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The Enigma of Reason
Reason, we are told, is what makes us human, the source of our knowledge and wisdom. If reason is so useful, why didn’t it also evolve in other animals? If reason is that reliable, why do we produce so much thoroughly reasoned nonsense? In their groundbreaking account of the evolution and workings of reason, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber set out to solve this double enigma. Reason, they argue with a compelling mix of real-life and experimental evidence, is not geared to solitary use, to arriving at better beliefs and decisions on our own. What reason does, rather, is help us justify our beliefs and actions to others, convince them through argumentation, and evaluate the justifications and arguments that others address to us. In other words, reason helps humans better exploit their uniquely rich social environment. This interactionist interpretation explains why reason may have evolved and how it fits with other cognitive mechanisms. It makes sense of strengths and weaknesses that have long puzzled philosophers and psychologists―why reason is biased in favor of what we already believe, why it may lead to terrible ideas and yet is indispensable to spreading good ones. Ambitious, provocative, and entertaining, The Enigma of Reason will spark debate among psychologists and philosophers, and make many reasonable people rethink their own thinking.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published April 17, 2017
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December 20, 2023
The First Rule of Rationality: There are No Rules of Rationality
Reason is one of those terms, like time or God, which seems obvious until it’s taken seriously. It then dissipates into a semantic haze with no solid meaning whatsoever. No one can find it outside the language which postulates and defines it. Reason, that is, is a purely linguistic phenomenon. And even within language its content is elusive.
Think about it. Reason cannot be logical deduction because deduction requires premises that are postulated without reference to logic. Reason cannot be induction from empirical data because there is no limit to the amount of opposing data which might be supplied.
Scientific method, however that is conceived, can’t be reason. What is deemed acceptable by scientists, however they are identified historically, is subject to continuously changing criteria of evidence and technique.
Philosophy can’t be reason since it always starts with a presumption of what is important in life. Or for that matter after life. And the choice of what is important for many philosophers seems arbitrary if not downright unreasonable.
Yet despite our inability to define what we mean by reason, we tend to treat it as a kind of species-specific superpower. Isn’t reason what distinguishes us from brute animals? Doesn’t reason allow us to transcend the limitations of physical force in resolving our conflicts? Isn’t it reason which allows us to achieve such heights of achievement as space travel and the internet?
There are good reasons to answer all these questions negatively. And in an admirably self-referential way, this is exactly what the authors do: “Reason, we will argue, is a mechanism for intuitive inferences about one kind of representations, namely, reasons.” Reason is about giving and comparing the worth of reasons, often in a most unreasonable manner.
Reason is an interactive process which cannot be reduced to a method or a formula: “We produce reasons in order to justify our thoughts and actions to others and to produce arguments to convince others to think and act as we suggest. We also use reason to evaluate not so much our own thought as the reasons others produce to justify themselves or to convince us.” Anyone who doubts this proposition has never been married, or certainly not been married for long.
In other words, reason is the way human beings communicate. Reason is uniquely human to the extent that human language is unique. Reason is an inherent element of language not something that is applied to language. Reason is how language is employed - to influence others.
The implications of this insight are profoundly important. Reason is not scientific, or rational, or objective; it is political; it is meant to justify and convince. Those who try to fix the meaning of reason are merely employing reason unreasonably for their own ends.
Reason is the profound strength and the equally profound flaw of language. It is the strength of an immeasurably strong linguistic technology that allows complex communal efforts; and it is the flaw of that technology that we are unable to escape from it. Language becomes an imperative which must be used.
Argument is superior to violence, we say. But only for the winners of the argument. Every political system, which is of course defined in language, has a means of keeping the losers of arguments from violence - the potential for even greater violence. Language’s claim to superiority is therefore fatuous. As the authors say, the purpose of reason is always the same - to justify and convince. And failing that, to compel.
Reason is one of those terms, like time or God, which seems obvious until it’s taken seriously. It then dissipates into a semantic haze with no solid meaning whatsoever. No one can find it outside the language which postulates and defines it. Reason, that is, is a purely linguistic phenomenon. And even within language its content is elusive.
Think about it. Reason cannot be logical deduction because deduction requires premises that are postulated without reference to logic. Reason cannot be induction from empirical data because there is no limit to the amount of opposing data which might be supplied.
Scientific method, however that is conceived, can’t be reason. What is deemed acceptable by scientists, however they are identified historically, is subject to continuously changing criteria of evidence and technique.
Philosophy can’t be reason since it always starts with a presumption of what is important in life. Or for that matter after life. And the choice of what is important for many philosophers seems arbitrary if not downright unreasonable.
Yet despite our inability to define what we mean by reason, we tend to treat it as a kind of species-specific superpower. Isn’t reason what distinguishes us from brute animals? Doesn’t reason allow us to transcend the limitations of physical force in resolving our conflicts? Isn’t it reason which allows us to achieve such heights of achievement as space travel and the internet?
There are good reasons to answer all these questions negatively. And in an admirably self-referential way, this is exactly what the authors do: “Reason, we will argue, is a mechanism for intuitive inferences about one kind of representations, namely, reasons.” Reason is about giving and comparing the worth of reasons, often in a most unreasonable manner.
Reason is an interactive process which cannot be reduced to a method or a formula: “We produce reasons in order to justify our thoughts and actions to others and to produce arguments to convince others to think and act as we suggest. We also use reason to evaluate not so much our own thought as the reasons others produce to justify themselves or to convince us.” Anyone who doubts this proposition has never been married, or certainly not been married for long.
In other words, reason is the way human beings communicate. Reason is uniquely human to the extent that human language is unique. Reason is an inherent element of language not something that is applied to language. Reason is how language is employed - to influence others.
The implications of this insight are profoundly important. Reason is not scientific, or rational, or objective; it is political; it is meant to justify and convince. Those who try to fix the meaning of reason are merely employing reason unreasonably for their own ends.
Reason is the profound strength and the equally profound flaw of language. It is the strength of an immeasurably strong linguistic technology that allows complex communal efforts; and it is the flaw of that technology that we are unable to escape from it. Language becomes an imperative which must be used.
Argument is superior to violence, we say. But only for the winners of the argument. Every political system, which is of course defined in language, has a means of keeping the losers of arguments from violence - the potential for even greater violence. Language’s claim to superiority is therefore fatuous. As the authors say, the purpose of reason is always the same - to justify and convince. And failing that, to compel.
June 21, 2017
Reasoning, as we know today, sucks. People are able to convince themselves of all kinds of bullshit, and the smarter we are and the longer we think, the more stubborn we seem to become. The function of Reason seems to be to justify our intuitions, not matter how silly they are.
Many recent books include delicious descriptions of these fallacies of reason, such as Haidt’s The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion or Greene’s Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, which I enjoyed immensely. But how does this gel with the equally thought-provoking Thinking, Fast and Slow, where Kahneman’s System 2 seems to be a Reason module (objective, effortful) that can sometimes trump our subjective and lazy System 1 intuition? That view, after all, seems to be closer to the perspective of classical philosophy, according to which Reason is a cognitive superpower that sets us apart from other animals.
If reason sucks (as we know it does) how and why can it be used to overcome even worse intuitions? From a Darwinian perspective, there is even more of a puzzle: Reason clearly is maladaptive (leading humans to rationalise obviously unfit behaviour)—so how can it have evolved? For instance, is Reason just it a byproduct of a cognitive module that is actually useful? And if, with Kahneman–Tversky, we grant positive truth-finding powers to Reason, then why is this (allegedly fitness-increasing) module effortful?
These are delicious, thought-provoking questions. I admit that I hadn’t thought of them in this way.
The book’s first half contains the authors’ description of what Reason is (and not). This is quite dry, and the style is scholarly. Here’s a prose excerpt:
These first 200 pages are interesting, but somewhat dense and require attention.
But then, in Part IV, the book finally hits its stride! The authors soundly reject the (classical) view of Reason, which they call intellectualist, according to which Reason helps the (sole) reasoner to reach a better conclusion. We know this is wrong, empirically. So why do we have this module? Because of the interactionist model: Reason is a social module. Its function is epistemic vigilance—to evaluate the claims of others (and build your own arguments in anticipation of such interactions). This fits the evidence and makes evolutionary sense: we need such a module lest we become helpless recipients of the deception of others, or unable to receive their good advice.
Mind = blown.
Imagine standing in the Vatican, in front of Raphael’s School of Athens, with Plato and Aristotle at the center, majestically vying for your attention and sympathy with their opposing epistemologies. But if you’re like me, your eyes wander slightly to the left, to the portly figure of Socrates, engaged in discourse. He, alone, uses Reason in the way it was selected for. Reason in its environment of adaptation.
I find this quite beautiful.
So if, like me, you like that particular bias confirmed, this book is for you.
Many recent books include delicious descriptions of these fallacies of reason, such as Haidt’s The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion or Greene’s Moral Tribes: Emotion, Reason, and the Gap Between Us and Them, which I enjoyed immensely. But how does this gel with the equally thought-provoking Thinking, Fast and Slow, where Kahneman’s System 2 seems to be a Reason module (objective, effortful) that can sometimes trump our subjective and lazy System 1 intuition? That view, after all, seems to be closer to the perspective of classical philosophy, according to which Reason is a cognitive superpower that sets us apart from other animals.
If reason sucks (as we know it does) how and why can it be used to overcome even worse intuitions? From a Darwinian perspective, there is even more of a puzzle: Reason clearly is maladaptive (leading humans to rationalise obviously unfit behaviour)—so how can it have evolved? For instance, is Reason just it a byproduct of a cognitive module that is actually useful? And if, with Kahneman–Tversky, we grant positive truth-finding powers to Reason, then why is this (allegedly fitness-increasing) module effortful?
These are delicious, thought-provoking questions. I admit that I hadn’t thought of them in this way.
The book’s first half contains the authors’ description of what Reason is (and not). This is quite dry, and the style is scholarly. Here’s a prose excerpt:
Higher-order intuitions in reasoning are metacognitive rather than just “metalogical.” Reasoning is based on rich and varied intuitions about intuitions. Take the kind of reasoning that would classically be represented by means of a disjunctive syllogism with a main premise of the form “P or Q.”
These first 200 pages are interesting, but somewhat dense and require attention.
But then, in Part IV, the book finally hits its stride! The authors soundly reject the (classical) view of Reason, which they call intellectualist, according to which Reason helps the (sole) reasoner to reach a better conclusion. We know this is wrong, empirically. So why do we have this module? Because of the interactionist model: Reason is a social module. Its function is epistemic vigilance—to evaluate the claims of others (and build your own arguments in anticipation of such interactions). This fits the evidence and makes evolutionary sense: we need such a module lest we become helpless recipients of the deception of others, or unable to receive their good advice.
Mind = blown.
Imagine standing in the Vatican, in front of Raphael’s School of Athens, with Plato and Aristotle at the center, majestically vying for your attention and sympathy with their opposing epistemologies. But if you’re like me, your eyes wander slightly to the left, to the portly figure of Socrates, engaged in discourse. He, alone, uses Reason in the way it was selected for. Reason in its environment of adaptation.
I find this quite beautiful.
So if, like me, you like that particular bias confirmed, this book is for you.
May 11, 2021
Proclamăm Rațiunea cu R mare ca luminător suprem al Omului și, în același timp, credem orice năzbîtie care ne trece prin cap. Sau pe care o prindem din aer.
Omul este, așadar, un animal dogmatic și, totodată, în chipul cel mai armonios, un animal foarte vulnerabil la minciună și sofisme (al autorității, al ignoranței etc.). Împărtășim opinii / credințe / Beliefs perfect contradictorii și nu ne grăbim niciodată (dar niciodată!) să cercetăm temeiul, justificarea lor. Nu dorim să (ne) clintim dogmele, după cum subliniază și Mercier & Sperber. În primul rînd, pentru că sînt ale noastre, și n-am renunța niciodată la ce-i al nostru. În plus, verificarea ia timp, e un proces dureros. E mai confortabil să credem orbește în „autorități” și în suma de credințe moștenite de la părinți, strămoși, străbuni etc. În limba română, aceste credințe poartă numele de „prejudecăți”.
Aș mai spune ceva. Omul trăiește pentru a-i amăgi pe ceilalți (sic!) și tocmai din acest motiv se amăgește (cu și mai mult succes) pe el însuși. Unii gînditori pretind că fără minciuni viața ar fi de nesuportat. Trebuie să te amăgești pentru a persevera și a nu cădea în depresie. Am scris asta și în recenzia cu privire la Jonathan Gottschall, Animalul povestitor (Vellant, 2019). Ne iubim pe noi înșine, fiindcă ne amăgim clipă de clipă, și ne amăgim pentru a ne suporta și iubi. Preceptul delfic „Cunoaște-te pe tine însuți! / Scito te ipsum!” a devenit, se pare, măcar pentru unii înțelepți, inactual.
Să venim și la subiect.
Unii autori deosebesc ferm între intuiție și rațiune / raționare: printre ei se situează, de exemplu, Daniel Kahneman, autorul cunoscutei cărți Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2011. Hugo Mercier și Dan Sperber tind să accepte faptul că gîndirea rațională (reasoning) este, de cele mai multe ori, o formă de „inferență intuitivă” (pp.7, 45-48, 64-65). Nu e vorba de nici un paradox. Intuiția, argumentul prin analogie, abducția sînt mai frecvente în gîndirea de zi cu zi decît ne-ar conveni să acceptăm. Rațiunea nu este niciodată formală și se supune foarte rar exigențelor logicii de manual. Este o prăpastie între modul în care gîndea Aristotel (cînd discuta cu Platon) și ceea ce a consemnat Aristotel în cele șase cărți cuprinse în Organin. Sau în Retorica...
