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121 pages, Paperback
First published December 1, 1940
For those dreamers who considered that force, thanks to progress, would soon be a thing of the past, the Iliad could appear as a historical document; for others, whose powers of recognition are more acute and who perceive force, today as yesterday, at the very center of human history, the Iliad is the purest and loveliest of mirrors.*
It is not the planning man, the man of strategy, the man acting on the resolution taken, who wins or loses battle; battles are fought and decided by men deprived of these faculties, men who have undergone a transformation, who have dropped either to the level of inert matter, which is pure passivity, or to the level of blind force, which is pure momentum.
Homer and Tolstoy have in common a virile love of war and a virile horror of it…
When Homer and Tolstoy want to illuminate the fatality inherent in force – the inevitable glide of the creative will into the automatism of violence, of conquest into terror, of courage into cruelty – they do not fall into invective and moral indignation. An image suffices them, a contrast that remains forever present in our memories.
"The true hero, the true subject, the centre of the Iliad, is force. Force employed by man, force that enslaves man, force before which man's flesh shrinks away. In this work at all times, the human spirit is shown as modified by its relation to force, as swept away, blinded, by the very force it imagined it could handle, as deformed by the weight of the force it submits to."
“Force is as pitiless to the man who possesses it, or thinks he does, as it is to its victims; the second it crushes, the first it intoxicates. The truth is, nobody really possesses it.”
“But at the time their own destruction seems impossible to them. For they do not see that the force in their possession is only a limited quantity; nor do they see their relations with other human beings as a kind of balance between unequal amounts of force. Since other people do not impose on their movements that halt, that interval of hesitation, wherein lies all our consideration for our brothers in humanity, they conclude that destiny has given complete licence to them, and none at all to their inferiors. And at this point they exceed the measure of the force that is actually at their disposal. Inevitably they exceed it, since they are not aware that it is limited. And now we see them committed irretrievably to chance; suddenly things cease to obey them. Sometimes chance is kind to them, sometimes cruel. But in any case there they are, exposed, open to misfortune; gone is the armor of power that formerly protected their naked souls; nothing, no shield, stands between them and tears. This retribution, which has a geometrical rigor, which operates automatically to penalize the abuse of force, was the main subject of Greek thought. It is the soul of the epic.”
“The wantonness of the conqueror that knows no respect for any creature or thing that is at its mercy or is imagined to be so, the despair of the soldier that drives him on to destruction, the obliteration of the slave or the conquered man, the wholesale slaughter – all these elements combine in the Iliad to make a picture of uniform horror, of which force is the sole hero. A monotonous desolation would result were it not for those few luminous moments, scattered here and there throughout the poem, those brief, celestial moments in which man possesses his soul. The soul that awakes then, to live for an instant only and be lost almost at once in force’s vast kingdom, awakes pure and whole; it contains no ambiguities, nothing complicated or turbid; It has no room for anything but courage and love. Sometimes it is in the course of inner deliberations that a man finds his soul: he meets it, like Hector before Troy, as he tries to face destiny on his own terms, without the help of gods or men.”

“Nietzsche is wrong when he says that Homer is the poet of apotheoses. What he exalts and sanctifies is not the triumph of victorious force but man’s energy in misfortune, the dead warrior’s beauty, the glory of the sacrificed hero, the song of the poet in times to come – whatever defies fatality and rises superior to it, even in defeat.”
… nothing the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known poem that appeared among them. Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that there is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortunate. How soon this will happen is another questionSimone’s lucid blaze of rage is partly echoed by the calmer, longer, wider ranging essay of Rachel Bespaloff, but possibly I prefer the former, which represents a radical view, a refusal of violence, whose purity I want to hold onto. Bespaloff is perhaps more practical; for example in naming Hector the “resistance hero” she suggests that violence might be needed to defend “the perishable joys” that Weil also finds under threat in The Iliad. She is also less insistent on the dehumanising power of violence, I think, when she points out that the gods preserve Hector’s body – if he is a “thing”, then he is a thing divine or at least adored.
This little volume, published by New York Review Books under the title War and the Iliad, packages three related essays inspired by The Iliad and written during or immediately after World War II: Simone Weil's “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force,” 1939, and Rachel Bespaloff's “On the Iliad,” 1943, both translated from the French by Mary McCarthy; and Hermann Broch's “The Style of the Mythical Age,” 1947.
