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The Cure for Catastrophe: How We Can Stop Manufacturing Natural Disasters
We can’t stop natural disasters, but we can stop them from being disastrous. One of the world’s foremost risk experts tells us how.
Year after year, floods sweep cities clean, earthquakes tear apart communities, and tornadoes uproot towns. Disasters bring with them rampage and despair. But does it have to be this way? In The Cure for Catastrophe, Robert Muir-Wood makes the controversial claim that our natural disasters are in fact human ones: we keep building in the wrong places and in the wrong way, putting brick buildings in the way of earthquakes, wood ones in the way of fire, and cities in the paths of tropical storms. We refuse to evacuate, blindly trusting our flood walls and disaster preparations, until they fail, making catastrophes even more deadly.
From the great Lisbon earthquake of 1755 to Hurricane Katrina, the story of natural disasters is less about a hostile environment than about human foolishness, denial, and greed. But there is hope, if humans cause catastrophes, we can also prevent them.
Year after year, floods sweep cities clean, earthquakes tear apart communities, and tornadoes uproot towns. Disasters bring with them rampage and despair. But does it have to be this way? In The Cure for Catastrophe, Robert Muir-Wood makes the controversial claim that our natural disasters are in fact human ones: we keep building in the wrong places and in the wrong way, putting brick buildings in the way of earthquakes, wood ones in the way of fire, and cities in the paths of tropical storms. We refuse to evacuate, blindly trusting our flood walls and disaster preparations, until they fail, making catastrophes even more deadly.
From the great Lisbon earthquake of 1755 to Hurricane Katrina, the story of natural disasters is less about a hostile environment than about human foolishness, denial, and greed. But there is hope, if humans cause catastrophes, we can also prevent them.
368 pages, Hardcover
Published September 1, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 17 of 17 reviews
June 9, 2021
This fascinating book is written by the Head of Research for RMS (the world’s leading catastrophe modelling firm) and someone I have had the pleasure to hear speak eloquently at conferences over the years (most recently a brilliant 2020 talk on COVID – both on the history of pandemics and on some fascinating counter-factuals on the COVID outbreak – pointing out for example that had the outbreak in Wuhan not coincided with Chinese New Year – we would probably not have heard of it).
The book is really about the history of the search for a cure for the impact (in damage and lives) from natural catastrophes (earthquakes, storms, fires, hurricane/cyclones, tsumanis, floods, volcanoes etc).
The chapters are set out thematically – and the overarching flow of the book is extremely logical. But each draws on various catastrophes scattered both across regions and over time (with many being re-examined in different chapters) – which is what can at times make the book a little hard to follow (if one is looking to apply a temporal or geographical filter).
The book uses story telling very effectively to make it a very enjoyable read as well as drawing on literature, the bible, and artistic sources to provide further colour and illustration .
The first chapter – slightly oddly placed - looks at both flood walls and evacuations (including looking at Hurricane Katrina and the 2011 Japanese earthquake/tsunami) – on flood walls it discussed how their effect can be counter-productive (for example in encouraging building in threatened areas).
The second focuses on the Great Lisbon earthquake in 1755 which it says were an “intellectual watershed: the view of catastrophes as some supernatural mystery outside the ordinary workings of the world yielded to attempts to develop a scientific understanding of these events” – and shows how little was understood at that stage.
The third shows the early stages of this process, particularly as relating to earthquakes (particularly difficult in California as there was an active attempt to downplay the risk so as not to imperil real estate values). This chapter also points out the problems even today with communications on earthquakes – the Richter scale (both simplistic and – due to use of a logarithmic scale – hard for non-mathematicians to understand) and the insistence on talking about an “epicentre” (and then drawing waves around it) of something which often actually occurs across a long fault. I found this last part very instructive.
The fourth and fifth were for me the most educationally valuable – in Catastrophe modelling terms (not used) this is about vulnerability curves and how they vary by construction type. The first recasts the story of the three little pigs – and looks at for example how brick designed buildings, while ideal for resisting fire and storms, have turned out to be very unsuitable for earthquake resistance ,while wooden buildings (especially if built like boats with rigid triangles) are almost the opposite. The next chapter looks in detail at concrete – how reinforced and engineered concrete can work really well but the non-reinforced, non-engineer designed concrete buildings built in poorer countries are death traps. This chapter also starts to examine building codes – both their importance and their loose if not non-existence enforcement in many cases.