Pentru acest motiv, a învăța și a ști bine manualul lui Immanuel Kant, a putea reconstitui (acasă) un argument dintr-un discurs informal (abilități obligatorii pentru un individ care vrea să gîndească critic și să nu fie păcălit de alții sau de sine însuși) nu garantează nimănui validitatea inferențelor personale, într-o dispută / polemică reală, în fața unui „adversar”, a unui public.
Firește, prin exemplele concrete analizate, The Enigma of Reason se înscrie în seria numeroasă a cărților despre ceea ce anglo-saxonii au numit „critical thinking”. Pe de altă parte, avem de a face și cu o meditație asupra „folosului” rațiunii. În definitiv, la ce-i folosește omului Rațiunea?
Răspunsul oferit de Hugo Mercier și Dan Sperber e următorul. Ne exersăm rațiunea (ca facultate și putere de argumentare) mai cu seamă în două împrejurări:
- pentru a-i convinge pe alții de justețea opiniilor susținute de noi și
- pentru a ne justifica / întemeia propriile opinii / credințe (pp.123–127, 142, 154, 330). Așadar, raționăm nu numai pentru a ne extinde cunoștințele și a verifica adevărul unor propoziții.
Ofer un citat: „Humans appeal to reasons not just in reasoning but also in explaining and justifying themselves” (p.109).
Și încă o observație, esențială. Sîntem mult mai pricepuți să identificăm greșelile de gîndire ale altora, decît propriile noastre erori. Asta mi-a amintit de venerabila întrebare: „De ce vezi tu paiul din ochiul fratelui tău şi nu observi bîrna din ochiul tău?!” (Matei VII: 3). În cuvintele autorilor:
„We are as good at recognizing biases in others as we are bad at acknowledging our own” (p.330).
The Enigma of Reason este neîndoielnic o lucrare utilă.
P. S. Mi s-a părut destul de bizar să găsesc într-o lucrare academică, în note, trimiteri la o traducere englezească a Eseurilor lui Montaigne din 1870; la ediția princeps Francis Bacon, Novum organum, 1620 (chiar au avut-o autorii sub ochi?); la o ediție online a tratatului lui Cicero „De inventione”; la alta a tratatul „De oratore”; la o ediție online a romanului The Hound of the Baskervilles; la articole din Wikipedia.
Omul este, așadar, un animal dogmatic și, totodată, în chipul cel mai armonios, un animal foarte vulnerabil la minciună și sofisme (al autorității, al ignoranței etc.). Împărtășim opinii / credințe / Beliefs perfect contradictorii și nu ne grăbim niciodată (dar niciodată!) să cercetăm temeiul, justificarea lor. Nu dorim să (ne) clintim dogmele, după cum subliniază și Mercier & Sperber. În primul rînd, pentru că sînt ale noastre, și n-am renunța niciodată la ce-i al nostru. În plus, verificarea ia timp, e un proces dureros. E mai confortabil să credem orbește în „autorități” și în suma de credințe moștenite de la părinți, strămoși, străbuni etc. În limba română, aceste credințe poartă numele de „prejudecăți”.
Aș mai spune ceva. Omul trăiește pentru a-i amăgi pe ceilalți (sic!) și tocmai din acest motiv se amăgește (cu și mai mult succes) pe el însuși. Unii gînditori pretind că fără minciuni viața ar fi de nesuportat. Trebuie să te amăgești pentru a persevera și a nu cădea în depresie. Am scris asta și în recenzia cu privire la Jonathan Gottschall, Animalul povestitor (Vellant, 2019). Ne iubim pe noi înșine, fiindcă ne amăgim clipă de clipă, și ne amăgim pentru a ne suporta și iubi. Preceptul delfic „Cunoaște-te pe tine însuți! / Scito te ipsum!” a devenit, se pare, măcar pentru unii înțelepți, inactual.
Să venim și la subiect.
Unii autori deosebesc ferm între intuiție și rațiune / raționare: printre ei se situează, de exemplu, Daniel Kahneman, autorul cunoscutei cărți Thinking, Fast and Slow, 2011. Hugo Mercier și Dan Sperber tind să accepte faptul că gîndirea rațională (reasoning) este, de cele mai multe ori, o formă de „inferență intuitivă” (pp.7, 45-48, 64-65). Nu e vorba de nici un paradox. Intuiția, argumentul prin analogie, abducția sînt mai frecvente în gîndirea de zi cu zi decît ne-ar conveni să acceptăm. Rațiunea nu este niciodată formală și se supune foarte rar exigențelor logicii de manual. Este o prăpastie între modul în care gîndea Aristotel (cînd discuta cu Platon) și ceea ce a consemnat Aristotel în cele șase cărți cuprinse în Organin. Sau în Retorica...
Pentru acest motiv, a învăța și a ști bine manualul lui Immanuel Kant, a putea reconstitui (acasă) un argument dintr-un discurs informal (abilități obligatorii pentru un individ care vrea să gîndească critic și să nu fie păcălit de alții sau de sine însuși) nu garantează nimănui validitatea inferențelor personale, într-o dispută / polemică reală, în fața unui „adversar”, a unui public.
Firește, prin exemplele concrete analizate, The Enigma of Reason se înscrie în seria numeroasă a cărților despre ceea ce anglo-saxonii au numit „critical thinking”. Pe de altă parte, avem de a face și cu o meditație asupra „folosului” rațiunii. În definitiv, la ce-i folosește omului Rațiunea?
Răspunsul oferit de Hugo Mercier și Dan Sperber e următorul. Ne exersăm rațiunea (ca facultate și putere de argumentare) mai cu seamă în două împrejurări:
- pentru a-i convinge pe alții de justețea opiniilor susținute de noi și
- pentru a ne justifica / întemeia propriile opinii / credințe (pp.123–127, 142, 154, 330). Așadar, raționăm nu numai pentru a ne extinde cunoștințele și a verifica adevărul unor propoziții.
Ofer un citat: „Humans appeal to reasons not just in reasoning but also in explaining and justifying themselves” (p.109).
Și încă o observație, esențială. Sîntem mult mai pricepuți să identificăm greșelile de gîndire ale altora, decît propriile noastre erori. Asta mi-a amintit de venerabila întrebare: „De ce vezi tu paiul din ochiul fratelui tău şi nu observi bîrna din ochiul tău?!” (Matei VII: 3). În cuvintele autorilor:
„We are as good at recognizing biases in others as we are bad at acknowledging our own” (p.330).
The Enigma of Reason este neîndoielnic o lucrare utilă.
P. S. Mi s-a părut destul de bizar să găsesc într-o lucrare academică, în note, trimiteri la o traducere englezească a Eseurilor lui Montaigne din 1870; la ediția princeps Francis Bacon, Novum organum, 1620 (chiar au avut-o autorii sub ochi?); la o ediție online a tratatului lui Cicero „De inventione”; la alta a tratatul „De oratore”; la o ediție online a romanului The Hound of the Baskervilles; la articole din Wikipedia.
October 3, 2021
Reason is the “super-power” of humans when compared to the cognitive powers of other living things on earth. Supposedly it is the distinguishing facility that is uniquely human. If so, why does reasoning lead to such divergent conclusions? What's so super about a faulty power? That's the enigma of reason.
A variety of psychological tests have repeatedly shown that reasoning is more likely to confirm things that we want to be true, or which we already believe, than it is to arrive at a neutral and objective conclusion. This book strives to explain why humans possess this “super-power” even though it is very error prone if judged on the basis its reliability to find the truth.
When exploring possible evolutionary pressures that might have led to the ability of humans to reason, it is safe to conclude that early humans in a primitive hunter-gatherer environment who spent time contemplating on the meaning of life were probably not the ones most favored to pass along their genes. However, the humans who were able to interact and communicate with other humans in a way that fostered cooperation would have been the ones to thrive and beget progeny.
Our human ancestors needed the ability to win arguments and justify their decisions in order to clinch the top spot in the social hierarch of their community. The strategies of reason gave them a way to do this. The fact that the power of reasoning also led to individuals such as Socrates or Aristotle is simply an example of its adaptive nature that can be applied to a secondary purpose.
Thus we shouldn’t be surprised if reasoning doesn’t always lead to the truth; that was not the purpose for which it was developed. Rather it was an interactive tool used to assure respect and acceptance among a community of individuals that depended on cooperative efforts to survive.
Remembering this origin of the power of reasoning helps explain some of the predictable tendencies to error, an example being the confirmation bias.
https://delanceyplace.com/view-archiv...
The Alphonse Bertillon referred to in the above excerpt is respected as an early researcher in the field of biometrics. But his analysis of handwriting in the Dreyfus case is perceived now as total nonsense. (It's quite a story.)
The book also gives other examples of individuals known to be wise in their area of expertise, but who also showed flawed reasoning when working in other areas. These examples include Linus Pauling (vitamin C and cancer) and Isaac Newton (alchemy and the occult).
The book provides a good defense of the merits of the jury system, and suggests it as an example where collaborative argumentation can lead to better conclusions than that of individual experts. The book also has a chapter on instances where lone thinkers are reputed to have made breakthroughs in science. It's true that they may have been alone at the moment of their epiphany, but their understanding of the problem to be solved was received from others, and the acceptance of their conclusions was judged by peers afterward. Thus there are transactional aspects to the reasoning of these loners that are often overlooked.
_________
It is my opinion that this book is written for an academic audience. Thus it gets into some details I didn't find of much interest. The book pursues an elaboration of the modular theory of mind, and the following is my unacademic understanding of what the authors are trying to say. (Readers of this review have my permission to skip the rest of the review.)
Modules in the context of theory of mind represent brain functions that provide output without conscious motivation or guidance. The authors believe many of these modules have the function of drawing inferences in order to maintain an accurate representation of the surrounding environment. These inferences are then the mechanism that enables the modules to produce further representations which can be used to make predictions, finding a pattern, or intuit a cause. These then are the basis of cognition that can be used by humans for social consumption.
Our reasoning has confirmation bias because confirmation bias works well in social environments. If we use reasoning to ponder the meaning of life, we needn't be surprised to find a wide variety of answers.
A variety of psychological tests have repeatedly shown that reasoning is more likely to confirm things that we want to be true, or which we already believe, than it is to arrive at a neutral and objective conclusion. This book strives to explain why humans possess this “super-power” even though it is very error prone if judged on the basis its reliability to find the truth.
When exploring possible evolutionary pressures that might have led to the ability of humans to reason, it is safe to conclude that early humans in a primitive hunter-gatherer environment who spent time contemplating on the meaning of life were probably not the ones most favored to pass along their genes. However, the humans who were able to interact and communicate with other humans in a way that fostered cooperation would have been the ones to thrive and beget progeny.
Our human ancestors needed the ability to win arguments and justify their decisions in order to clinch the top spot in the social hierarch of their community. The strategies of reason gave them a way to do this. The fact that the power of reasoning also led to individuals such as Socrates or Aristotle is simply an example of its adaptive nature that can be applied to a secondary purpose.
Thus we shouldn’t be surprised if reasoning doesn’t always lead to the truth; that was not the purpose for which it was developed. Rather it was an interactive tool used to assure respect and acceptance among a community of individuals that depended on cooperative efforts to survive.
Remembering this origin of the power of reasoning helps explain some of the predictable tendencies to error, an example being the confirmation bias.
The main role of reasons is not to motivate or guide us in reaching conclusions but to explain and justify after the fact the conclusions we have reached. (p. 121)The following link is to an excerpt from the book that tells of a classic example of "confirmation bias" and then "belief persistence" that occurred in France related to the Dreyfus Affair in 1894.
https://delanceyplace.com/view-archiv...
The Alphonse Bertillon referred to in the above excerpt is respected as an early researcher in the field of biometrics. But his analysis of handwriting in the Dreyfus case is perceived now as total nonsense. (It's quite a story.)
The book also gives other examples of individuals known to be wise in their area of expertise, but who also showed flawed reasoning when working in other areas. These examples include Linus Pauling (vitamin C and cancer) and Isaac Newton (alchemy and the occult).
The book provides a good defense of the merits of the jury system, and suggests it as an example where collaborative argumentation can lead to better conclusions than that of individual experts. The book also has a chapter on instances where lone thinkers are reputed to have made breakthroughs in science. It's true that they may have been alone at the moment of their epiphany, but their understanding of the problem to be solved was received from others, and the acceptance of their conclusions was judged by peers afterward. Thus there are transactional aspects to the reasoning of these loners that are often overlooked.
_________
It is my opinion that this book is written for an academic audience. Thus it gets into some details I didn't find of much interest. The book pursues an elaboration of the modular theory of mind, and the following is my unacademic understanding of what the authors are trying to say. (Readers of this review have my permission to skip the rest of the review.)
Modules in the context of theory of mind represent brain functions that provide output without conscious motivation or guidance. The authors believe many of these modules have the function of drawing inferences in order to maintain an accurate representation of the surrounding environment. These inferences are then the mechanism that enables the modules to produce further representations which can be used to make predictions, finding a pattern, or intuit a cause. These then are the basis of cognition that can be used by humans for social consumption.
Reason is an adaptation to the hyper-social niche humans have built for themselves. (p.339)Reasoning is thus primarily tied to social contexts and to language. It is an inner mental process closely related to argumentation which requires an interactive exchange between individuals in order to be truly argumentation.
