In a penetrating account of the evolution of british intelligence gathering in india, the author shows how networks of indian spies were recruited to secure information about their subjects
Christopher Bayly analyzes in this monograph how the British appropriated the Mughal information system that existed in the subcontinent to advance their control of these new territories, exposing how ultimately this system collapsed over the years as it lacked a solid social base for its functioning. The paramount event that explains this collapse is the 1857 Indian Rebellion that caught the British by surprise.
Bayly first looks at the communication systems present in Mughal India and how the British successfully absorbed them, using local intelligence agents (harkaras), newswriters at local courts (waqai navis) and other communication agents like the munshis to gain reliable information. Their ability to infiltrate within the subcontinent laid on their control of these information systems, which allowed them to anticipate any opposition or resistance coming from local leaders and regional lords. When this network of communication was inexistent or very limited, usually at the fringes of the ancient Mughal territories, the British experienced an ‘information blackout’, which explained their failed campaigns in Nepal and Burma in the 1810s and 1820s respectively.
As the British extended their control and developed their colonial project, new institutions were created to gather and dominate local knowledge. However, a dual system of communication emerged, evidencing the concentration of information in the upper levels of society (army and political officers), when compared to the decentralized system of communication that existed in the lower levels that often produced unreliable and contradictory information. For Bayly, this explains the creation of myths and ‘information panics’ that reinforced the stereotypes of the ‘other’ and the emergence of orientalist thought by the British. It was this lack of knowledge from the lower classes of the population that reflected the weaknesses of the colonial British project, unable to penetrate the social bases of Indian society (pp.170-171).
Bayly also argues that before the introduction of the newspaper in the subcontinent, there already existed an ‘Indian ecumene’ where religious and political matters were discussed. But more importantly, it was ‘‘the egalitarian traditions of Islamic lands and the community sensibilities of Indian cities that encouraged ordinary artisans and people to participate in the ecumene’’, evidencing the non-elitist nature of such community, surpassing divisions based on caste and religion (p.196). For this reason, the Indian nationalism that has been often ascribed to the late 19th century, can already be seen in the earlier decades of this century.
This nationalism enhanced traditional and native forms of knowledge (medicine and astrology) against British interference. With the introduction of printing, the information order was totally transformed. However, Bayly considers that ‘‘print in itself did not create an information revolution. Rather it speeded up the velocity and range of communication among existing communities of knowledge’’ (p.243). The real transformative agents were the knowledgeable people ‘‘who carried the deepest power of social change. The actors in this sphere were the owners of small lithographic presses, the sellers of herbal pills with western containers, the sepoys returning to their villages with western muskets and clocks’’ (p.314). Thus, an information revolution from below developed in India against the British attempts to control and dominate these communication networks. Essentially, the British failed in gaining access to these social actors, who often escaped from their control and surveillance. This explains why the 1857 Rebellion took the British by surprise. Their unsuccessful supervision toward lower social actors and of their communication systems, added to new forms of communication and knowledge introduced with the print and the newspapers, created ‘‘a battle over the press, posts, print and opinion’’ (p.329).
In conclusion, although the British successfully absorbed the ancient Mughal communication systems, over the years, as they advanced their control of the subcontinent, they failed in their efforts of penetrating the lower levels of Indian society. This ultimately provoked cracks in the system that were used by Indian nationalists to advance their efforts against colonial rule. Furthermore, the introduction of new knowledge and communication methods, like the print and the newspaper, reinforced these Indian nationalists’ discourse, who used their access to this ‘Indian ecumene’ and its heavy reliance on lower social actors to influence public opinion and allow their participation in political debates, despite their illiteracy. This explains the early nationalist movement that emerged in the country, way earlier than previously accounted, as Bayly traces its origins in the early 19th century.
"... the intellectual history of a society cannot be reduced to its social structure."
The key concept that holds this whole gigantic book together is "information order." A concept Bayly was inspired by the economic geographer Manuel Castells but throughout the book rigorously developed into his own idea based on meticulous archival research.
The way information is circulated in a society has great influence on the course of the society itself and this information order is irreducible to social or economic structure.
