The Imperial Presidency

by Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.

From two-time Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., comes one of the most important and influential investigations of the American presidency. The Imperial Presidency traces the growth of presidential power over two centuries, from George Washington to George W. Bush, examining how it has both served and harmed the Constitution and what Americans can do about it in years to come. The book that gave the phrase “imperial presidency” to the language, this is a work of “substantial scholarship written with lucidity, charm, and wit” (The New Yorker).

Genres: History, Politics, Nonfiction, American History, Presidents, American, Political Science

624 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1973

About the author

Arthur Meier Schlesinger Jr., born Arthur Bancroft Schlesinger, was a Pulitzer Prize recipient and American historian and social critic whose work explored the liberalism of American political leaders including Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Robert F. Kennedy. He served as special assistant and "court historian" to President Kennedy from 1961 to 1963. He wrote a detailed account of the Kennedy Administration, from the transition period to the president's state funeral, titled A Thousand Days. In 1968, he actively supported the presidential campaign of Senator Robert F. Kennedy until Kennedy's assassination in the Ambassador Hotel on June 5, 1968, and wrote the biography Robert Kennedy and His Times several years later.

He popularized the term "imperial presidency" during the Nixon administration by writing the book The Imperial Presidency.

His father was also a well-known historian.

Reviews

[Gina · Rating 2 out of 5]

I read Charlie Savage's Takeover: The Return of the Imperial Presidency some years ago, which referred to this, and thought I should read it. This book is not necessary for the other one, though it has its own points and its own weaknesses.

Maybe weakness is the wrong word. The first chapters are about legal history and constitutional law, and this is true with other authors too, but reading that is a long and difficult slog. i can't say that it is boring, because interesting information comes out, but it comes out between bits of forcing yourself to stay awake. That's just how it goes, at least for me, but there is definite value in seeing how precedents have been established, especially when they are being overturned.

Still, the part about Nixon himself and his attempts to consolidate presidential power were the most vivid parts of the book, and also fairly short. There is a lot of buildup, a fascinating segment, and then some long speculation about potential future solutions.

Takeover is a better book, and more on point, because of its tight focus on the presidency of George W. Bush. Interestingly, there are clearer correlations between Trump and Nixon than Bush and Nixon, though that information would not have been available to either Savage or Schlesinger. Part of that is in leaving various positions empty and a greater reliance on aides, though Nixon didn't pull from family as much.

It was interesting seeing things that were terrible about Nixon before Watergate. I had not known about him impounding federal funds to prevent integration, or fighting fair housing and pushing out George Romney over it. I had recently learned more about his role in Vietnam anyway, but this did treat the bombing of Cambodia a little as well.

That was actually one thing that weakened the book, in that all of the previous demonstrations of how presidential power was used or not used is supposed to help give Nixon's behavior context, and he was so far out of precedent and propriety, and it seems to be more a matter of personality than anything else.

It was valuable and interesting to see things that responsible presidents did to stay informed and make good choices, and maybe even make poor choices but with some attempts at doing right, but it does not relate to Nixon.

The other sad thing is that this presidential historian had previously noticed a 50-year cycle of presidential corruption - that perhaps the recoil from one scandal helps everyone avoid carefully avoid scandal for that long - so concluded that Americans should brace themselves for 2023.

If only.

I just want to share one line that I am sure is unfair, but it did wake me up:

"Quite the contrary, valued obstinate and opinionated men (who else could have put up for a dozen years with Harold Ickes?) and made debate a fundamental method of government."

Feels longer than it is.

[Dan Cassino · Rating 5 out of 5]

The mark of a great book is that it is as relevant decades after it was written as it was then. Long passages written about Nixon or Reagan could be perhaps better applied to more recent Presidents. Though the concentration on the unbridled foreign policy powers of POTUS seem outdated, the structure by which Schlesinger understands the office, and his objections to many knee jerk reforms, are still vivid.