We construct arguments when we are trying to convince others or, proactively, when we think we might have to. We evaluate the arguments given by others as a means—imperfect but uniquely useful all the same—of recognizing good ideas and rejecting bad ones. Being sometimes communicators, sometimes audience, we benefit both from producing arguments to present to others and from evaluating the arguments others present to us. Reasoning involves two capacities, that of producing arguments and that of evaluating them. These two capacities are mutually adapted and must have evolved together. Jointly they constitute, we claim, one of the two main functions of reason and the main function of reasoning: the argumentative function. (pp. 207-208)In other words, our ability to reason is built on the foundation of our innate ability of negotiate our position in our human social environment. If we want to reason well we should do it interactively with others.
Our reasoning has confirmation bias because confirmation bias works well in social environments. If we use reasoning to ponder the meaning of life, we needn't be surprised to find a wide variety of answers.
September 29, 2021
The main argument of this book that the human ability to reason is evolutionary evolved not to support individual cognitive decision making, but as a tool to justify intuitive decisions to the others. 400 pages are following to justify that hypotheses to us. It has only partly convinced me, but it was interesting to read. The results of a few experiments they described I found puzzling as my own "result" was different from the "majority" almost always. In general, I think I am taking a break from evolutionary psychology until it develops little further.
Below are the excerpts and quotes I found insightful:
"What functions does the reason module fulfill? We have rejected the intellectualist view that reason evolved to help individuals draw better inferences, acquire greater knowledge, and make better decisions. We favor an interactionist approach to reason. Reason, we will argue, evolved as a response to problems encountered in social interaction rather than in solitary thinking. Reason fulfills two main functions. One function helps solve a major problem of coordination by producing justifications. The other function helps solve a major problem of communication by producing arguments. (Our earlier work has been focused on reasoning and on developing, within the interactionist approach, an “argumentative theory of reasoning.”)"
" When beliefs are not readily testable, it is quite rational to accept them on the basis of trust, and it is quite rational for people who trust different authorities to stubbornly disagree. We don’t mean that these are the most rational attitudes possible. An intellectually more demanding approach asks for clarity and for a willingness to revise one’s idea in the light of evidence and dissenting arguments. This approach, which has become more common with the development of the sciences, is epistemically preferable—but no one has the time and resources to apply it to every topic."
"Reasons are social constructs. They are constructed by distorting and simplifying our understanding of mental states and of their causal role and by injecting into it a strong dose of normativity. Invocations and evaluations of reasons are contributions to a negotiated record of individuals’ ideas, actions, responsibilities, and commitments. This partly consensual, partly contested social record of who thinks what and who did what for which reasons plays a central role in guiding cooperative or antagonistic interactions, in influencing reputations, and in stabilizing social norms. Reasons are primarily for social consumption."
"Rules of arithmetic are taught and are not contested. There is no agreement, on the other hand, on the content and very existence of rules of reasoning. What is sometimes taught as rules of reasoning is either elementary logic or questionable advice for would-be good thinking or good argumentation (such as lists of fallacies to avoid, which are themselves fallacious)."
"When people reason on moral, social, political, or philosophical questions, they rarely if ever come to universal agreement. They may each think that there is a true answer to these general questions, an answer that every competent reasoner should recognize. They may think that people who disagree with them are, if not in bad faith, then irrational. But how rational is it to think that only you and the people who agree with you are rational? Much more plausible is the conclusion that reasoning, however good, however rational, does not reliably secure convergence of ideas. Scientists, it is true, do achieve some serious and, over time, increasing degree of convergence. This may be due in part to the many carefully developed methods that play a major role in conducting and evaluating scientific research. There are no instructions, however, for making discoveries or for achieving breakthroughs. Judging from scientists’ own accounts, major advances result from hunches that are then developed and fine-tuned in the process of searching, through backward inference, for confirming arguments and evidence while fending off and undermining counterarguments from competitors."
"Communication is a special form of cooperation. The evolution of cooperation in general poses, as we saw in Chapter 9, well-known problems. It might seem reasonable to expect that theories that explain the evolution of human cooperation might also explain the evolution of communication.14 Do they really? Actually, communication is a very special case. In most standard forms of cooperation, cheating may be advantageous provided one can get away with it. For any given individual, doing fewer house chores, loafing at work, or cheating on taxes, for example, may, if undetected, lower the costs of cooperation without compromising its benefits. This being so, cooperation can evolve and endure only in certain conditions—in particular, when organized surveillance and sanctions make cheating, on average, costly rather than profitable, or when the flow of information in society is such that cheaters put at risk their reputation and future opportunities of cooperation. For communication to evolve, however, the conditions that must be fulfilled differ considerably from this. Although this is hard to measure and to test, there are reasons to think that communicators are spontaneously honest much of the time, even when they could easily get away with some degree of dishonesty. Why? Because when humans communicate, doing so honestly is, quite commonly, useful or even necessary to achieve their goal. People communicate to coordinate with others, to organize joint action, to ask help from friends who are happy to give it. In such situations, deceiving one’s interlocutors, even if undetected, wouldn’t be beneficial; it would just be dumb. Still, in other situations that are also rather common, a degree of deception may be advantageous. People generally try to give a good image of themselves. For this, even people who consider themselves quite honest routinely exaggerate their virtues and achievements, use disingenuous excuses for their failings, make promises they are not sure to keep, and so on."
"The message of this chapter might seem bleak. Reason improves our social standing rather than leading us to intrinsically better decisions. And even when it leads us to better decisions, it’s mostly because we happen to be in a community that favors the right type of decisions on the issue. This, however, cannot be the whole picture. Justifications in terms of reasons do indeed involve deference to common wisdom or to experts. What implicitly justifies this deference, however, is the presumption that the community or the experts are better at producing good reasons. But there is a potential for tension between the lazy justification provided by socially recognized “good reasons” and an individual effort to better understand and evaluate these reasons, to acquire some expertise oneself."
Below are the excerpts and quotes I found insightful:
"What functions does the reason module fulfill? We have rejected the intellectualist view that reason evolved to help individuals draw better inferences, acquire greater knowledge, and make better decisions. We favor an interactionist approach to reason. Reason, we will argue, evolved as a response to problems encountered in social interaction rather than in solitary thinking. Reason fulfills two main functions. One function helps solve a major problem of coordination by producing justifications. The other function helps solve a major problem of communication by producing arguments. (Our earlier work has been focused on reasoning and on developing, within the interactionist approach, an “argumentative theory of reasoning.”)"
" When beliefs are not readily testable, it is quite rational to accept them on the basis of trust, and it is quite rational for people who trust different authorities to stubbornly disagree. We don’t mean that these are the most rational attitudes possible. An intellectually more demanding approach asks for clarity and for a willingness to revise one’s idea in the light of evidence and dissenting arguments. This approach, which has become more common with the development of the sciences, is epistemically preferable—but no one has the time and resources to apply it to every topic."
"Reasons are social constructs. They are constructed by distorting and simplifying our understanding of mental states and of their causal role and by injecting into it a strong dose of normativity. Invocations and evaluations of reasons are contributions to a negotiated record of individuals’ ideas, actions, responsibilities, and commitments. This partly consensual, partly contested social record of who thinks what and who did what for which reasons plays a central role in guiding cooperative or antagonistic interactions, in influencing reputations, and in stabilizing social norms. Reasons are primarily for social consumption."
"Rules of arithmetic are taught and are not contested. There is no agreement, on the other hand, on the content and very existence of rules of reasoning. What is sometimes taught as rules of reasoning is either elementary logic or questionable advice for would-be good thinking or good argumentation (such as lists of fallacies to avoid, which are themselves fallacious)."
"When people reason on moral, social, political, or philosophical questions, they rarely if ever come to universal agreement. They may each think that there is a true answer to these general questions, an answer that every competent reasoner should recognize. They may think that people who disagree with them are, if not in bad faith, then irrational. But how rational is it to think that only you and the people who agree with you are rational? Much more plausible is the conclusion that reasoning, however good, however rational, does not reliably secure convergence of ideas. Scientists, it is true, do achieve some serious and, over time, increasing degree of convergence. This may be due in part to the many carefully developed methods that play a major role in conducting and evaluating scientific research. There are no instructions, however, for making discoveries or for achieving breakthroughs. Judging from scientists’ own accounts, major advances result from hunches that are then developed and fine-tuned in the process of searching, through backward inference, for confirming arguments and evidence while fending off and undermining counterarguments from competitors."
"Communication is a special form of cooperation. The evolution of cooperation in general poses, as we saw in Chapter 9, well-known problems. It might seem reasonable to expect that theories that explain the evolution of human cooperation might also explain the evolution of communication.14 Do they really? Actually, communication is a very special case. In most standard forms of cooperation, cheating may be advantageous provided one can get away with it. For any given individual, doing fewer house chores, loafing at work, or cheating on taxes, for example, may, if undetected, lower the costs of cooperation without compromising its benefits. This being so, cooperation can evolve and endure only in certain conditions—in particular, when organized surveillance and sanctions make cheating, on average, costly rather than profitable, or when the flow of information in society is such that cheaters put at risk their reputation and future opportunities of cooperation. For communication to evolve, however, the conditions that must be fulfilled differ considerably from this. Although this is hard to measure and to test, there are reasons to think that communicators are spontaneously honest much of the time, even when they could easily get away with some degree of dishonesty. Why? Because when humans communicate, doing so honestly is, quite commonly, useful or even necessary to achieve their goal. People communicate to coordinate with others, to organize joint action, to ask help from friends who are happy to give it. In such situations, deceiving one’s interlocutors, even if undetected, wouldn’t be beneficial; it would just be dumb. Still, in other situations that are also rather common, a degree of deception may be advantageous. People generally try to give a good image of themselves. For this, even people who consider themselves quite honest routinely exaggerate their virtues and achievements, use disingenuous excuses for their failings, make promises they are not sure to keep, and so on."
"The message of this chapter might seem bleak. Reason improves our social standing rather than leading us to intrinsically better decisions. And even when it leads us to better decisions, it’s mostly because we happen to be in a community that favors the right type of decisions on the issue. This, however, cannot be the whole picture. Justifications in terms of reasons do indeed involve deference to common wisdom or to experts. What implicitly justifies this deference, however, is the presumption that the community or the experts are better at producing good reasons. But there is a potential for tension between the lazy justification provided by socially recognized “good reasons” and an individual effort to better understand and evaluate these reasons, to acquire some expertise oneself."
December 6, 2017
This is an interesting read if you struggle (like me) with understanding societal inclinations to disregard science and data and facts. The assessment is really good overall, research analysis is done very well with appropriate parameters. I'd definitely recommend this one. This book compliments with "The Knowledge Illusion: Why We Never Think Alone" by Steven Sloman, Philip Fernbach."
Cognitive dissonance and Confirmation bias is a flaw in reasoning; Of the many different forms of faulty-thinking, confirmation-bias is most cataloged and is the subject of entire textbooks’ worth of experiments.
— In of the experiments, researchers rounded up a group of students who had opposing opinions about capital punishment. Half the students were in favor of it and thought that it deterred crime; the other half were against it and thought that it had no effect on crime. The students were asked to respond to two studies. One provided data in support of the deterrence argument, and the other provided data that called it into question. Both studies—you guessed it—were made up, and had been designed to present what were, objectively speaking, equally compelling statistics. The students who had originally supported capital punishment rated the pro-deterrence data highly credible and the anti-deterrence data unconvincing; the students who’d originally opposed capital punishment did the reverse. At the end of the experiment, the students were asked once again about their views. Those who’d started out pro-capital punishment were now even more in favor of it; those who’d opposed it were even more hostile.
Also—and this is not even related to this but—while I was reading about this capital punishment experiment, it somehow reminded me this dialogue from a Japanese movie called 'Death by hanging' by Nagisa Oshima (Here's the trailer)
Anyhoo, If 'reason' is designed to generate sound judgments, then it’s hard to conceive of a more serious design flaw than confirmation-bias. Imagine, a mouse that thinks the way we do. Such a mouse, “bent on confirming its belief that there are no cats around,” would soon be dinner. To the extent that confirmation bias leads people to dismiss evidence of new or underappreciated threats—the human equivalent of the cat around the corner—it’s a trait that should have been selected against. The fact that both we and it survive, proves that it must have some adaptive function, and that function, they maintain, is related to our “hyper-sociability.” In this book, it is called 'myside-bias.'
— Here's a little (and really old) experiment performed again by the author, which demonstrates this asymmetry:
Participants were asked to answer a series of simple reasoning problems. They were then asked to explain their responses, and were given a chance to modify them if they identified mistakes. The majority were satisfied with their original choices; fewer than fifteen per cent changed their minds in step two.
In step three, participants were shown one of the same problems, along with their answer and the answer of another participant, who’d come to a different conclusion. Once again, they were given the chance to change their responses. But a trick had been played: the answers presented to them as someone else’s was actually their own, and vice versa. About half the participants realized what was going on. Among the other half, suddenly people became a lot more critical. Nearly sixty per cent now rejected the responses that they’d earlier been satisfied with.
This lopsidedness reflects the task that reason evolved to perform, which is to prevent us from getting screwed by the other members of our group. Living in small bands of hunter-gatherers, our ancestors were primarily concerned with their social standing, and with making sure that they weren’t the ones risking their lives on the hunt while others loafed around in the cave. There was little advantage in reasoning clearly, while much was to be gained from winning arguments.
Cognitive dissonance and Confirmation bias is a flaw in reasoning; Of the many different forms of faulty-thinking, confirmation-bias is most cataloged and is the subject of entire textbooks’ worth of experiments.