Simone Weil's brilliant, short, deservedly famous essay was written at the beginning of World War II. It begins rather abstractly and, I thought, off-puttingly, promoting the thesis that The Iliad is a depiction of force, or power, that turns people into things. This reading at first seemed cold to me, ignoring so much of the humanity and sympathy in the epic that define its perennial appeal after more than two and a half millennia. To Weil, war is a machine and people are cogs in that machine whether they’re victors or vanquished. People in war lose their souls and become objects, consumed either by the necessity of terror or by the alternative necessity of blind, drunk momentum. So, one wonders, is this essay about war per se or about The Iliad? It’s true that Homer’s gruesomely specific battle descriptions and similes revel in showing us the human body as a collection of vulnerable parts that can be crushed, spilled, and skewered. The Iliad is filled with brains, teeth, eyes, intestines being knocked or spilled out, with arms and heads lopped off, and with corpses—dropped face-down in the dust, trampled by horses, fought over, rolled over by chariot wheels, or dragged by the feet behind chariots. So yes, The Iliad does show war turning people into objects.
Within this context, Weil details the mindlessness, or the temporary blindness or insanity, of aggressors—or, if that’s not the right word, of those feeling ascendant, feeling strong, with force’s momentum at their backs. I’m going to quote two of her paragraphs at length, which I reread a number of times, thinking—I couldn’t help myself—of George Floyd and Derek Chauvin, not to mention of all of the other incidents of police brutality that we’ve learned about recently:
Perhaps all men, by the very act of being born, are destined to suffer violence; yet this is a truth to which circumstance shuts men's eyes. The strong are, as a matter of fact, never absolutely strong, nor are the weak absolutely weak, but neither is aware of this. They have in common a refusal to believe that they both belong to the same species: the weak see no relation between themselves and the strong, and vice versa. The man who is the possessor of force seems to walk through a non-resistant element; in the human substance that surrounds him nothing has the power to interpose, between the impulse and the act, the tiny interval that is reflection. Where there is no room for reflection, there is none either for justice or prudence. Hence we see men in arms behaving harshly and madly. We see their sword bury itself in the breast of a disarmed enemy who is in the very act of pleading at their knees. We see them triumph over a dying man by describing to him the outrages his corpse will endure. We see Achilles cut the throats of twelve Trojan boys on the funeral pyre of Patroclus as naturally as we cut flowers for a grave. These men, wielding power, have no suspicion of the fact that the consequences of their deeds will at length come home to them—they too will bow the neck in their turn. . . .
But at the time their own destruction seems impossible to them. For they do not see that the force in their possession is only a limited quantity; nor do they see their relations with other human beings as a kind of balance between unequal amounts of force. Since other people do not impose on their movements that halt, that interval of hesitation, wherein lies all our consideration for our brothers in humanity, they conclude that destiny has given complete license to them, and none at all to their inferiors. And at this point they exceed the measure of the force that is actually at their disposal. Inevitably, they exceed it, since they are not aware that it is limited. And now we see them committed irretrievably to chance; suddenly things cease to obey them. Sometimes chance is kind to them, sometimes cruel. But in any case, there they are, exposed, open to misfortune; gone is the armor of power that formerly protected their naked souls; nothing, no shield, stands between them and tears.
One of Weil’s great observations about The Iliad is its sense of balance and narrative fairness:
The progress of the war in the Iliad is simply a continual game of seesaw. The victor of the moment feels himself invincible, even though, only a few hours before, he may have experienced defeat; he forgets to treat victory as a transitory thing.
In the second half of her essay, after her abstract opening exposition, Weil acknowledges, perceptively and beautifully, that there’s more going on in The Iliad than the mere depiction of abstract mechanistic force acting on people as objects. Every reader of the epic knows that there are many moments sprinkled throughout the horrific battlefield scenes when the characters open up, clearly have souls, react with awareness and wonder at their own fates, question the very premise of war, express pity and compassion and love: Hector and Andromache with their infant son, for example, or Priam begging Achilles for the body of Hector. Weil writes that “there is hardly any form of pure love known to humanity of which the Iliad does not treat,” and she goes on to cite a number of the touching depictions in the poem of filial, parental, and brotherly love, of the friendship between comrades-at-arms, and of conjugal love, including the sorrowful words a widow expresses to her dead husband.
And Weil wants us to notice the accent of “incurable bitterness” that permeates the whole epic: “It is in this that the Iliad is absolutely unique, in this bitterness that proceeds from tenderness and that spreads over the whole human race, impartial as sunlight. . . . Nothing precious is scorned, whether or not death is its destiny; everyone’s unhappiness is laid bare without dissimulation or disdain; no man is set above or below the condition common to all men; whatever is destroyed is regretted.” The impartiality of Homer’s regret is indeed the most remarkable aspect of The Iliad, considering that it is a Greek poem, composed for a Greek audience, about a Greek war. There is nothing triumphal about it, nothing apologetic, nothing that portrays the Greek warriors as justified or virtuous or the Trojans as wicked and deserving of their fate. If anything, Weil points out, the enemy’s misfortunes are more sharply depicted than those of the Greeks and their fate more bitterly regretted. The Iliad is a poem about how war brings unhappiness to mankind, and it doesn’t take sides. “One is barely aware that the poet is a Greek and not a Trojan.” The epic’s final, heartbreaking scenes are of the Trojans mourning Hector.