The sixth and seventh were perhaps the most familiar ground – but I felt (with my prior knowledge) extremely well written. The sixth is a history of insurance which includes fire companies, fire insurers, reinsurers (including the first ever such firm – Cologne Re – for which I worked and which started by interest in insurance history due to its fantastic small archive/museum in Cologne) and Heath/Lloyd’s.
The seventh uses Borges’s early story “The Garden of Forking Paths” to examine the development of Monte-Carlo modelling in the Manhattan project and then to trace the development of Catastrophe modelling (with the East Coast AIR and West Coast RMS – two firms whose models are still vital to my day to day job).
The eight chapter then shifts away from the professionals (scientist, engineers, insurers and risk modellers) to society – and the decisions to be made about what is a tolerable/intolerable level of risk. The chapter has a lengthy discussion of the Dutch approach to flood risk, involving society wide collaboration and consensus (something which of course has spread outside of just flood prevention – with the Polder model of governance). The chapter points out how such a model has effectively failed completely to hold in other areas – while pointing out that it is much harder to deal with earthquake risk.
The ninth looks at disaster forecasting – particularly looking at volcanoes and earthquakes and concluding
The tenth is around disaster response – a slightly cynical chapter that shows that high-profile post-event responses (particularly international ones) are often largely around external perception and that most lives are saved almost immediately by friends and neighbours. The eleventh – also a little cynical – looks at how disasters have made or broken (or been exploited or covered up by) politicians.
The twelfth is a rather whistle stop tour of climate change impacts – which to be honest are better covered in more dedicated books (although the author admirably brings objective balance to his views on what impacts can really be seen from the data).
The last, deliberately futuristic and almost utopian in feel, argues for a profession and science of disaster risk reduction – with better education, risk reduction audits, more use of mutual insurance, better deployment of digital technology and innovative building design etc.
Overall a very worthwhile read which also assisted with my continuous professional development – given my recent increase in responsibilities to include international catastrophe management for a global insurer.
The book is really about the history of the search for a cure for the impact (in damage and lives) from natural catastrophes (earthquakes, storms, fires, hurricane/cyclones, tsumanis, floods, volcanoes etc).
The chapters are set out thematically – and the overarching flow of the book is extremely logical. But each draws on various catastrophes scattered both across regions and over time (with many being re-examined in different chapters) – which is what can at times make the book a little hard to follow (if one is looking to apply a temporal or geographical filter).
The book uses story telling very effectively to make it a very enjoyable read as well as drawing on literature, the bible, and artistic sources to provide further colour and illustration .
The first chapter – slightly oddly placed - looks at both flood walls and evacuations (including looking at Hurricane Katrina and the 2011 Japanese earthquake/tsunami) – on flood walls it discussed how their effect can be counter-productive (for example in encouraging building in threatened areas).
The second focuses on the Great Lisbon earthquake in 1755 which it says were an “intellectual watershed: the view of catastrophes as some supernatural mystery outside the ordinary workings of the world yielded to attempts to develop a scientific understanding of these events” – and shows how little was understood at that stage.
The third shows the early stages of this process, particularly as relating to earthquakes (particularly difficult in California as there was an active attempt to downplay the risk so as not to imperil real estate values). This chapter also points out the problems even today with communications on earthquakes – the Richter scale (both simplistic and – due to use of a logarithmic scale – hard for non-mathematicians to understand) and the insistence on talking about an “epicentre” (and then drawing waves around it) of something which often actually occurs across a long fault. I found this last part very instructive.
The fourth and fifth were for me the most educationally valuable – in Catastrophe modelling terms (not used) this is about vulnerability curves and how they vary by construction type. The first recasts the story of the three little pigs – and looks at for example how brick designed buildings, while ideal for resisting fire and storms, have turned out to be very unsuitable for earthquake resistance ,while wooden buildings (especially if built like boats with rigid triangles) are almost the opposite. The next chapter looks in detail at concrete – how reinforced and engineered concrete can work really well but the non-reinforced, non-engineer designed concrete buildings built in poorer countries are death traps. This chapter also starts to examine building codes – both their importance and their loose if not non-existence enforcement in many cases.
The sixth and seventh were perhaps the most familiar ground – but I felt (with my prior knowledge) extremely well written. The sixth is a history of insurance which includes fire companies, fire insurers, reinsurers (including the first ever such firm – Cologne Re – for which I worked and which started by interest in insurance history due to its fantastic small archive/museum in Cologne) and Heath/Lloyd’s.
