy. Boris Yeltsin, who presided over the period was feted by the United States as the savior of Russia though he disbanded an elected parliament with armed force. He hand picked Vladimir Putin as his successor because Putin could be certain not to come after Yeltsin for what he had done while in office.
The book uses a very effective technique in part 2. Essays that Cohen wrote for various US magazines are reproduced, each one followed by a report on what happened in the period after the essay was published. You might say it is merely "I told you so!" in print, but in this case it works well because Cohen's knowledge of the subjects he handles is deep and his accuracy in seeing the situation for what it was, impressive. He knows the details and reports them.
The overall theme of the book is that the United States approach was foolishly superficial and rushed at a time when it should have used the greatest caution. The opportunity was lost in sharp contrast to the long term bond established by the Marshall Plan after WW2. As a result came hostility from Russians that could have been avoided. Today, Cohen continues to appear with the same message of caution, care and a plea for understanding Russia's position in the world rather than turning it into an enemy when it need not be one.
The kind of reasonable thinking found in this book is a good example of the kind present in the foreign service of the State Department prior to the US attack on Iraq - thinking that was rejected out of hand in the rush to war. Cohen is not the only thinking man, there are many available if Washington wanted to listen. Unfortunately, those at the top develop an agenda that does not look for analysis and skepticism. Those with grand ideas eager for action ignore the advice that could save so much grief and money.
Failed Crusade is an easy read by a man making a persuasive case. Anyone who wonders why we are right back to making a villain of Russia and why Russia has not become a version of the US in Asia should read it.
September 10, 2021
Disappointing. I was ready for a bracing critique of U.S. Russia policy in the 1990s, and to be fair Cohen is indeed prescient in several ways. He is right to point out the Yeltsin clan's corruption and self-dealing, right to identify how the economic turmoil of the 1990s would sour Russian attitudes toward the West, and right to question how feel-good Western concepts of "civil society" and the like blinded us to what was really going on.
Still, this is not an original work of revisionist history so much as a repetitive "I told you so" screed, the middle section almost entirely recycled from past columns and the entire thing full of finger-pointing and score-settling. Cohen is myopic in his own right, failing to consider the political realities faced by U.S. officials at the time (would Congress really have funded $500 billion in aid to Russia?) or the inevitable trade-offs with other European allies (how would Poland and the Baltics have reacted if we followed Cohen's advice?) Though he lands some punches, Cohen tends toward the hyperbolic; at one point he suggests that the 1990s in Russia were as turbulent as the revolutionary period.
For a better account of this period (albeit not focused solely on U.S.-Russia relations), read Stephen Kotkin's "Armageddon Averted" and "Uncivil Society."
Still, this is not an original work of revisionist history so much as a repetitive "I told you so" screed, the middle section almost entirely recycled from past columns and the entire thing full of finger-pointing and score-settling. Cohen is myopic in his own right, failing to consider the political realities faced by U.S. officials at the time (would Congress really have funded $500 billion in aid to Russia?) or the inevitable trade-offs with other European allies (how would Poland and the Baltics have reacted if we followed Cohen's advice?) Though he lands some punches, Cohen tends toward the hyperbolic; at one point he suggests that the 1990s in Russia were as turbulent as the revolutionary period.
For a better account of this period (albeit not focused solely on U.S.-Russia relations), read Stephen Kotkin's "Armageddon Averted" and "Uncivil Society."
February 13, 2024
informative, easy to digest book on how US policymakers have failed to bring about economic/political stability in Russia & how journalists/reporters/experts failed to accurately report US-Russia relations in the post-Cold War landscape.
Part two felt redundant and repeated a lot of things that were already discussed in part one, but through primary sources.
the last paragraph ate!!!! what a way to end the book.
Part two felt redundant and repeated a lot of things that were already discussed in part one, but through primary sources.
the last paragraph ate!!!! what a way to end the book.