Finally, Weil sees this clear-eyed, impartial sense of justice and equity in The Iliad, rooted in an awareness of universal human suffering, as a key element of the Greek genius and of our “Occidental”—her word—inheritance, found also in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles and in the Gospels, but not found in Roman literature, in the Old Testament, or in other Western epics such as the Song of Roland or other chansons de geste, wherein the suffering and sacrifices of our people are always keenly felt and the suffering and sacrifices of other people are always trivial or justified. Weil concludes with a provocative dismissal of most of Western literature as shallow, absent that original Greek “spiritual force that allowed them to avoid self-deception”:. . . nothing the peoples of Europe have produced is worth the first known poem that appeared among them. Perhaps they will yet rediscover the epic genius, when they learn that there is no refuge from fate, learn not to admire force, not to hate the enemy, nor to scorn the unfortunate. How soon this will happen is another question.
Rachel Bespaloff’s essay in this volume is actually a series of sketches on characters and themes in The Iliad: for example, “Hector,” “Thetis and Achilles,” “Helen,” “The Comedy of the Gods,” etc. I confess that I found much of it unforgivably abstract and unreadable. The exception is “Priam and Achilles Break Bread,” Bespaloff’s sketch on The Iliad’s final book. It is less abstract than the rest of the essay, recognizably grounded in the poem, and revelatory and deeply moving because the epic’s Book 24 is itself revelatory and deeply moving. Bespaloff calls the scene between Priam and Achilles one of “ecstatic lucidity,” in which “the haggard world recomposes its features,” and she comments (in a footnote) that “We do not realize that he [Priam] dominates the poem until we have finished reading it.” It’s a surprising but true observation. Homer’s long narrative of so much violence, cruelty, and suffering ends on a note of remarkable grace and gentility. Priam transcends the role that fate has assigned him and forces Achilles to do the same, and in this final scene shifts the meaning of the entire poem.
Bespaloff’s concluding sketch, “Poets and Prophets,” forces—not very convincingly, I think—a comparison between Homer and the Old Testament prophets, in that both represent a thirst for justice and unvarnished truth. After “Priam and Achilles Break Bread,” this sketch felt like a relapse, a falling back to unreadable abstraction. Take, for example, this passage:
The climate of the Iliad is no more favorable than that of the Bible to the diffuse eroticism that sustains the workings of magic. A new energy has come along to collect the scattered Eros of nature divinities into one powerful love. Yet the attraction of the perishable, the spell of sensation remains. A grand anthropomorphic imagination forges a new bond between the individual and the universe, sanctifying the relationship of man to the elemental forces.
The third and final essay in this volume, by Austrian novelist Hermann Broch, takes Bespaloff’s essay as its jumping-off point—though it’s actually more lucid and interesting than most of Bespaloff’s. It is still, however, highly abstract and only tangentially about The Iliad. Broch’s subject is something that he calls “the style of old age,” which he finds in Homer and Tolstoy, as well as in Rembrandt, Goya, Beethoven’s late quartets, Bach’s Art of the Fugue, Goethe’s Faust, and perhaps in a few other great works. This “style of old age” has something to do with myth, and with “abstractism” (which I didn’t realize was a word), and with “expressing the essential and nothing but the essential.”
Broch’s brief essay is wide ranging cultural history, and rather sweeping in its generalizations. It seems to say (and this is me interpreting and paraphrasing) that the greatest art is only possible when the artist (1) is thoroughly a part of his own epoch or civilization and has completely absorbed its myths and conventions, but (2) is just beginning to challenge them, just beginning to ask essential questions about human life underneath those myths and conventions. Conversely, the greatest art isn’t possible when the artist is either (a) totally captured by and engaged in his epoch and culture, or (b) mostly disengaged from it. So, for example, medieval art is too complacent to be great, too comfortable in its Catholic civilization and worldview, to achieve the abstract essentialism demanded of the greatest art. Modern art, on the other hand—as a matter of fact, all Western civilization since the Reformation and, after that, Romanticism—is too deracinated to achieve greatness. Modern civilization is so focused on the individual that it has lost its connection to any prevailing mythology. Kafka tried to invent his own mythology but failed and despaired. Only a few artists, typically in old age, seem to take the forms or styles or conventions of their times and to pare them down to essentials. This is not about brevity: Broch isn’t saying that War and Peace and Art of the Fugue are great because they’re brief, which would be patently untrue; he’s saying that Tolstoy and Bach, like Homer, took the received conventions of their times and their genres and explored them for something true and infinite and universal.
I’m not sure how much of this I buy, and I’m not even sure that I’ve interpreted Broch’s essay correctly.