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Všetci mocní Kremľa
Aká veľká je moc, ktorá sa ukrýva v rukách Vladimira Putina? A ako ďaleko sú tie ruky schopné dosiahnuť? Je to človek, ktorého sa máme právom báť?
Ruský novinár Michail Zygar napísal knihu Všetci mocní Kremľa, v ktorej sa rozhodol neustále sa opakujúce otázky okolo Kremľa a Putina analyzovať do hĺbky. Kniha sa rýchlo stala ruským bestsellerom. Zygar sa veľa pýta – a pýta sa hlavne mocných a najmocnejších. Z informácií z prvej ruky komponuje obraz premeny, ktorou počas „putinovskej“ éry prešla nielen ruská spoločnosť, ale aj samotný neobmedzený vládca Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin. Ako sa z niekdajšieho reformátora stal nepriateľ Západu a majster propagandy? A kam to celé smeruje?
Otázok je v Rusku priveľa a ani kniha Michaila Zygara Všetci mocní Kremľa neponúka univerzálne odpovede. Istotne však môže pomôcť pri orientácii v spletitých labyrintoch politiky súčasného Ruska.
Ruský novinár Michail Zygar napísal knihu Všetci mocní Kremľa, v ktorej sa rozhodol neustále sa opakujúce otázky okolo Kremľa a Putina analyzovať do hĺbky. Kniha sa rýchlo stala ruským bestsellerom. Zygar sa veľa pýta – a pýta sa hlavne mocných a najmocnejších. Z informácií z prvej ruky komponuje obraz premeny, ktorou počas „putinovskej“ éry prešla nielen ruská spoločnosť, ale aj samotný neobmedzený vládca Vladimir Vladimirovič Putin. Ako sa z niekdajšieho reformátora stal nepriateľ Západu a majster propagandy? A kam to celé smeruje?
Otázok je v Rusku priveľa a ani kniha Michaila Zygara Všetci mocní Kremľa neponúka univerzálne odpovede. Istotne však môže pomôcť pri orientácii v spletitých labyrintoch politiky súčasného Ruska.
480 pages, Paperback
First published October 8, 2015
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7724 people want to read
About the author
Михаил Зыгарь
15 books329 followersMikhail Zygar is a journalist, writer, and filmmaker, and the founding editor-in-chief of Russian news channel Dozhd, which provided an alternative to Kremlin-controlled federal TV channels by giving a platform to opposition voices. The recipient of an International Press Freedom Award, Zygar writes a weekly column on Russia and the war for DerSpiegel and also writes for the New York Times, Time Magazine, Vanity Fair, and Foreign Affairs. He is also the author of All the Kremlin’s Men, The Empire Must Die, and War and Punishment. Currently a guest lecturer at Columbia University, he lives in New York with his husband.
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January 7, 2020
كتاب العام بلا منازع
ريفيو مرئي للكتاب:
https://youtu.be/8JHz0DRx44c
ريفيو مرئي للكتاب:
https://youtu.be/8JHz0DRx44c
May 31, 2020
Zygar reports on Putin as Russia’s leader detailing his relationships with the men around him. We see how Putin is seemingly accidentally thrust into the presidency and how he takes charge with his own entourage. We witness the changes in Putin as he consolidates power to become the Putin we recognize today. The book is very detailed introducing this reader to many new people: Oligarchs, politicians, administrators, dissidents, and Putin’s old friends. We see how Putin influences them and how in turn they influence Putin to shape him. We also get revealing insights into Putin’s interactions with foreign leaders. Zygar is the founder of Russia’s only independent TV station which presents alternative views to those of the Kremlin. He is a journalist and this book is based on extensive interviews of people with personal knowledge of Putin, thus we get many anecdotes. This is a great read for those interested enough to sort through all the details. What follows are notes of items that captured my interest.
As the end of Boris Yeltsin’s second term approached, he suddenly resigned on December 31, 1999 and appointed Vladimir Putin as his successor. Putin immediately granted Yeltsin immunity from any crimes he may have committed. Yeltsin’s close relations were known as the Family. They maintained outsized influence along with oligarchs and politicians close to them. The Family had selected Putin, the director of the FSB, believing he would help them retain their influence. He did for a few years.
Putin had his clique, the siloviki, composed of military and security officials who would turn the Prosecutor General’s Office into a Putin weapon, and another loyal group known as the “Petersburgers”. Putin, a former intelligence officer, maintained close ties with former KGB and current FSB officials and he brought along many associates from his days as Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg. He won the election for president in 2000 with political and financial help from the Family and powerful friends including oligarchs. They and the public favored Putin because he was anti-communist, pro-business and espoused democracy. Putin found his new job and its perks to his liking. It would take several years for him to cement power, destroying opposition parties and taking down troublesome oligarchs and replacing them with those who understood who was in charge.
Putin set out to woo the West. He formed a close relationship with Tony Blair and his first meeting with George W. Bush showed just how cagey Putin is. Putin used his career honed skills sizing Bush up knowing that Bush had sworn off alcohol and turned religious. Putin told Bush a story saying he had owned a dacha that was destroyed in a fire but thankfully no one was injured. And by some miracle the only object to survive was a crucifix his mother had given to him. Because of that he said he believed in miracles. Putin was convincing. Bush was taken with the story saying later, “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul.” Bush now believed Russia under Putin would become just like Western European countries.
Putin became incensed over the U. S. invasion of Iraq and it permanently changed his attitude towards the U. S. Russia was much closer to and had a much better understanding of Saddam Hussein and his circle than the U. S. But the U. S. did not consult with Russia before deciding to invade Iraq. Putin was already irritated by the constant lecturing from the U. S. on how Russia should behave. Putin was also upset with Blair who went along with Bush. He would write off his friendship with Blair when Britain gave political asylum to two of his Russian enemies. Blair claimed he couldn’t intervene with the courts, which made no sense to Putin.
Putin publicly revealed his dark side in 2001 when he cracked down on a popular TV station that opposed his policies. He had his Prosecutor General file charges against the media mogul owner who was imprisoned. Putin removed others involved with the station and put his own team in place. Putin made sure everyone understood how he would govern in 2003 charging and then in 2005 imprisoning one of the richest men in Russia, the owner of Yukos Oil, oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was opposing Putin policies. With this show of strength the balance of power changed. The Family was through. After the 2004 election, the Petersburgers were ready to take control. Putin’s silviki was busily collecting compromising data on the rich and powerful. The oligarchs had come into being in the mid-nineties as state owned properties were privatized. It was part of an election strategy and self-enrichment by Yeltsin and the Family to win the 1996 election. Powerful people loyal to the Family became billionaires.
Putin began replacing the remaining Family oligarchs and ministers with his own. As one of Putin’s aides told the prime minister who “suddenly resigned”, “Thank you for showing us how to run the country. Now we can do it for ourselves.” Putin made an obscure choice for his new prime minister, one who would pose no threat and be loyal and readily agreed to impossible goals. As an insider noted “No one gets fired for poor performance – They get fired for disloyalty.”
Putin fervently believed that Ukraine belonged to Russia and took every opportunity to ensure it did not stray to the West. When in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, despite Putin’s personal involvement and massive support, his candidate Viktor Yanukovych lost, Putin was furious. He blamed the West for its interference. The U. S. and other countries had sent observers who made their opinions known. Pro West Ukrainians took to the streets in the Orange Revolution. So called “Color” revolutions also took place in other former Soviet republics, most notably Georgia. Putin and his aides became paranoid seeing the hand of the U. S. everywhere. Bush sat beside Putin in Moscow at the 60th anniversary of Victory Day parade and as always was respectful to Putin. But then Bush skipped the gala dinner and went to Georgia where he lauded the “Rose” revolution speaking to 150,000 American Flag waving Georgians. Putin was surer than ever he could never trust the Americans.
In 2005 Putin decided to center his foreign policy on business, specifically as a gas supplier to Europe. Under the guise of energy security he tried to strike deals to build Russian gas pipelines to Western Europe. At first the European leaders were enthusiastic. But again Ukraine was the fly in the ointment. Ukraine, already buying Russian gas, was negotiating a new deal with Putin. Putin structured a shady scheme through a secretive middle company with Russian mafia connections. Ukraine balked at the sky high price. Putin showed his cards suddenly sharply cutting the amount of gas Russia was supplying until Ukraine accepted Putin’s compromise. At the same time he cut service to other customers in East European countries and to Austria. Needless to say West European leaders quickly saw the Russian pipelines as a trap.
After Hurricane Katrina decimated New Orleans in 2005, Bush’s approval declined sharply as he badly mishandled the situation. Putin now saw Bush as weak, a lame duck. He decided to go on the offensive and challenge U. S. dominance in the world. In a blistering speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference he accused the U. S. of destabilizing the world with its missile programs and foreign interventions. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Putin in Moscow in 2006, he humiliated her by making her wait hours in a hotel lobby while he sat drinking with friends in a bar. She was then invited to the bar where Putin’s group sat with drinks and snacks. Rice asked Putin to talk separately. She started in about the situation in Georgia which quickly turned into a screaming match. Interestingly, in 2008 at a NATO meeting Rice and Angela Merkel got into a heated argument over admitting Georgia and Ukraine, yelling at each other in Russian which they both spoke fluently. Putin went to the meeting the last day and flew into a rage at Bush for trying to admit Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. Putin followed up by sending troops into Georgia showing the U. S. just who was in control.
Putin decided not to change the 1993 Russian constitution which limited the president to two successive terms. He selected Dmitri Medvedev to succeed him in 2008. Putin had other loyal associates he could have picked, but he liked Medvedev’s lack of ambition. Putin became prime minister forming what was known as the “tandem”. Medvedev instituted some modest liberal reforms, but usually knew where to draw the line. Putin let him know when he crossed it. Medvedev also changed the constitution to extend subsequent presidential terms from four to six years. As the 2012 election approached, Medvedev allowed some small demonstrations by genuine opposition. Putin had always set up fake opposition parties to manipulate the electorate. Putin saw Medvedev as weak but it didn’t matter, Putin planned to run for President in 2012 and have Medvedev as prime minister, switching their positions, but all the power always remained with Putin. Putin controlled the media, senior government ministers, the security services and the oligarchs. He and his siliviki might loosen the reigns from time to time to allow opponents to reveal themselves, but he always kept control. After the election Putin quickly cleaned house replacing Medvedev’s ministers and rescinding his reforms. He also cracked down harshly on the demonstrators arresting many and sending leaders to prison.
In 2013 Ukraine was considering signing an association agreement with the EU, strongly supported by many Ukrainians. Putin made clear to the Ukrainian president, Putin’s man Yanukovych, that Ukraine’s future was with Russia. Putin offered attractive loans to Ukraine to stay close to Russia, which Yanukovych took, surprising and angering many of his supporters and pro-Western Ukrainians. Protesters headed for the government sector of Kiev where security forces killed 25. The U. S. imposed sanctions and other European countries spoke out against the violence. As the days went on, the protests gained strength eventually toppling Yanukovych who escaped to Russia.