— In of the experiments, researchers rounded up a group of students who had opposing opinions about capital punishment. Half the students were in favor of it and thought that it deterred crime; the other half were against it and thought that it had no effect on crime. The students were asked to respond to two studies. One provided data in support of the deterrence argument, and the other provided data that called it into question. Both studies—you guessed it—were made up, and had been designed to present what were, objectively speaking, equally compelling statistics. The students who had originally supported capital punishment rated the pro-deterrence data highly credible and the anti-deterrence data unconvincing; the students who’d originally opposed capital punishment did the reverse. At the end of the experiment, the students were asked once again about their views. Those who’d started out pro-capital punishment were now even more in favor of it; those who’d opposed it were even more hostile.
Also—and this is not even related to this but—while I was reading about this capital punishment experiment, it somehow reminded me this dialogue from a Japanese movie called 'Death by hanging' by Nagisa Oshima (Here's the trailer)
Anyhoo, If 'reason' is designed to generate sound judgments, then it’s hard to conceive of a more serious design flaw than confirmation-bias. Imagine, a mouse that thinks the way we do. Such a mouse, “bent on confirming its belief that there are no cats around,” would soon be dinner. To the extent that confirmation bias leads people to dismiss evidence of new or underappreciated threats—the human equivalent of the cat around the corner—it’s a trait that should have been selected against. The fact that both we and it survive, proves that it must have some adaptive function, and that function, they maintain, is related to our “hyper-sociability.” In this book, it is called 'myside-bias.'
“Reason is an adaptation to the hyper-social niche humans have evolved for themselves"
— Here's a little (and really old) experiment performed again by the author, which demonstrates this asymmetry:
Participants were asked to answer a series of simple reasoning problems. They were then asked to explain their responses, and were given a chance to modify them if they identified mistakes. The majority were satisfied with their original choices; fewer than fifteen per cent changed their minds in step two.
In step three, participants were shown one of the same problems, along with their answer and the answer of another participant, who’d come to a different conclusion. Once again, they were given the chance to change their responses. But a trick had been played: the answers presented to them as someone else’s was actually their own, and vice versa. About half the participants realized what was going on. Among the other half, suddenly people became a lot more critical. Nearly sixty per cent now rejected the responses that they’d earlier been satisfied with.
This lopsidedness reflects the task that reason evolved to perform, which is to prevent us from getting screwed by the other members of our group. Living in small bands of hunter-gatherers, our ancestors were primarily concerned with their social standing, and with making sure that they weren’t the ones risking their lives on the hunt while others loafed around in the cave. There was little advantage in reasoning clearly, while much was to be gained from winning arguments.
October 1, 2017
The Enigma of Reason posits that the evolutionary function of reasoning is not to enhance individuals’ ability to arrive at better solutions to problems, but rather to provide social, group benefits. This is a striking proposition, and one that is reasonably well-developed over the course of this engaging book. The authors argue that the well-known deficiencies of human reasoning in achieving logical solutions – primarily exemplified by confirmation bias – demonstrate that the function of articulating reasons is not to enable better thinking, but rather to equip human groups to arrive at better solutions in certain situations (e.g., tribal meetings), and concomitantly to increase the social standing of individuals who offer reasons.
The book’s argument is well put-together, and carefully develops its ideas in a thoughtful way. The most powerful points are eye-opening. The theory explains: (1) why people reason so poorly; (2) why people seem to be able to justify their own opinions, but have a hard time seeing the other side of issues; (3) why people are better at seeing the flaws in others’ arguments than their own; (4) why reasoning is so verbal in nature; and (5) how humans could have developed a mode of cogitation that, at first glance, appears so different from how other animals think. It’s really quite an ingenious argument.
To me, however, the book overstates the case somewhat. It convinced me that social elements are a major part of reasoning. It also convinced me that it is inaccurate to think of our usual reasoning process as the generator of our opinions and solutions. But it did not convince me that all reasoning is social, nor that it is solely evolutionarily suited to achieve social tasks.
First, the authors define reasoning in such a way as to exclude much of what is commonly considered reasoning. To the authors, only the development of articulable reasons to justify a position, opinion, or action is reasoning. They dismiss much of everyday reasoning – and by that, I mean the action of thinking about issues in a logical way – as mere “intuition.” Thus, when criticizing other analyses of human reasoning, they are often attacking analyses addressing a different subject. Moreover, and more importantly, their framework discounts the fact that our intuitions are developed and strengthened through reasoning processes; that is, the more one thinks deeply about the reasons for a position or activity, the more likely that later intuitions about that subject will be valid and useful.
Second, not being an expert in the authors’ area of study, I can’t assess how well their thesis builds on the available empirical evidence. What I can say is that the book did not sufficiently make a convincing evidentiary case to me. The book will often say, “there is much evidence to suggest…,” then present only a study or two, often of limited extent and scope, to back up the point. Contradicting evidence is rarely presented, making me wary. While it’s possible there is little evidence that runs contrary to the book’s theory, I doubt it. What about the studies suggesting that people are not convinced by others’ reasons? I’ve almost never seen a person convinced to change their political views, no matter how deeply their underlying reasoning is undermined. What about the studies that suggest that people are more influenced by body language, rank, and other factors, than the actual content of what is said? There might be a counter-argument that it is not the provision of good reasons that enhances social standing but rather other predominant factors. What about the studies that show that individuals sometimes arrive at better solutions than groups subject to “group-think”? The failure to present a full body of evidence to support many arguments, and the failure to account for some key potential counter-arguments, leads me to conclude that this book is offering more of an evidence-based hypothesis than a fully grounded theory.
Third, a linchpin to the book’s evolutionary analysis is that developing alternatives and counter-arguments to your personal view is resource-intensive. But isn’t distinguishing among alternatives and counter-arguments also resource-intensive? And what exactly does it mean to say that thinking of reasons is resource-intensive? Is reasoning from multiple angles so much more resource-intensive than other kinds of thought processes? This assumption needs more fleshing out to be truly compelling.
Fourth, the theory doesn’t fully accord with my own self-examination of my thinking. Sometimes I use reasoning exactly the way the authors say we all do. But sometimes I don’t. Often, I just need to puzzle out a low-level problem of the kind that our ancestors would have needed to solve to survive. Why is this door getting stuck? How do I build a stable structure? Or, as caveman me -- how can I block the entrance to my cave to prevent attackers from entering unnoticed? How can I catch those slippery fish? Sometimes I really have to reason through problems, testing hypothesis, accumulating evidence, and using that evidence to consciously build reasons that help me find a solution. Moreover, as a corollary, it strikes me that using reason to solve these kinds of problems would have been as important to survival for caveman-me as being able to communicate in tribal meetings. In short, self-examination leads me to believe that sometimes we use reasoning as a social tool, and sometimes as a way of solving problems. Thus, it strikes me as overstated to say that all reasoning is social.
Nonetheless, despite these misgivings, I think this is an important book, one that should open a new line of discussion into why and how we reason.
The book’s argument is well put-together, and carefully develops its ideas in a thoughtful way. The most powerful points are eye-opening. The theory explains: (1) why people reason so poorly; (2) why people seem to be able to justify their own opinions, but have a hard time seeing the other side of issues; (3) why people are better at seeing the flaws in others’ arguments than their own; (4) why reasoning is so verbal in nature; and (5) how humans could have developed a mode of cogitation that, at first glance, appears so different from how other animals think. It’s really quite an ingenious argument.
To me, however, the book overstates the case somewhat. It convinced me that social elements are a major part of reasoning. It also convinced me that it is inaccurate to think of our usual reasoning process as the generator of our opinions and solutions. But it did not convince me that all reasoning is social, nor that it is solely evolutionarily suited to achieve social tasks.
First, the authors define reasoning in such a way as to exclude much of what is commonly considered reasoning. To the authors, only the development of articulable reasons to justify a position, opinion, or action is reasoning. They dismiss much of everyday reasoning – and by that, I mean the action of thinking about issues in a logical way – as mere “intuition.” Thus, when criticizing other analyses of human reasoning, they are often attacking analyses addressing a different subject. Moreover, and more importantly, their framework discounts the fact that our intuitions are developed and strengthened through reasoning processes; that is, the more one thinks deeply about the reasons for a position or activity, the more likely that later intuitions about that subject will be valid and useful.
Second, not being an expert in the authors’ area of study, I can’t assess how well their thesis builds on the available empirical evidence. What I can say is that the book did not sufficiently make a convincing evidentiary case to me. The book will often say, “there is much evidence to suggest…,” then present only a study or two, often of limited extent and scope, to back up the point. Contradicting evidence is rarely presented, making me wary. While it’s possible there is little evidence that runs contrary to the book’s theory, I doubt it. What about the studies suggesting that people are not convinced by others’ reasons? I’ve almost never seen a person convinced to change their political views, no matter how deeply their underlying reasoning is undermined. What about the studies that suggest that people are more influenced by body language, rank, and other factors, than the actual content of what is said? There might be a counter-argument that it is not the provision of good reasons that enhances social standing but rather other predominant factors. What about the studies that show that individuals sometimes arrive at better solutions than groups subject to “group-think”? The failure to present a full body of evidence to support many arguments, and the failure to account for some key potential counter-arguments, leads me to conclude that this book is offering more of an evidence-based hypothesis than a fully grounded theory.
Third, a linchpin to the book’s evolutionary analysis is that developing alternatives and counter-arguments to your personal view is resource-intensive. But isn’t distinguishing among alternatives and counter-arguments also resource-intensive? And what exactly does it mean to say that thinking of reasons is resource-intensive? Is reasoning from multiple angles so much more resource-intensive than other kinds of thought processes? This assumption needs more fleshing out to be truly compelling.
Fourth, the theory doesn’t fully accord with my own self-examination of my thinking. Sometimes I use reasoning exactly the way the authors say we all do. But sometimes I don’t. Often, I just need to puzzle out a low-level problem of the kind that our ancestors would have needed to solve to survive. Why is this door getting stuck? How do I build a stable structure? Or, as caveman me -- how can I block the entrance to my cave to prevent attackers from entering unnoticed? How can I catch those slippery fish? Sometimes I really have to reason through problems, testing hypothesis, accumulating evidence, and using that evidence to consciously build reasons that help me find a solution. Moreover, as a corollary, it strikes me that using reason to solve these kinds of problems would have been as important to survival for caveman-me as being able to communicate in tribal meetings. In short, self-examination leads me to believe that sometimes we use reasoning as a social tool, and sometimes as a way of solving problems. Thus, it strikes me as overstated to say that all reasoning is social.
Nonetheless, despite these misgivings, I think this is an important book, one that should open a new line of discussion into why and how we reason.
September 4, 2017
Really loved this book! Can't believe two French academics could write so beautifully in English. Not an easy read exactly, but far from impenetrable- it takes a little work to read but ideas are explained slowly and carefully and convincingly. Basic premise is that the ability of humans to reason is more of a communications skill, evolved to help us make arguments and evaluate arguments made by others. In most cases, in non-social situations, people don't reason at all - we act intuitively. Bravo, a fine psychology/philosophy mix!
May 23, 2018
Humans are special because we make our reason about our reasons. Proust will say that we are the only animals that can doubt our own reason.
We justify what we are doing otherwise we would not be doing it (unless we are pathological) and we infer the best we can from what we believe we know or think we know, and we use our representations of our representations to explain ourselves to ourselves or others. As Hume said we understand our desire but we don’t control the desires of our desires. The author doesn’t quote Hume saying that, but the author does formulate their arguments similar to Hume as when Hume said reason ‘is that which discovers truth from falsity through our relational experiences and non-contradictory ideas based on those experiences’.
Mystical experiences are real to the person who has them, but to me ‘mystical’ is only a word they use when they can’t explain something. ‘Reason’ often has a mystical connotation and is given a magical mystical meaning (at least when it’s capitalized). This book will argue that there is no Reason as such there are just reasons, and that what we label ‘reason’ is made up of various modules in the mind and that it evolved evolutionarily over time.
Logic never creates truth. It can only preserve truth. Our intuitions make up our ontological priors and are what we label reason as we process them with our logic modules. The S1 (intuition) verse S2 (reflective) paradigm is highly criticized within this book. There is no mystical magical thing called Reason except as a label. The authors called that the ‘intellectual’ model. They mostly argue from an ‘intentional’ view point. That our thoughts are our hopes, wishes, desires and wants and are always about something. Kant (who I think is not quoted in this book) will say that the ‘I think’ is always really an ‘I think about I think’. These authors definitely are not dualist in the Cartesian sense.
In addition to the trashing of the S1 v S2 paradigm the authors call out the incoherence within the ‘theory of mind’ with its ‘mirror neurons’. The authors said that ‘theory of mind’ would have been better characterized as ‘mind reading’. That’s a better label for it and now I know why I’ve never really embraced either paradigm.
There is definitely a phenomenological bent to the way the authors tell their story. They don’t mention Husserl’s book ‘Ideas’ but the way they tell their story falls within that book. (I highly recommend that book, but it was definitely one of the more complicated books I have ever read).
Also, I want to mention Heidegger and ‘Being and Time’ (in my opinion, more of a phenomenological book than an existentialist book). Heidegger says our ontological meaning comes from our understanding, discourse, attunement and entanglement with being in the world and is up to us to grab onto our authentic selves. This book (‘Enigma of Reason’) has that thought embedded within it. This book argues that our reason comes about through our intuition (i.e. attunement with the mood of the world and the mood of ourselves) and that our culture we’re thrown into (i.e. entanglement, and the authors give an excellent example in the book about Thomas Jefferson and slavery) and our discourse (i.e. how we think reflectively albeit through intuition) helps us understand our true selves as best as we can.