[Eric Hollister · Rating 4 out of 5]

I saw this book in a library book sale and thought, as it was written in 1973 and focuses on the Nixon administration, would make a very interesting parallel to what is currently going on in government. I bought it (for a dime!) and was not disappointed. The book traces presidential power from the nation's founding up to Nixon, and focuses primarily on war powers, foreign policy and treaties, emergency powers, and secrecy (i.e. executive privilege). It is incredibly well researched and documented, and as such there are some choice quotes in here. Some of my many, many notes follow:


Chief Justice John Marshall: No exception to compulsory process of the court…President "may be impeached and may be removed from office." The POTUS "may be subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper in his possession…" (Page 31)

Founding Fathers: "A decent respect to the opinion of mankind " impelled them to write the Declaration of Independence. Federalist papers: "sensibility to the opinion of the world" was an indispensable characteristic of sound government. 63rd Federalist: (paraphrased) We should consider opinions and reactions of other nations when making policy for two reasons: 1) Other nations should feel our policy is wise and honorable. 2) When we are divided in our thinking or whipped up into a passionate frenzy, the opinion of the impartial world might be a good guide. "What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures, had, in every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?" (Page 34)

Push toward neutrality grew in 30s. Popular referendum of World War "except in cases of actual or threatened attack" or "actual invasion." In a 1937 gallup poll 3/4 of nation in favor of Peace Amendment: Except in event of invasion, "the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast in a Nation-wide referendum." Congressman Louis Ludlum: "To declare war is the highest act of sovereignty...and should not be delegated to any man or body of men." (Page 98)

Resolution from 1951 saying that no additional forces could be sent [to Korea] without prior auth of Cong in each instance, also specifies funds cannot be used to send additional troops. Truman said he didn't need Cong auth. Great debate info here. Resolution watered down a bit authorized four more divisions but no more, passed narrowly in the Senate. Senator Nixon voted against inherent presidential authority and for the principal of Congressional control of troop deployment (pp. 136-140)

Jefferson: "The freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic governments." (Article XIV of the Virginia Declaration of Rights) (p 228)

Watergate discussion…"Locke condemned the executive who in normal times 'set up his own arbitrary will as the law of society' or who employed "the force, treasure, and offices' of society to gain his purposes through interference in the political process..." (page 269)

Woodrow Wilson "No peculiar dignity or sanctity attaches amongst us to any officer of government. The theory of our law is that an officer is an officer only so long as he acts within his powers; that when he transcends his authority he ceases to be an officer and is only a private individual, subject to be sued and punished for his offense." (page 273)

"As problems unforseen in 1787 had emerged, judicial interpretation had unfolded new possibilities in the Constitution, which was after all, as Holmes said, a document to be read 'in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago'" (page 285)

Hamilton in 26th Federalist: limitations on army appropriations "obliged" congress "once at least every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot, to come to a new resolution on the point, and to declare their sense on the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents." (page 309)

Author: "though who could tell what might result from building up an American base in the Persian Gulf?" (page 314)

"The whole concept of a return to secrecy in peacetime demonstrates a profound misunderstanding of the role of a free press...The plea for security could well become a cloak for errors, misjudgements and other failings of government." Quote by Richard Nixon 1961 (Page 343)

"The tyranny of the legislature is really the danger most to be feared, and will continue to be so for many years to come. The tyranny of the executive power will come in its turn, but at a more distant period." Jefferson to Madison six weeks before Washington's first inaugural. (page 377)

Americans have tacitly assumed that through the winnowing process of elections no one will be elected who will reject "the written restraintsof the Constitution and the unwritten restraints of the republican ethos." Bryce, 1921: "Not many Presidents have been brilliant, some have not risen to the full moral height of the position. But none has been base or unfaithful to his trust, none has tarnished the honor of the nation." [Ironically, this was just before Harding's election!] (Page 378)

George Mason at the Consitutional Convention: "No point is of more importance than the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above justice? Above all shall that man be above it, who [as President] can commit the most extensive injustice?" (page 414)

And finally:

Author: "We have noted that corruption appears to visit the White House in fifty-year cycles. This suggests that exposure and retribution inoculate the Presidency against its latent criminal impulses for about half a century. Around the year 2023 the American people would be well-advised to go on the alert and start nailing down everything in sight." (page 418)

I guess he was off by a few years...

[Tony · Rating 4 out of 5]

The Imperial Presidency is great reading for anyone seeking to understand the debates over presidential power & democratic accountability and how we reached the present status. Schlesinger Jr. is a compelling writer who speaks from personal experience and his own friendship with JFK.

Schlesinger begins by outlining what was created at the Constitutional Convention--rejection of the Hamilton Plan and placement of foreign policy in the hands of the Congress. Then he develops how that framework was implemented, with Washington creating precedents and vigorously using the powers granted by the Constitution. On the other hand, Jefferson as president relied on his role as political party head, rather than on presidential status, to guide legislation and foreign policy. Jefferson articulated the doctrine of the Lockean Perogative--executive action for the good of the commonwealth later submitted to the legislature and judiciary for commendation or censure (Louisiana Purchase, Barbary Wars, Burr Conspiracy).