Seeing Ukraine in disarray, Putin made the decision in 2014 to return Crimea to Russia. Crimea had been part of Russia before 1954, when Khrushchev got it transferred to Ukraine. This put a large population of Russians into Ukraine helping tie it to Russia. With Crimea’s significant Russian population getting local support was easy. Using local activists along with help from Russian troops from a nearby base, the takeover was quick. A Crimean government was formed which then applied for accession to the Russian Federation which was shortly ratified by Russia. Putin had always considered Crimea to be part of Russia. In Eastern Ukraine his strategy was different. It too held many Russians and the same combination of forces successfully battled the Ukrainian army. But Putin did not want to annex Eastern Ukraine. He wanted to hold its future over Ukraine as leverage. He wanted all of Ukraine in Russia’s orbit.
In response, the U. S. and European allies issued sanctions against Russian officials and oligarchs. Putin now was completely bitter about the U. S. and the West. He believed that he and Russia had never been and would never be treated as equals. Putin also hardened even further on dissidents and officials or businessmen he felt had “liberal” ideas. This attitude carried over to Vladimir Yevtushenkov who owned a Russian oil company and wanted to list it on the London stock exchange. For this, Putin had him arrested. This shook the business community, for unlike Khodorkovsky, Yevtushenkov scrupulously avoided politics. The business community already suffering from sanctions due to the war in Ukraine and takeover of Crimea was even more upset by this arrest. After Khodorkovsky’s arrest they knew to stay out of politics, but now they weren’t sure what would get them in trouble. Putin associates that attempted to defend Yevtushenkov or point out the economic downside of arresting him lost their influence with Putin.
Putin’s attitude towards the West was reinforced at the G20 summit in November 2014 in Australia. Putin was treated like a pariah. Nobody engaged with him. He was positioned at the end of the line in the photoshoot and assigned a table to eat essentially alone. He left early the next day. Not only did Putin not intend to be humiliated again, his isolationist attitude was adopted by government officials and businessmen. Getting ahead in Russia depends on one’s relationship with Putin and his attitudes are quickly emulated. A good example of Putin’s point of view is the U. S. reaction to his support for Syria’s Assad. The U. S. criticizes Putin for violating human rights and supporting a ruthless dictator, but to Putin Assad is no worse than the leadership of Saudi Arabia. The U. S. allies with Saudi Arabia which summarily hangs and beheads people. The U. S. even supports it with weapons in its cruel war with Yemen. So Putin sees the U. S. and its Western European allies as sanctimonious hypocrites. There are many more examples in the book, not the least of which is the Iraq war.
Zygar’s book was published in 2016, so we don’t get any insight on Putin’s relationship with Trump. But after reading this it is easy to see why Putin would get along well with Trump. Zygar sees Putin as caught up in all his manipulations, as one who is manipulated as much as he manipulates others. Unfortunately this review leaves out much of the internal politics Zygar outlines that would lend support to this view. Still from my reading, Putin looked like he was usually the one pulling the strings, albeit often reactionary and often relying on advice from associates who had ulterior motives. Just like the tsars, Putin identified himself as Russia, so the way he saw himself treated was the way Russia was being treated and vice versa. But I am convinced when Zygar says that when Putin is gone little will change.
As the end of Boris Yeltsin’s second term approached, he suddenly resigned on December 31, 1999 and appointed Vladimir Putin as his successor. Putin immediately granted Yeltsin immunity from any crimes he may have committed. Yeltsin’s close relations were known as the Family. They maintained outsized influence along with oligarchs and politicians close to them. The Family had selected Putin, the director of the FSB, believing he would help them retain their influence. He did for a few years.
Putin had his clique, the siloviki, composed of military and security officials who would turn the Prosecutor General’s Office into a Putin weapon, and another loyal group known as the “Petersburgers”. Putin, a former intelligence officer, maintained close ties with former KGB and current FSB officials and he brought along many associates from his days as Deputy Mayor of St. Petersburg. He won the election for president in 2000 with political and financial help from the Family and powerful friends including oligarchs. They and the public favored Putin because he was anti-communist, pro-business and espoused democracy. Putin found his new job and its perks to his liking. It would take several years for him to cement power, destroying opposition parties and taking down troublesome oligarchs and replacing them with those who understood who was in charge.
Putin set out to woo the West. He formed a close relationship with Tony Blair and his first meeting with George W. Bush showed just how cagey Putin is. Putin used his career honed skills sizing Bush up knowing that Bush had sworn off alcohol and turned religious. Putin told Bush a story saying he had owned a dacha that was destroyed in a fire but thankfully no one was injured. And by some miracle the only object to survive was a crucifix his mother had given to him. Because of that he said he believed in miracles. Putin was convincing. Bush was taken with the story saying later, “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy and we had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul.” Bush now believed Russia under Putin would become just like Western European countries.
Putin became incensed over the U. S. invasion of Iraq and it permanently changed his attitude towards the U. S. Russia was much closer to and had a much better understanding of Saddam Hussein and his circle than the U. S. But the U. S. did not consult with Russia before deciding to invade Iraq. Putin was already irritated by the constant lecturing from the U. S. on how Russia should behave. Putin was also upset with Blair who went along with Bush. He would write off his friendship with Blair when Britain gave political asylum to two of his Russian enemies. Blair claimed he couldn’t intervene with the courts, which made no sense to Putin.
Putin publicly revealed his dark side in 2001 when he cracked down on a popular TV station that opposed his policies. He had his Prosecutor General file charges against the media mogul owner who was imprisoned. Putin removed others involved with the station and put his own team in place. Putin made sure everyone understood how he would govern in 2003 charging and then in 2005 imprisoning one of the richest men in Russia, the owner of Yukos Oil, oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was opposing Putin policies. With this show of strength the balance of power changed. The Family was through. After the 2004 election, the Petersburgers were ready to take control. Putin’s silviki was busily collecting compromising data on the rich and powerful. The oligarchs had come into being in the mid-nineties as state owned properties were privatized. It was part of an election strategy and self-enrichment by Yeltsin and the Family to win the 1996 election. Powerful people loyal to the Family became billionaires.
Putin began replacing the remaining Family oligarchs and ministers with his own. As one of Putin’s aides told the prime minister who “suddenly resigned”, “Thank you for showing us how to run the country. Now we can do it for ourselves.” Putin made an obscure choice for his new prime minister, one who would pose no threat and be loyal and readily agreed to impossible goals. As an insider noted “No one gets fired for poor performance – They get fired for disloyalty.”
Putin fervently believed that Ukraine belonged to Russia and took every opportunity to ensure it did not stray to the West. When in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, despite Putin’s personal involvement and massive support, his candidate Viktor Yanukovych lost, Putin was furious. He blamed the West for its interference. The U. S. and other countries had sent observers who made their opinions known. Pro West Ukrainians took to the streets in the Orange Revolution. So called “Color” revolutions also took place in other former Soviet republics, most notably Georgia. Putin and his aides became paranoid seeing the hand of the U. S. everywhere. Bush sat beside Putin in Moscow at the 60th anniversary of Victory Day parade and as always was respectful to Putin. But then Bush skipped the gala dinner and went to Georgia where he lauded the “Rose” revolution speaking to 150,000 American Flag waving Georgians. Putin was surer than ever he could never trust the Americans.
In 2005 Putin decided to center his foreign policy on business, specifically as a gas supplier to Europe. Under the guise of energy security he tried to strike deals to build Russian gas pipelines to Western Europe. At first the European leaders were enthusiastic. But again Ukraine was the fly in the ointment. Ukraine, already buying Russian gas, was negotiating a new deal with Putin. Putin structured a shady scheme through a secretive middle company with Russian mafia connections. Ukraine balked at the sky high price. Putin showed his cards suddenly sharply cutting the amount of gas Russia was supplying until Ukraine accepted Putin’s compromise. At the same time he cut service to other customers in East European countries and to Austria. Needless to say West European leaders quickly saw the Russian pipelines as a trap.
After Hurricane Katrina decimated New Orleans in 2005, Bush’s approval declined sharply as he badly mishandled the situation. Putin now saw Bush as weak, a lame duck. He decided to go on the offensive and challenge U. S. dominance in the world. In a blistering speech at the 2007 Munich Security Conference he accused the U. S. of destabilizing the world with its missile programs and foreign interventions. When Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Putin in Moscow in 2006, he humiliated her by making her wait hours in a hotel lobby while he sat drinking with friends in a bar. She was then invited to the bar where Putin’s group sat with drinks and snacks. Rice asked Putin to talk separately. She started in about the situation in Georgia which quickly turned into a screaming match. Interestingly, in 2008 at a NATO meeting Rice and Angela Merkel got into a heated argument over admitting Georgia and Ukraine, yelling at each other in Russian which they both spoke fluently. Putin went to the meeting the last day and flew into a rage at Bush for trying to admit Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. Putin followed up by sending troops into Georgia showing the U. S. just who was in control.
Putin decided not to change the 1993 Russian constitution which limited the president to two successive terms. He selected Dmitri Medvedev to succeed him in 2008. Putin had other loyal associates he could have picked, but he liked Medvedev’s lack of ambition. Putin became prime minister forming what was known as the “tandem”. Medvedev instituted some modest liberal reforms, but usually knew where to draw the line. Putin let him know when he crossed it. Medvedev also changed the constitution to extend subsequent presidential terms from four to six years. As the 2012 election approached, Medvedev allowed some small demonstrations by genuine opposition. Putin had always set up fake opposition parties to manipulate the electorate. Putin saw Medvedev as weak but it didn’t matter, Putin planned to run for President in 2012 and have Medvedev as prime minister, switching their positions, but all the power always remained with Putin. Putin controlled the media, senior government ministers, the security services and the oligarchs. He and his siliviki might loosen the reigns from time to time to allow opponents to reveal themselves, but he always kept control. After the election Putin quickly cleaned house replacing Medvedev’s ministers and rescinding his reforms. He also cracked down harshly on the demonstrators arresting many and sending leaders to prison.
In 2013 Ukraine was considering signing an association agreement with the EU, strongly supported by many Ukrainians. Putin made clear to the Ukrainian president, Putin’s man Yanukovych, that Ukraine’s future was with Russia. Putin offered attractive loans to Ukraine to stay close to Russia, which Yanukovych took, surprising and angering many of his supporters and pro-Western Ukrainians. Protesters headed for the government sector of Kiev where security forces killed 25. The U. S. imposed sanctions and other European countries spoke out against the violence. As the days went on, the protests gained strength eventually toppling Yanukovych who escaped to Russia.
Seeing Ukraine in disarray, Putin made the decision in 2014 to return Crimea to Russia. Crimea had been part of Russia before 1954, when Khrushchev got it transferred to Ukraine. This put a large population of Russians into Ukraine helping tie it to Russia. With Crimea’s significant Russian population getting local support was easy. Using local activists along with help from Russian troops from a nearby base, the takeover was quick. A Crimean government was formed which then applied for accession to the Russian Federation which was shortly ratified by Russia. Putin had always considered Crimea to be part of Russia. In Eastern Ukraine his strategy was different. It too held many Russians and the same combination of forces successfully battled the Ukrainian army. But Putin did not want to annex Eastern Ukraine. He wanted to hold its future over Ukraine as leverage. He wanted all of Ukraine in Russia’s orbit.