Objective reality is based on our ontological understanding of the world but gets confounded with our being. The book gives an excellent summation of the Dreyfus Affair and shows how ‘reason’ as applied to hand writing analysis lead anti-Semites into an absurd application of reasoning which was ridiculously re-justified whenever new information (hand writing samples) came in. That section in the book will stay with me forever and is worth reading the book alone. Similarly, I’m reminded on a daily basis how Trump can rationalize the absurd and have 48% of Americans think he is reasonable and then when new facts come in just reassert the ridiculous as if that’s what they meant all along.
I really enjoyed this book and would highly recommend it. Don’t be turned off by my philosophical name-dropping in this review. The authors wisely stayed away from that kind of story (except for Hume), but when I really like a book such as this one, I connect it to other books that I’ve recently been reading. Also, if you liked this book I would highly recommend ‘Strange Order of Things’ and ‘How Emotions are made’. Each of these books seemed to flow together and tell a similar story.
We justify what we are doing otherwise we would not be doing it (unless we are pathological) and we infer the best we can from what we believe we know or think we know, and we use our representations of our representations to explain ourselves to ourselves or others. As Hume said we understand our desire but we don’t control the desires of our desires. The author doesn’t quote Hume saying that, but the author does formulate their arguments similar to Hume as when Hume said reason ‘is that which discovers truth from falsity through our relational experiences and non-contradictory ideas based on those experiences’.
Mystical experiences are real to the person who has them, but to me ‘mystical’ is only a word they use when they can’t explain something. ‘Reason’ often has a mystical connotation and is given a magical mystical meaning (at least when it’s capitalized). This book will argue that there is no Reason as such there are just reasons, and that what we label ‘reason’ is made up of various modules in the mind and that it evolved evolutionarily over time.
Logic never creates truth. It can only preserve truth. Our intuitions make up our ontological priors and are what we label reason as we process them with our logic modules. The S1 (intuition) verse S2 (reflective) paradigm is highly criticized within this book. There is no mystical magical thing called Reason except as a label. The authors called that the ‘intellectual’ model. They mostly argue from an ‘intentional’ view point. That our thoughts are our hopes, wishes, desires and wants and are always about something. Kant (who I think is not quoted in this book) will say that the ‘I think’ is always really an ‘I think about I think’. These authors definitely are not dualist in the Cartesian sense.
In addition to the trashing of the S1 v S2 paradigm the authors call out the incoherence within the ‘theory of mind’ with its ‘mirror neurons’. The authors said that ‘theory of mind’ would have been better characterized as ‘mind reading’. That’s a better label for it and now I know why I’ve never really embraced either paradigm.
There is definitely a phenomenological bent to the way the authors tell their story. They don’t mention Husserl’s book ‘Ideas’ but the way they tell their story falls within that book. (I highly recommend that book, but it was definitely one of the more complicated books I have ever read).
Also, I want to mention Heidegger and ‘Being and Time’ (in my opinion, more of a phenomenological book than an existentialist book). Heidegger says our ontological meaning comes from our understanding, discourse, attunement and entanglement with being in the world and is up to us to grab onto our authentic selves. This book (‘Enigma of Reason’) has that thought embedded within it. This book argues that our reason comes about through our intuition (i.e. attunement with the mood of the world and the mood of ourselves) and that our culture we’re thrown into (i.e. entanglement, and the authors give an excellent example in the book about Thomas Jefferson and slavery) and our discourse (i.e. how we think reflectively albeit through intuition) helps us understand our true selves as best as we can.
Objective reality is based on our ontological understanding of the world but gets confounded with our being. The book gives an excellent summation of the Dreyfus Affair and shows how ‘reason’ as applied to hand writing analysis lead anti-Semites into an absurd application of reasoning which was ridiculously re-justified whenever new information (hand writing samples) came in. That section in the book will stay with me forever and is worth reading the book alone. Similarly, I’m reminded on a daily basis how Trump can rationalize the absurd and have 48% of Americans think he is reasonable and then when new facts come in just reassert the ridiculous as if that’s what they meant all along.
I really enjoyed this book and would highly recommend it. Don’t be turned off by my philosophical name-dropping in this review. The authors wisely stayed away from that kind of story (except for Hume), but when I really like a book such as this one, I connect it to other books that I’ve recently been reading. Also, if you liked this book I would highly recommend ‘Strange Order of Things’ and ‘How Emotions are made’. Each of these books seemed to flow together and tell a similar story.
April 5, 2023
The Enigma of Reason is one of the best evolutionary psychology books that I have read in a long time. Admittedly, this book is probably not for everyone since it is quite technical and at times textbook-like. However, I found it to be a very thorough treatment of the subject of human reason which avoids the populist hype that often surrounds evolutionary psychology. The authors themselves harness reason to carefully construct cogent arguments about reason and meticulously debunk several preceding theories. Among the many takeaways from Enigma of Reason is that reason is a social construct of humans which is as often used for justification of our actions as it is to convince others to change their mind. I was also intrigued by many of the paradoxes and concepts touched on by the authors. For example: belief perseverance -how people remain steadfast in their beliefs in spite of overwhelming information to the contrary - which has afflicted many well-known and respected icons, including Linus Pauling. It goes without saying that I highly recommend The Enigma of Reason to anyone looking to delve deeper into evolutionary psychology.
April 16, 2017
A persuasive and well argued claim for the interactionist view of reason in contrast to the intellectualist view of reason. By this view reason evolved to support social interaction including the statement of claims and their evaluation by others. Thus reason advances through arguments with audiences who critically engage the claims and their reasons.
June 6, 2018
We feel exuberant arrogance over other animals considering our cognitive capabilities as well as reason.
But, reason has flaws otherwise why do we experience cognitive dissonances and Confirmation Bias? Why are people better at seeing the flaws in others’ arguments than their own?
Why do people divide over issues like climate change, gun control, or abortions? Is it the result of an intelligence gap?
But, sometimes intelligent people do interpret facts to further their own biases. Don't they?
Besides, the same set of facts can polarize groups of people even further, because of our in-built confirmation biases.
In a broader perspective, confirmation bias can lead people to dismiss evidence of new or underestimated threats ... ... ...
So, how did reason evolve? Why? What's the adaptive function of reason?
The authors discussed "The argumentative theory of reasoning" in which they claim that the main role of reasons is not to motivate us in reaching conclusions but to explain and justify after the fact the conclusions we have reached. It is also that the search for reasons aimed at justification may influence action. The authors preferred the term "myside bias" which is related to our little advantage in hypersociability, winning arguments and cooperation. It had been adapted not to search for better solutions to problems but to ensure acceptance from a group of individuals resulting in cooperative/group advantages for survival.
"The ability to produce and evaluate reasons has not evolved in order to improve psychological insight but as a tool for defending or criticizing thoughts and actions, for expressing commitments, and for creating mutual expectations. The main function of attributing reasons is to justify oneself and to evaluate the justifications of others"
I appreciate the authors' point of confirmation bias, research on instincts, intuition, and the cognitive mechanism that shapes them, collaborative argumentations and it's aspect contrast to individual argumentation but I had to pause a lot to digest its implications. :)
Finally, I like to remember the quote of Charles Bukowski “The problem with the world is that the intelligent people are full of doubts, while the stupid ones are full of confidence.”
Happy reading :)
But, reason has flaws otherwise why do we experience cognitive dissonances and Confirmation Bias? Why are people better at seeing the flaws in others’ arguments than their own?
Why do people divide over issues like climate change, gun control, or abortions? Is it the result of an intelligence gap?
But, sometimes intelligent people do interpret facts to further their own biases. Don't they?
Besides, the same set of facts can polarize groups of people even further, because of our in-built confirmation biases.
In a broader perspective, confirmation bias can lead people to dismiss evidence of new or underestimated threats ... ... ...
So, how did reason evolve? Why? What's the adaptive function of reason?
The authors discussed "The argumentative theory of reasoning" in which they claim that the main role of reasons is not to motivate us in reaching conclusions but to explain and justify after the fact the conclusions we have reached. It is also that the search for reasons aimed at justification may influence action. The authors preferred the term "myside bias" which is related to our little advantage in hypersociability, winning arguments and cooperation. It had been adapted not to search for better solutions to problems but to ensure acceptance from a group of individuals resulting in cooperative/group advantages for survival.
"The ability to produce and evaluate reasons has not evolved in order to improve psychological insight but as a tool for defending or criticizing thoughts and actions, for expressing commitments, and for creating mutual expectations. The main function of attributing reasons is to justify oneself and to evaluate the justifications of others"
I appreciate the authors' point of confirmation bias, research on instincts, intuition, and the cognitive mechanism that shapes them, collaborative argumentations and it's aspect contrast to individual argumentation but I had to pause a lot to digest its implications. :)
Finally, I like to remember the quote of Charles Bukowski “The problem with the world is that the intelligent people are full of doubts, while the stupid ones are full of confidence.”
Happy reading :)
Want to read
January 11, 2020Referenced approvingly in the New Yorker article,
Why Facts Don’t Change Our Minds
.
Also, the Guardian Science podcast episode, The evolution of reason: a new theory of human understanding, was partially an interview with one of the authors.
Also, the Guardian Science podcast episode, The evolution of reason: a new theory of human understanding, was partially an interview with one of the authors.
January 19, 2020
Did not finish. This interminable book is of the "angels on the head of a pin" variety where the authors juggle several mostly-untestable hypotheses about human reasoning. Maybe I'd enjoy this book if I were following the philosophical discourse around this more closely, but as a layperson I found it arid and without practical application.
June 3, 2019
Will be re-reading sections of this while I still have the book from the library. Excellent, engrossing, and persuasive text. Some of it is a little beyond my understanding but the many colorful examples helped me grasp the ideas throughout.
March 24, 2020
Best book this year so far
February 12, 2021
I will begin by saying that I probably only understood 60% of what was written.
Our misunderstanding of the nature of reason is very astounding, I did not expect how easy it is for us to be reasonably unreasonable. The book discussed the many theories about reason and how our brain functions when we try to think and other aspects of what we unconsciously do when we try to reason. It also discusses some fallacies we use in our lives that we may not even notice.
Overall, it’s a good book that I should return too when I’m smarter or more knowledgeable.
Our misunderstanding of the nature of reason is very astounding, I did not expect how easy it is for us to be reasonably unreasonable. The book discussed the many theories about reason and how our brain functions when we try to think and other aspects of what we unconsciously do when we try to reason. It also discusses some fallacies we use in our lives that we may not even notice.
Overall, it’s a good book that I should return too when I’m smarter or more knowledgeable.
July 4, 2022
...so two psychologists/cognitive scientists walk into a bar. What will they talk about? Who know? ...but if you had to guess, it is likely a good idea that something about mind, reason, and even philosophy might soon be on the table.
This general set-up has been generating books to inform the educated public more about what they know and don’t know (mostly don’t know) about popular topics with a mental bent. It is not surprising that this is sometimes called “pop” psychology.
Mercier and Sperber are doing much more here than is found in the typical (or even atypical) pop psychology book / research review. They start with the idea that “reason” as is commonly understood has come to occupy a place of high standing in thinking about human capabilities - especially opposed to animal capabilities - but that upon examination, reason is frequently shown to be lacking in some way and undeserving of his position of privilege. One of the most prominent lines in this direction has concerned human limitations and cognitive biases, especially as developed by Kahneman.
So is human rationality a false promise? Is it the case that we are less reasoned than we think and highly biased in how we use our heads - and that this is a bad thing? Are we really going to turn over the evaluation of our proper place in the universe of capabilities to the psychologists? Well no. In two words - uh-uh! In three words - yea, yea, yea!
The problem is not the limitations of reason, but rather that reason’s role in our reality is poorly understood. It is not the supreme mental capability but one capability among many - albeit an important one. Its job is to generate and process reasons and arguments about our reasons and arguments - sort of an internal control mechanism. Along the way, it is noted that reason is not solitary and individual but social. Reason is not primarily intended to figure out the truth, but rather to justify individual choices and position ourselves relative to others going forward in a social world. Oh - and if one has to think through what reason is and how it operates, it is better and more useful to adopt an interactionist perspective, often involving argument and discussion with others, than to think of reason primarily in terms of solitary and linear bouts of thinking things through.
Get the idea?
The book is full of references and short summaries of lots of cognitive psychology research and the authors position their work persuasively - as well as elegantly. If one is unaware of the psychology / cognitive science literature on these topics, this is a good book to start with that is relatively recent and well aware of other researchers. If one is more aware of this, but has other things to do than dive deep into the psychology journals, then this book provides a good opportunity for updating. It is a well written, interdisciplinary, and insightful book that exceeded my expectations.
This general set-up has been generating books to inform the educated public more about what they know and don’t know (mostly don’t know) about popular topics with a mental bent. It is not surprising that this is sometimes called “pop” psychology.
Mercier and Sperber are doing much more here than is found in the typical (or even atypical) pop psychology book / research review. They start with the idea that “reason” as is commonly understood has come to occupy a place of high standing in thinking about human capabilities - especially opposed to animal capabilities - but that upon examination, reason is frequently shown to be lacking in some way and undeserving of his position of privilege. One of the most prominent lines in this direction has concerned human limitations and cognitive biases, especially as developed by Kahneman.
So is human rationality a false promise? Is it the case that we are less reasoned than we think and highly biased in how we use our heads - and that this is a bad thing? Are we really going to turn over the evaluation of our proper place in the universe of capabilities to the psychologists? Well no. In two words - uh-uh! In three words - yea, yea, yea!
The problem is not the limitations of reason, but rather that reason’s role in our reality is poorly understood. It is not the supreme mental capability but one capability among many - albeit an important one. Its job is to generate and process reasons and arguments about our reasons and arguments - sort of an internal control mechanism. Along the way, it is noted that reason is not solitary and individual but social. Reason is not primarily intended to figure out the truth, but rather to justify individual choices and position ourselves relative to others going forward in a social world. Oh - and if one has to think through what reason is and how it operates, it is better and more useful to adopt an interactionist perspective, often involving argument and discussion with others, than to think of reason primarily in terms of solitary and linear bouts of thinking things through.