Debate on presidential responsibility in war was continuous throughout the 19th century. Schlesinger argues for the position that the role of "commander-in-chief" of the armed forces only confers power upon the president during time of war declared by Congress or in a national emergency where the president relies upon Lockean Perogative. Needless to say, Schlesinger's position was a minority in his own time and almost unknown today. For Schlesinger traced the apex of presidential war-making to Woodrow Wilson--and Americans' national disillusionment with World War that led to the Congress re-asserting itself as primary in questions of war and foreign policy. Despite Schlesinger's support of FDR politically, he shows how FDR's campaign to bring the USA into World War Two undermined the narrative of congressional competency in foreign affairs. Then Schlesinger calls Truman's self-described "police action" in Korea as "The Presidency Ascendant." JFK, Schlesinger's friend and boss, is spared much criticism, but that is a momentary pause as Schlesinger attacks LBJ and Nixon as "Vietnam: The Presidency Rampant."

In addition to war and foreign policy, Schlesinger addresses two more ways presidents accumulated imperial power--the budget process and the secrecy system. Until the Bureau of the Budget was established in 1922, Schlesinger notes, agencies looked directly to congressional committees for funding and direction. When the growing size of government made that process incoherent, Congress remained inactive, giving the presidency the opening to assert control by taking over the budgetary reins. On the secrecy system, Schlesinger catalogues a decreasing openness, increasing obfuscation and belligerence, and use of state secrets as political weaponry.

In sum, writing in the tumultuous aftermath of Nixon's Watergate inspired resignation, Schlesinger saw an imbalanced presidency. Schlesinger is no believer in weak presidents as good for the country however. The forward he wrote as editor of the American Presidents Series of biographies calls the presidency "the vital center" of action--necessary to a thriving democratic system in America. In the epilogue to the 2004 edition of The Imperial Presidency, Schlesinger sums up his book in one sentence: "The title refers to the condition that ensues when the constitutional balance between presidential power and presidential accountability is upset in favor of presidential power."

How can that accountability be maintained is the fundamental question facing our political culture of the past 50 years. As Schlesinger's contemporary and colleague, Richard Nuestadt, wrote in his Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, "When it come to action risking nuclear war, technology has modified the Constitution: the President, perforce, becomes the only such man in the system capable of exercising judgement under the extraordinary limits now imposed ..." Perhaps the only disappointment of reading Schlesinger's The Imperial Presidency is to see the problems continue, the quandary between power and accountability as intractable as ever, and to find no definitive solutions in Schlesinger's book. Sometimes it seems Schlesinger's only solution to solve the modern presidency is to make sure all presidents act like JFK (read Schlesinger's A Thousand Days to understand JFK's leadership in the White House).

[noblethumos · Rating 5 out of 5]

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.’s The Imperial Presidency (1973) remains one of the most incisive and enduring analyses of executive power in American political thought. Written at the height of the Watergate scandal and published amid the constitutional crisis of the Nixon era, the book traces the historical expansion of presidential authority from the early Republic to the twentieth century. Schlesinger’s argument is both historical and normative: he warns that the United States, conceived as a republic of limited powers, has gradually evolved into a polity dominated by an imperial presidency that threatens the constitutional balance envisioned by the framers. Combining the sensibilities of a historian, political theorist, and public intellectual, Schlesinger offers a sweeping account of how war, ideology, and institutional inertia have produced a concentration of executive power that endangers the very fabric of American democracy.


At its core, The Imperial Presidency examines the tension between presidential leadership and constitutional constraint. Schlesinger defines the “imperial presidency” as the condition in which the president’s power exceeds its constitutional bounds, particularly in matters of war, foreign policy, and secrecy. He argues that while strong executive leadership is sometimes necessary in crises, the historical tendency since the early twentieth century has been toward the normalization of emergency powers. The result is a presidency that increasingly acts as if it were accountable to itself rather than to Congress or the electorate.


Schlesinger’s narrative is organized chronologically, charting the evolution of executive authority from the Founding Fathers’ vision of a limited presidency through the crises of the modern era. He distinguishes between what he calls the “constitutional presidency”—anchored in law, shared governance, and accountability—and the “imperial presidency,” characterized by unilateral action, secrecy, and the erosion of checks and balances. His historical analysis begins with George Washington’s deliberate restraint, contrasts it with Andrew Jackson’s populist assertiveness, and moves through Abraham Lincoln’s wartime powers, Theodore Roosevelt’s “stewardship theory” of executive action, and Franklin D. Roosevelt’s consolidation of presidential authority during the Great Depression and World War II. By the mid-twentieth century, Schlesinger argues, the conditions were set for the full emergence of an imperial presidency during the Cold War.