In response, the U. S. and European allies issued sanctions against Russian officials and oligarchs. Putin now was completely bitter about the U. S. and the West. He believed that he and Russia had never been and would never be treated as equals. Putin also hardened even further on dissidents and officials or businessmen he felt had “liberal” ideas. This attitude carried over to Vladimir Yevtushenkov who owned a Russian oil company and wanted to list it on the London stock exchange. For this, Putin had him arrested. This shook the business community, for unlike Khodorkovsky, Yevtushenkov scrupulously avoided politics. The business community already suffering from sanctions due to the war in Ukraine and takeover of Crimea was even more upset by this arrest. After Khodorkovsky’s arrest they knew to stay out of politics, but now they weren’t sure what would get them in trouble. Putin associates that attempted to defend Yevtushenkov or point out the economic downside of arresting him lost their influence with Putin.
Putin’s attitude towards the West was reinforced at the G20 summit in November 2014 in Australia. Putin was treated like a pariah. Nobody engaged with him. He was positioned at the end of the line in the photoshoot and assigned a table to eat essentially alone. He left early the next day. Not only did Putin not intend to be humiliated again, his isolationist attitude was adopted by government officials and businessmen. Getting ahead in Russia depends on one’s relationship with Putin and his attitudes are quickly emulated. A good example of Putin’s point of view is the U. S. reaction to his support for Syria’s Assad. The U. S. criticizes Putin for violating human rights and supporting a ruthless dictator, but to Putin Assad is no worse than the leadership of Saudi Arabia. The U. S. allies with Saudi Arabia which summarily hangs and beheads people. The U. S. even supports it with weapons in its cruel war with Yemen. So Putin sees the U. S. and its Western European allies as sanctimonious hypocrites. There are many more examples in the book, not the least of which is the Iraq war.
Zygar’s book was published in 2016, so we don’t get any insight on Putin’s relationship with Trump. But after reading this it is easy to see why Putin would get along well with Trump. Zygar sees Putin as caught up in all his manipulations, as one who is manipulated as much as he manipulates others. Unfortunately this review leaves out much of the internal politics Zygar outlines that would lend support to this view. Still from my reading, Putin looked like he was usually the one pulling the strings, albeit often reactionary and often relying on advice from associates who had ulterior motives. Just like the tsars, Putin identified himself as Russia, so the way he saw himself treated was the way Russia was being treated and vice versa. But I am convinced when Zygar says that when Putin is gone little will change.
November 19, 2025
تحديث: عرض رائع لكتاب عن الحرب الشيشانية الروسية بالتفصيل
https://youtu.be/LRbtUvWRdNI?si=vLmjT...
لما الكاتب قال إنه هيكتب موجز تاريخ روسيا المعاصرة خلال ١٥ سنة كان قصده هيكتبهم كلهم لإنه فعليا لم يغفل حدث د��ن ذكره، وده سبب في كون عدد صفحات الكتاب خادع بالنسبة لما تحتويه من معلومات تحتاج لوقت في قراءتها.
التاريخ السياسي لروسيا من ٩٩ ل ٢٠١٤ أي قبل قليل من وصول بوتين إلى الحكم عام ٢٠٠٠ كرئيس للدولة ثم تبادله المناصب مع ميدفيديف لأربع سنوات كرئيس وزراء ليعود مجددا بفترات رئاسية متتالية يبدو أنها لن تنتهي..
الكتاب على قائمتي من ثلاث سنوات، بدأت بقراءته أو بالأحرى عذبته من ٨ يوليو ٢٠٢٣ إلى ٨ فبراير ٢٠٢٤، وكنت بنقطع عنه لفترات طويلة دون رغبة في ذلك ولكنها الحياة.
لما تقرأ العنوان تتساءل هيتكلم عن إيه بالظبط كل جيش الكريملين (مجلس إدارة الرئاسة الروسية) و إيه المساحة اللي هيتحرك فيها؟
في الحقيقة المساحة كبيرة جدا وأكبر منا تتصور عند رؤيتك للكتاب.
هنا هنلاقي تفاصيل عن علاقة روسيا بجيرانها وازاي تدخلت في كتير من الأزمات في دول اغلبها كان سابقا ضمن الاتحاد السوفيتي..
الكاتب بيحكي بشكل ممتع جدا عن كل التفاصيل اللي صاحبت علاقة روسيا بالدول المجاورة ليها او ما يعرف بكمنولث الدول المستقلة عن الاتحاد السوفيتي بالإضافة لعلاقة روسيا بأوروبا وأمريكا وعلاقة بوتين بميركل وبوش وتوني بلير وأوباما وازاي بدأ بوتين بنوايا انفتاحية على الغرب وليس بالسعي إلى الانعزال، وتناول الكاتب دور روسيا وموقفها من الأزمات الانفصالية لبعض الأقاليم في الدول المجاورة ليها
(في حالات كتير بيكون الدول دي فيها أقليات روسية.. أما كيف دخلت هذه الأقليات الروسية هناك فربنا يذكرني واكتب عنه في مراجعة تانية لأنه موضوع يطول شرحه)
وتناول الكتاب حرب الشيشان بين توجهات سياسة بوريس يلتسين وسياسة بوتين وكيف استخدمها بوتين لصالحه، والأهم طبعا هو بدايات أزمة أوكرانيا وتفاصيل إعادة القرم لروسيا وخصوصية وتعقيد العلاقات الروسية الأوكرانية، ومر أيضا على تفاصيل الثورات الملونة في أوروبا الشرقية وعلاقة النظام الروسي بالنظم الحاكمة في الدول دي
وسعي الغرب لتعيين حكومات معادية لروسيا وسعي روسيا للعكس..
وبعيدا عن موقف القوتين روسيا والغرب فمن رأيي إنه منطقي بالنسبة لحسابات القوة إن روسيا تسعى لتنصيب حكومات موالية ليها في الدول دي لضمان أمنها القومي وإن الدول دي متكونش أرض لقواعد عسكرية غربية وأمريكية ولا لتوسعات الناتو.. مهو يعني دي نفس سياسة أمريكا في أمريكا اللاتينية فبستغرب من بجاحة الغرب حقيقي في دعمه لأنظمة أوروبا الشرقية وحقها في لمؤاخذة "الديمقراطية" وهي بعتت المجرمين بتوعها اغتالوا "عمر توريخوس" في بنما ومتأخرتش هي وبريطانيا في توضيب انقلاب على "محمد مصدق" في إيران، فحقيقي وقاحة لا مثيل لها.
تناول الكتاب نهايات حكم يلتسين والكارثة الاقتصادية التي خلفتها نهاية القرن العشرين للاتحاد السوفيتي السابق وفساد رجال الأعمال،والسيطرة على شركات الغاز الكبرى زي "غازبروم" و"روس نفط" وازاي تمكن بوتين من إحكام القبضة على رجال الأعمال(بشكل يذكر بالتأميم الاشتراكي) وكيف تم تهيئة وصول بوتين إلى الحكم والأثمان التي دفعها كل طرف.
يقدم الكاتب وجهة نظره أن بوتين ليس الحاكم المفرد لروسيا كما تحاول النخبة الروسية تصويره، وإنما السياسة الروسية هي نتاج لسياسة رجال الكريملين مجتمعين وهذا عكس السردية الرسمية.
الملفت أن هذه النخبة لا تستخدم بوتين كدمية لتحقيق أهدافها مثلا كما يحدث في بعض الحالات وإنما يبذلون من الجهد ما يقنعون به بوتين أن رغباتهم هي رغبته وأفكارهم انما هي أفكاره جاءت من خلالهم، هذه النخبة تعلم تماما أن وجود بوتين في السلطة هو الضامن لبقاءها نخبة، هي النخبة المسيطرة على الغاز والنفط الذي تعتمد عليه أوروبا مهما صدعتنا بمقاطعتها لروسيا اقتصاديا.
وهذه النخبة هي التي تبيع السلاح وتستثمر في الثروات الطبيعية في السوق الإفريقي منافسةً أمريكا.
قراءة الكتاب ممتعة واللغة بسيطة جدا جدا وفكاهية في بعض الأحيان وأعتقد عمل الكاتب كمخرج سينما مساعد في ظهور الكاتب بشكل بعيد كل البعد عن الجفاف المتوقع في الكتب السياسية.
لكن صعوبة الكتاب تكمن في العدد المهول من المؤثرين في العملية السياسية الروسية والذين تعتبر أسماؤهم مجهولة بالنسبة لأغلبنا فضلا عن أسماء السياسيين في أوكرانيا ودول الجوار الروسي.
وصعوبة أخرى تمثلت بالنسبالي في كثرة الأحداث بالكتاب والتي تحتاج إما لتركيز شديد أو لهدوء ويقين أننا سننسى الكثير منها ولكن ستبقى لنا صورة ذهنية عامة شاملة عن مسار السياسة الروسية الداخلية والخارجية، وبما إن المعرفة تراكمية فعندما نصادف مرة أخرى كلمة أوسيتيا أو سوتشي أو ترانسنيستريا فلن تكون كلمات غريبة.
مشكلتي مع الكتاب (وأتوقع إنه ده من أسباب شهرته بالإنجليزية زي شهرة خالد حسيني كده من أفغانستان) إن الكاتب ميخائيل زيغار بينتقد نظرية المؤامرة اللي الروس عايشين فيها تجاه الغرب وأمريكا، وبيوضح ده من خلال وقائع فعلا حقيقية لكنه بيقرر يتغاضى عن نفس هذا السلوك من ناحية الغرب تجاه روسيا..
والغرب نفسهم مش بيخبوا الكلام ده ولا حاجة، يعني مثلا الإدارة الأمريكية في فترة ترامب اللي كان أقل عداء مع روسيا وأكثر انفتاحا عليها، من أوباما أعلن ان المهدد الأول للولايات المتحدة وأمنها القومي هو روسيا مش الإرهاب وده كان موقف الحكومة ككل هو فقط اعلنه بصفته رئيس، مش مجرد هرتلات ترامبية، وتم تجديد هذا الإعلان مؤخرا مع الحرب الروسية الأوكرانية، فيعني الحال من بعضه.
Sun, Feb 11, 2024🩵📖
June 17, 2024
I rarely read books on politics, but I read this one in one breath. I learned a lot of new things, one could say politically enlightened. It is written in a very interesting and rather impartial manner.
By the way, I immediately made an association with House of Cards - Vladimir Putin's favorite, according to the author, TV series.
By the way, I immediately made an association with House of Cards - Vladimir Putin's favorite, according to the author, TV series.
August 28, 2016
Книга Михаила Зыгаря сразу после выхода начала мелкать в моей ленте Фейсбука. За неё много кто взялся, и, хотя на тот момент ещё никто её не дочитал, уже рекомендовали. В частности поэтому мои ожидания от книги были достаточно высокими. Не могу сказать, что они оправдались.
Я бы сказала, что книга рассказывает об истории России в понимании Миахила Зыгаря. В его понимании Путин — это симулякр первого порядка, когда источник ещё присутствует в реальности, но мы видим его копию. И принимаем её за реальность. Цитируя автора:
В мире Зыгаря Путин, в целом, квалифицированный политик, старающийся выполнять свою работу, искренне считающий, что оппозиция ему «мешает». Портят картину маслом, как водится, люди, то есть наш русский народ. Как говорится, царь хороший, а вот бояре плохие.