The seventh uses Borges’s early story “The Garden of Forking Paths” to examine the development of Monte-Carlo modelling in the Manhattan project and then to trace the development of Catastrophe modelling (with the East Coast AIR and West Coast RMS – two firms whose models are still vital to my day to day job).
The eight chapter then shifts away from the professionals (scientist, engineers, insurers and risk modellers) to society – and the decisions to be made about what is a tolerable/intolerable level of risk. The chapter has a lengthy discussion of the Dutch approach to flood risk, involving society wide collaboration and consensus (something which of course has spread outside of just flood prevention – with the Polder model of governance). The chapter points out how such a model has effectively failed completely to hold in other areas – while pointing out that it is much harder to deal with earthquake risk.
The ninth looks at disaster forecasting – particularly looking at volcanoes and earthquakes and concluding
Once upon a time, all catastrophes – storms, floods hurricanes, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions – arrived without warning. That was before satellite observations, supercomputing, numerical weather prediction models, ensembles, Doppler radara and Bayesian forecasting. Today we have come to expect at least a week’s warning for an eruption, two or three days for a hurricane, twenty-four hours for its storm surge, at least twelve hours for (faster and harder-to-forecast) intense windstorms, six hours for flash floods, twenty minutes for a tsunami and at least five minutes for a tornado. But the deadly earthquake remains strangely, remarkably, almost admirably, resistant to all that forecasting science has thrown at it
The tenth is around disaster response – a slightly cynical chapter that shows that high-profile post-event responses (particularly international ones) are often largely around external perception and that most lives are saved almost immediately by friends and neighbours. The eleventh – also a little cynical – looks at how disasters have made or broken (or been exploited or covered up by) politicians.
The twelfth is a rather whistle stop tour of climate change impacts – which to be honest are better covered in more dedicated books (although the author admirably brings objective balance to his views on what impacts can really be seen from the data).
The last, deliberately futuristic and almost utopian in feel, argues for a profession and science of disaster risk reduction – with better education, risk reduction audits, more use of mutual insurance, better deployment of digital technology and innovative building design etc.
Overall a very worthwhile read which also assisted with my continuous professional development – given my recent increase in responsibilities to include international catastrophe management for a global insurer.
January 18, 2018
The Cure for Catastrophe: How We Can Stop Manufacturing Natural Disasters by Robert Muir-Wood is an interesting book about the development of disaster risk management as a science. Muir-Wood is a risk management specialist, and looks at natural disasters as issues of improper/underdeveloped policies pertaining to risk, as well as an unclear understanding of the composition of natural disasters. Muir-Wood looks at many instances of natural disasters that have caused some change in how humanity as a whole looks at the natural world, and how we plan, build and combat natural disasters as a tangible risk. Disasters that are examined include fires, storm surges, hurricanes, floods, Tsunamis and earthquakes throughout history. Principles of engineering, financing and insurance, urban design, and environmental sciences are all present throughout the book, as well as statistical risk management principles. Although the book seems complex, it is actually a fairly well organized book, and sticks to the lighter side of the above topics making the book readable and the topics approachable to the average reader.
Muir-Wood's starts by examining the history of natural disasters, beginning with the Great Lisbon Earthquake on All-Saints Day in 1755, but also looking at various other disasters, from Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti earthquake, to the history of Tsunamis in Japan, to typhoon storm surges in the Philippines and so on. These events often triggered a shift in how humans view disasters, and helped develop the principles of examining and attempting to predict and mitigate the impact of natural disasters. For example, the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 began to change how humans responded to disasters. Lisbon was a pious city, and the fact that it took place on a religious holiday lent credence to disasters as an Act of God. However, the Portuguese government began to enact principles akin to modern humanitarian aid, trying to feed, house and save the survivors. The earthquake also made intellectual rumbles throughout Europe, as other nations tried to make sense of the event.
The above disasters are examined to show the development of certain topics. Muir-Wood goes deeper into the development of disaster insurance as an industry. During many great disasters, like the San Francisco earthquake in the early 20th century, large percentages of the insurance industry involved in San Francisco were unable to process the overwhelming claims, and many were shuttered. This was due to a lack of understanding about natural disasters, an inability to predict or model them, and insurance premiums that did not fit the necessary financial requirements to process claims. These issues kick-started an interesting development of natural disaster modeling, as insurance brokers and jilted claimants battled it out in the court system. This led to a deeper look at disasters, and over time the insurance industry began to tighten up its policies by modeling risk in certain regions, adjusting premiums accordingly, and encouraging risk reduction by lobbying governments for more durable civic works, assistance during disasters, and so on.