Particularly compelling is Schlesinger’s treatment of the post–World War II period, when the institutional and ideological structures of the national security state entrenched executive dominance. The Cold War, he contends, provided both the rationale and the machinery for perpetual emergency government. Presidential war-making—first under Truman in Korea, later under Johnson and Nixon in Vietnam—bypassed congressional authority, justified by doctrines of containment and national security. Schlesinger shows how secrecy, bureaucratic expansion, and the growth of the intelligence apparatus produced a presidency increasingly insulated from democratic oversight. The Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, for Schlesinger, represent the culmination of this historical process: a moment when the president assumed quasi-monarchical prerogatives, undermining both the rule of law and public trust.


The theoretical underpinning of Schlesinger’s analysis lies in his interpretation of the American constitutional tradition. Drawing on Madisonian principles, he argues that the framers designed the separation of powers as a safeguard against tyranny, not as an obstacle to efficiency. The imperial presidency thus represents not merely a political development but a constitutional perversion—a drift toward Caesarism within a system meant to resist it. Schlesinger’s approach is implicitly republican: he invokes civic virtue and institutional restraint as antidotes to the temptations of power. Yet he is no idealist; his historical sensibility acknowledges that crises and global responsibilities inevitably expand presidential initiative. His concern is less with the existence of strong leadership than with the absence of countervailing forces to restrain it.


Critics of The Imperial Presidency have noted both its moral urgency and its historical selectivity. Some have argued that Schlesinger underplays the role of Congress and the judiciary in enabling executive aggrandizement, while others contend that his critique of presidential power is shaped by the particular excesses of the Nixon administration. Later scholars of the presidency—such as Richard Neustadt, Stephen Skowronek, and Sidney Milkis—have placed Schlesinger’s argument within broader frameworks of institutional development and political order, suggesting that the “imperial” tendency is a structural feature of modern governance rather than a mere aberration. Nonetheless, even these critiques confirm the enduring relevance of Schlesinger’s warning: that constitutional democracy depends upon the vigilance of both institutions and citizens against the encroachment of unchecked power.


Stylistically, Schlesinger’s prose combines scholarly precision with literary grace. His narrative is animated by a historian’s eye for continuity and irony, and by a moral intensity that reflects his dual identity as both scholar and public advocate. The tone is deeply informed by liberal humanism and by a faith in constitutionalism as the moral compass of American politics. While his diagnosis is historical, his prescription is civic: a call for renewed congressional oversight, public accountability, and the restoration of balance among the branches of government.


In retrospect, The Imperial Presidency stands as both a product of its time and a timeless meditation on power. Its arguments resonate in the post–9/11 era, when questions of executive secrecy, surveillance, and unilateral war-making have once again dominated political discourse. Indeed, Schlesinger himself updated the book in later editions to address these developments, reaffirming his thesis that the American presidency remains vulnerable to imperial temptations under the pressures of perpetual crisis.


The Imperial Presidency endures as a foundational text in the study of American constitutionalism and executive power. It offers a masterful synthesis of history, theory, and moral reflection, tracing how the logic of necessity and ambition has repeatedly expanded the presidency beyond its republican bounds. More than fifty years after its publication, Schlesinger’s warning remains pertinent: the preservation of liberty depends not merely on constitutional design but on the collective will to resist the concentration of power in the executive. In this sense, The Imperial Presidency is both a historical analysis and a civic admonition—a reminder that the health of a republic rests on the perpetual contest between authority and accountability.

GPT

[Lindsay · Rating 3 out of 5]

for work.

[Jared · Rating 3 out of 5]

In the closing paragraphs of this 1973 book, the author writes:

"We have noted that corruption appears to White House in fifty-year cycles. This suggests that exposure and retribution inoculate the Presidency against its latent criminal impulses for about half a century. Around the year 2023 people would be well advised to go on alert and start nailing down everything in sight."

***

Well, I started this book in January and I'm finally finishing it in July. I have to say that reading this book is like eating oatmeal through a straw: the content is rewarding and wholesome, but it is so dense that you can only enjoy it a little bit at a time and you don't think that you'll ever finish...

***

This book traces the rise of presidential powers from Washington until Nixon. It explains how the presidency has evolved over the years and explains how a president should never be too weak (also a problem) or too powerful.