Поясню мысль автора ярким примером подводной лодки «Курск». По мнению автора, пять дней отпуска Путина, во время которых экипаж лодки медленно, но верно погибал, имели место быть исключительно по вине военных, которые докладывали главе государства, что «всё под контролем». Именно из-за их докладов президент находился в отпуске в Сочи пять дней, и лишь потом посчитал необходимым прервать отпуск. То, что окончательное решение, быть ему в отпуске или нет, принимает всё-таки сам президент, Зыгарь почему-то забывает, списывая всю вину за задержку в спасении подводников и их последующую гибель по сути на подчинённых главе государства военных. Словом, я с ключевой концепцией автора о том, что Путин просто старается, как может, и работает, а исполнители и средние звенья исполнительной цепочки всё портят, не согласна.
Второй вопрос, который у меня неизбежно возник по ходу чтения, это загадочные источники, на которые автор не ссылается. О да, он ссылается на статьи, когда их цитирует, на книгу Кондолизы Райс, на стенограммы заседаний и проч. Он брал интервью у многих упоминаемых в книге людей (Ходорковского, Саакашвили, Навального), в этом случае понятно, что источник информации — интервью. Но зачастую в самых «горячих» местах автор упоминает некие близкие к президенту источники, какие-то слухи, которые ходили среди сотрудников администрации президента или какой-то другой организации, о которой идёт речь. Тут возникает любопытный вопрос: автор строит повествование и свою концепцию на вот этих самых слухах, легендах, разговорах, которые он слышал где-то, на словах источников, пожелавших остаться неназванными. Насколько такая гремучая смесь из фактов, слухов и сплетен может претендовать на звание «краткой истории современной России»? А ведь именно это вынесено на обложку книги.
Из сильных сторон книги не могу не отметить, как легко она читается, лёгкий стиль письма автора, логичное построение повествования. Книга воспринимается как триллер, пока не дочитаешь до очередной шокирующей детали, о которой не знал/а.
Читать «Кремлёвскую рать» мне лично было крайне интересно, ведь всё описываемое в книге пришлось на мой сознательный возраст, и если тогда я о происходящем узнавала из СМИ, то Зыгарь даёт читателю возможность увидеть кухню изнутри приёмных президента, министров, из самих мест событий, где принимаются решения.
Вот всего лишь три из множества шокировавших меня деталей:
Словом, если стоит вопрос читать или не читать «Рать», мой ответ однозначен: читать. Но надо понимать, что эта книга — лишь мнение одного конкретного человека, и не истина в последней инстанции. И уж точно не может называться «краткой историей современной России». Разве что с пометкой «*как выглядит история России по мнению Михаила Зыгаря».
Обзор на БукГик.ру.
Я бы сказала, что книга рассказывает об истории России в понимании Миахила Зыгаря. В его понимании Путин — это симулякр первого порядка, когда источник ещё присутствует в реальности, но мы видим его копию. И принимаем её за реальность. Цитируя автора:
Нынешний образ Путина — грозного русского царя — придуман за него, и зачастую без его участия: и свитой, и западными партнерами, и журналистами. <...> Мы все себе выдумали своего Путина. И, скорее всего, он у нас — далеко не последний.
В мире Зыгаря Путин, в целом, квалифицированный политик, старающийся выполнять свою работу, искренне считающий, что оппозиция ему «мешает». Портят картину маслом, как водится, люди, то есть наш русский народ. Как говорится, царь хороший, а вот бояре плохие.
Поясню мысль автора ярким примером подводной лодки «Курск». По мнению автора, пять дней отпуска Путина, во время которых экипаж лодки медленно, но верно погибал, имели место быть исключительно по вине военных, которые докладывали главе государства, что «всё под контролем». Именно из-за их докладов президент находился в отпуске в Сочи пять дней, и лишь потом посчитал необходимым прервать отпуск. То, что окончательное решение, быть ему в отпуске или нет, принимает всё-таки сам президент, Зыгарь почему-то забывает, списывая всю вину за задержку в спасении подводников и их последующую гибель по сути на подчинённых главе государства военных. Словом, я с ключевой концепцией автора о том, что Путин просто старается, как может, и работает, а исполнители и средние звенья исполнительной цепочки всё портят, не согласна.
Второй вопрос, который у меня неизбежно возник по ходу чтения, это загадочные источники, на которые автор не ссылается. О да, он ссылается на статьи, когда их цитирует, на книгу Кондолизы Райс, на стенограммы заседаний и проч. Он брал интервью у многих упоминаемых в книге людей (Ходорковского, Саакашвили, Навального), в этом случае понятно, что источник информации — интервью. Но зачастую в самых «горячих» местах автор упоминает некие близкие к президенту источники, какие-то слухи, которые ходили среди сотрудников администрации президента или какой-то другой организации, о которой идёт речь. Тут возникает любопытный вопрос: автор строит повествование и свою концепцию на вот этих самых слухах, легендах, разговорах, которые он слышал где-то, на словах источников, пожелавших остаться неназванными. Насколько такая гремучая смесь из фактов, слухов и сплетен может претендовать на звание «краткой истории современной России»? А ведь именно это вынесено на обложку книги.
Из сильных сторон книги не могу не отметить, как легко она читается, лёгкий стиль письма автора, логичное построение повествования. Книга воспринимается как триллер, пока не дочитаешь до очередной шокирующей детали, о которой не знал/а.
Читать «Кремлёвскую рать» мне лично было крайне интересно, ведь всё описываемое в книге пришлось на мой сознательный возраст, и если тогда я о происходящем узнавала из СМИ, то Зыгарь даёт читателю возможность увидеть кухню изнутри приёмных президента, министров, из самих мест событий, где принимаются решения.
Вот всего лишь три из множества шокировавших меня деталей:
Словом, если стоит вопрос читать или не читать «Рать», мой ответ однозначен: читать. Но надо понимать, что эта книга — лишь мнение одного конкретного человека, и не истина в последней инстанции. И уж точно не может называться «краткой историей современной России». Разве что с пометкой «*как выглядит история России по мнению Михаила Зыгаря».
Обзор на БукГик.ру.
September 25, 2022
I admire the author for the years of work spent when gathering the information needed to compile what is an informative work, written in an entertaining, easy-read, style. The research for this book includes a multitude of interviews with those who've had first hand dealings with 'King Putin': memory being as unreliable and malleable as it is, we are asked to accept what is retold. I do accept the author has done the best possible, but I remain a little hesitant over believing all is word-for-word exactly how all happened.
The 'King', whilst amassing billions in personal wealth, presides over a feudal state and as we would expect, in his 'Court' sits his chosen advisors, who've also amassed untold wealth.
Are those advisors merely sycophants or manipulators? We are told, Putin was led to the thrown: he did not fight his way there. We are told, he wanted to abdicate: he was persuaded to stay. Some in the 'Court' have lost favour with the 'King': resulting in expulsion, or in some cases untimely death.
The 'King' it would seem suffers from an insecurity complex and this is why his behaviour is seen as that of a dangerous, volatile, bully. Does the 'Court' play on his weaknesses and use the 'King' as their stooge?
The 'King' was a KGB agent, and worked for a time in foreign lands: part of that work, I think we can safely assume, was to recruit sources/spies. Enough is known of how deft some can be at playing their cards in order to gain the trust of another. The 'King' it would seem managed to hoodwink Blair and Bush, with ease: both of whom would have been briefed by their respective intelligence agencies, before, during and after their introductions to the 'New King'.
Is the 'Court' playing the 'King'? Did the 'Court' convince the 'King' to remain on the throne?
Is the 'King' playing the 'Court'? Has Putin always wanted to sit on the throne and has never wanted to move from it? It would seem from what we read here, the 'King' now has no choice but to remain and the 'Court' has no choice but to ensure he does remain.
There is an old Russian proverb: “You live for as long as you are remembered.”
The 'King', whilst amassing billions in personal wealth, presides over a feudal state and as we would expect, in his 'Court' sits his chosen advisors, who've also amassed untold wealth.
Are those advisors merely sycophants or manipulators? We are told, Putin was led to the thrown: he did not fight his way there. We are told, he wanted to abdicate: he was persuaded to stay. Some in the 'Court' have lost favour with the 'King': resulting in expulsion, or in some cases untimely death.
The 'King' it would seem suffers from an insecurity complex and this is why his behaviour is seen as that of a dangerous, volatile, bully. Does the 'Court' play on his weaknesses and use the 'King' as their stooge?
The 'King' was a KGB agent, and worked for a time in foreign lands: part of that work, I think we can safely assume, was to recruit sources/spies. Enough is known of how deft some can be at playing their cards in order to gain the trust of another. The 'King' it would seem managed to hoodwink Blair and Bush, with ease: both of whom would have been briefed by their respective intelligence agencies, before, during and after their introductions to the 'New King'.
Is the 'Court' playing the 'King'? Did the 'Court' convince the 'King' to remain on the throne?
Is the 'King' playing the 'Court'? Has Putin always wanted to sit on the throne and has never wanted to move from it? It would seem from what we read here, the 'King' now has no choice but to remain and the 'Court' has no choice but to ensure he does remain.
There is an old Russian proverb: “You live for as long as you are remembered.”
April 3, 2022
4.5*
Not for everyone perhaps and not the first book you'll read on the subject, but a real tour de force in following-through on its thesis that Putin the man is of far less interest than are all the men (and they are all men, and the book's length attests to their number) around him and whose careers and even lives depend upon him remaining in power. The -0.5 is for how book glides rather breezily, given its penchant for the deep dive in far lesser matters, over some of the atrocities that books like The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep: Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin make it their entire raison d'être for pursuing, but there is so much else to consider here that make this book a key part of the puzzle that is Russia, that I can't but rate it as highly as I do.
A bestseller at home, it is rather unsparing of the English reader in its pile-on of "characters" at first, like a Dostoevsky novel in fact, but through sheer repetition, you do eventually come to map out the network of machinations, intrigue, backstabbing, and yes, patriotic works done in good faith here. The Kremlin's men can be as stumbling and bumbling as they are master craftsmen of the political game, and it is to Zygar's credit that he humanizes them even as he paints the incredibly detailed, realistic, and, yes, vulgar (but tragic) picture that is modern Russia.
Gone now are the (often cretinous) Liberals who championed the kleptocracy of the Yeltsin years. Surrounding and cocooning Putin are the strong men, the nationalists, the true believers and the yes men who reflect back to him that which he wants to see: a Russia-of-the-mind that the Russian public desired their politicians to reflect as if it were already the reality that, from 2008 onwards, it increasingly became: the besieged, maligned, wronged, strong, bastion of past greatness that it is destined to become once again (sound familiar, 'Mericans?!), once it reconnects with its historical roots (in Orthodox Christian/Stalinist/Imperial greatness, reach and unity) and cleanses itself of foreign decadence and hypocrisy. Sanctions (from the first war in Ukraine are thus actually seen as a benefit in this regard: the (post-Yeltsin) "oligarchs" are billionaires in name only, and are depicted as willing to sacrifice their wealth and even their lives to the State if Putin declares it so. And as all of Russia says, "If not Putin, who?" This sad, sordid tale is far from over....