Another topic examined is the development of urban design principles to combat natural disasters. These were not always privately led initiatives, as with the insurance examples above. For example, Tsunami prone areas of Japan began to look at ways to mitigate the impact of earthquake and Tsunami damage from the 19th century onward, by dealing with how flood waters drained into the Ocean, redesigning canal systems and river banks, building flood walls, and experimenting with construction materials. The Netherlands is another good example, where land reclamation projects began in the 17th century, and sophisticated systems of labour levying, taxation and drainage engineering led to the reclamation of huge tracts of land, and the elimination of perennial flood damages to Dutch agriculture.
The centuries long debate about housing construction design and materials is another topic. Wood was often more resilient to earthquakes, but during wind storms and floods would topple and wash away. Wood is also flammable, and many cities throughout the world have burned to the ground more than once throughout history. Building with stone and brick would often solve the fire problems, but these buildings became death traps during earthquakes, as they collapsed easily due to non-existent building code standards. Eventually, various nations began to experiment with building materials, building codes, design standards and the like to eliminate both fires and earthquake risks - leading to the high standards many nations have in terms of urban design. One shining example is Chile, where a 2015 magnitude 8.3 Earthquake, although damaging, had very low casualty rates. This is due to high building standards in a nation that has had repeated and damaging earthquakes throughout its history.
Muir-Woods book is interesting, factual, and looks at both historical evidence and modern practices to show the development of risk management principles to combat natural disasters. The book is well sourced, and contains much interesting information on how humans have pushed the science of natural disaster management into new directions, through private insurance issues, government run programs, civic engineering and environmental sciences. The book is global in scale, looking at disasters in the US, Japan, Chile, Mexico, the UK, Turkey, Iran and many more nations. To offer one complaint, I did feel the book jumped around frequently through periods of time. One section would pertain to earthquakes in Japan in the 19th century, and the next would be discussing a storm surge in the Philippines in the 21st Century, followed by civic engineering principles in Italy in the early 18th century. This jumping around often felt disorganized, as the principles being examined may not have been factually intertwined. Besides this small issue, this is an authoritative book, and I can easily recommend it to those interested in natural disaster history and science, environmental issues, or the principles of risk management.
Muir-Wood's starts by examining the history of natural disasters, beginning with the Great Lisbon Earthquake on All-Saints Day in 1755, but also looking at various other disasters, from Hurricane Katrina and the Haiti earthquake, to the history of Tsunamis in Japan, to typhoon storm surges in the Philippines and so on. These events often triggered a shift in how humans view disasters, and helped develop the principles of examining and attempting to predict and mitigate the impact of natural disasters. For example, the Lisbon earthquake in 1755 began to change how humans responded to disasters. Lisbon was a pious city, and the fact that it took place on a religious holiday lent credence to disasters as an Act of God. However, the Portuguese government began to enact principles akin to modern humanitarian aid, trying to feed, house and save the survivors. The earthquake also made intellectual rumbles throughout Europe, as other nations tried to make sense of the event.
The above disasters are examined to show the development of certain topics. Muir-Wood goes deeper into the development of disaster insurance as an industry. During many great disasters, like the San Francisco earthquake in the early 20th century, large percentages of the insurance industry involved in San Francisco were unable to process the overwhelming claims, and many were shuttered. This was due to a lack of understanding about natural disasters, an inability to predict or model them, and insurance premiums that did not fit the necessary financial requirements to process claims. These issues kick-started an interesting development of natural disaster modeling, as insurance brokers and jilted claimants battled it out in the court system. This led to a deeper look at disasters, and over time the insurance industry began to tighten up its policies by modeling risk in certain regions, adjusting premiums accordingly, and encouraging risk reduction by lobbying governments for more durable civic works, assistance during disasters, and so on.
Another topic examined is the development of urban design principles to combat natural disasters. These were not always privately led initiatives, as with the insurance examples above. For example, Tsunami prone areas of Japan began to look at ways to mitigate the impact of earthquake and Tsunami damage from the 19th century onward, by dealing with how flood waters drained into the Ocean, redesigning canal systems and river banks, building flood walls, and experimenting with construction materials. The Netherlands is another good example, where land reclamation projects began in the 17th century, and sophisticated systems of labour levying, taxation and drainage engineering led to the reclamation of huge tracts of land, and the elimination of perennial flood damages to Dutch agriculture.