While reading the book, I was shocked to see how much of the material is directly relevant to today (2018). I only had a hard copy, so there are only a few notes that I was able to extract:

- This book's comments on Watergate make me think about its parallels to Russian interference in the 2016 election:
"What they were seeking to steal was not the jewels, or money or other property of American citizens, but something much more valuable - their most precious heritage, the right to vote in a free election."

- A prudent prince, Machiavelli said, chose wise men for his council and gave these alone full liberty to speak the truth to him. The prince, moreover, must so comport himself that that each adviser "may see that the more freely he speaks, the more he will be acceptable." Machiavelli added that a ruler "ought to be a great asker, and a patient hearer of the truth about those things of which he has inquired..."

- "The more a President sits surrounded only by his own views and those of his personal advisers," said Senator Charles Mathias, "the more he lives in a house of mirrors in which all views and ideas tend to reflect and reinforce his own."

- The author is correct (in this 1973 book) about the influence that the president has on the rest of government:
"Each president's distinctive temperament and character, his values, standard, style, his habits, expectations, idiosyncrasies, compulsions, phobias recast the White House and pervaded the entire government beyond."

- "Executive privilege had the advantage of sounding like a very old term...though...no President or Attorney General used it before the Eisenhower administration..."

- "The unhappy truth is that the prevailing public opinion has been decisively wrong at the critical junctures. People have imposed a veto upon the judgments of informed and responsible officials...Mass opinion has acquired mounting power in this century. It has shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions..."
- Walter Lippmann (American writer; 1889-1974)

- "...the sacrosanct nature of the laws" should never be interfered with "save when the safety of the State is in question."...The President had to be conceded reserve powers to meet authentic emergencies. And yet, and yet...no argument was more depressing to constitutionalists, and no argument more appealing to usurpers.

- Watergate was potentially the best thing to have happened to the Presidency in a long time...And if the nation wanted to work its way back to a constitutional Presidency, there was only one way to begin. That was by showing Presidents that, when their closest associates placed themselves above the law and the Constitution, such transgressions would be, not forgiven or forgotten for the sake of the Presidency, but exposed and punished for the sake of the Presidency.

[Aaron Million · Rating 3 out of 5]

Schlesinger starts this book out by examining the history of the office of Presidency: how it was set up, the arguments that the Founders had about it, and how those arguments shaped the compromises that comprise the office. He then goes into how the powers of the office grew over time - gradually at first, then exponentially once FDR came into office. Ironically, Schlesinger credits him with not abusing the office as several later Presidents did. But, as Schlesinger points out, FDR's expansion of the office (via his actions during the Great Depression and WWII) paved the way for the rapid increase in power that began with Truman. I found this part of the book interesting, in part because Schlesinger writes about the relationship that Presidents had over time with Congress and, to a lesser extent, the Supreme Court.

But the last half of the book is, with a few diversions, basically a rant about Nixon's disastrous and deceptive behavior while he was in office: how Nixon isolated himself, surrounded himself with staff people (Haldeman, Erlichman, etc...) who acted like a palace guard - keeping others from seeing him, used the pretext of "national security" as a cloak to do whatever he pleased, how he marginalized his Cabinet, and had no respect for the office and the citizens. Well, Schlesinger is right on all of these things, but after awhile the book seems like more of a diatribe than anything else.

This is a useful book for anyone who is interested in the history of the Presidency, how it was created, why it was set up the way it was, and how it has changed over the ensuing two centuries.

Grade: C+

[Jamie · Rating 4 out of 5]

The first half or so of this important tome is a fascinating trek through a series of administrations and the highs and lows of presidential power and control. The second half is dedicated, for the most part, to a critique of Richard Nixon and his usurpation of powers normally delegated to - or carried out in conjunction with - the Congress and the courts. As the book came out in 1973, it is dated insofar as it predates Nixon's resignation the year after as well as the passing of the War Powers Resolution, though Schlesinger does critique the bill as it was proposed while he was wrapping up the book. Despite the tenuous staying power of the end - and Schlesinger's occasional meandering to sing the praises of the Founding Fathers - it is an impressive work of scholarship and one that students of constitutional history and federal law cannot afford to skip.

[Nathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Arthur Schlesinger's "The Imperial Presidency" is one of the best books I've read in a long time. It's an incisive and critical look at the American Presidency. It was published during the Nixon administration and then fell out of favor during the decades that followed. The dramatic expansion of executive power during the Bush years has made it seem both relevant and prophetic again.

[Jeremy · Rating 4 out of 5]

While I think it was a bit more of a straightforward anti-Nixon rag rather than a broader analytic/historical view of executive power, I thought it was excellent.