Not for everyone perhaps and not the first book you'll read on the subject, but a real tour de force in following-through on its thesis that Putin the man is of far less interest than are all the men (and they are all men, and the book's length attests to their number) around him and whose careers and even lives depend upon him remaining in power. The -0.5 is for how book glides rather breezily, given its penchant for the deep dive in far lesser matters, over some of the atrocities that books like The Less You Know, the Better You Sleep: Russia's Road to Terror and Dictatorship under Yeltsin and Putin make it their entire raison d'être for pursuing, but there is so much else to consider here that make this book a key part of the puzzle that is Russia, that I can't but rate it as highly as I do.
A bestseller at home, it is rather unsparing of the English reader in its pile-on of "characters" at first, like a Dostoevsky novel in fact, but through sheer repetition, you do eventually come to map out the network of machinations, intrigue, backstabbing, and yes, patriotic works done in good faith here. The Kremlin's men can be as stumbling and bumbling as they are master craftsmen of the political game, and it is to Zygar's credit that he humanizes them even as he paints the incredibly detailed, realistic, and, yes, vulgar (but tragic) picture that is modern Russia.
Gone now are the (often cretinous) Liberals who championed the kleptocracy of the Yeltsin years. Surrounding and cocooning Putin are the strong men, the nationalists, the true believers and the yes men who reflect back to him that which he wants to see: a Russia-of-the-mind that the Russian public desired their politicians to reflect as if it were already the reality that, from 2008 onwards, it increasingly became: the besieged, maligned, wronged, strong, bastion of past greatness that it is destined to become once again (sound familiar, 'Mericans?!), once it reconnects with its historical roots (in Orthodox Christian/Stalinist/Imperial greatness, reach and unity) and cleanses itself of foreign decadence and hypocrisy. Sanctions (from the first war in Ukraine are thus actually seen as a benefit in this regard: the (post-Yeltsin) "oligarchs" are billionaires in name only, and are depicted as willing to sacrifice their wealth and even their lives to the State if Putin declares it so. And as all of Russia says, "If not Putin, who?" This sad, sordid tale is far from over....
October 6, 2025
Who is Putin?
All the Kremlin’s Men is look into world of Vladimir Putin by renowned journalist and author Mikhail Zygar. It tells the story from the Putin’s selection as heir to Boris Yeltsin from seemingly out of nowhere to being a force indispensable and bigger than the state.
I found All the Kremlin’s Men fascinating and modern history isn’t usually my forte. It follows from his promising start and bright new beginning forging strong relationships with Europe and US President George W Bush to an era of Cold War in all but name. Zygar writes with ease as he describes the circumstances which drove the wedge between East and West. But also the character of Putin and his dreams to place Russia in an equal footing with the super power. In realising he was not considered an equal and the world was really ‘one rule for the USA’ and ‘another for Russia’ Putin and his ego has pushed Russia into almost diplomatic isolation and economic decline culminating in the 2022 war on Ukraine which Zygar predicts.
Inside of all of this is the intrigues of how Putin runs his state, his social conservatism, limited democracy and dominance over statesman and oligarchs alike. Within this an attempt to unpick who the ‘real’ Putin is, is made. However, as the author explains this is almost impossible to know. Like a hybrid between powerful Tsar and despotic Stain Putin is the personification of je suis l'état. One question arises though is, ‘where does this all end?’
All the Kremlin’s Men is a really great book that has spurred me to look at other books on the subject. It was also interesting to read about things I have lived through, but didn’t really understand at the time, The Pussy Riot controversy, Putin’s 2012 invasion of Crimea, the Sochi Olympics and the ostracism of Mikhail Khodorkovsky to name a few. Mikhail Zygar also has a book on the Russian Revolution which will surely be worth a read too. Pleasantly surprised with this one.
All the Kremlin’s Men is look into world of Vladimir Putin by renowned journalist and author Mikhail Zygar. It tells the story from the Putin’s selection as heir to Boris Yeltsin from seemingly out of nowhere to being a force indispensable and bigger than the state.
I found All the Kremlin’s Men fascinating and modern history isn’t usually my forte. It follows from his promising start and bright new beginning forging strong relationships with Europe and US President George W Bush to an era of Cold War in all but name. Zygar writes with ease as he describes the circumstances which drove the wedge between East and West. But also the character of Putin and his dreams to place Russia in an equal footing with the super power. In realising he was not considered an equal and the world was really ‘one rule for the USA’ and ‘another for Russia’ Putin and his ego has pushed Russia into almost diplomatic isolation and economic decline culminating in the 2022 war on Ukraine which Zygar predicts.
Inside of all of this is the intrigues of how Putin runs his state, his social conservatism, limited democracy and dominance over statesman and oligarchs alike. Within this an attempt to unpick who the ‘real’ Putin is, is made. However, as the author explains this is almost impossible to know. Like a hybrid between powerful Tsar and despotic Stain Putin is the personification of je suis l'état. One question arises though is, ‘where does this all end?’
All the Kremlin’s Men is a really great book that has spurred me to look at other books on the subject. It was also interesting to read about things I have lived through, but didn’t really understand at the time, The Pussy Riot controversy, Putin’s 2012 invasion of Crimea, the Sochi Olympics and the ostracism of Mikhail Khodorkovsky to name a few. Mikhail Zygar also has a book on the Russian Revolution which will surely be worth a read too. Pleasantly surprised with this one.
December 15, 2015
Понятно, что вся книга - только попытка выстроить одну из возможных моделей, но в чем она уж точно не обманывает реальность, так это в тягостном чувстве безысходности, которое возникает ближе к концу. Да, Путин, может быть, и не кощей бессмертный, но нам всем пиздец в любом случае.
June 5, 2020
For more than two decades, Putin has been the strongman of Russian politics. He'd spent more years than any other person, except Joseph Stalin, as president of Russia. And if the ongoing constitutional reforms on the extension of term limits are completed, Putin might remain in power till 2036, surpassing even Stalin.
Putin, like Stalin, is complicated. In a sense, the explanation of Stalin's behaviour can help understand Putin's transformation.
Stephen Kotkin's two volumes of a projected three-volumes authoritative biography of Joseph Stalin investigated the stimulus for Stalin's dictatorship. There are two schools of thought: The first assumption is that Stalin's cruelty can be explained by his bad childhood and difficult upbringing. To put it more succinctly, his personality. The second explanation is that the system makes Stalin a despot. Stalinism was, in this way, as much enabled from below as imposed from above. Kotkin, of course, comfortably aligns with the latter school of thought.
Well, it's unfair to compare Putin to Stalin. For starters, Putin obviously has not built a gulag nor killed millions. But the point is, Putin is a creation of the system. Putin is what his entourage moulded him to become.
"In the very beginning, Putin did not believe that Russia is surrounded by enemies on all sides. He did not have plans to close down independent TV channels. But in trying to divine the intentions of their leader, his associates effectively materialized their own wishes.
Today’s image of Putin as a formidable Russian tsar was constructed by his entourage, Western partners, and journalists, often without his say."
Zygar takes the reader through the transformation of Putin from an admirer of the West and liberal reformer to a power-grabbing dictator. In every chapter is a protagonist whose story is then tied to the larger narrative and scheming of Putin's administration.
Putin, like Stalin, is complicated. In a sense, the explanation of Stalin's behaviour can help understand Putin's transformation.
Stephen Kotkin's two volumes of a projected three-volumes authoritative biography of Joseph Stalin investigated the stimulus for Stalin's dictatorship. There are two schools of thought: The first assumption is that Stalin's cruelty can be explained by his bad childhood and difficult upbringing. To put it more succinctly, his personality. The second explanation is that the system makes Stalin a despot. Stalinism was, in this way, as much enabled from below as imposed from above. Kotkin, of course, comfortably aligns with the latter school of thought.
Well, it's unfair to compare Putin to Stalin. For starters, Putin obviously has not built a gulag nor killed millions. But the point is, Putin is a creation of the system. Putin is what his entourage moulded him to become.
"In the very beginning, Putin did not believe that Russia is surrounded by enemies on all sides. He did not have plans to close down independent TV channels. But in trying to divine the intentions of their leader, his associates effectively materialized their own wishes.
Today’s image of Putin as a formidable Russian tsar was constructed by his entourage, Western partners, and journalists, often without his say."
Zygar takes the reader through the transformation of Putin from an admirer of the West and liberal reformer to a power-grabbing dictator. In every chapter is a protagonist whose story is then tied to the larger narrative and scheming of Putin's administration.
December 28, 2016
Ak vás baví súčasné Rusko, tak je to kniha, ktorú si treba prečítať. Nedozviete sa, či má Putin 2 falusy alebo 4 vajcia, dokonca tam nie je nič o jeho frajerkách a utajených majetkoch. Je to o vzťahoch a o tom, ako sa robí ruská politika. Po autorovej knihe Gazprom, ktorá riešila viac 90's je to dobrý update. Veľkou výhodou je národnosť autora - je to Rus, takže rozumie tým "little differences", ktoré západní autori píšúci o Rusku nevedia pochopiť a nemá klasický bias, ktorý "nám" zvykne liezť na nervy.
Nenájdete tu žiadne senzačné odhalenie, len popis kto je kto, čo sa ako robí a pohľad na ruského Steva Jobsa, ktorého schopnosť "reninventnúť sa" podľa potreby je celkom pozoruhodná. A taktiež sa dá rýchlo pochopiť, prečo ruská zahraničná politika vyzerá tak, ako vyzerá - je to pomerne jednoduché a v tejto knihe zrozumiteľne podané, či sa nám páči, alebo nepáči. Keď ste až sem dočítali, odporúčam.
Nenájdete tu žiadne senzačné odhalenie, len popis kto je kto, čo sa ako robí a pohľad na ruského Steva Jobsa, ktorého schopnosť "reninventnúť sa" podľa potreby je celkom pozoruhodná. A taktiež sa dá rýchlo pochopiť, prečo ruská zahraničná politika vyzerá tak, ako vyzerá - je to pomerne jednoduché a v tejto knihe zrozumiteľne podané, či sa nám páči, alebo nepáči. Keď ste až sem dočítali, odporúčam.
May 23, 2017
Освежил в памяти основные моменты новейшей истории нашей страны. Книга читается как детектив. Автор достаточно стройно и логично выстраивает цепь событий с 2000 по 2015 год и показывает почему наша страна и ее руководство проводят текущую внешнюю и внутреннюю политику. Всем кто хочет лучше понимать причины того строя, который сейчас возник в России, рекомендую.
September 24, 2022
Other reviews have suggested this is a somewhat difficult account to consume; I found it otherwise. That means little as I have found other text a slog, when some readers have not.
There is, I agree, value in taking notes. I read this as a an ebook and so the note taking was no great shakes.
The author, Mikhail Zygar, is a well-known Russian journalist with a history of exposing the unvarnished truth of how Machiavellian principles has come to overshadow Russian political thinking.
Published in 2016, Zygar's account shows how from the very beginning of Putin's rise to power the indicators of his intent to reclaim authority over former Soviets states (Ukraine) was apparent.
There is clear evidence of how from the very early days, Putin duped Western leaders. Putin was a KGB field agent; and the leaders of the free world were quite aware of such). How does a field agent groom a source? Find some common ground and build an empathy: Bush and Blair need to hang their heads in shame. The glaring fecklessness of those who sought to embrace their, 'new-to-the-throne', Eastern counterpart is at times laughable.
I've no doubt, this account is plausible and made form countless interviews and unnamed sources.