The centuries long debate about housing construction design and materials is another topic. Wood was often more resilient to earthquakes, but during wind storms and floods would topple and wash away. Wood is also flammable, and many cities throughout the world have burned to the ground more than once throughout history. Building with stone and brick would often solve the fire problems, but these buildings became death traps during earthquakes, as they collapsed easily due to non-existent building code standards. Eventually, various nations began to experiment with building materials, building codes, design standards and the like to eliminate both fires and earthquake risks - leading to the high standards many nations have in terms of urban design. One shining example is Chile, where a 2015 magnitude 8.3 Earthquake, although damaging, had very low casualty rates. This is due to high building standards in a nation that has had repeated and damaging earthquakes throughout its history.
Muir-Woods book is interesting, factual, and looks at both historical evidence and modern practices to show the development of risk management principles to combat natural disasters. The book is well sourced, and contains much interesting information on how humans have pushed the science of natural disaster management into new directions, through private insurance issues, government run programs, civic engineering and environmental sciences. The book is global in scale, looking at disasters in the US, Japan, Chile, Mexico, the UK, Turkey, Iran and many more nations. To offer one complaint, I did feel the book jumped around frequently through periods of time. One section would pertain to earthquakes in Japan in the 19th century, and the next would be discussing a storm surge in the Philippines in the 21st Century, followed by civic engineering principles in Italy in the early 18th century. This jumping around often felt disorganized, as the principles being examined may not have been factually intertwined. Besides this small issue, this is an authoritative book, and I can easily recommend it to those interested in natural disaster history and science, environmental issues, or the principles of risk management.
December 13, 2016
This book reads as if someone dropped the manuscript out the window and then put the pages back together willy-nilly. It hops back and forth from century to century, continent to continent, and from one type of disaster to another. I guess this makes it less boring for people with short attention spans. But if the point is to help save millions of lives, why make it more confusing than it needs to be?
For example, we get a general idea that the Dutch have figured things out for flooding by building lots of walls. But they completely messed up on their Caribbean islands to prevent flooding from hurricanes, and other passages suggest flood walls kill people. So then at the end, there's one paragraph about what the Dutch did get right in Holland. I would have liked more depth.
Nevertheless, the book does sort of reveal a recipe for producing catastrophes: denial, deregulation, and indemnifying stupidity.
For example, we get a general idea that the Dutch have figured things out for flooding by building lots of walls. But they completely messed up on their Caribbean islands to prevent flooding from hurricanes, and other passages suggest flood walls kill people. So then at the end, there's one paragraph about what the Dutch did get right in Holland. I would have liked more depth.
Nevertheless, the book does sort of reveal a recipe for producing catastrophes: denial, deregulation, and indemnifying stupidity.
March 1, 2017
A bit uneven. And a bit repetitive. And much of this material I've seen in other forms. But basically this book asks the question of, isn't surviving natural disasters a solved problem? And the case was made fairly strongly. We know what to do - and it's not just not rebuilding New Orleans and abandoning Miami. It's the right kind of building for the right location. It's the right kind of insurance and reinsurance. It's defense in depth. And some additional relatively simple technology. All seems pretty doable, especially for countries with money. An interesting read.
April 19, 2019
The Cure for Catastrophe is a rich history of the intentional and unintentional ways in which we build structures and infrastructure for its collapse. The book is obviously a labour of love and long expertise in the subject, and I found it erudite and well-organized. (This is not to say it is entirely without minor flaws that further fact-checking should have solved - for instance, Muir-Wood erroneously states that the nuclear disaster at Chernobyl occurred in 1985!) Chapters on environmental hazards accompany others on historical research and policy in specific disaster issues, such as earthquake science, emergency preparedness, and building practices. Other chapters on risk management and prediction, as well as insurance, round out the book's total perspective on the disasters that defy comprehension, even though we know their names and can ring off statistics about them: X dead in Y...
I found myself thinking about Thinking in an Emergency quite a bit during this book, and came around to realizing that the two books are mutually complementary. For serious thinking about the integrated effects of total devastation, these two books are excellent starting places. Find them at your local library!
I found myself thinking about Thinking in an Emergency quite a bit during this book, and came around to realizing that the two books are mutually complementary. For serious thinking about the integrated effects of total devastation, these two books are excellent starting places. Find them at your local library!