Bayly compares the decentralized and non- hierarchical way information is circulated in South Asia through mainly people who run to deliver the information orally or literary to the more hierarchical and centralized way information is circulated surrounding the Buddhist temple in Burma to the ultra hierarchical, centralized, and deeply controlling through bureaucracy way information is controlled in China and Japan.
Britain colonized South Asia successfully mainly because of the success of people on the scene who understands how information flows in India, and had great difficulty in conquering Burma because of the completely different way information flows. Even after conquering Burma, it never became as successful as South Asia because of that.
Bayly 's cautious archival research results in many warnings against reading post colonial texts like Said's Orientalism at face value. Broad stroke claims of the hegemony of the West is fleshed out into a nuanced picture that in the end everyone is human, whether they are from the West or South Asia. Popular texts from back in the day might seem very orientalist but Bayly found in the archives that many administrators actually had a more grounded understanding of South Asian life. Racism and stereotyping indeed existed but that was not the only narrative in town. Complex syncretism of various kinds characterised the hearts and minds of the rulers and the ruled. When cholera struck Western doctors sought help from South Asian knowledge. The printing press far from dominating Indian thought, was also adapted by Indians to advance their own narratives. Westernization was always adapted to locally existing intellectual traditions.
Like making a good pot of Indian curry, Bayly cooks the information order idea very slowly with low heat. The archival sources arrive gradually as ingredients in fleshed out stories of people navigating the information order from the streets to the court. Bayly steers clear of easy and satisfying conclusions and instead lets the archives tell the story. Slowly and all over the place in the whole book the information order dawns on the reader. The information order idea is not beaten into the readers ' head but is rather what emerges out of the countless stories of real people.
Some readers will find this style quite tedious and lacking in structure and power of a simple argument or maxim. For busy readers the conclusion chapter and introduction chapter surprisingly are good summary and introduction for the whole book. But the conclusion does sound like no shit Sherlock , captain obvious, without the arduous journey through the archives presented throughout the course of the whole fat book.
No wonder this book is rather obscure, perhaps known only among South Asian studies scholars or a few book history scholars. It doesn't have the quick thrills of books from authors like Benedict Anderson, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and so on. It doesn't capitalize on pushing the button for the feel good feeling of oh shit I understand it all now. I see through everything. I figured it all out. There are no good guys or bad guys in Bayly. No evil mega corporations or bloodthirsty nation states. Only people trying to figure out life, as we all do, have always done, and will always do.
A richly detailed, if somewhat tedious at some points, account with no overarching metanarrative, focusing on small detail after small detail rather than brushing complex events under the rug of hyper-explanative slogans. Perhaps the most interesting section is the first one, focusing on runners, munshis, court spies, and imperial failures
The work would have benefited from greater attention to the relation between British "intelligence" efforts and previous Portuguese or Dutch accounts. For instance, how much does Maine owe to Mexia? Do previous European accounts of caste inform later debates? And how can a scholar discuss 19th-century debates between Christian missionaries and Hindu priests without even mentioning the rich materials on such debates in 16th-century South India? By focunsing on Mughal agents and documents, Bayly elides, as usual in British historiography, the flow of materials between different colonial powers.
Another interesting aspect here is the author's struggle with the then-recent and fashionable Orientalism/discourse-as-power debate. Although Bayly makes some simple yet valid points here and there, his failure to engage with these debates beyond caricature and his lack of theoretical muscle testify to the pressure and discomfort that some scholars felt a few decades ago when faced with a new (and soon to become hegemonical) paradigm.
This comprehensive history of the information order (with a close attention to the practices and its enactors) of colonial north India is remarkably multifaceted and goes far beyond the critical study of Orientalism as understood by Edward Said. The author intends to give a new breath to the scholarship on knowledge, which relies heavily on the Foucauldian formula "knowledge-power", avoiding what he considers its limitations. Many of the arguments in the study are based on the pre-colonial specificity of Indian knowledge systems, and chronologically the work goes as far as to examine British surveillance of the colonized and communication between the latter during and after the Rebellion of 1857, demonstrating the importance of information spread and gathering to the course and aftermath of the uprising as well as national issues.
Marking this as 'read' as I've read all of the chapters which are most relevant to my on-going PhD research (which is most of the book!), and will no doubt return to it again.