An essential read for anyone who is concerned over the current situation in Eastern Europe.
There is, I agree, value in taking notes. I read this as a an ebook and so the note taking was no great shakes.
The author, Mikhail Zygar, is a well-known Russian journalist with a history of exposing the unvarnished truth of how Machiavellian principles has come to overshadow Russian political thinking.
Published in 2016, Zygar's account shows how from the very beginning of Putin's rise to power the indicators of his intent to reclaim authority over former Soviets states (Ukraine) was apparent.
There is clear evidence of how from the very early days, Putin duped Western leaders. Putin was a KGB field agent; and the leaders of the free world were quite aware of such). How does a field agent groom a source? Find some common ground and build an empathy: Bush and Blair need to hang their heads in shame. The glaring fecklessness of those who sought to embrace their, 'new-to-the-throne', Eastern counterpart is at times laughable.
I've no doubt, this account is plausible and made form countless interviews and unnamed sources.
An essential read for anyone who is concerned over the current situation in Eastern Europe.
July 16, 2022
Mikhail Zygar presents a well-rounded look into the functionings of Putin's 'inner circle.' Those closest to him, and those who have the most influence over him and his policies. I was exposed to some new information through reading this, as well as presented with some known facts in a fresh and insightful way. I would highly recommend this to anyone wanting a deeper understanding of the mechanics of Vladimir Putin, and of the men who make up his inner circle. Four stars.
April 11, 2022
Это единственная книга, которую мне удалось прочитать с начала войны. Очень хотелось понять истоки того, к чему мы пришли. Горько всё это, конечно.
January 7, 2023
Зигар не е привърженик на теорията за световната конспирация. Но е убеден привърженик на теорията за световната алчност, некомпетентност и хищничество, показвайки ефектите в руската властова реалност в периода 1999 - 2015 г. (когато излиза тази книга).
Оригиналното руско заглавие би могло да се преведе и като “Цялото кремълско войнство”, може би намигване към Робърт Пен Уорън. Заглавието се явява пряко продължение на по-новата книга на Зигар “Всички са свободни. Русия една секунда преди Путин, или какво се обърка, как и защо“. Епохата (защото още през 2015 г. вече е епоха) на Путин е разгледана хронологично, през призмата на различните участници в най-тесния кръг приближени ня властта. Всяка глава има различен “герой”, всички до един известни руски политици. Личи си огромния труд и широкият кръг журналистически и не само контакти на Зигар, както и, разбира се, ерудицията в плоскостите минало-настояще-бъдеще, личност-политика, Изток-Запад.
Градацията е интересна и многозначителна, актуална дори и след 8 години. През първия мандат се тръгва с идеята на Запада да се обясни. През втория следва разочарование и упреци. През третия - втвърдяване, суеверно псевдорелигиозно рвакционерство и изолация. Тези процеси не протичат във вакуум. Криминалната руска приватизация вече е подготвила блатистата почва. Олигарсите действително са заплаха. Наследените от времето на СССР проблеми също си цъкат и само си сменят формата - като например Украйна, нейните не по-малко подкупни и хищни собствени олигарси и мафиоти, но и стремежът да се измъкнат в малко по-различна орбита. Или пък своенравната Чечня.
Само че как да имаш доверие на държавен ръководител като Путин, заявил в прав текст на Ангела Меркел, че затягането на крепостничеството от страна на сънародничката и Екатерина Велика през 18-ти век е единственият правилен ход за Русия, и че отмяната му би била пагубна? Или в политически послания, изразяващи се в хорово цитиране на теории за световната конспирация, тъй като са лесно смилаеми за масата хора и не искат сложни обяснения?
Автокрацията в Русия има дълги традиции. И никога не е плод на усилията на един единствен човек, а на куп иначе образовани и интелигентни хора с патетични лозунги или просто откровено и щастливо алчни и умни. Ходорковски, Медведев, Сурков, Иванов, Шойгу, Сечин, патриарх Кирил и други. Именно тези хора, често пледиращи за невинност и/или патриотизъм са истинските герои на книгата. Това са истинските кръгове на властта, които понякога се хващат за гърлата, понякога щастливо обединени пируват с плячката. И Путин е само един от тях, в началото - далеч не най-значимият. Зигар ги назовава поименно. Но - това също е традиция - изборът за независимата руска журналистика е или ГУЛАГ, или емиграция (освен ако не е куршум като за Политковская). Този филм вече сме го гледали, но масата руснаци (а и не само) явно са назад със сериите. Въпросът за нас са нашите собствени родни паралели, каквито се прокрадват на всяка страница.
А ето този кадър на руския фотограф Дмитрий Марков прекрасно онагледява:
Оригиналното руско заглавие би могло да се преведе и като “Цялото кремълско войнство”, може би намигване към Робърт Пен Уорън. Заглавието се явява пряко продължение на по-новата книга на Зигар “Всички са свободни. Русия една секунда преди Путин, или какво се обърка, как и защо“. Епохата (защото още през 2015 г. вече е епоха) на Путин е разгледана хронологично, през призмата на различните участници в най-тесния кръг приближени ня властта. Всяка глава има различен “герой”, всички до един известни руски политици. Личи си огромния труд и широкият кръг журналистически и не само контакти на Зигар, както и, разбира се, ерудицията в плоскостите минало-настояще-бъдеще, личност-политика, Изток-Запад.
Градацията е интересна и многозначителна, актуална дори и след 8 години. През първия мандат се тръгва с идеята на Запада да се обясни. През втория следва разочарование и упреци. През третия - втвърдяване, суеверно псевдорелигиозно рвакционерство и изолация. Тези процеси не протичат във вакуум. Криминалната руска приватизация вече е подготвила блатистата почва. Олигарсите действително са заплаха. Наследените от времето на СССР проблеми също си цъкат и само си сменят формата - като например Украйна, нейните не по-малко подкупни и хищни собствени олигарси и мафиоти, но и стремежът да се измъкнат в малко по-различна орбита. Или пък своенравната Чечня.
Само че как да имаш доверие на държавен ръководител като Путин, заявил в прав текст на Ангела Меркел, че затягането на крепостничеството от страна на сънародничката и Екатерина Велика през 18-ти век е единственият правилен ход за Русия, и че отмяната му би била пагубна? Или в политически послания, изразяващи се в хорово цитиране на теории за световната конспирация, тъй като са лесно смилаеми за масата хора и не искат сложни обяснения?
Автокрацията в Русия има дълги традиции. И никога не е плод на усилията на един единствен човек, а на куп иначе образовани и интелигентни хора с патетични лозунги или просто откровено и щастливо алчни и умни. Ходорковски, Медведев, Сурков, Иванов, Шойгу, Сечин, патриарх Кирил и други. Именно тези хора, често пледиращи за невинност и/или патриотизъм са истинските герои на книгата. Това са истинските кръгове на властта, които понякога се хващат за гърлата, понякога щастливо обединени пируват с плячката. И Путин е само един от тях, в началото - далеч не най-значимият. Зигар ги назовава поименно. Но - това също е традиция - изборът за независимата руска журналистика е или ГУЛАГ, или емиграция (освен ако не е куршум като за Политковская). Този филм вече сме го гледали, но масата руснаци (а и не само) явно са назад със сериите. Въпросът за нас са нашите собствени родни паралели, каквито се прокрадват на всяка страница.
А ето този кадър на руския фотограф Дмитрий Марков прекрасно онагледява:
September 14, 2017
Fun and games with Mr Putin
Many times, whilst reading this, I imagined myself seeing a chess game were pawns get elevated even kinged at times and use and get used in turn and then they are ushered gently or not so gently off the board.
Questions that meander through my mind:
Does Putin want to leave?
Can he leave?
Will he be allowed to leave?
How will it all end?
Zygar gives a portrait of Putin or better the 'Myth of Putin', how that all began, how it grew and what it is now and what held it up and what holds it up now.
and in doing so if the inventor has some kind of power over what he helped the invention to be.
read with Irina
Many times, whilst reading this, I imagined myself seeing a chess game were pawns get elevated even kinged at times and use and get used in turn and then they are ushered gently or not so gently off the board.
Questions that meander through my mind:
Does Putin want to leave?
Can he leave?
Will he be allowed to leave?
How will it all end?
Zygar gives a portrait of Putin or better the 'Myth of Putin', how that all began, how it grew and what it is now and what held it up and what holds it up now.
"This book demonstrates that Putin, as we imagine him, does not actually exit."
"Each of us invented our own Putin."
and in doing so if the inventor has some kind of power over what he helped the invention to be.
read with Irina
January 16, 2016
Книга не столько о политике или истории, сколько о процессе выработки и принятия решения. Что интересно, тут очень мало оценок, показаны, поступки, действия - а за выводами к читателю. И если я например считаю что там все первостатейные людоеды, то у других может сложиться впечатление о "сильной руке" и тому подобное.
В итоге легко читается, много интересных фактов, которые позволяют если не по новому посмотреть на события 2000-2015гг., то уточнить свое мнение об отдельных людях.
В итоге легко читается, много интересных фактов, которые позволяют если не по новому посмотреть на события 2000-2015гг., то уточнить свое мнение об отдельных людях.
August 25, 2021
Ak vás zaujíma ruská politika a už máte ako také základy, tak určite odporúčam! Ak ste môj prípad (tj. idem si prečítať knihu o Rusku, aby som sa zorientovala), nie je to ideálny začiatok.
V podstate by som to vedela rozdeliť do dvoch častí. V prvej polke knihy som sa výrazne strácala v menách ruských oligarkoch a ich väzbách na daných politikov. Snažila som sa si to pospájať do nejakej obširnejšej skladačky, no moc sa mi úprimne nedarilo.Avšak druhá časť bola pre mňa osobne zaujímavejšia. Autor v nej opisoval viac medzinárdnu scénu a teda, ako bolo od určitého obdobia Rusko vnímane v medzinárodnej komunite, čo tomu predchádzalo a aká bola ruská reakcia.
V konečnom dôsledku je síce komplikovanejšia a náročna na čítanie, no zároveň skvelá a veľmi prepracovaná.
V podstate by som to vedela rozdeliť do dvoch častí. V prvej polke knihy som sa výrazne strácala v menách ruských oligarkoch a ich väzbách na daných politikov. Snažila som sa si to pospájať do nejakej obširnejšej skladačky, no moc sa mi úprimne nedarilo.Avšak druhá časť bola pre mňa osobne zaujímavejšia. Autor v nej opisoval viac medzinárdnu scénu a teda, ako bolo od určitého obdobia Rusko vnímane v medzinárodnej komunite, čo tomu predchádzalo a aká bola ruská reakcia.
V konečnom dôsledku je síce komplikovanejšia a náročna na čítanie, no zároveň skvelá a veľmi prepracovaná.
May 8, 2021
Usually you do not check the facts in the books, right?
That's what I did and enjoyed the story. And suddenly in the "Ramzan Kadyrov's chapter" I read the Putin's words " I treat Kadyrov as a son ..."
Booooooooooooooom!
That's a famous fake! The whole phrase is " I treat Kadyrov Jr. as a son of his father, who helped a lot in Chechnya crisis a lot, blah-blah".
Proof: https://youtu.be/_ikNXKGONRM?t=44
And this very unpleasant moment you realize how unreliable the whole book might be.