May 15, 2020
Earthquakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, hurricanes, floods, climate change (not the 'natural' disaster currently outdoing all of them by far) are all on display here in this ambitious, yet entertaining tour of the field of catastrophe, root causes and the societal reactions. It is a dizzying journey through history and a somewhat uneven one, bouncing around from historical disaster to disaster and the often bungled responses. There are many fascinating tales--how San Francisco denied the earthquake of 1906 (just a bad fire), how the Dutch became the world leaders in flood control, and the Japanese in earthquake construction (until a little tsunami in 2011 undid the Fukushima nuclear plant) and the how the disaster insurance industry evolved. The book advertises a 'cure' for the aforementioned maladies and although that may be an ambitious title there a lot of ideas on what works and what does not. As he points out, building resilience to disaster is extremely difficult as only disasters seem to generate the political will to make real changes, while prevention without a recent disaster is almost impossible in the face of human tendency to put off what can be faced tomorrow or next decade. He is clearly an expert in the field and points many interesting puzzles and paradoxes. The book is copiously footnoted with many interesting citations (the best for me was 'Floods of the Tiber in Ancient Rome' with a link to site with a high water mark still extant from 1277 A.D., the oldest in the City). I guess the general disorganization lowered it 1-star for me.
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August 1, 2021Dr. Muir is not only an excellent writer, but he is also among the most highly accredited professionals in his field of disaster research and modeling. He is the leading research officer at Risk Management Solutions, one of the world’s most prestigious catastrophe risk modeling companies. And to further add to his credibility are his other high ranking positions focused on financial management of catastrophic risk elements. In his book, The Cure for Catastrophe, readers are given a detailed expose of how most countries have failed to properly control disaster risks as well as insights on how we can improve. Muir argues that the natural disasters themselves are usually not the cause of catastrophes and that the real perpetrator is often times human error. He does this through detailed expositions of historical catastrophes and the ways that they could have been prevented.
From cases of school buildings collapsing, to entire cities burning, the unifying theme between his examples is people’s proclivity to focus on reparations after a disaster as opposed to proactively working to prevent them. Muir points out that with the technology available and the knowledge we have of when and where disasters are likely to strike, it is no longer excusable for preventable deaths to continue piling up. It is already known that continued urbanization in hazardous areas only increases the disaster risk, but Muir points out that it is even worse when that development completely disregards the present hazards. This is an actively perpetuating problem and can be seen in both developing and already highly developed countries. Muir also points out that people will build where it is easy and in a way that is affordable which can put entire communities at risk if not properly regulated. This was explained with cases such as unreinforced concrete buildings constructed above active fault lines collapsing and killing hundreds, or the fact that we continue building open ground floor buildings even though they are one of the leading causes of collapse during earthquakes. Despite the many declarations of the ways we have failed, Muir still offers the reader a hopeful vision of the future by claiming that with a proper paradigm shift, we can greatly improve our resistance to natural disasters worldwide. He also stresses the importance of acting on the knowledge we have, such as a Japanese school teacher who saved hundreds of children simply by teaching them proper tsunami safety protocols.
The only real argument that can be made against Muir’s claims is the fact that not all communities have access to the resources required to prevent the disasters that they are subjected to. However, even this problem can be mitigated through the same changes in mindset that he advocates for throughout the book, as it is the same issue of poorly placed priorities again that exasperates risks for the disprivileged. This is evident when considering how often low-income residential areas are built in hazard zones with no regard given to building codes to ensure their safety. This problem, according to Muir, would be less common in a society that valued preparedness, one which invests more money where it is needed and builds structures that resist disasters as opposed to attempting to make amends after the damage has been done.
From cases of school buildings collapsing, to entire cities burning, the unifying theme between his examples is people’s proclivity to focus on reparations after a disaster as opposed to proactively working to prevent them. Muir points out that with the technology available and the knowledge we have of when and where disasters are likely to strike, it is no longer excusable for preventable deaths to continue piling up. It is already known that continued urbanization in hazardous areas only increases the disaster risk, but Muir points out that it is even worse when that development completely disregards the present hazards. This is an actively perpetuating problem and can be seen in both developing and already highly developed countries. Muir also points out that people will build where it is easy and in a way that is affordable which can put entire communities at risk if not properly regulated. This was explained with cases such as unreinforced concrete buildings constructed above active fault lines collapsing and killing hundreds, or the fact that we continue building open ground floor buildings even though they are one of the leading causes of collapse during earthquakes. Despite the many declarations of the ways we have failed, Muir still offers the reader a hopeful vision of the future by claiming that with a proper paradigm shift, we can greatly improve our resistance to natural disasters worldwide. He also stresses the importance of acting on the knowledge we have, such as a Japanese school teacher who saved hundreds of children simply by teaching them proper tsunami safety protocols.