[Rodney Harvill · Rating 4 out of 5]

In this book, Mr. Schlesinger explores the changing relationship between the president and Congress in the area of foreign policy and its occasional interaction on domestic policy. The president is the commander-in-chief of the military and has a better understanding of international geopolitics on account of the staff in the State Department, but Congress is authorized to declare war and can set priorities through the legislative and budgeting processes. In their constitutional design for separation of powers, the founding fathers provided for quite a dance between the executive and legislative branches of the federal government, but the President often takes the lead for several reasons:

• Events requiring quick and decisive action can take place while Congress is not in session, and the President has to make decisions with the expectation that Congress will retroactively support him, although Congress' option not to back him is part of how they can hold him accountable.
• Congress tends to defer to the President in matters of foreign policy. Competing interests within Congress and fears that controversial decisions will jeopardize reelection prospects militate against decisive stands by the legislative branch. Furthermore, unlike the President, Congress doesn't have a cadre of foreign policy wonks advising it. Sadly, this can produce feckless submission when Congress should be making a strong stand against a President overstepping his bounds.

In times of crisis, presidential power tends to grow because of the need for prompt and decisive action, but afterwards Congress tends to claw back some or all of that power. One example given by Mr. Schlesinger that surprised me was the impeachment of Andrew Johnson. I had understood the impeachment to be the culmination of a power struggle between radical reconstruction proponents among the Republican members of Congress and a President who was less enamored with social change. In contrast, Mr. Schlesinger paints it as an example of Congress overreaching in its effort to restrain an executive branch whose powers had greatly expanded over the course of the Civil War. He didn't change my mind, but his arguments were sufficiently strong to cause me to expand my understanding of that impeachment.

There was no claw-back effort by Congress after World War 2 because it was almost immediately followed by the Cold War and its associated crises, such as the Berlin Airlift and the Korean War. As a result, the expansion of executive power became normal, and efforts to constrain it seen as challenges to the proper order. It wasn't until Nixon's abuses of power that Congress saw fit to do its job and hold the President accountable.

The President can often control the flow of information to Congress, either helping them or inhibiting their efforts to set priorities. In the early days of the Republic, Presidents gave a number of reasons for refusing to transmit records, including the following:

• Protection of confidential information
• Preservation of secrecy during sensitive negotiations
• Refusal to submit to harassment by the opposition party

After World War 2, such reasoning was developed into the expansive doctrine of executive privilege.

As discussed above, crisis situations tend to expand presidential power, but the conduct of the executive branch can be influenced by the personality of the President. For example, Dwight Eisenhower, accustomed to hierarchy and strict control of information from his days as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, expanded executive power and restricted the flow of information to Congress. Constraining Senator McCarthy’s witch hunts didn't help matters. On the other hand, JFK was more open to transparency with Congress. LBJ, in seeking consensus to enhance his power base, restricted the flow of information that could jeopardize that consensus. Richard Nixon, obsessed with political enemies, both real and imagined, and building on the foundations laid by his predecessors, took executive power and secrecy to extremes that would have been inconceivable only a few years before.

This book was originally written shortly after the downfall of the Nixon administration and was subsequently republished with an epilogue that addresses the events between Nixon and George H.W. Bush. While I don't necessarily agree with all of his positions, I appreciated how he openly considered the different sides of the exceedingly complex issues about which this book is written. The law of unintended consequences has never been and never will be repealed; and my engineer brain, trained by years of experience to ask what can go wrong, cringes when people try to solve the world's problems with sound bite solutions whose blind spots might be able to conceal an entire galaxy. So, even if you disagree with Mr. Schlesinger, I think you might benefit from observing how he reasons.

[Jeremiah · Rating 3 out of 5]

In The Imperial Presidency, Schlesinger explains the history of the American balance of power and how the original model of our government has evolved and come into question. The founding fathers sought to have a strong presidency that was also limited in power, and they distributed related powers across the three branches with accountability measures to prevent them from taking on too much power. Even within this framework there was intentional ambiguity and flexibility such that a certain combination of power-hungry and/or complacent leaders could result in one branch exceeding its intended role, but even the limits of those roles have been brought into question as the entire history of the US Government has been a time of experimentation to see which combinations of the constitution work best and which should be discarded.

