“Somewhere between Ignorance and Arrogance”: Oppose any Foe by Mark Moyer.
You gotta play this game with fear and arrogance (Crash Davis)
Yeah, fear and ignorance. (Nuke Lalouche)
No, fear and arrogance you hayseed! (Crash)
Huh, I just like seeing you get mad (Nuke)
To those with only a cursory knowledge of our nation’s special operations forces, Mark Moyers history of SOF from WWII to present will provide both context and perspective. However, for even an amateur student of military history and/or special operations forces, this book has much less to offer. Moyer starts off his account with both the famous and less well known, referencing the much publicized mission to kill UBL and the successful rescue of a Danish-American de-mining team in Somalia in 2012. He then goes on to point out “The Rise of Special Operations Forces” to a force of almost 70,000 today and the almost unprecedented publicity and glamorization as compared to the services conventional forces. He has four major themes he follows in the course of his book: 1) Political expediency and sponsorship; 2) Mutability – what domain do SOF operate most effectively; 3) Disputation of value – the differences of opinion on their claims of success and actual contributions and 4) Rivalry with conventional forces – often in terms of ignorance (misuse) or arrogance (jealousy). The book’s value lies in his attempts at objectivity – inherently recognizing all SOF Ops aren’t successful. I also found that his starting point of World War II – the point at which the formation of most modern day SOF occurred as well as the post war NDA creating ‘Jointness’ were sound. Much of his book is concerned with a survey of SOF units, including devoting attention to some less well known (Det 1/OSS Kachin Rangers). However, he relies on all secondary source material – most of what he recounts will be more than familiar to those who’ve completed a cursory survey of SOF – and grossly oversimplifies many of his arguments (use Ranger and Raider examples). He offers very little perspective on the institutions that gave rise to them and falls prey to the ‘cult of personality’ that so dominates most SOF Narratives. Like most recent books on SOF, his recent accounts are dependent on very few sources. One topic he dances around is that specialized forces are a function of large militaries. ‘Specialization is for ants’ as Robert Heinlein wrote. Most SOF are in fact, parasites on larger conventional formations and institutions, exceptionally expensive and draw and inordinate amount of talent (he addresses this last point). They are also tactically fragile; not being easily raised they are exceptionally difficult to reconstitute. Losses that wouldn’t slow a conventional unit can bring a SOF unit to a halt; and usually result in a standown and loss of operational tempo. Additionally, their strained relationship with their services almost guarantees a propensity for malfeasance greater than their conventional counterparts. Finally, as there are great differences in the services, there are similar difference in the various SOF selection processes as there are differences in the different service approaches to manning them. A question that goes unanswered is what is the optimal SOF-conventional mix? These are the kind of questions that await a more scholarly and thorough book.