That's what I did and enjoyed the story. And suddenly in the "Ramzan Kadyrov's chapter" I read the Putin's words " I treat Kadyrov as a son ..."
Booooooooooooooom!
That's a famous fake! The whole phrase is " I treat Kadyrov Jr. as a son of his father, who helped a lot in Chechnya crisis a lot, blah-blah".
Proof: https://youtu.be/_ikNXKGONRM?t=44
And this very unpleasant moment you realize how unreliable the whole book might be.
April 4, 2022
كتاب رائع مناسب لفهم السياسة الداخلية والخارجية لروسيا بوتين منذ وصوله إلى الحكم سنة 2000 إلى غاية صدور الكتاب سنة 2015.
فلاديمير فلاديميروفيتش لم يكن ذو خلفية عسكرية، بل كان مقدرا له أن يصير محاميا بعد تخرجه من معهد الحقوق إلا أنه انضم الى الاستخبارات السوفييتية وتدرج فيها حتى أصبح مدير وريثتها الـFSB، إلى غاية تعيينه رئيسا للوزراء فترة بوريس يلتسين، الذي خلفه بوتين بعد تنحيه عن الحكم وأصبح زعيم روسيا الأوحد كما نعرفه اليوم.
الغريب أن بوتين بدأ رحلته في قيادة روسيا كرئيس ذو توجه ليبرالي يريد جعل روسيا دولة ليبرالية صديقة للغرب وقطع صلاتها بالفترة السوفييتية، لدرجة أنه كان يطلب من نظرائه الغربيين السماح لروسيا بالانضمام لحلف الناتو، قبل أن يتحول إلى بوتين الأرثوذكسي اليميني المحافظ المعادي للغرب والذي يشن الحروب ضد توسع الناتو بداية بجورجيا سنة 2008 إلى ضمه لشبه جزيرة القرم الأوكرانية سنة 2014، وانتهاءا بغزوه الشامل لأوكرانيا الذي نعيشه اليوم.
قصتي مع الكتاب
طوال العامين الماضيين (منذ بداية جائحة كورونا) وانا انتظر بفارغ الصبر عودة المعرض الدولي للكتاب بالجزائر في شهر آذار/مارس 2022، ومن بين الكتب التي كنت أنوي اقناءها الترجمة العربية لهذا الكتاب، لكن بعد اندلاع الحرب الأوكرانية-الروسية في فبراير لم أستطع الصبر أكثر ومقاومة الرغبة في فهم روسيا وبوتين، فبدأت قراءة النسخة الالكترونية الإنجليزية، وفي طور قراءتي عثرت على نسخة الكترونية عربية للكتاب، لكن عند مقارنتي للنسختين الإنجليزية ونسخة ممدوح عدوان السورية لاحظت العديد من المشاكل منها رداءة الترجمة العربية في الكثير من الفقرات لدرجة تغيير معنى الكلام، إضافة إلى بتر فصل كامل من الكتاب لأنه يتحدث عن بشار الأسد، وعند بحثي اكتشفت ان دار النشر سورية وتعمل في دمشق فبطل عجبي.
يصف الصحفي مؤلف الكتاب بشار بعد لقائه به في أحد المرات:
لماذا تتكبد دار نشر عناء ترجمة كتاب اذا كانت لا تستطيع نشره كاملا فتضطر لحذف فصل كامل يتحدث القائد الملهم المغوار بشار؟ ولماذا سمح المؤلف ودار النشر الأصلية بحذف فصل كامل في النسخة المترجمة؟
أتمنى أن أرى ترجمات أكثر جودة وأكثر مصداقية لدور نشر عربية أخرى مستقبلا.
مقارنة بين النظامين الروسي والجزائري
أوليغارشية متكونة من رجال أعمال مزيفين صنعهم النظام، برلمان صوري تابع يتحرك بالأوامر، أحزاب معارضة صورية من صنع النظام، إعلام عمومي وخاص تسيره الأجهزة الأمنية وتملي عليه السياسة التحريرية. كل هذه أوجه تشابه في تكوين النظامين الروسي والجزائري، مع فرق أن النظام الجزائري يسير بأقل كفاءة وبأفراد أقل جودة، بالإضافة لكونه أكثر هشاشة ورداءة وأكثر عمالة وتبعية للغرب، عكس النظام الروسي.
كما أن أبرز اختلاف بين النظامين هو عدم وجود زعيم قوي الآمر الناهي الذي يجلس على قمة هرم النظام، إذ أن السطلة في الجزائر غير مركزة في نقطة واحدة بل موزعة على عدة أقطاب.
فلاديمير فلاديميروفيتش لم يكن ذو خلفية عسكرية، بل كان مقدرا له أن يصير محاميا بعد تخرجه من معهد الحقوق إلا أنه انضم الى الاستخبارات السوفييتية وتدرج فيها حتى أصبح مدير وريثتها الـFSB، إلى غاية تعيينه رئيسا للوزراء فترة بوريس يلتسين، الذي خلفه بوتين بعد تنحيه عن الحكم وأصبح زعيم روسيا الأوحد كما نعرفه اليوم.
الغريب أن بوتين بدأ رحلته في قيادة روسيا كرئيس ذو توجه ليبرالي يريد جعل روسيا دولة ليبرالية صديقة للغرب وقطع صلاتها بالفترة السوفييتية، لدرجة أنه كان يطلب من نظرائه الغربيين السماح لروسيا بالانضمام لحلف الناتو، قبل أن يتحول إلى بوتين الأرثوذكسي اليميني المحافظ المعادي للغرب والذي يشن الحروب ضد توسع الناتو بداية بجورجيا سنة 2008 إلى ضمه لشبه جزيرة القرم الأوكرانية سنة 2014، وانتهاءا بغزوه الشامل لأوكرانيا الذي نعيشه اليوم.
قصتي مع الكتاب
طوال العامين الماضيين (منذ بداية جائحة كورونا) وانا انتظر بفارغ الصبر عودة المعرض الدولي للكتاب بالجزائر في شهر آذار/مارس 2022، ومن بين الكتب التي كنت أنوي اقناءها الترجمة العربية لهذا الكتاب، لكن بعد اندلاع الحرب الأوكرانية-الروسية في فبراير لم أستطع الصبر أكثر ومقاومة الرغبة في فهم روسيا وبوتين، فبدأت قراءة النسخة الالكترونية الإنجليزية، وفي طور قراءتي عثرت على نسخة الكترونية عربية للكتاب، لكن عند مقارنتي للنسختين الإنجليزية ونسخة ممدوح عدوان السورية لاحظت العديد من المشاكل منها رداءة الترجمة العربية في الكثير من الفقرات لدرجة تغيير معنى الكلام، إضافة إلى بتر فصل كامل من الكتاب لأنه يتحدث عن بشار الأسد، وعند بحثي اكتشفت ان دار النشر سورية وتعمل في دمشق فبطل عجبي.
يصف الصحفي مؤلف الكتاب بشار بعد لقائه به في أحد المرات:
بدا لي ساذجا إلى حد ما، جد ليّن وغير واثق من نفسه بالنسبة إلى ديكتاتور، صريح جدا وثرثار بالنسبة لسياسي متمرس.
لماذا تتكبد دار نشر عناء ترجمة كتاب اذا كانت لا تستطيع نشره كاملا فتضطر لحذف فصل كامل يتحدث القائد الملهم المغوار بشار؟ ولماذا سمح المؤلف ودار النشر الأصلية بحذف فصل كامل في النسخة المترجمة؟
أتمنى أن أرى ترجمات أكثر جودة وأكثر مصداقية لدور نشر عربية أخرى مستقبلا.
مقارنة بين النظامين الروسي والجزائري
أوليغارشية متكونة من رجال أعمال مزيفين صنعهم النظام، برلمان صوري تابع يتحرك بالأوامر، أحزاب معارضة صورية من صنع النظام، إعلام عمومي وخاص تسيره الأجهزة الأمنية وتملي عليه السياسة التحريرية. كل هذه أوجه تشابه في تكوين النظامين الروسي والجزائري، مع فرق أن النظام الجزائري يسير بأقل كفاءة وبأفراد أقل جودة، بالإضافة لكونه أكثر هشاشة ورداءة وأكثر عمالة وتبعية للغرب، عكس النظام الروسي.
كما أن أبرز اختلاف بين النظامين هو عدم وجود زعيم قوي الآمر الناهي الذي يجلس على قمة هرم النظام، إذ أن السطلة في الجزائر غير مركزة في نقطة واحدة بل موزعة على عدة أقطاب.
February 18, 2018
Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar chronicles the rise of Vladimir Putin from his inception into the political realm, to the backroom scheming he partakes to keep him there, to the modern day Putin we see today.
Despite some time jumping which can at times be a little disorientating, the book is easy enough to follow and contains some decent insight into the Russian perspective of major events impacting on the soviet state.
Each chapter focuses on a key player (and sometime agitator) in Putin's court which gives the book a fresh feel each chapter. There's no degree of repetitiveness or a sense of drab writing as the book flows freely chapter to chapter.
It was interesting to read about the conflicts, the relationships, and the rise to power of one of the more prominent individuals in the worldwide political circle.
My rating: 4/5 stars. A heavy read loaded with political insight, best digested in bite size chunks.
Despite some time jumping which can at times be a little disorientating, the book is easy enough to follow and contains some decent insight into the Russian perspective of major events impacting on the soviet state.
Each chapter focuses on a key player (and sometime agitator) in Putin's court which gives the book a fresh feel each chapter. There's no degree of repetitiveness or a sense of drab writing as the book flows freely chapter to chapter.
It was interesting to read about the conflicts, the relationships, and the rise to power of one of the more prominent individuals in the worldwide political circle.
My rating: 4/5 stars. A heavy read loaded with political insight, best digested in bite size chunks.
January 7, 2017
Prosto politično, nemám k tomu veľmi čo dodať. Skvelý, fundovaný, dokuanalytický pohľad na to, ako politicky prežiť v krajine oligarchov, kde je v zemi zakopaná petamiliarda dolárov, chce sa tváriť ako demokracia, ale nemá nič, čo by pripomínalo funkčné politické inštitúcie. Poučenie znie, že sa to dá, ak sa voláte Surkov alebo Putin a nemáte nič, čo by pripomínalo nemennú ideologickú doktrínu (okrem toho prežitia, samozrejme). Pre fanúšikov politinžinierstva veľká jazda, pre všetkých ostatných asi veľká nuda.
Špeciálneho bludišťáka venujem vydavateľstvu, že to pre nás piatich vydalo.
Špeciálneho bludišťáka venujem vydavateľstvu, že to pre nás piatich vydalo.