Schlesinger uses this book to explain the background of executive power, its limitations, and how it has progressed since the country's founding. The early presidents understood the mindset and reasoning behind the constitution and its context, and they recognized the importance of maintaining a proper balance of power for the sake of future generations. One of the primary opportunities for abuse of power lay in foreign policy because of the scarcity of information and the time-sensitive nature of such dealings. By the early 19th century - not so long after the founding - the executive branch began to take on more power through the medium of foreign policy by exerting American influence abroad and manipulating the flow of information to congress. Congress retaliated in its own way and thus a pattern emerged of the give-and-take of trying to find the right balance between branches.

One element of flexibility in the constitution was to enable the president to take on unusual amounts of power in order to address emergent, anomalous situations for the sake of the nation's preservation. This relates back to Locke's idea that when a group's existence is called into question, the intent of the law is more important than its specific mechanics. Lincoln and FDR were the two primary presidents to exercise such unusual levels of power, and they both wielded the power handily while also deferring to congress as appropriate and considering the impact their actions would have both on an immediate and future scale. But these exceptions added a chaos factor to the presidential ideology and the amount of exceptions taken, even if for good reason, were used by future leaders as justification for less worthy causes, even for the sake of their own political purposes. After World War II there was a great accumulation of power, global influence, and secrecy amounting to a centralization of power into the executive branch, and it seems as if congress didn't completely mind because it took the responsibility off their hands. Eisenhower had a part in this buildup of global influence and agencies, but the culmination of the secrecy and centralization were seen primarily in Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. They both removed accountability measures as much as possible, held their workings secret as much as possible, and surrounded themselves with like-minded "yes men" to support their preferred reality. The author focused more heavily on Nixon's administration as this was more fresh at the time of writing and also because Nixon embodied Schlesinger's theory of the imperial presidency most fully, that the executive branch had gained unprecedented levels of power which paved the way for despotism and corruption.

I liked how Schlesinger explained the progression of these specific events but also tied them to the bigger questions and implications that followed. If the balance of power is so prone to lean in favor of the executive, what would happen if we gave congress more power? Is the 18th-century model of the US government still a relevant and sustainable model in the Scientific Age? How much information should be kept secret? I think the crucial points beyond having a well-structured government is having capable, sensitive, selfless leaders in all branches of the government with as free a flow of information as is appropriate for the safety and functionality of the nation and also maintain the use of accountability measures. Unfortunately we are all prone to self-interest even if we start out with good intentions, and it's difficult to ensure that the best leaders will always be selected and then retain their ideals.

Overall I found the work very thought-provoking and informative, though clearly a bit reactionary to the faults of the Nixon Administration. Definitely worth reading for those interested in the governmental leadership structure.

[Jeffrey Nichols · Rating 5 out of 5]

Long but good read on a timeless position

I picked this book up on sale and because I know Arthur Schlesinger is a good historian. The book is a little dry and not for a casual history reader. I powered through the book only because I knew it would take a long time to read if I hadn't.

While written in the early 70s, with an update from the 80s, the book is very relevant and frames out food arguments and explanations. Too often, too many people have a knee jerk reaction to current events and automatically have quick solutions. But these current problems have the same structure as older problems, and many so called solutions have been discussed and found inadequate to fix the problem.

Democracy should always be in contention. There should always be arguments and people trying to stop what others are trying to do. While difficult to accept and much easier if everyone just agreed, the debate and contention leads to ensuring that the right thing is done; that no unexpected issues arise; that we don't make the wrong turn.

The author hit the nail on the head when he said that a presidential crisis happens about every 50 years and predicted that 2023 would be around the time of the next one. He was almost spot on. And it leads to a better feeling that when that happens, the pendulum swings back the other way.

Democracy is a living thing and can change to meet the changes that occurs, so long as people keep in mind the foundation laid down by the Founding Fathers.

I recommend this book to historians and people really interested in Democracy and politics.

[Danesh · Rating 4 out of 5]

The prophecy that by 2023 America will face again corruption and immorality in the presidency was chilling. Everything in this book outlined exactly how the Trump presidency is playing out, and shows that it's not new. That most presidents battled with this issue of executive privilege. The Nixon administration is the main focus towards the end of how an power hungry person can pervert the presidency. A constitutional power grab to move towards a Plebiscitary Presidency. There's toolkits for all levels of branches on how executive power can be consolidated, and very little about how to prevent it.

[Mitchell Nemeth · Rating 4 out of 5]

Reading this book today gives the reader great perspective on how the presidency has become dramatically more important since the Founding Fathers. It would be even more interesting to see how the President’s authority has expanded as the Executive agencies have taken on a more active role.

[Jennifer Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

A good history of executive power, but longer than it needs to be.

[Cloe · Rating 3 out of 5]

A more political version of Con Law I. Wish we could hear what Schlesinger thinks about Trump. It probably would not be too kind.

