Kampf um Anerkennung

by Axel Honneth

Aus dem Hegelschen Denkmodell eines »Kampfes um Anerkennung« die Grundlagen einer normativ gehaltvollen Gesellschaftstheorie zu entwickeln - das ist das Ziel dieses Buches. Die systematische Rekonstruktion der Hegelschen Argumentationsfigur, die den ersten Teil des Buches ausmacht, führt zu einer Unterscheidung von drei Anerkennungsformen. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit nimmt seinen Ausgang in dem Unterfangen, der Hegelschen Idee mit Rückgriff auf die Sozialpsychologie G. H. Meads eine empirische Wendung zu geben: auf diese Weise entsteht ein intersubjektivitätstheoretisches Personenkonzept. Als eine Konsequenz dieser Untersuchung zeichnet sich die Idee einer kritischen Gesellschaftstheorie ab, in der Prozesse des gesellschaftlichen Wandels mit Bezugnahme auf die normativen Ansprüche erklärt werden sollen, die in der Beziehung der wechselseitigen Anerkennung strukturell angelegt sind. Die durch diesen Grundgedanken eröffneten Perspektiven werden im letzten Teil des Buches weiterverfolgt.

Genres: Philosophy, Sociology, Nonfiction, Politics, Psychology, German Literature, Theory

340 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1992

About the author

Axel Honneth (born July 18, 1949) is a professor of philosophy at both the University of Frankfurt and Columbia University. He is also director of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) in Frankfurt am Main, Germany.

Honneth's work focuses on social-political and moral philosophy, especially relations of power, recognition, and respect. One of his core arguments is for the priority of intersubjective relationships of recognition in understanding social relations. This includes non- and mis-recognition as a basis of social and interpersonal conflict. For instance, grievances regarding the distribution of goods in society are ultimately struggles for recognition.

Reviews

[C · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the book that - I believe - made Axel Honneth famous in Germany. In The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth wants to place critical theory (or critical social philosophy) within a new normative context. Instead of being pessimistic and implicitly normative - like many of the first generation Frankfurt school were - Honneth believes he can redefine the landscape of normativity, to provide a foothold for socio-political critiques. The new landscape is the struggle for recognition, which can originally be found in Hegel, and is subsequently naturalized by G.H. Mead. Honneth builds upon Hegel and Mead, providing fairly interesting empirical research, to develop three primary forms of recognition that constitute the sources for our sense of self-worth and the sources of our sense of injustice.

The first source of recognition is love. Children require love from their parents in order to develop a basic sense of self confidence and trust. Without proper love they lack confidence, and are often scared to explore the world, for fear no one is there to protect them, and care for them. Once an individual knows someone cares about them and is willing to protect them, this allows for a basic sense of self confidence that makes exploring the world possible, less frightening, and even exciting (hence if you experience no love, there’s a chance you may be a xenophobe). There's nothing too radical about this thesis, psychologist, and people with basic human empathy, know love is necessary for proper development and social functioning.

The next source of recognition is rights. This form of recognition historically comes after love, which is primordial. But Honneth wants to argue that the struggle for rights is equally primordial, albeit its historical fruition is a response to the growth of society and the division of labor. Rights allow us to generalize one another as capable of some basic forms of recognition and dignity. This is obvious in various racial struggles, or struggles for gay marriage. People are trying to be recognized on equal footing, and have access to something potentially universal (speech, marriage, property, healthcare), and although each individual is unique, a universal outlet for recognizing them provides for some sense of self-worth and dignity.

The final source is social/solidarity recognition. This form was a bit more confusing than the other two, and seemed primarily to overlap with them to some degree. Whereas love is necessary for a sense of confidence within a community, and necessary for amicable interaction within a community, and rights provide confidence within a larger social context - where one encounters strangers - solidarity was aimed at basic social esteem which allows the individual to have confidence in their unique traits and characteristics. One can feel comfortable being good at singing, but bad at dancing for instance. Simultaneously having esteem for individual traits should lead you to esteem other individuals for their traits (e.g., if someone can’t dance we don’t chide them for it). This form of recognition is different from rights in that it's not universal, but recognizes the particular in everyone.

Considering all three of these forms of recognition are primordial, Honneth believes that this allows for a new normative basis for social-political criticism. If one is being denied some form of recognition, or failing to recognize another individual as some basic level, an immoral event has occurred. Moreover, by placing recognition at the forefront of social and moral development, he believes he has opened up a window into understanding how and why social movements come about. So various classes and racial groups aren't just "mad" at how they're being treated, even if they say things like "I'm mad" or "I'm being exploited," what they really mean is that they are not being recognized, and are thus being denied something essential and necessary for their fruition both individually and socially. Honneth explicitly wants to get beyond the justice debates related to distribution of resources. There’s something deeper, and more insidious, than just handing someone reparations, or giving them access to some commodity in order to quell their sense of injustice, that generates the initial complaint.