Get the idea?
The book is full of references and short summaries of lots of cognitive psychology research and the authors position their work persuasively - as well as elegantly. If one is unaware of the psychology / cognitive science literature on these topics, this is a good book to start with that is relatively recent and well aware of other researchers. If one is more aware of this, but has other things to do than dive deep into the psychology journals, then this book provides a good opportunity for updating. It is a well written, interdisciplinary, and insightful book that exceeded my expectations.
May 5, 2017
A fantastic book. Presents a very compelling alternative to (expansion of?) the Kahneman-ian dual systems model of cognition and a compelling enough evolutionary explanation for the existing state of human cognitive affairs.
The core concepts can be difficult to get your head around (due to the similarity of some terms, the relevance of several meta- concepts, and the overall novelty of the stuff to non-professionals), so I was grateful for the clear, concise, and engaging writing -- this is a very, very well-written book. The tone (confident, reasonable, erudite, with a lot of respect for the reader's intellectual abilities) communicates mastery without sacrificing clarity or readability. I wish that more books about challenging abstract ideas were written this way.
I have not read enough Sperber to venture a guess as to how much of this was Mercier's work, but I'll definitely be looking for more from him in the future.
This isn't an easy read but if you're serious about trying to improve your thinking about thinking, it is probably required reading. Familiarity with the dual systems model is probably a prerequisite.
The core concepts can be difficult to get your head around (due to the similarity of some terms, the relevance of several meta- concepts, and the overall novelty of the stuff to non-professionals), so I was grateful for the clear, concise, and engaging writing -- this is a very, very well-written book. The tone (confident, reasonable, erudite, with a lot of respect for the reader's intellectual abilities) communicates mastery without sacrificing clarity or readability. I wish that more books about challenging abstract ideas were written this way.
I have not read enough Sperber to venture a guess as to how much of this was Mercier's work, but I'll definitely be looking for more from him in the future.
This isn't an easy read but if you're serious about trying to improve your thinking about thinking, it is probably required reading. Familiarity with the dual systems model is probably a prerequisite.
June 27, 2017
Just simply the best book on Cognition and Reason I have read in over 20 years. With that said I do wonder about how the scope of the theory seems to explain every problem about reason and reasoning. I am also left wondering how the theory would explain why people continue to vote against their best interests. If the development and purpose of reason is social and if politics is largely conducted within a social venue, why do we not elect the best candidate for the majority of the people all of the time, or even most of the time?
May 4, 2017
A compelling case for an interactionist perspective of human reason.
"The ability to produce and evaluate reasons has not evolved in order to improve psychological insight but as a tool for defending or criticizing thoughts and actions, for expressing commitments, and for creating mutual expectations. The main function of attributing reasons is to justify oneself and to evaluate the justifications of others" (p.186).
"The ability to produce and evaluate reasons has not evolved in order to improve psychological insight but as a tool for defending or criticizing thoughts and actions, for expressing commitments, and for creating mutual expectations. The main function of attributing reasons is to justify oneself and to evaluate the justifications of others" (p.186).
July 4, 2019
Interesting book, but you must 'close read' to really get the most out of it.
My take away was, as I suspected, that 'reasoning' seems to be use by many people to make 'cognitive dissonance' less uncomfortable. We don't want to see or really understand another's view (as much as we might say we do), what many of us want is to do is have someone with a different conclusion see and agree with our conclusion, thus we 'reason' with them.
My take away was, as I suspected, that 'reasoning' seems to be use by many people to make 'cognitive dissonance' less uncomfortable. We don't want to see or really understand another's view (as much as we might say we do), what many of us want is to do is have someone with a different conclusion see and agree with our conclusion, thus we 'reason' with them.
November 24, 2019
Human rationality evolved to help us persuade, not to help us make decisions, and that is WILD! and has kind of changed the way I think about everything! That said, I would highly recommend this book to anyone who wants to do a deep dive into why humans are like this/wants to really understand their own head, but I’d recommend a summary of this book to anyone else because it’s really the succinct main ideas here that make this book so worthwhile
August 10, 2025
La raison des philosophes est un super-pouvoir distinctif de l'humain; celle des psychologues expérimentaux une capacité biaisée, paresseuse et fautive ("flawed") (voir Daniel Kahneman Système 1 / système 2 : les deux vitesses de la pensée pour une exposition détaillée).
Ces deux perspectives sont irréconciliables avec une explication évolutionnaire de la raison : une capacité ne peut être sélectionnée pour ses défauts, ni l'être en vertu de caractères ou de traits d'une nouveauté entière et sans commune mesure (sans homologie) avec sa/ses devancière(s).
Une super-capacité fautive et fruit de l'évolution forme une énigme. Mercier et Sperber entreprennent de la démonter en défendant cette proposition centrale :
Le raisonnement est un mécanisme inférenciel intuitif dont le domaine propre comprend l'évaluation et la production des raisons comme justifications et comme arguments pour convaincre autrui.
Ce que les psychologues expérimentaux tiennent pour des défauts et des erreurs de l'intuition et de la raison sont en réalité des caractères adaptatifs, adéquats à la coordination sociale, à la préservation de la réputation individuelle, à la communication et au renforcement des normes et engagements mutuels, de manière telle, par exemple, que le partage de croyances au sein d'un groupe et la capacité d'anticiper les objections possibles renforcent la portée et la qualité du raisonnement individuel; tandis que l'absence de cet arrière-plan et d'objection anticipables appauvrit le raisonnement. Ces motifs font que le même Newton a atteint des sommets dans le raisonnement mathématique (auditoire dense) et s'est égaré dans les spéculations d'alchimie (auditoire faible).
Les organismes vivants possèdent une variété de mécanismes cognitifs inférenciels, produisant des informations nouvelles à partir d'informations actuelles (par exemple: la direction du retour au nid déterminée à partir de la position du soleil et du décompte des pas ou emjambées chez Cataglyphis fortis , une variété de fourmis).
Les intuitions sont des informations nouvelles auxquelles un système cognitif parvient sans représentation ni accès aux raisons ou raisonnement qui les précédent, il s'agit d'un mécanisme non conscient.
Les mécanismes inférenciels sont modulaires, spécialisés pour le traitement d'un domaine d'informations, et pour la production d'une sortie, spécifiques.
Les mécanismes inférenciels cognitifs n'opèrent pas sur des entrées formatées en représentations langagières articulées logiquement (du type modus ponens , si P, Q ), ils exploitent plutôt des régularités fiables dans leur environnement sans produire une représentation de la transformation qu'ils en font.
L'erreur à la base des énigmes de la tradition de pensée sur la raison viennent de ce que celle-ci est entendue comme un mécanisme de formation de croyances et de décisions objectives, impartiales et supérieures chez le penseur solitaire, alors que la raison permet de justifier, argumenter, évaluer et convaincre autrui.
Les tenants de la raison individualiste sont incapables d'expliquer pourquoi nous nous avérons, d'un côté, si prompts et persévérants à tenir et à tirer orgueil de jugements faiblement étayés, mais si minutieux et détaillés, de l'autre côté, dans l'évaluation des raisons des autres. Ils sont également peu loquaces sur la forme de la discussion, du débat et de justification que revêt la formation solitaire de nos décisions. Nous raisonnons en réponse à des objections et à des demandes de justification virtuelles, prochaines ou imaginaires. Enfin et surtout, les partisans de la raison individualiste sont incapables d'expliquer pourquoi un groupe d'individus qui discutent, argumentent et justifient leurs décisions parvient, confronté à des tâches logiques exigeantes, à des résultats supérieurs à la moyenne des réponses de ses membres, et supérieurs au résultat individuel des meilleurs d'entre eux. Dans le même ordre d'idées, tandis que des étudiants des meilleures universités américaines ne réussissent guère mieux qu'à 20 à 25% des tâches sélection Wason (quelles cartes tourner pour vérifier la justesse d'une règle de type Si P, Q), des groupes de gens moyennement dotés parviennent jusqu'à 70 ou même 80% de réussite. Un résultat aussi formidable, qui est l'équivalent d'un groupe de coureurs dont les vitesses respectives s'additionnent plutôt que de demeurer parallèle, a jusqu'ici reçu aucune attention digne de ce nom.
La raison interactionniste, au contraire, genère et confirme des hypothèses sur chacun de ces fronts. Les lacunes et les anomalies de l'ancienne conception cartésienne semblent combler ou en voie de l'être. La raison est destinée à la consommation sociale; l'inégalité de nos capacités d'évaluation de nos propres décisions et jugements et de ceux d'autrui assure une saine division du travail cognitif (je donne des raisons faibles auxquelles je crois fermement et j'évalue sévèrement tes raisons, et toi les miennes). Le pari est tenu.
Forces du livre
Mercier et Sperber recourent à un éventail d'exemples et de supports à leur thèse dont la richesse et la variété sont remarquables. La culture scientifique, historique et littéraire dont ils font montre agrémente la lecture et convainc d'autant. Plutôt que de recourir exclusivement aux études entreprises avec des sujets étudiants des campus universitaires et de tomber sous les critiques de non-représentativité de ce genre d'échantillon (communément nommés les WEIRD : White, Educated members of Industrialised, Rich and Democratic countries ), nous avons des exemples stupéfiants des défauts ainsi que des lumières du raisonnement à l'aide de figures clefs, allant de Bertillon, à Linnus Pauling et Thomas Jefferson (préservation du "myside bias" malgré de faibles raisons empiriques et l'existence de contre-exemples solides, "overconfidence" et polarisation), chez Newton, chez des tributs amazoniennes, maya, indiennes de temps reculés.
Faiblesse du livre.
Il peut sembler que la contribution qu'apporte le passage sur la modularité des mécanismes inférenciels à l'avancement de la thèse soit faible. J'ai cru que ce concept, après une critique comme celle de Jesse Prinz ( Is the Mind really modular , in Stanton ed. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science ), était tombée en désuétude pour cause de sur-estimation de son pouvoir explicatif - il ne serait rien d'autres que l'affirmation banale de la différenciation fonctionnelle des aires du cerveau. Il se peut que Sperber, qui a étrenné ce concept contre vents et marées sur le long terme, ait voulu administrer la preuve du bien-fondé de son pari, un cas de belief perseverance. Il ajoute une certaine lourdeur pour le non-initié (auquel ce livre ne s'adresse clairement pas de toutes façons).
La morale de l'histoire modulaire tient largement en ceci: la spécificité de domaine est compatible avec la production d'une généralité de résultats. Le module de la raison a le domaine des raisons (des méta-représentations) comme justification et arguments; étant donné que ceux-ci portent sur un nombre incalculable de sujets, la raison traite une nombre incalculable d'objets. Plus exactement, et la subtilité de cette construction est importante : le sentiment de justesse des intuitions auxquelles nous cherchons des raisons après coup (backward inférence) est également un sentiment de justesse à propos de ce sur quoi porte l'intuition . Mon intuition qu'il pleuvra dans une heure, sans que je sache comment j'en arrive à le penser, me procure le sentiment d'être justifié, non seulement d'avoir cette intuition, mais également d'agir dans un monde où il pleuvra. La justesse de l'intuition cognitivement opaque est compatible avec la production d'une conclusion réflective sur le monde auquel se rapporte l'intuition (et auquel nous accédons par-dessus l'épaule de celle-ci). Ici réside, largement, non seulement la livraison de cette promesse que la modularité semblait incapable de livrer (spécificité et généralité), mais également l'angle par lequel Mercier et Sperber réfutent la perspective d'une discontinuité entre raison et intuition (Système 2 vs Système 1).
Dans l'ensemble comme dans le menu, cet ouvrage est admirable et hautement recommandé. Il nous rend plus intelligent et confiant, notamment, dans le potentiel, sous des conditions adverses d'accroissement démographique des groupes humains, de l'exercice du raisonnement à produire ce qu'il a de plus fécond : c'est-à-dire des croyances, jugements et décisions supérieurs à ce que chacun peut atteindre isolément.
Le tournant coopératif dans la théorie évolutionnaire de la cognition avance d'un autre grand pas.
Mercier and Sperber hold that reason is a cognitive skill that evolved to bolster cooperation and communication in a way that insure what is called the fiability of the signal; and throughtout, evolutionnary reasoning is taken to give better ground to their argumentative reason than to reason as traditionnally conceived. Their book is bold, has empirical anchorage (in problem solving by solitary thinkers vs argumentative group). All in all, the book exposes one alternative view of reason(convince others and resisting being convinded by others up to a certain epistemic point) and to one dominant view (the solitary thinker aiming the truth), and succeeds. A Great book
Rather than reason being the individual thinker's key to access objective, impartial knowledge and decision, through logical, modus-tolens-like way of formatting (representing) sensory inputs, reason is an intuitive inferential mechanism, among many other such mechanisms, exploiting efficient regularities without representing them; the proper (modular) domain of which is reasons given as justifications and as arguments. Justifications and arguments are for social consumption - to convince, to enforce reputation and normativity, to commit oneself, to communicate through epistemic vigilance. Intuitively evaluating reasons qua justification / arguments is domain specific. But since the latter can be about anything, and since feeling right about an intuition also amounts to feeling right about the things intuition are about, reason amounts to a virtual domain-general mechanism (from intuitive argument to reflective conclusion). We see the world over the shoulder of a prior, intuitive reason of which we ignore the pros and cons.