December 7, 2021
Իհարկե Զիգարին մեղադրում եմ ավելորդ «գեղարվեստականության մեջ» և մանրամասների, որոնք որևէ մեկը չէր կարող իմանալ։ Բայց դա չի փոխում երկու հանգամանք. նախ, սա Կրեմլը ներսից ներկայացնելու առաջին փորձն է ու երկրորդ. այդ փորձը հաջողված է։
«Կրեմլի ամբողջ շքախումբը» իրականում մեկ այլ կարևոր առաքելություն ուներ. այն թույլ տվեց ռուսներին՝ պատմել իրենց մասին իրենց հեղինակով։ Թե որքանով էր այդ հեղինակը ընդդիմադիր Կրեմլին, կարևոր չէ։ Բայց շատ երկար ժամանակ, 1991 թվականից հետո Ռուսաստանի մասին լավագույն գրքերը գրել են արտասահանցիները։
Բուն գրքի բովանդակությունը չափազանց ուշագրավ է։ Զիգարը արձանների փոխարեն ներկայացնում է մարդկանց՝ իրենց խոցելի և կառավարելի կողմերով, որոշում կայացնողների նեղ շրջանակը և այն մեծ ազդեցությունը, որ նրանք ունեն։ Սա քաղաքական բեսթսելլեր է ռուսական քաղաքական ներքին խոհանոցի մասին, որ ընթերցվում է մեկ շնչով։
«Կրեմլի ամբողջ շքախումբը» իրականում մեկ այլ կարևոր առաքելություն ուներ. այն թույլ տվեց ռուսներին՝ պատմել իրենց մասին իրենց հեղինակով։ Թե որքանով էր այդ հեղինակը ընդդիմադիր Կրեմլին, կարևոր չէ։ Բայց շատ երկար ժամանակ, 1991 թվականից հետո Ռուսաստանի մասին լավագույն գրքերը գրել են արտասահանցիները։
Բուն գրքի բովանդակությունը չափազանց ուշագրավ է։ Զիգարը արձանների փոխարեն ներկայացնում է մարդկանց՝ իրենց խոցելի և կառավարելի կողմերով, որոշում կայացնողների նեղ շրջանակը և այն մեծ ազդեցությունը, որ նրանք ունեն։ Սա քաղաքական բեսթսելլեր է ռուսական քաղաքական ներքին խոհանոցի մասին, որ ընթերցվում է մեկ շնչով։
April 2, 2016
Exceptionally good journalism. I was following Russsian politics since 1990 but even I was able to find interesting and useful insights in this book.
"Must read" if you are interested in the Russian politics and Putin's phenomena. One of the best attempts to answer the question - "Who is mr. Putin?"
"Must read" if you are interested in the Russian politics and Putin's phenomena. One of the best attempts to answer the question - "Who is mr. Putin?"
December 1, 2023
This book, published in 2015, maintains its relevance by offering a compelling narrative centered around key figures within Vladimir Putin's inner circle, such as oligarchs, politicians, and security officials. The author adeptly explores the intricate dynamics of personal loyalty, political maneuvering, and shifting alliances within this circle, crucial for grasping the functioning of Putin's regime and the motivations behind pivotal decisions.
The text also highlights the recurring theme of paranoia against the West in Russian politics, a card consistently played by Putin during his time in power. It underscores the notion that Russian leaders rarely experience democratic defeats; instead, they either pass away in office or face alternative forms of removal, with Putin serving as the latest example.
The book is commended for providing insightful explanations linking aggression against Ukraine to internal politics and historical distortions. Additionally, it asserts that the well-being of Russian citizens and their quality of life have never been top priorities for leaders, presenting Putin as in continuity with his predecessors. Zygar's work exposes how Western leaders engaged in wishful thinking regarding Putin, failing to anticipate war crimes and the gradual erosion of freedoms in Russia, ultimately resulting in the country reverting to a violent police state.
The text also highlights the recurring theme of paranoia against the West in Russian politics, a card consistently played by Putin during his time in power. It underscores the notion that Russian leaders rarely experience democratic defeats; instead, they either pass away in office or face alternative forms of removal, with Putin serving as the latest example.
The book is commended for providing insightful explanations linking aggression against Ukraine to internal politics and historical distortions. Additionally, it asserts that the well-being of Russian citizens and their quality of life have never been top priorities for leaders, presenting Putin as in continuity with his predecessors. Zygar's work exposes how Western leaders engaged in wishful thinking regarding Putin, failing to anticipate war crimes and the gradual erosion of freedoms in Russia, ultimately resulting in the country reverting to a violent police state.
January 7, 2017
Detailná anatómia Putinovho vládnutia od čias, kedy chcel dostať Rusko do NATO, až po časy, kedy jeho ľudia vo verejných prejavoch informujú o utajených komplotoch USA na základe citátu americkej ministerky zahraničia, ktorý si vymysleli jasnovidci pracujúci pre ruskú tajnú službu.
Žiadne šokujúce odhalenia a veľkolepé zovšeobecnenia, ale chladnokrvný popis toho, ako vo vnútri funguje kleptokracia a režim zameraný jedine na zachovanie seba samého.
Žiadne šokujúce odhalenia a veľkolepé zovšeobecnenia, ale chladnokrvný popis toho, ako vo vnútri funguje kleptokracia a režim zameraný jedine na zachovanie seba samého.
December 25, 2019
"نحن جميعا اخترعنا لأنفسنا شخصية بوتين التي تروقنا. و علي الأغلب، لن تكون الشخصية الوحيدة."
November 1, 2025
كتابة صحافية في صورتها المثلى، لغة رشيقة، ساخرة، مليئة بالإحالات الأدبية والتضامين، لوهلة تشعر وكأنك تقرأ هيكل-ولهيكل المثل الأعلى-كما يُميّز الكتاب قدرة كاتبه على الوصول إلى العديد من المصادر الذين كانوا في مواقع مُهمة واكبت صعود القيصر. تقسيمة الكتاب رائعة، تجمع بين الكرونولوجية والبيوجرافية والثيماتية، لذلك لا تظن أنك ستقرأ تتبع سردي تاريخي مُعتاد.. وأكثر ما أقدره وأحترمه في تلك الكتابة، هو اختيار العنوان الجانبي "موجز" فهذا الكتاب بالفعل مجرد موجز ولكنه موجز هام وثري عن صعود روسيا البوتينية، لكونه مجرد موجز فيُمكن النظر إليه بتقدير كبير أن كثف الكثير من القضايا ومسك الكثير من الخيوط، ولكن، إن عاملناه كتاريخ لروسيا المعاصرة سيكون بالكتاب الكثير من العوار والنواقص.. من أراد أن يطلع على كتابة تاريخ روسيا، بإمكانه أن يرى مجموعة كامبردج للتاريخ الروسي ليُصاب بسكتة قلبية من فرط ضخامتها.. ولكننا في هذا الكتاب، نقرأ مجموعة من المقالات، على ما في فكرة المقالات من انتقائية واختيار زوايا مُعينة للتناول، تقبس من تاريخ روسي أوكراني شرق أوروبي في فترة 2000-2015.. ولكن أن تخرج من هذا الكتاب لتقول أنني قد عرفت بوتين وعرفت روسيا وليكن هو مصدرك الوحيد، فبالطبع ذلك تمثل حقيقي لإنسان أخذته العزة بالإثم.. حيث أني رأيت الكثيرين ينطلقون للحديث والنقاش حول روسيا لمجرد أنهم قرأوا جيش الكرملين، وجيش الكرملين في النهاية مهما بلغت روعته لغته السرديّة، ومحاولة كاتبه التحلي بموضوعية الصحفي، إلا أنه في النهاية سرديّة عن تاريخ روسيا ذات شبق بالاتجاه غربًا والتعالي المعتاد من تلك المدرسة على التعددية الثقافية وفرادة النماذج السياسية حينما يتعلق الأمر بثقافات مثل روسيا والصين والهند وخلافه
March 14, 2017
Zygar reminded me that Putin is an actual human. Sometimes I forget. L’état c’est lui. Plus a soupçon of siloviki. Zygar convinced me that Putin tried to make nice with the West (in his way) and felt rejected and that Putin believes he is doing his best for Russia. A while back he may have even considered stepping down for the life of a private oligarch.
Now Russia is his mission and identity. Putin is reputed to think of himself as an expert on everything. He’s neurotic, suspicious and values loyalty above all. He can’t show weakness or he will be crushed by those around him. He likes to hold back his reactions in order “to weaken the link between cause and effect.” The West is hypocritical, untrustworthy and out to get Russia (Putin). He analyses the West through a Russian (Putin’s) perspective.
He doesn’t quite get how our executives are hampered by courts and legislatures. He feels looked down upon by the West (true). Foreign policy is personal. IRL, he communicates indirectly to maintain plausible deniability. He upholds a system of “checks and balances” among his staff so no one can amass too much power. He has created an echo chamber around himself but he can be subtly manipulated by those who understand his way of thinking. He doesn’t receive contradiction. “It seems that the Russian leadership was duped by its own propaganda.” Volodin: “Russia is Putin. Russia exists only if there is Putin. There is no Russia without Putin.” God knows what will follow his demise. Interestingly, Zygar doesn’t offer a clear explanation of the reason/s for Putin’s disappearance years ago. He doesn’t exactly make Putin look good but he doesn’t present us with a monster either. Maybe that’s why the book was released in Russia.
Ukraine has been an obsession of Putin's long before the annexation of Crimea.
He and his subordinates (including the ever amusing and chilling Kadyrov) have used the media to communicate with each other.
Putin was shocked by Nemtsov’s murder.
To paraphrase Chubais, honest privatization would have required a strong state.
“In a sense Assad was the Vladimir Putin of the Middle East: a man who accidentally became ruler of his country as the result of unforeseen circumstances, and who would have probably chosen a different fate had the choice presented itself. He did not plan to become anti-Western.”
“Assad proved that blind stubborn resistance can be an effective way to hold power whatever the cost. A lack of strategy can in fact be strategy.” As Somoza was our (USA) bastard, Assad is Putin’s.
Now Russia is his mission and identity. Putin is reputed to think of himself as an expert on everything. He’s neurotic, suspicious and values loyalty above all. He can’t show weakness or he will be crushed by those around him. He likes to hold back his reactions in order “to weaken the link between cause and effect.” The West is hypocritical, untrustworthy and out to get Russia (Putin). He analyses the West through a Russian (Putin’s) perspective.
He doesn’t quite get how our executives are hampered by courts and legislatures. He feels looked down upon by the West (true). Foreign policy is personal. IRL, he communicates indirectly to maintain plausible deniability. He upholds a system of “checks and balances” among his staff so no one can amass too much power. He has created an echo chamber around himself but he can be subtly manipulated by those who understand his way of thinking. He doesn’t receive contradiction. “It seems that the Russian leadership was duped by its own propaganda.” Volodin: “Russia is Putin. Russia exists only if there is Putin. There is no Russia without Putin.” God knows what will follow his demise. Interestingly, Zygar doesn’t offer a clear explanation of the reason/s for Putin’s disappearance years ago. He doesn’t exactly make Putin look good but he doesn’t present us with a monster either. Maybe that’s why the book was released in Russia.
Ukraine has been an obsession of Putin's long before the annexation of Crimea.
He and his subordinates (including the ever amusing and chilling Kadyrov) have used the media to communicate with each other.
Putin was shocked by Nemtsov’s murder.
To paraphrase Chubais, honest privatization would have required a strong state.
“In a sense Assad was the Vladimir Putin of the Middle East: a man who accidentally became ruler of his country as the result of unforeseen circumstances, and who would have probably chosen a different fate had the choice presented itself. He did not plan to become anti-Western.”
“Assad proved that blind stubborn resistance can be an effective way to hold power whatever the cost. A lack of strategy can in fact be strategy.” As Somoza was our (USA) bastard, Assad is Putin’s.
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