The only real argument that can be made against Muir’s claims is the fact that not all communities have access to the resources required to prevent the disasters that they are subjected to. However, even this problem can be mitigated through the same changes in mindset that he advocates for throughout the book, as it is the same issue of poorly placed priorities again that exasperates risks for the disprivileged. This is evident when considering how often low-income residential areas are built in hazard zones with no regard given to building codes to ensure their safety. This problem, according to Muir, would be less common in a society that valued preparedness, one which invests more money where it is needed and builds structures that resist disasters as opposed to attempting to make amends after the damage has been done.
December 25, 2020
I don't agree with the negative reviews of this book below.
The author is not a full time journalist. He is not a historian.
He is writing about the field that he works in and he is very experienced and has traveled the world.
Muir-Wood is a leading international expert in the forensics of disasters and catastrophe risk management.
He is experienced in writing and journalism too, so he has a fluid style that is easy to follow,
I did not find what others here called his "bouncing around" distracting at all.
He makes solid points in strong arguments.
I saved this book up on my coffee table since March when the pandemic struck here and I just picked it up a few weeks ago.
I am glad to finish out the year with such a worthy read,
The author is not a full time journalist. He is not a historian.
He is writing about the field that he works in and he is very experienced and has traveled the world.
Muir-Wood is a leading international expert in the forensics of disasters and catastrophe risk management.
He is experienced in writing and journalism too, so he has a fluid style that is easy to follow,
I did not find what others here called his "bouncing around" distracting at all.
He makes solid points in strong arguments.
I saved this book up on my coffee table since March when the pandemic struck here and I just picked it up a few weeks ago.
I am glad to finish out the year with such a worthy read,
September 19, 2017
I skimmed through much of this book tonight. Very readable collection of examples supporting the author's argument that we need both "disaster culture and disaster policy." Useful stuff here.
(Also, I googled "seismic retrofitting" in the middle of reading...we really need to work on our home earthquake prep!)
(Also, I googled "seismic retrofitting" in the middle of reading...we really need to work on our home earthquake prep!)
August 19, 2020
This book could be half as long and say what it wants to say, way too many almost arbitrary examples of events used when only a few are really needed. The whole book basically says, it is easy to not die when there is a massive flood or earthquake if you, retrofit houses, have a escape and recovery plan and create a catastrophe culture as well as policy. All feels very cursory.
May 29, 2018
Good to learn more in depths on catastrophe: understanding the difference with "disaster", the Three Pig and Wolf story and the twist, the dark side of risk reduction, the importance of local adaptations and intelligence, etc.
March 22, 2017
Really well written and interesting. It's ridiculous how much politics plays a part in disaster management and preparedness - how things aren't done until something bad happens because it won't win an election. Plus, people are just dumb - it's frustrating.
September 12, 2020
Excellent book. Should be required reading for everyone in public office.
November 5, 2018
This was more of an examination of disasters than a guide book. If you are looking for straightforward solutions and actionable takeaways on disaster reduction, you will probably be disappointed in this book. However, I was very interested in the details provided on the history of disaster management including building codes and insurance. The writing is readable, but the structure could have been improved to add clarity.
October 1, 2018
Excellent overview of the disaster business.
March 28, 2017
The central message of Robert Muir-Wood's "The cure for catastrophe" is well summarized on the back cover of the book: "Natural disasters aren't just natural - they're made by humans too". As the head of research at a catastrophe modeling company, and a lead author on climate and catastrophe risks for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Muir-Wood is well placed to reach this conclusion.
With an impressive lists of examples, Muir-Wood shows that earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes and volcano eruptions are often more lethal than they need to be, mainly because of human error. The origins of these errors are very diverse: sometimes simply scientific ignorance (how were people to know what causes earthquakes until they understood plate tectonics), limited recollection of past similar disasters (some disasters only strike the same place once in every 2000 years), and, of course, greed (property developers have a vested interest in making you believe that the disaster was a one-off).