Among this book's many strength are it's deep, large historical knowledge. Mercier and Sperber gives rich and moving examples in support of their claim : Thomas Jefferson's endorsement of slavery and of man's inborn right to freedom and happiness at the same time is one but a speaking case.
Ces deux perspectives sont irréconciliables avec une explication évolutionnaire de la raison : une capacité ne peut être sélectionnée pour ses défauts, ni l'être en vertu de caractères ou de traits d'une nouveauté entière et sans commune mesure (sans homologie) avec sa/ses devancière(s).
Une super-capacité fautive et fruit de l'évolution forme une énigme. Mercier et Sperber entreprennent de la démonter en défendant cette proposition centrale :
Le raisonnement est un mécanisme inférenciel intuitif dont le domaine propre comprend l'évaluation et la production des raisons comme justifications et comme arguments pour convaincre autrui.
Ce que les psychologues expérimentaux tiennent pour des défauts et des erreurs de l'intuition et de la raison sont en réalité des caractères adaptatifs, adéquats à la coordination sociale, à la préservation de la réputation individuelle, à la communication et au renforcement des normes et engagements mutuels, de manière telle, par exemple, que le partage de croyances au sein d'un groupe et la capacité d'anticiper les objections possibles renforcent la portée et la qualité du raisonnement individuel; tandis que l'absence de cet arrière-plan et d'objection anticipables appauvrit le raisonnement. Ces motifs font que le même Newton a atteint des sommets dans le raisonnement mathématique (auditoire dense) et s'est égaré dans les spéculations d'alchimie (auditoire faible).
Les organismes vivants possèdent une variété de mécanismes cognitifs inférenciels, produisant des informations nouvelles à partir d'informations actuelles (par exemple: la direction du retour au nid déterminée à partir de la position du soleil et du décompte des pas ou emjambées chez Cataglyphis fortis , une variété de fourmis).
Les intuitions sont des informations nouvelles auxquelles un système cognitif parvient sans représentation ni accès aux raisons ou raisonnement qui les précédent, il s'agit d'un mécanisme non conscient.
Les mécanismes inférenciels sont modulaires, spécialisés pour le traitement d'un domaine d'informations, et pour la production d'une sortie, spécifiques.
Les mécanismes inférenciels cognitifs n'opèrent pas sur des entrées formatées en représentations langagières articulées logiquement (du type modus ponens , si P, Q ), ils exploitent plutôt des régularités fiables dans leur environnement sans produire une représentation de la transformation qu'ils en font.
L'erreur à la base des énigmes de la tradition de pensée sur la raison viennent de ce que celle-ci est entendue comme un mécanisme de formation de croyances et de décisions objectives, impartiales et supérieures chez le penseur solitaire, alors que la raison permet de justifier, argumenter, évaluer et convaincre autrui.
Les tenants de la raison individualiste sont incapables d'expliquer pourquoi nous nous avérons, d'un côté, si prompts et persévérants à tenir et à tirer orgueil de jugements faiblement étayés, mais si minutieux et détaillés, de l'autre côté, dans l'évaluation des raisons des autres. Ils sont également peu loquaces sur la forme de la discussion, du débat et de justification que revêt la formation solitaire de nos décisions. Nous raisonnons en réponse à des objections et à des demandes de justification virtuelles, prochaines ou imaginaires. Enfin et surtout, les partisans de la raison individualiste sont incapables d'expliquer pourquoi un groupe d'individus qui discutent, argumentent et justifient leurs décisions parvient, confronté à des tâches logiques exigeantes, à des résultats supérieurs à la moyenne des réponses de ses membres, et supérieurs au résultat individuel des meilleurs d'entre eux. Dans le même ordre d'idées, tandis que des étudiants des meilleures universités américaines ne réussissent guère mieux qu'à 20 à 25% des tâches sélection Wason (quelles cartes tourner pour vérifier la justesse d'une règle de type Si P, Q), des groupes de gens moyennement dotés parviennent jusqu'à 70 ou même 80% de réussite. Un résultat aussi formidable, qui est l'équivalent d'un groupe de coureurs dont les vitesses respectives s'additionnent plutôt que de demeurer parallèle, a jusqu'ici reçu aucune attention digne de ce nom.
La raison interactionniste, au contraire, genère et confirme des hypothèses sur chacun de ces fronts. Les lacunes et les anomalies de l'ancienne conception cartésienne semblent combler ou en voie de l'être. La raison est destinée à la consommation sociale; l'inégalité de nos capacités d'évaluation de nos propres décisions et jugements et de ceux d'autrui assure une saine division du travail cognitif (je donne des raisons faibles auxquelles je crois fermement et j'évalue sévèrement tes raisons, et toi les miennes). Le pari est tenu.
Forces du livre
Mercier et Sperber recourent à un éventail d'exemples et de supports à leur thèse dont la richesse et la variété sont remarquables. La culture scientifique, historique et littéraire dont ils font montre agrémente la lecture et convainc d'autant. Plutôt que de recourir exclusivement aux études entreprises avec des sujets étudiants des campus universitaires et de tomber sous les critiques de non-représentativité de ce genre d'échantillon (communément nommés les WEIRD : White, Educated members of Industrialised, Rich and Democratic countries ), nous avons des exemples stupéfiants des défauts ainsi que des lumières du raisonnement à l'aide de figures clefs, allant de Bertillon, à Linnus Pauling et Thomas Jefferson (préservation du "myside bias" malgré de faibles raisons empiriques et l'existence de contre-exemples solides, "overconfidence" et polarisation), chez Newton, chez des tributs amazoniennes, maya, indiennes de temps reculés.
Faiblesse du livre.
Il peut sembler que la contribution qu'apporte le passage sur la modularité des mécanismes inférenciels à l'avancement de la thèse soit faible. J'ai cru que ce concept, après une critique comme celle de Jesse Prinz ( Is the Mind really modular , in Stanton ed. Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science ), était tombée en désuétude pour cause de sur-estimation de son pouvoir explicatif - il ne serait rien d'autres que l'affirmation banale de la différenciation fonctionnelle des aires du cerveau. Il se peut que Sperber, qui a étrenné ce concept contre vents et marées sur le long terme, ait voulu administrer la preuve du bien-fondé de son pari, un cas de belief perseverance. Il ajoute une certaine lourdeur pour le non-initié (auquel ce livre ne s'adresse clairement pas de toutes façons).
La morale de l'histoire modulaire tient largement en ceci: la spécificité de domaine est compatible avec la production d'une généralité de résultats. Le module de la raison a le domaine des raisons (des méta-représentations) comme justification et arguments; étant donné que ceux-ci portent sur un nombre incalculable de sujets, la raison traite une nombre incalculable d'objets. Plus exactement, et la subtilité de cette construction est importante : le sentiment de justesse des intuitions auxquelles nous cherchons des raisons après coup (backward inférence) est également un sentiment de justesse à propos de ce sur quoi porte l'intuition . Mon intuition qu'il pleuvra dans une heure, sans que je sache comment j'en arrive à le penser, me procure le sentiment d'être justifié, non seulement d'avoir cette intuition, mais également d'agir dans un monde où il pleuvra. La justesse de l'intuition cognitivement opaque est compatible avec la production d'une conclusion réflective sur le monde auquel se rapporte l'intuition (et auquel nous accédons par-dessus l'épaule de celle-ci). Ici réside, largement, non seulement la livraison de cette promesse que la modularité semblait incapable de livrer (spécificité et généralité), mais également l'angle par lequel Mercier et Sperber réfutent la perspective d'une discontinuité entre raison et intuition (Système 2 vs Système 1).
Dans l'ensemble comme dans le menu, cet ouvrage est admirable et hautement recommandé. Il nous rend plus intelligent et confiant, notamment, dans le potentiel, sous des conditions adverses d'accroissement démographique des groupes humains, de l'exercice du raisonnement à produire ce qu'il a de plus fécond : c'est-à-dire des croyances, jugements et décisions supérieurs à ce que chacun peut atteindre isolément.
Le tournant coopératif dans la théorie évolutionnaire de la cognition avance d'un autre grand pas.
Mercier and Sperber hold that reason is a cognitive skill that evolved to bolster cooperation and communication in a way that insure what is called the fiability of the signal; and throughtout, evolutionnary reasoning is taken to give better ground to their argumentative reason than to reason as traditionnally conceived. Their book is bold, has empirical anchorage (in problem solving by solitary thinkers vs argumentative group). All in all, the book exposes one alternative view of reason(convince others and resisting being convinded by others up to a certain epistemic point) and to one dominant view (the solitary thinker aiming the truth), and succeeds. A Great book
Rather than reason being the individual thinker's key to access objective, impartial knowledge and decision, through logical, modus-tolens-like way of formatting (representing) sensory inputs, reason is an intuitive inferential mechanism, among many other such mechanisms, exploiting efficient regularities without representing them; the proper (modular) domain of which is reasons given as justifications and as arguments. Justifications and arguments are for social consumption - to convince, to enforce reputation and normativity, to commit oneself, to communicate through epistemic vigilance. Intuitively evaluating reasons qua justification / arguments is domain specific. But since the latter can be about anything, and since feeling right about an intuition also amounts to feeling right about the things intuition are about, reason amounts to a virtual domain-general mechanism (from intuitive argument to reflective conclusion). We see the world over the shoulder of a prior, intuitive reason of which we ignore the pros and cons.
Among this book's many strength are it's deep, large historical knowledge. Mercier and Sperber gives rich and moving examples in support of their claim : Thomas Jefferson's endorsement of slavery and of man's inborn right to freedom and happiness at the same time is one but a speaking case.
June 3, 2023
This book was absolutely remarkable in its scope and convincing in its argument. Mercier and Sperber display how we aren't always the best at reasoning, falling into an array of cognitive traps. However, they show how reason is still a powerful tool. From an interactionist perspective, they argue that it is within deliberative argument that we can strengthen reason. There isn't a wonderful reason machine which we can rely on. The best reason takes place with a multitude of reasoners.
November 7, 2022
I loved this book! Give it a go if you are interested in how human reason works, it's flaws and evolutional purpose of it... definitely a lot to think about. It does get a bit tiring with so many technicalities of biases etc, so take it slow if necessary.
Conclusion: reasons are for human consumption.
Conclusion: reasons are for human consumption.
April 10, 2019
The standard view, going as far back as the Ancient Greeks, is that we humans possess the unique ability of reason. It's the defining characteristic of human nature, according to Aristotle. Through reason, we make sense of the world and remain objective. It's almost a theological view of rationality, viewing it as divine. This still permeates the current culture to a large degree, where rationality is viewed as sort of evolutionary blessing that separates us from animals. It's considered general-purpose intelligence that allows the individual to better understand the world and make better choices. Even though we know we have an irrational side, it's believed we also have the ability to think clearly and rationality, illustrated by Kahneman’s famous System 1 and System 2. This what the authors call the intellectualist model.
It took Hume to go against the tide, and famously said: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." This is more in line with what modern psychology has shown us, and the list of cognitive biases are endless. While indeed reason can be deeply flawed, it's an incomplete picture, and the goal of the book is to view reason is a new light.
Reason is a mechanism of intuitive inference, it's one module of inference among many. It is not a logical system, which most view it as. The first half of the book goes incredibly in-depth into explaining what logic is and how it relates (poorly) to rationality. It's also not a probability calculus. It's a metacognitive module that works in a narrow domain, making unconscious inferences based on regular patterns in the world.
Humans use reason to convince themselves and others. It's made and used for social consumption, and not in a scientific essence of epistemology. It's an adaptation to our rich social lives and powerful language, where individuals have competing interests. The authors call this an interactionist model. Its function is epistemic vigilance—to evaluate the claims of others and improve our own reasons to better convince them.
While reason is indeed flawed on many levels, just as pop-psychology claims, it's mostly because we don't understand its function. An example given in the book is that someone might think a pen is broken while he's using it up-side-down.
Humans are biased and produce reasons almost exclusively to their side. The quality control is poor - it's lazy and seeks the least amount of effort to justify one's intuition. Yet, in a social context, this changes. We're much less biased when evaluation of other people's reasons. We can accept challenging reasons if they're strong enough, and people tend to demand good enough reasons from others. While it seems flawed in isolation, once we take a group view, this allows divide the cognitive labour (by each person arguing their own side) and being pragmatic about reasons (being good enough if accepted). It's a cost-effective way to solve social disagreements.
It's a fantastic book, although hard to summarize and at times very dense, particularly in the first half which is quite heavy in logic. It balances out both the overly optimistic and overly pessimistic view of reason in a new paradigm that makes evolutionary sense.
Finally, it's worth noting that this book is involved in some controversy, where it has been claimed that it was stolen in large part by the work of Gregg Henriques. I happened to already own the book after knowing this, and I didn't know any other book that touches on the same topic at this level of depth, so I decided to use it regardless. If the claims are true, it's likely better to learn this topic elsewhere.
It took Hume to go against the tide, and famously said: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions." This is more in line with what modern psychology has shown us, and the list of cognitive biases are endless. While indeed reason can be deeply flawed, it's an incomplete picture, and the goal of the book is to view reason is a new light.
Reason is a mechanism of intuitive inference, it's one module of inference among many. It is not a logical system, which most view it as. The first half of the book goes incredibly in-depth into explaining what logic is and how it relates (poorly) to rationality. It's also not a probability calculus. It's a metacognitive module that works in a narrow domain, making unconscious inferences based on regular patterns in the world.
Humans use reason to convince themselves and others. It's made and used for social consumption, and not in a scientific essence of epistemology. It's an adaptation to our rich social lives and powerful language, where individuals have competing interests. The authors call this an interactionist model. Its function is epistemic vigilance—to evaluate the claims of others and improve our own reasons to better convince them.