October 25, 2018
Although I think Stephen F. Cohen is far too much of a Putin apologist today, his critique of US policy towards Russia in the 1990s is very insightful and depressing and a road map to "what went wrong" in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This book was very influential on my thinking then as now. Cohen's argument is basically that "shock therapy" imposed on Russia was needlessly cruel and harsh and there could have been a more humane path taken to a mixed economy that didn't hurt so many people or deepen inequalities so sharply. This book's analysis is a precursor to what journalist and author Naomi Klein would later examine at length worldwide in her book on The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Cohen seems to imply that our humiliation of Russia in the 1990s, for short-term geopolitical gain for the USA and the EU sowed a backlash in Russia that led to the rise of strong man Vladimir Putin. Putin's rise might have taken a different trajectory had US policy been more humane in the 1990s, Cohen seems to intimate between the lines (though this book was written before Putin was tapped by Yeltsin to become a major player on the Russian political scene).
December 29, 2024
Stephen Cohen's "Failed Crusade" - published in 2000 - offers a scathing review of the original Bush and Clinton Administration's approach to the transition of the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation, especially exploring how American officials, media, and Russia watchers ignored the deep problems of the Yeltsin government and endorsed its horribly self-destructive and corrupt policies in the name of democratization in Moscow.
Mr. Cohen goes on to explore how - keeping in mind the date of publishing - Washington could right the ship and chart a better path forward on relations with Russia. Tragically, many of his suggestions went unheard. He suggested that we may find ourselves facing a resurgent Russia with new imperialist ambitions due to our own hubris in how we anointed corrupt leaders during the Soviet collapse. His words are deeply depressing read today as the war in Ukraine approaches its second year anniversary.
Mr. Cohen goes on to explore how - keeping in mind the date of publishing - Washington could right the ship and chart a better path forward on relations with Russia. Tragically, many of his suggestions went unheard. He suggested that we may find ourselves facing a resurgent Russia with new imperialist ambitions due to our own hubris in how we anointed corrupt leaders during the Soviet collapse. His words are deeply depressing read today as the war in Ukraine approaches its second year anniversary.
March 16, 2022
Cohen dredges up often ignored historical facts and applies calm level headedness to explain how Russian- American relations got where they are today, what went wrong, and what could be done to restore the promise that the end of the first Cold War held.
August 11, 2024
I finished reading in 2010.
I don’t remember it.
Notes say
"was just ok, he is a lefty".
Great blurb that I hold in great esteem is:
Optimism prevails universally among those who are familiar with what is going on in Russia.
US VP Al Gore 1998
Another great observation about the drunken Yeltsin who parcelled off the assets of the State for pennies:
Only a few years from now...what will be left standing is the towering edifice of Yeltsin's achievement.
Leon Aron biographer 2000
I think Stephen F Cohen was a sensible guy.
To be fair this book had a quote from Solzhenitsyn in 2000 that more or less told the truth.
I don’t remember it.
Notes say
"was just ok, he is a lefty".
Great blurb that I hold in great esteem is:
Optimism prevails universally among those who are familiar with what is going on in Russia.
US VP Al Gore 1998
Another great observation about the drunken Yeltsin who parcelled off the assets of the State for pennies:
Only a few years from now...what will be left standing is the towering edifice of Yeltsin's achievement.
Leon Aron biographer 2000
I think Stephen F Cohen was a sensible guy.
To be fair this book had a quote from Solzhenitsyn in 2000 that more or less told the truth.
September 24, 2016
I doubt either the cold war or the current growing strife with Russia is all the US fault. In the least, they were and are willing participants, with a dangerous penchant to being ruthless.
I also find the oddity of the discrepancy between the references to Putin in the last chapter, and the rest of the book: while throughout the text Cohen is critical of Putin's rise to power in post-soviet Russia, in the last chapter he again shifts to blaming the media for unjustly critical of Putin's reign.
I also find the oddity of the discrepancy between the references to Putin in the last chapter, and the rest of the book: while throughout the text Cohen is critical of Putin's rise to power in post-soviet Russia, in the last chapter he again shifts to blaming the media for unjustly critical of Putin's reign.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews