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And I Was There : Breaking the Secrets - Pearl Harbor and Midway
Why did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor? How did they inflict the greatest military defeat in American history? What went wrong? "And I Was There" is the first book by a top-ranking American navy officer to answer these questions. Admiral Layton scrupulously kept these secrets to himself until the recent declassification of a half million documents from U.S. military archives. Only then did Layton believe he was free to tell his story. He names those who knew about Japanese intentions, how they acquired their knowledge and how they misused it. He speaks with unique authority. He was the Pacific Fleet's intelligence officer prior to Pearl Harbor, and he continued to serve in the same capacity for Admiral Nimitz throughout the war. As Layton he was there.
596 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1985
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About the author
Edwin T. Layton
3 books8 followersEdwin Thomas Layton was a rear admiral in the United States Navy. Layton is most noted for his work as an intelligence officer before and during World War II.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 31 reviews
May 20, 2020
The Pacific war against Japan always remains a topic of interest and this book by the Fleet Intelligence Officer at Pearl Harbor remains relevant today. Edwin Layton’s memoir, appropriately entitled “I Was There” was published in 1985 and my well-worn copy was read and filed away many years ago. My interest in the book was rekindled after seeing the new “Midway” movie near the end of 2019. One of the lead characters in the movie is Edwin Layton and I decided to look the book over to see how accurate the movie was.
After skimming the first couple of chapters I was pleasantly surprised that the screenwriters had faithfully adapted scenes from the book into the movie and decided that it was time to re-read this classic. The Midway movie and most of Layton’s book cover those six months from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the naval victory at Midway. This book is well over 500 pages and covers a lot more than just the view from Pearl Harbor where Layton served from December of 1940. He and his co-authors spend a lot of time researching and describing the seemingly inevitable forces that drove Japan to attack the United States as well as the many mistakes and missed opportunities that led to the US Navy being caught unprepared by the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. Most of these mistakes were made in Washington but the blame was laid on the local commanders at Pearl Harbor: Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Layton then goes on to describe the naval intelligence breakthroughs made by the codebreakers at Pearl Harbor that lead to the destruction of four Japanese carriers six months later.
This book really functions at two levels: to show how Layton and Roachefort and their team managed to read Japanese naval communications enough to allow Admiral Nimitz to ambush and defeat a much stronger opponent. This naval intelligence work turned the tide of battle and led to the ultimate destruction of the Japanese Navy. The other underlying theme that runs through the book is the author’s disgust on how Admiral Kimmel was denied access to critical information by his superiors in Washington DC and then made the scapegoat for their failures. Similarly, the victory at Midway should have shown the value of the team working for Admiral Nimitz; instead it led to more political interference from Washington and the removal of Roachefort from his position.
The book is extremely well-written and difficult to put down; other comments from Leyton also found their way to the 2019 Midway movie. Layton's descriptions of the political infighting that seemed to pervade the US Naval Intelligence community during this time period were very disturbing and probably cost the lives of sailors and marines because their commanders were not getting the intelligence that they needed.
After skimming the first couple of chapters I was pleasantly surprised that the screenwriters had faithfully adapted scenes from the book into the movie and decided that it was time to re-read this classic. The Midway movie and most of Layton’s book cover those six months from the attack on Pearl Harbor to the naval victory at Midway. This book is well over 500 pages and covers a lot more than just the view from Pearl Harbor where Layton served from December of 1940. He and his co-authors spend a lot of time researching and describing the seemingly inevitable forces that drove Japan to attack the United States as well as the many mistakes and missed opportunities that led to the US Navy being caught unprepared by the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. Most of these mistakes were made in Washington but the blame was laid on the local commanders at Pearl Harbor: Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Layton then goes on to describe the naval intelligence breakthroughs made by the codebreakers at Pearl Harbor that lead to the destruction of four Japanese carriers six months later.
This book really functions at two levels: to show how Layton and Roachefort and their team managed to read Japanese naval communications enough to allow Admiral Nimitz to ambush and defeat a much stronger opponent. This naval intelligence work turned the tide of battle and led to the ultimate destruction of the Japanese Navy. The other underlying theme that runs through the book is the author’s disgust on how Admiral Kimmel was denied access to critical information by his superiors in Washington DC and then made the scapegoat for their failures. Similarly, the victory at Midway should have shown the value of the team working for Admiral Nimitz; instead it led to more political interference from Washington and the removal of Roachefort from his position.
The book is extremely well-written and difficult to put down; other comments from Leyton also found their way to the 2019 Midway movie. Layton's descriptions of the political infighting that seemed to pervade the US Naval Intelligence community during this time period were very disturbing and probably cost the lives of sailors and marines because their commanders were not getting the intelligence that they needed.
May 13, 2020
After watching the second Midway movie, I noticed that it was based in part on this book. (I liked both movies, btw...they cover different aspects so it's not really redundant to watch them both. Plus, 2 different eras of moviemaking. Plus, footage recorded by John Ford.)
So, I looked up the book -- once I saw the cover, I thought, "I have that book!" After a thorough search of my bookshelves, I turned it up.
It is long, far longer than it needed to be, but that's okay. I understand that Layton had a LOT he wanted to say and that his editor probably would have had to strangle him in order to get him to cut it.
It certainly answered a lot of the questions that people have about both Pearl Harbor and Midway -- both the events and the people involved [Roosevelt (no, he didn't leave us open to attack), and MacArthur (yes, still a jackass)].
In my view, he focused way too much on vindicating the officers he served with; by the end of the book I just skimmed over those sections. But the stuff on breaking the Japanese codes and getting higher-ups to believe the decryptions....well, that's good stuff.
So, I looked up the book -- once I saw the cover, I thought, "I have that book!" After a thorough search of my bookshelves, I turned it up.
It is long, far longer than it needed to be, but that's okay. I understand that Layton had a LOT he wanted to say and that his editor probably would have had to strangle him in order to get him to cut it.
It certainly answered a lot of the questions that people have about both Pearl Harbor and Midway -- both the events and the people involved [Roosevelt (no, he didn't leave us open to attack), and MacArthur (yes, still a jackass)].
In my view, he focused way too much on vindicating the officers he served with; by the end of the book I just skimmed over those sections. But the stuff on breaking the Japanese codes and getting higher-ups to believe the decryptions....well, that's good stuff.
January 30, 2018
This is, essentially, the memoirs of Edwin Layton. He was intelligence officer for both Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz. The key events in the book are the attack on Pearl Harbor and the battle of Midway. But it's not a combat book. It's about the signals intelligence efforts of the US Navy; the failures and successes.
The majority of the book, in fact, takes place before 7 December 1941. There are 526 pages of text, and we don't arrive at the morning of the attack until page 299. In the first few pages, Layton instructs us that "Intelligence is a perishable commodity. Battles are won and lost and campaigns decided often on the basis of which side is the most proficient in the use of intelligence - that is, the acquisition, evaluation, and dissemination of military information in time for commanders to act upon it." That is the issue of the first three hundred pages. What intelligence was acquired, how was it evaluated, and what were the issues in getting it into the right hands in a timely manner?
One key subject was the treatment of Kimmel (and, to a lesser degree, General Short). Layton lays out the case the Kimmel and Short were scapegoats and that the blame for the disaster (unpreparedness) at Pearl rightly belongs in Washington.
After Midway, the book compresses the remainder of the war into just a few chapters. Guadalcanal takes one short chapter and everything from Guadalcanal to the end of the war is reduced to one chapter.
Again, this book isn't about combat. It's primarily about communications intelligence. To get the full picture of Pearl Harbor and Midway, it should be combined with combat books about those battles.
On a side note, my reading about General MacArthur always left me conflicted about him. MacArthur is not a key figure in this account, but enough is said about him to reinforce my misgivings about his skills as a tactician/strategist. Kimmel and Short were pilloried for Pearl Harbor, but MacArthur got a pass even though his air assets were destroyed on the ground nine hours after the attack on Pearl. Also, MacArthur's supporters point to the low casualties suffered during his campaigns. But it seems this was a result, to a large degree, of the intelligence provided to him but not credited by any of MacArthur's hagiographers.
The majority of the book, in fact, takes place before 7 December 1941. There are 526 pages of text, and we don't arrive at the morning of the attack until page 299. In the first few pages, Layton instructs us that "Intelligence is a perishable commodity. Battles are won and lost and campaigns decided often on the basis of which side is the most proficient in the use of intelligence - that is, the acquisition, evaluation, and dissemination of military information in time for commanders to act upon it." That is the issue of the first three hundred pages. What intelligence was acquired, how was it evaluated, and what were the issues in getting it into the right hands in a timely manner?
One key subject was the treatment of Kimmel (and, to a lesser degree, General Short). Layton lays out the case the Kimmel and Short were scapegoats and that the blame for the disaster (unpreparedness) at Pearl rightly belongs in Washington.
After Midway, the book compresses the remainder of the war into just a few chapters. Guadalcanal takes one short chapter and everything from Guadalcanal to the end of the war is reduced to one chapter.
Again, this book isn't about combat. It's primarily about communications intelligence. To get the full picture of Pearl Harbor and Midway, it should be combined with combat books about those battles.
On a side note, my reading about General MacArthur always left me conflicted about him. MacArthur is not a key figure in this account, but enough is said about him to reinforce my misgivings about his skills as a tactician/strategist. Kimmel and Short were pilloried for Pearl Harbor, but MacArthur got a pass even though his air assets were destroyed on the ground nine hours after the attack on Pearl. Also, MacArthur's supporters point to the low casualties suffered during his campaigns. But it seems this was a result, to a large degree, of the intelligence provided to him but not credited by any of MacArthur's hagiographers.
August 4, 2022
Best inside look at Pacific war I have read. Dispels a number of myths.
Admiral Layton was sent by the Navy to study in Japan and learn the language and the culture in the 1930s. He then started working in Naval Intelligence. At first there was a turf war between Naval intelligence and Naval communications which meant information wasn't being shared and the right people weren't getting information. Then Admiral Stark got them working together.
However, then Admiral Turner came in under Stark for war planning. Apparently he was a pain in the ass and thought highly of himself. He also slightly outranked the Naval intelligence Admirals and had Starks ears. He wanted all intelligence coming through him and he would decide how to interpret it. This royally pissed off most everyone in intelligence. Also, Turner and his top aids had no training in intelligence but thought they should be the ones making the final decisions.
Turner decided Japan was going to strike north against Russia while Intelligence was telling him they thought Japan would go south to assure access to oil. They got 80% of their oil from the US and if the US cut them off, they had a major problem.
In the 1930s there were hotheads in the Japanese military and they started attacking China without permission. Japan then went with the flow and expanded the attack. In September 1940 they signed an agreement with Germany and Italy to become part of the Axis. After fleet exercises in May 1940 around Hawaii, Admiral Richardson received orders to keep the fleet there instead of the West Coast where they had been. After September 1940 Axis agreement he requested to move the fleet back to the west coast feeling it was safer. He was relieved of duty in January 1941. Bad decision obviously. Some of the reason for the bad decision was that important information wasn't reaching the right people in Washington, both military and civilian.
Japan used a number of different codes for different purposes. A Mrs. Driscoll was apparently really critical to breaking the codes. Apparently the best person the US had. So the US was reading a lot of the Japanese messages in the late 1930s. Then they started changing codes and using cipher machines (not Enigma but mechanized as well). According to Layton a lot of time was wasted by Turner having them focus on the wrong code systems and not having the right people do it. I think I understood that there were some easier systems they could get a lot of useful info from if they spent their time on that but were forced to focus on only one that was almost unbreakable.
The FBI and Hoover had an extensive network of agents tracking both Japanese and German agents in the US. That was good but he messed up with info from a double agent. He sent a report about it focusing on the microdot technique instead of the contents on the microdot. He failed to mention that 1/3 of it was about Pearl Harbor and the other 2/3 were about US military installations. Apparently, while we were sending 3-4 Naval people to Japan a year, Japan was sending dozens and they were not only learning the language, they had an extensive spy network sending back info on US military installations, arms manufacturing, military manuevers and much more. The US arranged illegal breakins to Japanese organizations in the US and especially California. They found extensive evidence of spying among a wide range of Japanese Americans. This led to the decision to send Japanese Americans to the infamous internship camps. I had always thought that was wrong but after reading this book it is less clear. There were probably much better ways to do it.
In Sept. 1940 Germany captured a ship that had classified British documents which said they had to focus on the Atlantic and couldn't do much in the Pacific. This let Japan know they had leeway in the Pacific as long as they steered clear of the US.
Japan was worring about the US and oil. They sent Admiral Nomoru in Feb. 1941 to the US as ambassador. Layton knew him from Japan and said Nomoru had a better understanding of the US of almost any Japanese. He was sent to reduce tensions and hopefully set up a treaty. At the same time another diplomat was sent to Germany to increase ties. Nomoru/Japan wanted the US to ignore the fighting in China and the US wanted Japan to stop fighting Nationalist China since we were supporting them against the communists in China
By June 1941, the Japanese army wanted to fight Russia in Siberia and to make a major push in China to win the war there. The navy wanted to go south to the Dutch East Indies etc to assure access to oil. By June the cabinet still had authorized formal war planning even though plans for the Pearl Harbor attack were already under development.
In late July, a Japanese ambassador sent a message that was decoded the indicated Japan had to take action to prevent encirclement by the US and Britain. It wasn't acted on.
Japan invaded Indochina and 24 hours later on 7/26, the US announced it was freezing all Axis funds in the US and therefore trade with the US. But Roosevelt assured Nomura that the embargo would not include oil. Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes and other hardliners wanted an oil embargo. Roosevelt and Churchill knew that an oil embargo would guarantee Japan would attack. (p 121) In the book The China Mirage by James Bradley, it talks about the Roosevelt/Churchill meeting (see below). It says that there had been several attempts by hardliners to have an oil embargo on Japan. Even though a sale of oil to the Japanese had been approved, Dean Acheson and Henry Morganthau slow walked the sale and effectively embargoed Japan which started the war. Acheson and his disciples continued to be hawkish and screw up our foreign policy for years to come.
Interestingly, the book indicates that military leaders and other countries felt that Roosevelt and his administration kept changing their mind and weren't making the best decisions. (p 128-9)
There was a top secret meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt and top military commanders off the coast of Nova Scotia in early August 1941. Ambassador Nomura sent a telegram 3 days before to Japan informing them of the meeting. So presumably the Japanese had managed to read some messages. At the meeting Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to support each other and to form a joint defense in the Pacific. Apparently this was probably illegal since it wasn't presented to Congress, but it seems to have been a verbal agreement between the two and not written down. But preparations by the top military people seemed to follow along the lines of this agreement. And Japan was aware of it.
The Wash DC codebreakers had been sending the decrypted diplomatic messages to Pearl Harbor to keep them up to speed. But from August to November, not a single decoded message was sent to Pearl. Once the attack on Pearl Harbor happened everyone tried to cover their butt, especially Turner who was notorious for micromanaging and oversaw everything that was sent to Pearl. When there were hearings later about Pearl Harbor, Turner's subordinates chickened out from talking about a 4 star admiral. As Layton said, if he had made these mistakes he would have been court martialed but nothing happened to Stark, Ingersoll or Turner and they went on the fame and increased rank.
In the next few chapters, Layton talks about all the intelligence that intelligence in DC ignored or didn't bother to forward to Pearl Harbor. Such as a message asking for detailed information on where ships where berthed or anchored in the harbor and to create a 5 part grid and to give details for each of the grids that overlaid the harbor. Several people in DC wanted to send this and following info to Pearl but were denied.
Pearl Harbor was supposed to be getting B17 bombers but higher ups decided to send them to MacArthur in the Philippines as a deterrent to Japan. They later realized that this was foley. The number of planes in the Philippines would have no deterrent effect. Not enough of them. Plus, Pearl was stripped of planes and defenses to send to MacArthur in the Philippines.
Also, at some point Layton said that a lot of people in the Navy were still thinking WW1 and that battleships were the most important ship and that aircraft carriers were support for scouting and the like. They also felt that planes from a carrier were no match for a battleship. Obviously that thinking changed after the war started.
The Japanese had set 11/25/41 as the final date for negotiations. Finally the Americans decided negotiations was a good idea at the last minute to try to avert a 2 front war. The Japanese pushed the date back 4 days. The US knew this from reading diplomatic decrypts. Being able to read these gave the US too much confidence perhaps. All parted on the 25th thinking there was good progress. At the 26th meeting, Secretary of State Hull gave new demands and killed the negotiations. Apparently Roosevelt had gotten new info overnight, probably from the British that changed his mind. Even at the time of this book 40 years later, the info was still classified. The Brits classified it for 75 years which is now up. I wonder if anyone has looked into it. (See Negotiations Off chapter)
Roosevelt and his top military people knew this would cause an attack by the Japanese, but when and where? If we struck first, the isolationists in Congress would accuse him of starting the war. If we negotiated a delay and Japan attacked, Roosevelt gets branded an appeaser and make it harder to rally Congress. Waiting to be attacked would guarantee votes in Congress but could lead to charge of Roosevelt of dereliction of duty.
There were many more missed chances over the next several chapters. Some just bad luck. Some clues easier to see in hindsight. But a lot was because of screw ups of Turner and Stark and Marshall in DC. Even when subordinates such as McCollom kept wanting to send warnings and info to Pearl Harbor and other locations, these 3 kept saying no, we have already informed them. But if Pearl had the information that DC had, the outcome would have likely been quite different.
Then in the aftermath, a commission was formed to investigate. It was a joke, a kangaroo court. It was overseen by a Supreme Court justice, Stewart, but it was absurd and had one purpose, find scapegoats. They let Turner, Stark and Marshall off the hook and crucified Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
The day before, December 6, Layton had gone over with some latest intelligence to talk to Admiral Pye to warn him and suggest he might want to make preparations because something was happening. Pye said Japan would never attack Pearl, the US was too strong. The next day, Pye's command battleship was sunk as were others.
Kimmel wanted to go on the offensive immediately and came up with a brilliant plan to attack the Japanese in the South Pacific. It was in the middle of being implemented when he was relieved of duty and Pye took over as interim. If Kimmel's plans had been carried out, Japan would have been dealt a blow similar to the later Midway battle (maybe not as significant but still a huge deal that early in the war), Wake Island would have been supplied and reinforced instead of being captured. But Pye got cold feet. Halsey attacked a few ships and did little damage but that was it.
MacArthur was informed of Pearl Harbor quickly. He had the chance to bomb and destroy the nearby Japanese airfield and its planes. Instead, he did nothing for 9 hours and the Japanese bombed him and wiped out his air force. He should have been courtmartialed for dereliction of duty, not Kimmel and Short (although they were actually never court martialed of course)
Then Admiral Nimitz took over from Pye and he was aggressive like Kimmel. Also, Admiral King took over in DC. Turner was under him and given other duties because he was so arrogant he couldn't work with Army Intelligence. Later in the war he was given command of amphibious landings.
Hawaiian Intelligence was known as Hypo and DCs was Negat. The intelligence unit, at least for the Far East was known as OP-20-G. Two new guys enter the picture who were brothers named Redman. One was in charge of OP-20-G. Being in DC, they could sweet talk and influence people.
First there was the battle of the Coral Sea. Each side lost 24 ships. I think it was Admiral Fletcher who got lucky. He was "old school" and felt he should believe in his gut and not the intelligence people. Halsey had been so successful in the first bit after Pearl Harbor by having an intelligence group on board to listen to and break codes and other info that each fleet had one now. But Fletcher(?) didn't listen to the intelligence of where the Japanese carrier was and was lucky he wasn't sunk.
Under Layton at Hypo was Joe Rochefort. He headed up the cryptologists. Brilliant but eccentric. And he had a good team. They had finally been given permission to work on other codes and were doing a brilliant job. They figured out that Midway was going to be attacked and the Japanese saw it as a way to draw out the US fleet and destroy them in a surprise attack. But Negat/DC thought the attack would be in the South Pacific. Nimitz had seen what Rochefort's team and Layton could do and trusted them.
Hypo kept getting things right (place, time etc) and Negat kept getting things wrong. Finally, Hypo had Midway send a message saying that their water maker was broken and they were short on water and please send more. They Japanese started talking about lack of water at their destination, proving they were going to attack Midway. Unlike in movies, this wasn't done to figure out where they were going to attack but to prove that Negat was wrong to get them off Hypo's back.
Midway went almost exactly as Hypo said and of course was a huge success. But the Redman's only cared for power and saving face. They took credit in DC and said that Rochefort had been wrong. They got King to remove Rochefort and they got promotions. One to Captain and one to Vice Admiral. Rochefort was removed from intelligence duty for a couple of years and the US lost a valuable asset who could have made a difference in the war. Finally towards the end he was given another intelligence role. The Redmans should have been court martialed or some punishment. Then they made matters worse.
One idiot showed a reporter a secret report so he knew that we had succeeded at Midway because we had broken the Japanese code. He of course printed it. The Navy tried to hush it up. But the Redmans wanted revenge (possibly because they thought Rochefort was involved) and wanted the people prosecuted. It ended up in a very public court battle that the Navy lost but it was all over the papers and alerted the Japanese who promptly changed their code and the US intelligence had to start all over again trying to break it.
This hampered our efforts to capture the Solomon Islands of which Guadalcanal was key. It took 6 months to capture. The key landing was screwed up by Fletcher who decided to refuel all his carriers at once leaving Turner's landing party with no air cover. Then Turner decided to be his own intelligence analyst (again) and therefore didn't get warning of an approaching Jap force. He lost 4 cruisers and 1 destroyer and landing transports.
In April 43 decrypts allowed shooting down Yamamoto's plane. Around then we recaptured the 2 Aleutian Islands the Japanese took at same time as Midway campaign.
The US gathered a large fleet in 1944 to start recapturing the South Pacific. They took Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands but it was bloody and costly. Almost no Japanese survived. They fought to the death. So for the Marshall Islands there was a plan to attack the outer islands first. But Layton and his crew found the Japanese were moving troops to the outer islands and fortifying them. Their headquarters on Kwajalein was relatively unprotected. So Nimitz said we will attack that and just skip by the outer islands. Except for the outer island of Majuro which Layton said had only 6 people on it. General Smith bet him a bottle of bourbon there would be 600 at least. There was one person. Layton won the bet. Kwajalein was a little more difficult than expected but they by luck captured secret documents that let them know where mine fields were and other useful info.
Then Admiral Koga moved his main ships from Truk to Palau. But was slower moving the support ships there. A US carrier attack destroyed most of their support vessels, oilers, tenders etc and also hundreds of planes. This prevented the Japanese from any further offensive plans for the rest of the war.
Then MacArthur wanted control of the navy to retake the rest of New Guinea and then the Philippines. (Layton asked why Nimitz had a picture of MacArthur pinned up in his office. Nimitz' answer was it was a reminder not to be a horse's ass.)
The fifth fleet was sent to help MacArthur and on the way caught the Palaus by surprise and destroyed more planes and support ships. Then went to help MacArthur. He had success because the intelligence guys had finally broken the army codes. The Palau attack forced Admiral Koga to give up the Palaus as fleet headquarters. But MacArthur using PR etc to get his way to focus on the Philippines instead of bypassing and going for Japan more directly probably added 6 months and thousands of lives to the war.
The navy then planned to attack the Mariana islands. They got lucky by capturing the Japanese plans to counter them so they knew what the Japanese were going to do going into battle. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese forces vastly outnumbered ours. For this, we had 535 ships and 127K troops. We took them by surprise and destroyed most of their planes and 3 carriers among others. Still soldiers on Saipan held out for a while. Guam and Tinian were much easier.
Philippines campaign started off well but almost was a disaster when Halsey took off after some carriers and left nothing behind to protect against a Japanese fleet he wasn't aware of. The landing ships were saved by planes from US pocket "jeep" carriers. First use of kamikaze because Japan had run out of experienced pilots.
MacArthur's blunder that lost the Philippines had a bigger impact than Pearl Harbor. The battleships couldn't keep up with the carriers and were less important. It points out that if the Pearl fuel tanks had been hit instead of battleships and Jap subs prevented resupply, it would have held us up 12-18 months instead of 3 to start offensive operations.
Layton and our intelligence efforts in general gave us huge advantages and greatly shortened the war.
Admiral Layton was sent by the Navy to study in Japan and learn the language and the culture in the 1930s. He then started working in Naval Intelligence. At first there was a turf war between Naval intelligence and Naval communications which meant information wasn't being shared and the right people weren't getting information. Then Admiral Stark got them working together.
However, then Admiral Turner came in under Stark for war planning. Apparently he was a pain in the ass and thought highly of himself. He also slightly outranked the Naval intelligence Admirals and had Starks ears. He wanted all intelligence coming through him and he would decide how to interpret it. This royally pissed off most everyone in intelligence. Also, Turner and his top aids had no training in intelligence but thought they should be the ones making the final decisions.
Turner decided Japan was going to strike north against Russia while Intelligence was telling him they thought Japan would go south to assure access to oil. They got 80% of their oil from the US and if the US cut them off, they had a major problem.
In the 1930s there were hotheads in the Japanese military and they started attacking China without permission. Japan then went with the flow and expanded the attack. In September 1940 they signed an agreement with Germany and Italy to become part of the Axis. After fleet exercises in May 1940 around Hawaii, Admiral Richardson received orders to keep the fleet there instead of the West Coast where they had been. After September 1940 Axis agreement he requested to move the fleet back to the west coast feeling it was safer. He was relieved of duty in January 1941. Bad decision obviously. Some of the reason for the bad decision was that important information wasn't reaching the right people in Washington, both military and civilian.
Japan used a number of different codes for different purposes. A Mrs. Driscoll was apparently really critical to breaking the codes. Apparently the best person the US had. So the US was reading a lot of the Japanese messages in the late 1930s. Then they started changing codes and using cipher machines (not Enigma but mechanized as well). According to Layton a lot of time was wasted by Turner having them focus on the wrong code systems and not having the right people do it. I think I understood that there were some easier systems they could get a lot of useful info from if they spent their time on that but were forced to focus on only one that was almost unbreakable.
The FBI and Hoover had an extensive network of agents tracking both Japanese and German agents in the US. That was good but he messed up with info from a double agent. He sent a report about it focusing on the microdot technique instead of the contents on the microdot. He failed to mention that 1/3 of it was about Pearl Harbor and the other 2/3 were about US military installations. Apparently, while we were sending 3-4 Naval people to Japan a year, Japan was sending dozens and they were not only learning the language, they had an extensive spy network sending back info on US military installations, arms manufacturing, military manuevers and much more. The US arranged illegal breakins to Japanese organizations in the US and especially California. They found extensive evidence of spying among a wide range of Japanese Americans. This led to the decision to send Japanese Americans to the infamous internship camps. I had always thought that was wrong but after reading this book it is less clear. There were probably much better ways to do it.
In Sept. 1940 Germany captured a ship that had classified British documents which said they had to focus on the Atlantic and couldn't do much in the Pacific. This let Japan know they had leeway in the Pacific as long as they steered clear of the US.
Japan was worring about the US and oil. They sent Admiral Nomoru in Feb. 1941 to the US as ambassador. Layton knew him from Japan and said Nomoru had a better understanding of the US of almost any Japanese. He was sent to reduce tensions and hopefully set up a treaty. At the same time another diplomat was sent to Germany to increase ties. Nomoru/Japan wanted the US to ignore the fighting in China and the US wanted Japan to stop fighting Nationalist China since we were supporting them against the communists in China
By June 1941, the Japanese army wanted to fight Russia in Siberia and to make a major push in China to win the war there. The navy wanted to go south to the Dutch East Indies etc to assure access to oil. By June the cabinet still had authorized formal war planning even though plans for the Pearl Harbor attack were already under development.
In late July, a Japanese ambassador sent a message that was decoded the indicated Japan had to take action to prevent encirclement by the US and Britain. It wasn't acted on.
Japan invaded Indochina and 24 hours later on 7/26, the US announced it was freezing all Axis funds in the US and therefore trade with the US. But Roosevelt assured Nomura that the embargo would not include oil. Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes and other hardliners wanted an oil embargo. Roosevelt and Churchill knew that an oil embargo would guarantee Japan would attack. (p 121) In the book The China Mirage by James Bradley, it talks about the Roosevelt/Churchill meeting (see below). It says that there had been several attempts by hardliners to have an oil embargo on Japan. Even though a sale of oil to the Japanese had been approved, Dean Acheson and Henry Morganthau slow walked the sale and effectively embargoed Japan which started the war. Acheson and his disciples continued to be hawkish and screw up our foreign policy for years to come.
Interestingly, the book indicates that military leaders and other countries felt that Roosevelt and his administration kept changing their mind and weren't making the best decisions. (p 128-9)
There was a top secret meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt and top military commanders off the coast of Nova Scotia in early August 1941. Ambassador Nomura sent a telegram 3 days before to Japan informing them of the meeting. So presumably the Japanese had managed to read some messages. At the meeting Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to support each other and to form a joint defense in the Pacific. Apparently this was probably illegal since it wasn't presented to Congress, but it seems to have been a verbal agreement between the two and not written down. But preparations by the top military people seemed to follow along the lines of this agreement. And Japan was aware of it.
The Wash DC codebreakers had been sending the decrypted diplomatic messages to Pearl Harbor to keep them up to speed. But from August to November, not a single decoded message was sent to Pearl. Once the attack on Pearl Harbor happened everyone tried to cover their butt, especially Turner who was notorious for micromanaging and oversaw everything that was sent to Pearl. When there were hearings later about Pearl Harbor, Turner's subordinates chickened out from talking about a 4 star admiral. As Layton said, if he had made these mistakes he would have been court martialed but nothing happened to Stark, Ingersoll or Turner and they went on the fame and increased rank.
In the next few chapters, Layton talks about all the intelligence that intelligence in DC ignored or didn't bother to forward to Pearl Harbor. Such as a message asking for detailed information on where ships where berthed or anchored in the harbor and to create a 5 part grid and to give details for each of the grids that overlaid the harbor. Several people in DC wanted to send this and following info to Pearl but were denied.
Pearl Harbor was supposed to be getting B17 bombers but higher ups decided to send them to MacArthur in the Philippines as a deterrent to Japan. They later realized that this was foley. The number of planes in the Philippines would have no deterrent effect. Not enough of them. Plus, Pearl was stripped of planes and defenses to send to MacArthur in the Philippines.
Also, at some point Layton said that a lot of people in the Navy were still thinking WW1 and that battleships were the most important ship and that aircraft carriers were support for scouting and the like. They also felt that planes from a carrier were no match for a battleship. Obviously that thinking changed after the war started.
The Japanese had set 11/25/41 as the final date for negotiations. Finally the Americans decided negotiations was a good idea at the last minute to try to avert a 2 front war. The Japanese pushed the date back 4 days. The US knew this from reading diplomatic decrypts. Being able to read these gave the US too much confidence perhaps. All parted on the 25th thinking there was good progress. At the 26th meeting, Secretary of State Hull gave new demands and killed the negotiations. Apparently Roosevelt had gotten new info overnight, probably from the British that changed his mind. Even at the time of this book 40 years later, the info was still classified. The Brits classified it for 75 years which is now up. I wonder if anyone has looked into it. (See Negotiations Off chapter)
Roosevelt and his top military people knew this would cause an attack by the Japanese, but when and where? If we struck first, the isolationists in Congress would accuse him of starting the war. If we negotiated a delay and Japan attacked, Roosevelt gets branded an appeaser and make it harder to rally Congress. Waiting to be attacked would guarantee votes in Congress but could lead to charge of Roosevelt of dereliction of duty.
There were many more missed chances over the next several chapters. Some just bad luck. Some clues easier to see in hindsight. But a lot was because of screw ups of Turner and Stark and Marshall in DC. Even when subordinates such as McCollom kept wanting to send warnings and info to Pearl Harbor and other locations, these 3 kept saying no, we have already informed them. But if Pearl had the information that DC had, the outcome would have likely been quite different.
Then in the aftermath, a commission was formed to investigate. It was a joke, a kangaroo court. It was overseen by a Supreme Court justice, Stewart, but it was absurd and had one purpose, find scapegoats. They let Turner, Stark and Marshall off the hook and crucified Admiral Kimmel and General Short.
The day before, December 6, Layton had gone over with some latest intelligence to talk to Admiral Pye to warn him and suggest he might want to make preparations because something was happening. Pye said Japan would never attack Pearl, the US was too strong. The next day, Pye's command battleship was sunk as were others.
Kimmel wanted to go on the offensive immediately and came up with a brilliant plan to attack the Japanese in the South Pacific. It was in the middle of being implemented when he was relieved of duty and Pye took over as interim. If Kimmel's plans had been carried out, Japan would have been dealt a blow similar to the later Midway battle (maybe not as significant but still a huge deal that early in the war), Wake Island would have been supplied and reinforced instead of being captured. But Pye got cold feet. Halsey attacked a few ships and did little damage but that was it.
MacArthur was informed of Pearl Harbor quickly. He had the chance to bomb and destroy the nearby Japanese airfield and its planes. Instead, he did nothing for 9 hours and the Japanese bombed him and wiped out his air force. He should have been courtmartialed for dereliction of duty, not Kimmel and Short (although they were actually never court martialed of course)
Then Admiral Nimitz took over from Pye and he was aggressive like Kimmel. Also, Admiral King took over in DC. Turner was under him and given other duties because he was so arrogant he couldn't work with Army Intelligence. Later in the war he was given command of amphibious landings.
Hawaiian Intelligence was known as Hypo and DCs was Negat. The intelligence unit, at least for the Far East was known as OP-20-G. Two new guys enter the picture who were brothers named Redman. One was in charge of OP-20-G. Being in DC, they could sweet talk and influence people.
First there was the battle of the Coral Sea. Each side lost 24 ships. I think it was Admiral Fletcher who got lucky. He was "old school" and felt he should believe in his gut and not the intelligence people. Halsey had been so successful in the first bit after Pearl Harbor by having an intelligence group on board to listen to and break codes and other info that each fleet had one now. But Fletcher(?) didn't listen to the intelligence of where the Japanese carrier was and was lucky he wasn't sunk.
Under Layton at Hypo was Joe Rochefort. He headed up the cryptologists. Brilliant but eccentric. And he had a good team. They had finally been given permission to work on other codes and were doing a brilliant job. They figured out that Midway was going to be attacked and the Japanese saw it as a way to draw out the US fleet and destroy them in a surprise attack. But Negat/DC thought the attack would be in the South Pacific. Nimitz had seen what Rochefort's team and Layton could do and trusted them.
Hypo kept getting things right (place, time etc) and Negat kept getting things wrong. Finally, Hypo had Midway send a message saying that their water maker was broken and they were short on water and please send more. They Japanese started talking about lack of water at their destination, proving they were going to attack Midway. Unlike in movies, this wasn't done to figure out where they were going to attack but to prove that Negat was wrong to get them off Hypo's back.
Midway went almost exactly as Hypo said and of course was a huge success. But the Redman's only cared for power and saving face. They took credit in DC and said that Rochefort had been wrong. They got King to remove Rochefort and they got promotions. One to Captain and one to Vice Admiral. Rochefort was removed from intelligence duty for a couple of years and the US lost a valuable asset who could have made a difference in the war. Finally towards the end he was given another intelligence role. The Redmans should have been court martialed or some punishment. Then they made matters worse.
One idiot showed a reporter a secret report so he knew that we had succeeded at Midway because we had broken the Japanese code. He of course printed it. The Navy tried to hush it up. But the Redmans wanted revenge (possibly because they thought Rochefort was involved) and wanted the people prosecuted. It ended up in a very public court battle that the Navy lost but it was all over the papers and alerted the Japanese who promptly changed their code and the US intelligence had to start all over again trying to break it.
This hampered our efforts to capture the Solomon Islands of which Guadalcanal was key. It took 6 months to capture. The key landing was screwed up by Fletcher who decided to refuel all his carriers at once leaving Turner's landing party with no air cover. Then Turner decided to be his own intelligence analyst (again) and therefore didn't get warning of an approaching Jap force. He lost 4 cruisers and 1 destroyer and landing transports.
In April 43 decrypts allowed shooting down Yamamoto's plane. Around then we recaptured the 2 Aleutian Islands the Japanese took at same time as Midway campaign.
The US gathered a large fleet in 1944 to start recapturing the South Pacific. They took Tarawa in the Gilbert Islands but it was bloody and costly. Almost no Japanese survived. They fought to the death. So for the Marshall Islands there was a plan to attack the outer islands first. But Layton and his crew found the Japanese were moving troops to the outer islands and fortifying them. Their headquarters on Kwajalein was relatively unprotected. So Nimitz said we will attack that and just skip by the outer islands. Except for the outer island of Majuro which Layton said had only 6 people on it. General Smith bet him a bottle of bourbon there would be 600 at least. There was one person. Layton won the bet. Kwajalein was a little more difficult than expected but they by luck captured secret documents that let them know where mine fields were and other useful info.
Then Admiral Koga moved his main ships from Truk to Palau. But was slower moving the support ships there. A US carrier attack destroyed most of their support vessels, oilers, tenders etc and also hundreds of planes. This prevented the Japanese from any further offensive plans for the rest of the war.
Then MacArthur wanted control of the navy to retake the rest of New Guinea and then the Philippines. (Layton asked why Nimitz had a picture of MacArthur pinned up in his office. Nimitz' answer was it was a reminder not to be a horse's ass.)
The fifth fleet was sent to help MacArthur and on the way caught the Palaus by surprise and destroyed more planes and support ships. Then went to help MacArthur. He had success because the intelligence guys had finally broken the army codes. The Palau attack forced Admiral Koga to give up the Palaus as fleet headquarters. But MacArthur using PR etc to get his way to focus on the Philippines instead of bypassing and going for Japan more directly probably added 6 months and thousands of lives to the war.
The navy then planned to attack the Mariana islands. They got lucky by capturing the Japanese plans to counter them so they knew what the Japanese were going to do going into battle. At the beginning of the war, the Japanese forces vastly outnumbered ours. For this, we had 535 ships and 127K troops. We took them by surprise and destroyed most of their planes and 3 carriers among others. Still soldiers on Saipan held out for a while. Guam and Tinian were much easier.
Philippines campaign started off well but almost was a disaster when Halsey took off after some carriers and left nothing behind to protect against a Japanese fleet he wasn't aware of. The landing ships were saved by planes from US pocket "jeep" carriers. First use of kamikaze because Japan had run out of experienced pilots.
MacArthur's blunder that lost the Philippines had a bigger impact than Pearl Harbor. The battleships couldn't keep up with the carriers and were less important. It points out that if the Pearl fuel tanks had been hit instead of battleships and Jap subs prevented resupply, it would have held us up 12-18 months instead of 3 to start offensive operations.
Layton and our intelligence efforts in general gave us huge advantages and greatly shortened the war.
August 27, 2024
ESSENTIAL reading for those interested in understanding World War II's "War in the Pacific".
August 22, 2024
Look no further for proof that Pearl Harbor was not a conspiracy. Admiral Turner, at U.S. Naval intelligence in Washington, arrogantly prognosticates to his naval underlings at Pearl Harbor that the Japs are headed towards Kamchatka, not Pearl. But the Pearl Harbor intelligence team turns out to be right about Pearl and, later, Midway, so the ever jealous Redman brothers (again, back in Washington) manage to ruin the career of one of the Pearl intelligence team’s star officers, because he was not sufficiently deferential to the Redman hierarchical reorganization plans. It turns out office politics and jockeying for position by selfish a-holes has been around for a long, long time, and the U.S. Navy is not immune to this particularly disgusting virus. The petty egotism and ambition of Turner and the Redman brothers turns the stomach. Even my usually tolerant father had no kind words for the Redmans.
August 16, 2023
Superb, wonderful, detailed, and compelling. Finally the full story of Pearl Harbor's destruction and the victory at Midway. Clearly this book was used extensively in the film Midway.
June 13, 2023
Nimitz’s intelligence officer’s (Layton) inside description of the code breaking activity underlying the US Navy’s miraculous victory at Midway.
January 5, 2022
This book was well written, the amount of sources in this book was immense. At times I believe Layton had too much evidence.
The book was about average all the way through, enough information to keep you reading but multiple dry spots.
Chapter 22 and 23, made the book worth every penny. Oddly enough, he changed his writing format for these specific chapters, however, it worked into the stories favour as those chapters were the best writing on pearl harbour I HAVE EVER READ. The immense detail, the information of how and where everything was going on, including his own personal additions being a intelligence officer.
Those two chapters made that book have a 4/5, if it was just those two chapters in the book 5/5
I can’t stress how much I enjoyed those 2 chapters.
Therefore if you find the book dry and want to give up on it, just read chapter 22/23 and then put it away. You won’t be sorry!
The book was about average all the way through, enough information to keep you reading but multiple dry spots.
Chapter 22 and 23, made the book worth every penny. Oddly enough, he changed his writing format for these specific chapters, however, it worked into the stories favour as those chapters were the best writing on pearl harbour I HAVE EVER READ. The immense detail, the information of how and where everything was going on, including his own personal additions being a intelligence officer.
Those two chapters made that book have a 4/5, if it was just those two chapters in the book 5/5
I can’t stress how much I enjoyed those 2 chapters.
Therefore if you find the book dry and want to give up on it, just read chapter 22/23 and then put it away. You won’t be sorry!
March 25, 2025
As the intelligence office working with the Pacific Fleet under Admiral Nimitz during WWII, Edwin Layton and the team at Station HYPO was instrumental in bringing about the victory against the Japanese.
The overall history of the fleet intelligence unit and how their work brought about America’s victory is one I’m very familiar with, but this add plenty to the story.
The overall history of the fleet intelligence unit and how their work brought about America’s victory is one I’m very familiar with, but this add plenty to the story.
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December 5, 2019Wow...this book is...dense...
Admiral Layton is said to have kept voluminous, thorough notes on the lead up to WW2 and of the war in the Pacific, and his diaries and recollections has been turned into this account of--well--almost everyone of any note in the Pacific naval theater. He served primarily in naval intelligence, and he has rather a low opinion of some of the politicians and brass who, he avers, kept vital information out of the hands of the commanders at Pearl Harbor--information that may have enabled them to prevent or defend against the sneak attack of December 7, 1941.
And boy, does he love his codes. Detailed information about codes and ciphers (they're not the same), which unit got which messages to decode, how they broke the codes--if one isn't as enamored of codebreaking, it gets a bit long-winded.
Adm Layton died before the book was completed; and his co-authors had access to his notes and the cooperation of Mrs Layton.
Recommended for any WW2 military history buffs or NSC types.
Admiral Layton is said to have kept voluminous, thorough notes on the lead up to WW2 and of the war in the Pacific, and his diaries and recollections has been turned into this account of--well--almost everyone of any note in the Pacific naval theater. He served primarily in naval intelligence, and he has rather a low opinion of some of the politicians and brass who, he avers, kept vital information out of the hands of the commanders at Pearl Harbor--information that may have enabled them to prevent or defend against the sneak attack of December 7, 1941.
And boy, does he love his codes. Detailed information about codes and ciphers (they're not the same), which unit got which messages to decode, how they broke the codes--if one isn't as enamored of codebreaking, it gets a bit long-winded.
Adm Layton died before the book was completed; and his co-authors had access to his notes and the cooperation of Mrs Layton.
Recommended for any WW2 military history buffs or NSC types.
April 12, 2025
Amazing! An 80 year old sets the record straight about who was and wasn't responsible for Pearl Harbor. He clearly had been stewing about it for 40 years and, when the relevant documents were finally declassied, he told his story with compelling force and verve. I knew what had happened, but not how it happened and why it happened the way it did.
If you're fascinated by history, this will give you a different perspective. Layton explains the difference between code breaking and cryptanalysis, he explains radio traffic analysis, not in a dry academic way, but how it played out when the fate of the United States was on the line and thousands of lives depended on the answers they found. Or rather the hints, the possibilities, the suppositions.
It's a big read, no doubt, but it's a huge subject and he pulls out the key threads. I highly recommend it.
By the way, if you watched the movie "Midway", Layton is an important character and the writers clearly read this book while writing the script.
If you're fascinated by history, this will give you a different perspective. Layton explains the difference between code breaking and cryptanalysis, he explains radio traffic analysis, not in a dry academic way, but how it played out when the fate of the United States was on the line and thousands of lives depended on the answers they found. Or rather the hints, the possibilities, the suppositions.
It's a big read, no doubt, but it's a huge subject and he pulls out the key threads. I highly recommend it.
By the way, if you watched the movie "Midway", Layton is an important character and the writers clearly read this book while writing the script.
April 25, 2019
Although substantially completed in first draft, the memoirs of Admiral Layton were not finished until after his death. Late declassification of relevant documents served to support Layton's contention that Admiral Kimmel and Gen Short were made scapegoats for the Pearl Harbor disaster. His well documented and carefully reasoned account logically portrays the failures of the Navy Department to share the vital intelligence needed to prevent the disaster. Layton's later service with Admiral Nimitz enhances our understanding of the Pacific naval war. If you are interested in the value of military intelligence to change the course of events this is a must read!
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July 17, 2022And I Was There, Layton, Pineau, Costello. About the WWII naval war in the Pacific. Mostly written by Layton. He was in Naval Intelligence in Hawaii, as opposed to Naval Intelligence in Washington, DC. Failure at Pearl Harbor. Success at Midway and some other places. They were able to read a lot of the Japanese radio messages, whereas the Japanese read few of ours. Had a major bone to pick with the Washington, DC, Naval intelligence folks, in particular two brothers, cast as scheming, power-hungry folks. Sad to see the conflicts in egos that lead to needless deaths. Sigh. July 17, 2022
January 8, 2024
Loaned to us by cousin Tom. Very detailed book about how the author, Layton, who worked for Admiral Kimmel on Pearl Harbor, was at the beginning of radio intellegence and the beginning of cracking codes and cyphers. Hard reading at times as it is so detailed, also when it came to the fighting after Pearl it would help if you knew all the places and islands that were involved in all that action. One thing, it shows the government was just as crooked as it is today. They protect certain ones, find scapegoats and information gets "lost". It was interesting reading though.
May 12, 2017
The best summary of intelligence, code, ciphers and utilizing this information
to help your Admirals and military to assist their task to take the battle to the enemies for a successful conclusion. This also includes where personal politics and jealousy endangered the safety of our nation.
This also credits Nimitz for using his intuition and this information to help make a correct decision.
to help your Admirals and military to assist their task to take the battle to the enemies for a successful conclusion. This also includes where personal politics and jealousy endangered the safety of our nation.
This also credits Nimitz for using his intuition and this information to help make a correct decision.
January 13, 2021
This is a very detailed and very interesting book. I found myself rereading paragraphs/pages to make sure I didn't miss anything. I caught myself almost yelling at parts and wanting to applaud or even cry at others. Well worth reading if you are at all interested in the "behind the scenes" of our war in the Pacific.
February 23, 2023
The information and analysis in the book were outstanding, but I downgraded the rating from 5 stars to 4 stars due to a very complicated, cumbersome writing style. I am thankful that the truth about these events was properly documented.
June 10, 2017
Great source material.
December 23, 2019
Highly technical and packed with intelligence and military strategy detail, Adm Layton clearly lays out the Pacific theater of WWII in this gripping first-hand account.
March 31, 2020
Excelent telling of events leading up to Pearl harbor and Miday
December 19, 2024
I looked forward to reading this book as I enjoy WW2 history. But, the book was a bit too detailed with information.
November 17, 2012
An important source of information about communications intelligence in the Pacific Ocean war zone during World War II.
"...a secret wartime navy department assessment concluded: 'It takes nothing from the achievements of the fleets of the U.S. Navy at Coral Sea to say that they had been brought to the right spot at exactly the right time by the work of radio (communications) intelligence.' " (page 404)
27 November 1941 "I learned that a top-secret and urgent dispatch had just come in. I went at once to the communications office ... As I scanned the smudged tape spewing out of the decoding machine that was reserved for our most secret communications, I was instantly galvanized by the message ... When I read "This dispatch is...a war warning,' it gave me a jolt. I had never seen such a message before." (pages 214 and 215)
"...a secret wartime navy department assessment concluded: 'It takes nothing from the achievements of the fleets of the U.S. Navy at Coral Sea to say that they had been brought to the right spot at exactly the right time by the work of radio (communications) intelligence.' " (page 404)
27 November 1941 "I learned that a top-secret and urgent dispatch had just come in. I went at once to the communications office ... As I scanned the smudged tape spewing out of the decoding machine that was reserved for our most secret communications, I was instantly galvanized by the message ... When I read "This dispatch is...a war warning,' it gave me a jolt. I had never seen such a message before." (pages 214 and 215)
February 9, 2017
Didn't like it. Didn't finish it.
December 4, 2015
An absolute must-read for anyone researching Pearl Harbor. Adm. Layton was Adm. Kimmel's intelligence officer and both were unfairly blamed for the disaster. This book and Kimmel's should be read together. The bottom line is that they did not get the intelligence coming out of Washington. In particular, and what I point out in my book (Into the Lion's Mouth), is that neither Kimmel nor Layton received a word of the warning that British double agent Dusko Popov gave to the FBI in August 1941 (not to mention Popov's actual questionnaire -- which I have as an appendix in my book).
January 6, 2008
This is one of the best books I've ever had the pleasure to read, and an absolute must read for any Naval Intelligence professional. I just cannot say enough about this book. It's well worth the read.
February 28, 2016
One of the best books I have ever read. It is a tale of courage and war, yes, but more importantly a story of the infighting that goes on in human organizations. The attitudes of the Redman brothers in trying to control the glory of intelligence show hom lust for power can subvert real power.
July 17, 2012
If you enjoy the history of WWII, especially naval history, as I do, your library is incomplete without this book.
February 13, 2014
Read this in conjunction with "Joe Rochefort's War" and biographies of Nimitz, Spruance and King. Now know more about the politics of code breaking than I ever expected to.
November 5, 2015
If you have an interest in WWII and specifically the battles of the Pacific this a good but lengthy read.
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