While reason is indeed flawed on many levels, just as pop-psychology claims, it's mostly because we don't understand its function. An example given in the book is that someone might think a pen is broken while he's using it up-side-down.
Humans are biased and produce reasons almost exclusively to their side. The quality control is poor - it's lazy and seeks the least amount of effort to justify one's intuition. Yet, in a social context, this changes. We're much less biased when evaluation of other people's reasons. We can accept challenging reasons if they're strong enough, and people tend to demand good enough reasons from others. While it seems flawed in isolation, once we take a group view, this allows divide the cognitive labour (by each person arguing their own side) and being pragmatic about reasons (being good enough if accepted). It's a cost-effective way to solve social disagreements.
It's a fantastic book, although hard to summarize and at times very dense, particularly in the first half which is quite heavy in logic. It balances out both the overly optimistic and overly pessimistic view of reason in a new paradigm that makes evolutionary sense.
Finally, it's worth noting that this book is involved in some controversy, where it has been claimed that it was stolen in large part by the work of Gregg Henriques. I happened to already own the book after knowing this, and I didn't know any other book that touches on the same topic at this level of depth, so I decided to use it regardless. If the claims are true, it's likely better to learn this topic elsewhere.
January 21, 2021
أهمية الجدل ...
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في بداية فيلم 12 Angry Men ، يتهم شاب بطعن والده حتى الموت. حياته في وضع حرج: في غرفة المحلفين ، تتراكم الحجج من أجل الإدانة.
شاهد أحدهم الصبي يفعل ذلك. وسمع آخر الشجار ورأى المتهم يفر من الشقة ؛ عذر الصبي لا يصمد. لديه دافع ، ولديه سجل طويل من العنف. هناك استقطاب جماعي كامن ، وعلى استعداد لإقناع المحلفين بوجوب إرسال الصبي إلى الكرسي الكهربائي.
لكن أحد المحلفين أقل ثقة من الآخرين. في حين أن هذا المحلف غير مقتنع ببراءة المدعى عليه ، إلا أنه ليس متأكدًا تمامًا من ذنبه أيضًا. إنه "يريد التحدث فقط". عندما يتم حثه على تقديم الحجج ، يبدأ بحجج ضعيفة: الأدلة ضد الصبي جيدة جدًا ؛ إنها جيدة بشكل مريب.
ليس من المستغرب أن هذا لا يؤثر على أي من المحلفين الآخرين. ومع ذلك ، يقوم هذا المحلف بعمل أفضل في إحداث ثغرات في قضية الادعاء.
يكشف التناقضات في الحجج التي تجرم الصبي . يزعم أحد الشهود أنه شاهد جريمة القتل من الجانب الآخر من الشارع ، عبر نوافذ قطار عابر في مترو الأنفاق المرتفع. يدعي شاهد آخر أنه سمع الصبي يهدد والده - "سأقتلك!" - ثم سقط والده ميتاً بعد ذلك ببضع ثوان. ولكن كيف سمع الشاهد الثاني أي شيء بالرغم من صوت القطار الذي يصم الآذان؟
تظهر المزيد من التناقضات في حجج المحلفين الآخرين. لا يمكن العثور على بصمات الصبي على السكين. ليست مشكلة للمحلف الرابع: الصبي قاتل بدم بارد يمسح السكين ، حيث لا يزال ملوثًا بدماء والده. تم القبض على المتهم من قبل الشرطة عائدا إلى منزله ثلاثة ساعات من الجريمة. لماذا العودة إلى مسرح الجريمة؟ لدى المحلف الرابع إجابة: "أصيب بالذعر بعد أن قتل والده ، وبعد ذلك ، عندما هدأ أخيرًا ، أدرك أنه ترك السكين هناك." ولكن بعد ذلك ، يشير المحلف الأكثر تشككًا ، كيف يمكنك ضبط ذلك مع حقيقة أنه "كان هادئًا بما يكفي ليرى أنه لم تكن هناك بصمات على السكين؟"
يمكن أن تتخذ التناقضات شكل معايير مزدوجة. الصبي من الأحياء الفقيرة ، والمحلف العاشر يعلم أن الناس هناك "كذابين بالفطرة" ؛ "لا يمكنك تصديق كلمة مما يقولون". ومع ذلك ، ليس لديه أي مشاكل في قبول شهادة الشاهدة التي تدعي أنها رأت الصبي يرتكب جريمة القتل ، على الرغم من أنها "واحدة منهم أيضًا" ، كما يشير المحلف المتشكك.
في بعض الأحيان ، يظهر التناقض بشكل صارخ لدرجة أنه لا يحتاج حتى إلى الإشارة إليه. دافع المحلف الثالث بشدة عن حكم الإدانة ، معتمدا في جزء كبير منه على شهادة الرجل الذي قال إنه سمع الشجار ورأى الصبي يغادر الشقة بعد ذلك مباشرة. مع ذلك ، يدعي الشاهد أنه نهض وتجاوز طول المبنى بأكمله في خمس عشرة ثانية - وهو أمر مستحيل بالنسبة لرجل عجوز يعرج. لكن هذه ليست قضية للمحلف الثالث: لابد أن الشاهد قد أخطأ في تقديره - بعد كل شيء ، "كان رجلاً عجوزًا ، نصف الوقت كان مرتبكًا. كيف يمكن أن يكون إيجابيا بشأن أي شيء؟ "
هذه التناقضات تدفع ببطء معظم المحلفين نحو الشك المعقول ، ولكن ليس كلهم . ومع ذلك ، فإن معظم العمل يتم عن طريق الجدل. إن الجدل هو الذي يسمح للثغرات في قضية الادعاء بالظهور. إن الجدل هو الذي يبرز المعايير المزدوجة. إن الجدل هو الذي يكشف التناقضات. إن الجدل هو الذي يثير الشك في أذهان المحلفين. في فيلم 12 Angry Men ، ينقذ الجدل حياة الصبي!!
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المصدر : كتاب The enigma of reason
ترجمة ماهر رزوق
.
.
في بداية فيلم 12 Angry Men ، يتهم شاب بطعن والده حتى الموت. حياته في وضع حرج: في غرفة المحلفين ، تتراكم الحجج من أجل الإدانة.
شاهد أحدهم الصبي يفعل ذلك. وسمع آخر الشجار ورأى المتهم يفر من الشقة ؛ عذر الصبي لا يصمد. لديه دافع ، ولديه سجل طويل من العنف. هناك استقطاب جماعي كامن ، وعلى استعداد لإقناع المحلفين بوجوب إرسال الصبي إلى الكرسي الكهربائي.
لكن أحد المحلفين أقل ثقة من الآخرين. في حين أن هذا المحلف غير مقتنع ببراءة المدعى عليه ، إلا أنه ليس متأكدًا تمامًا من ذنبه أيضًا. إنه "يريد التحدث فقط". عندما يتم حثه على تقديم الحجج ، يبدأ بحجج ضعيفة: الأدلة ضد الصبي جيدة جدًا ؛ إنها جيدة بشكل مريب.
ليس من المستغرب أن هذا لا يؤثر على أي من المحلفين الآخرين. ومع ذلك ، يقوم هذا المحلف بعمل أفضل في إحداث ثغرات في قضية الادعاء.
يكشف التناقضات في الحجج التي تجرم الصبي . يزعم أحد الشهود أنه شاهد جريمة القتل من الجانب الآخر من الشارع ، عبر نوافذ قطار عابر في مترو الأنفاق المرتفع. يدعي شاهد آخر أنه سمع الصبي يهدد والده - "سأقتلك!" - ثم سقط والده ميتاً بعد ذلك ببضع ثوان. ولكن كيف سمع الشاهد الثاني أي شيء بالرغم من صوت القطار الذي يصم الآذان؟
تظهر المزيد من التناقضات في حجج المحلفين الآخرين. لا يمكن العثور على بصمات الصبي على السكين. ليست مشكلة للمحلف الرابع: الصبي قاتل بدم بارد يمسح السكين ، حيث لا يزال ملوثًا بدماء والده. تم القبض على المتهم من قبل الشرطة عائدا إلى منزله ثلاثة ساعات من الجريمة. لماذا العودة إلى مسرح الجريمة؟ لدى المحلف الرابع إجابة: "أصيب بالذعر بعد أن قتل والده ، وبعد ذلك ، عندما هدأ أخيرًا ، أدرك أنه ترك السكين هناك." ولكن بعد ذلك ، يشير المحلف الأكثر تشككًا ، كيف يمكنك ضبط ذلك مع حقيقة أنه "كان هادئًا بما يكفي ليرى أنه لم تكن هناك بصمات على السكين؟"
يمكن أن تتخذ التناقضات شكل معايير مزدوجة. الصبي من الأحياء الفقيرة ، والمحلف العاشر يعلم أن الناس هناك "كذابين بالفطرة" ؛ "لا يمكنك تصديق كلمة مما يقولون". ومع ذلك ، ليس لديه أي مشاكل في قبول شهادة الشاهدة التي تدعي أنها رأت الصبي يرتكب جريمة القتل ، على الرغم من أنها "واحدة منهم أيضًا" ، كما يشير المحلف المتشكك.
في بعض الأحيان ، يظهر التناقض بشكل صارخ لدرجة أنه لا يحتاج حتى إلى الإشارة إليه. دافع المحلف الثالث بشدة عن حكم الإدانة ، معتمدا في جزء كبير منه على شهادة الرجل الذي قال إنه سمع الشجار ورأى الصبي يغادر الشقة بعد ذلك مباشرة. مع ذلك ، يدعي الشاهد أنه نهض وتجاوز طول المبنى بأكمله في خمس عشرة ثانية - وهو أمر مستحيل بالنسبة لرجل عجوز يعرج. لكن هذه ليست قضية للمحلف الثالث: لابد أن الشاهد قد أخطأ في تقديره - بعد كل شيء ، "كان رجلاً عجوزًا ، نصف الوقت كان مرتبكًا. كيف يمكن أن يكون إيجابيا بشأن أي شيء؟ "
هذه التناقضات تدفع ببطء معظم المحلفين نحو الشك المعقول ، ولكن ليس كلهم . ومع ذلك ، فإن معظم العمل يتم عن طريق الجدل. إن الجدل هو الذي يسمح للثغرات في قضية الادعاء بالظهور. إن الجدل هو الذي يبرز المعايير المزدوجة. إن الجدل هو الذي يكشف التناقضات. إن الجدل هو الذي يثير الشك في أذهان المحلفين. في فيلم 12 Angry Men ، ينقذ الجدل حياة الصبي!!
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المصدر : كتاب The enigma of reason
ترجمة ماهر رزوق
June 14, 2018
A very good book on human reasoning. The enigma here refers to the flaws of human reasoning such as confirmation bias, as well as an evolutionary explanation of reasoning and how such a flawed feature could be selected in natural selection.
The authors explain their model of human mind as it relates to reasoning, and then provide the evolutionary function of reasoning: To justify ourselves and to convince others. With this view, the "flaws" of reasoning become expected features of it: We do expect reason to be biased, for instance.
I find the book an excellent read. First, the arguments in the book are clearly presented and expressed, with a good organization into chapters and support of many examples. I guess the book is a good demonstration of one of its own subjects: argumentation and convincing others.
Secondly, the examples in the book are very interesting. Tons of interesting experiments such as the Wason card selection task, interesting historical information such as Thomas Jefferson's views regarding slavery, and so many others.
Thirdly, there is a lot to learn for our own practical life from the book, for instance, becoming aware of our own biases, understanding the way argumentation leads to better conclusions, the reason people generate reasons to accept ridiculous ideas, and so on. Thus, it is not only an interesting subject on its own, it is also quite practical. Overall, I highly suggest this book for an enjoyable read.
The authors explain their model of human mind as it relates to reasoning, and then provide the evolutionary function of reasoning: To justify ourselves and to convince others. With this view, the "flaws" of reasoning become expected features of it: We do expect reason to be biased, for instance.
I find the book an excellent read. First, the arguments in the book are clearly presented and expressed, with a good organization into chapters and support of many examples. I guess the book is a good demonstration of one of its own subjects: argumentation and convincing others.
Secondly, the examples in the book are very interesting. Tons of interesting experiments such as the Wason card selection task, interesting historical information such as Thomas Jefferson's views regarding slavery, and so many others.
Thirdly, there is a lot to learn for our own practical life from the book, for instance, becoming aware of our own biases, understanding the way argumentation leads to better conclusions, the reason people generate reasons to accept ridiculous ideas, and so on. Thus, it is not only an interesting subject on its own, it is also quite practical. Overall, I highly suggest this book for an enjoyable read.
July 10, 2019
'The study of books is a languishing and feeble motion that heats not, whereas conversation teaches and exercises at once. If I converse with a strong mind and a rough disputant, he presses upon my flanks, and pricks me right and left; his imaginations stir up mine; jealousy, glory, and contention, stimulate and raise me up to something above myself; and acquiescence is a quality altogether tedious in discourse.
The argumentative use of reasons helps genuine information cross the bottleneck that epistemic vigilance creates in the social flow of information. It is beneficial to addressees by allowing them to better evaluate possibly valuable information that they would not accept on trust. It is beneficial to communicators by allowing them to convince a cautious audience.
Argumentation helps overcome the limits of trust.'
The argumentative use of reasons helps genuine information cross the bottleneck that epistemic vigilance creates in the social flow of information. It is beneficial to addressees by allowing them to better evaluate possibly valuable information that they would not accept on trust. It is beneficial to communicators by allowing them to convince a cautious audience.
Argumentation helps overcome the limits of trust.'
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