[Jack · Rating 5 out of 5]

I read this when new in '73 and was reminded of it by events through Bush years - still very interesting on history of Presidential Power

[Kasey · Rating 4 out of 5]

I really informative and interesting chronical of the expansion of presidential power throigh the decades. long and wordy but rather relevant to today's dialog.

[riri]

did this book take me a long time to finish bc of the way i read it? yes
did i enjoy? yes

[Alayna Holt · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Corruption appears to visit the White House in 50 year cycles… Around the year 2023 the American people would be well advised to go on the alert and start nailing down everything in sight.”

[alexa koe · Rating 1 out of 5]

sorry schlesinger i do not like your argument!!!! he's too caught up on his hatred of richard nixon to have an objective view on presidential power and has some CRAZY history with the kennedy administration. he is first and foremost a political scientist and NOT a historian. yes presidential power has been expanding but it's not as urgent and doom and gloom as schlesinger likes to think it is. it's just the ebb and flow of a fluid constitutional demcoracy, one which MUST be self-correcting to survive. he's just caught up in the moment of the early 70s, and the book miiight be better if he was further removed from it. but alas.

[Ollie · Rating 3 out of 5]

In this dense and somewhat thorough book, Arthur Schlesinger takes us through the manifestation of a very important phenomenon in American politics: the Imperial Presidency. Namely, one that acquires more and more power as the years go by.

Although I was unable to absorb all the points presented in this book, there is a certain pattern that emerges from studying the course of the presidency in the United States since its inception, and this is that presidents are unhappy with the limitation of their powers, find it crippling and humiliating, and slowly and successfully take measures to expand their powers (after all, all the president is constitutionally supposed to do is represent the US to foreign nations).

This manifests itself in several ways, but mostly by hiding things from congress as far as domestic and foreign war is concerned. Presidents do this through executive agreements or pacts with other nations, by claiming a national threat (so immediate action to protect the country was necessary), by claiming that powers are bestowed on a president to protect a constitution and nation (as Lincoln did by claiming he had to take measures to ensure there was a constitution left to uphold), and by straight up claiming that unconstitutional actions were constitutional (congress has to the power to declare war, and can do so after the president has taken actions to start it). Basically this all has to do with weaseling one's way through the constitution and interpreting it in a way that justifies one's actions. As soon as a president gets away with it, subsequent presidents can use that as reference to claim their actions are not illegal. Throughout history we go through many phases where the president acquires a large amount of powers and congress retaliates on the next president by asserting itself. The only power congress has is the power of impeachment. And that is considered a last course of action. All very fascinating stuff.

Schlesinger highlights certain periods of US history more than others and it's really the instances that we deal with the more known events (such as committing to WWII, and Watergate) that its clearest how exactly the president is maneuvering to make unconstitutional decisions. The book ends with a very in-depth look at the Nixon administration and basically portrays it as a epitome of power abuse by a president. All well and good, but the reader can definitely tell that Schlesinger is not being completely forthright when we read how easy he goes on the FDR and Kennedy administrations (on which he served). Still, the Imperial Presidency is a highly informative and thought provoking book, and it's easy to understand why it's required reading for anyone interested in American politics.

3.5 stars.

[Toni Snyder · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was assigned for a political science class, but I found myself reading it outside the parameters of the class because it was so fascinating. An in-depth look at how the balance of power has changed between the legislative and executive branches of government since the ratification of the Constitution.

[Vincent Lombardo · Rating 2 out of 5]

This book was exhaustively researched, but I found it exhausting to read! Schlesinger conveyed fact after fact and incident after incident, and he left my head spinning. I found the first three chapters fascinating, but the more that I read, the more confused and overwhelmed that I became, so I skimmed the rest.

[Matthew · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was a real eye-opener for me, even if I wasn't in love with the writing. Dry, sometimes too legalistic, but overall very informative. A must read for anyone who cares at all about the state of the presidency in America.

[Jordan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Schlesinger works out his penitence to Edwin Corwin and unleashes his rhetoric on Nixon. I say this not in defense of Nixon, but that without him, Schlesinger's thesis lacks force. It is an important read, but the thesis is far from sound.

[Drew]

The Imperial Presidency by Arthur Meier Schlesinger (1973)

[Tim Lundquist · Rating 4 out of 5]

Brilliantly distilled "classic" view of executive power. Penned in obvious response to Nixon Presidency. . . one wonders what Schlesinger would say of the Obama/Bush/Clinton executive model.