However, Muir-Wood succeeds very well in avoiding the dangerous trap of righteousness that hindsight often brings. For instance, we all now agree that it was crazy that the Japanese built their nuclear plants on a sea shore that was known to be at risk from tsunamis - but, when the nuclear plants were built, the sea shore was the only option as Japanese rivers are completely unsuitable for providing cooling water. We think it is only right that the governor who refused the evacuation of Saint Pierre de Martinique died with all other inhabitants when the city was destroyed by a volcano eruption that had been preparing for weeks in advance - until we realize that there are also examples of false alarms, where the forced evacuation of a poor area caused a major disruption. We forget that some places are both vulnerable to hurricanes and to earthquakes, and that the building techniques that make a house resilient to one type of disasters makes it more vulnerable to the second. And so on...
While Muir-Wood avoids patronizing lecturing, he does point out that history has taught us some lessons. After much trial-and-error, people have found techniques to make houses more earthquake-resistant. Tsunami alarm systems exist now and limit the risk of another carnage. Disaster response procedures have improved. It took the Dutch centuries, but eventually they have learned against all odds how to master the floods. Insurance has been developed so that destruction does not always end with financial ruin (although it of course also creates moral hazard, as Muir-Wood acknowledges). In general, as countries become richer, and their institutional capabilities improve, their resilience in the case of disaster improves as well.
It is clear that the central messages of this book should be known to all policy makers over the world, especially as climate change is likely to increase the risk and magnitude of coming disasters. Understanding how to reduce the impact of disaster through precautionary measures, and how to respond to disasters when they strike, will become key.
In general, the book is also a very pleasant read, and some chapters read as thrillers, even if we already know the outcome in advance. Nevertheless, the book could have used some culling in the examples, especially half way - the same messages could have been conveyed with more force in a book about one third shorter. But this is a minor flaw in a book that discusses one of the major policy issues of the coming decades and maybe centuries: how to avoid that natural disasters are made worse by human action (or by the lack of it).
With an impressive lists of examples, Muir-Wood shows that earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes and volcano eruptions are often more lethal than they need to be, mainly because of human error. The origins of these errors are very diverse: sometimes simply scientific ignorance (how were people to know what causes earthquakes until they understood plate tectonics), limited recollection of past similar disasters (some disasters only strike the same place once in every 2000 years), and, of course, greed (property developers have a vested interest in making you believe that the disaster was a one-off).
However, Muir-Wood succeeds very well in avoiding the dangerous trap of righteousness that hindsight often brings. For instance, we all now agree that it was crazy that the Japanese built their nuclear plants on a sea shore that was known to be at risk from tsunamis - but, when the nuclear plants were built, the sea shore was the only option as Japanese rivers are completely unsuitable for providing cooling water. We think it is only right that the governor who refused the evacuation of Saint Pierre de Martinique died with all other inhabitants when the city was destroyed by a volcano eruption that had been preparing for weeks in advance - until we realize that there are also examples of false alarms, where the forced evacuation of a poor area caused a major disruption. We forget that some places are both vulnerable to hurricanes and to earthquakes, and that the building techniques that make a house resilient to one type of disasters makes it more vulnerable to the second. And so on...
While Muir-Wood avoids patronizing lecturing, he does point out that history has taught us some lessons. After much trial-and-error, people have found techniques to make houses more earthquake-resistant. Tsunami alarm systems exist now and limit the risk of another carnage. Disaster response procedures have improved. It took the Dutch centuries, but eventually they have learned against all odds how to master the floods. Insurance has been developed so that destruction does not always end with financial ruin (although it of course also creates moral hazard, as Muir-Wood acknowledges). In general, as countries become richer, and their institutional capabilities improve, their resilience in the case of disaster improves as well.
It is clear that the central messages of this book should be known to all policy makers over the world, especially as climate change is likely to increase the risk and magnitude of coming disasters. Understanding how to reduce the impact of disaster through precautionary measures, and how to respond to disasters when they strike, will become key.
In general, the book is also a very pleasant read, and some chapters read as thrillers, even if we already know the outcome in advance. Nevertheless, the book could have used some culling in the examples, especially half way - the same messages could have been conveyed with more force in a book about one third shorter. But this is a minor flaw in a book that discusses one of the major policy issues of the coming decades and maybe centuries: how to avoid that natural disasters are made worse by human action (or by the lack of it).
Read
May 28, 2017Hundreds of dates, thousands of statistics, and the revelation that more money = safer buildings if not for politics. Natty disasters don't kill us, shoddy overlooked construction does.
I could not read the final two chapters because the data and ranting became overbearing to me. Maybe I'll skim the final whatever pages.
I could not read the final two chapters because the data and ranting became overbearing to me. Maybe I'll skim the final whatever pages.
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