The only problem I have with Honneth's theory is that he has rewritten social history from the point of view of agency alone, and writes off structure. Hegel said history was spirit coming to know itself, Marx thought it was class conflict in a particular mode of production, and Honneth believes it's a struggle for recognition. Like Hegel, this struggle is progressive. But there are various structural and ideological factors that undergird the desire to be recognized, and at least in this book, Honneth seems to ignore them, or discount them. Very particular forms of recognition, even if they have primordial components, are frequently ideological, and it’s not at all clear that primordial properties take precedence here; the need to be recognized as a king qua king, or as an executive qua executive, is ideological at its core, and these social roles exist prior to the individual.

Overall though this is a breath of fresh air in regards to normative theory, ethical philosophy, and theories of political justice. Instead of just plugging some system (Kantian, Utilitarian, etc), into some particular case (Euthanasia, Abortion, Healthcare), Honneth is providing us with a grander view of morality: where it comes from, how it works, and how to make it flourish.

[محمد شکری · Rating 4 out of 5]

نزاع برای (بر سر) به رسمیت شناخته شدن

کتاب در سه بخش تدارک شده که با مقدمه بسیار خوب «جول اندرسون» (نظیر مقدمه «هلموت واگنر» بر کتاب پدیدارشناسی و روابط اجتماعی «آلفرد شوتز») به انگلیسی ترجمه شده است
هونت، استاد فلسفه دانشگاه فرانکفورت و کلمبیا است که از سال 2001 مدیریت موسسه تحقیقات اجتماعی دانشگاه فرانکفورت (مکتب فرانکفورت) را نیز متقبل است
کتاب «نزاع برای به رسمیت شناخته شدن»، به گفته خود او، ادامه کتاب «نقد قدرت» است و قصد او تثبیت «به رسمیت شناختن»* به عنوان ترمینولوژی اصلی یک نظریه سیاسی-اجتماعی درمورد عدالت است
راهبرد هونت در کتاب حاضر استفاده از نوشته های ینای هگل (هگل جوان) است که با روی آوردن به ج.هربرت مید در بخش دوم از نقایص متافیزیکی و غیرتجربی او در امان بماند

جان کلام کتاب می گوید که
1- بر خلاف نظر هابز و ماکیاولی نزاع اجتماعی نه به منظور صیانت نفس بلکه برای خود فهمی عملی رخ می دهد و این نکته را هگل به خوبی فهمیده بود
2- این خود فهمی عملی از دل به رسمیت شناخته شدن به نحوی میان-سوژگانی** و توسط دیگران بدست می آید که کاملا در بستری هگلی در سه مرحله عشق (خانواده)، قانون (جامعه مدنی) و شرافت (دولت) حاصل می شود
3- این نزاع اخلاقی است و (همانطور که در زیرعنوان کتاب هم می توان دید) قواعد اخلاقی دارد و در سه مرحله آن به ترتیب اعتماد-به-نفس، حرمت-نفس و عزت-نفس حاصل می شود (پس می تواند منشا نظریه عدالت در گام بعدی قرار بگیرد) ر

باید اعتراف کنم همه کتاب را نخوانده ام
فصل 4 را نخواهم خواند ولی فصل 7 و 9 را در اولین فرصت خواهم خواند

هونت کتاب های معروف دیگری هم دارد که در یکی از آنها («من» در «ما»***) از برخی مدعیات کتاب حاضر عدول کرده است

*recognition
**intersubjectivity
***The I in The We

[Mohammad Ramezanzadeh · Rating 4 out of 5]

هماهنطور که از اسم کتاب آشکار است نویسنده در این کتاب به دنبال تبیین ساختاری نزاعهای اجتماعی است. از منظر نویسنده نزاع های تاریخی و اجتماعی ترکیبی از نزاع های یوتیلیتارین بر سر منافع گروهی و نزاع های اخلاقی ست که در راستای به رسمیت شناخته شدن هستند و این نزاع و مبارزه زمینه ظهور رفتار و نیاز و هنجارهای جدید اجتماعی را فراهم می آورد. آبشخور فکری نویسنده نظریات مکتب انقادی فرانکفورت است که خود نیز نسل سوم این مکتب به حساب می آید، بالاخص میتوان به خوبی تاثیرپذیری از هابرماس را در این کتاب مشاهده کرد. کتاب دارای سه بخش است: ۱- دربخش اول به لحاظ فلسفی به بررسی آرای هگل جوان در ینا می پردازد و به خوبی نشان داده می شود که هگل برای ساختن تئوری اجتماعی خود با روشی اینترسوبژکتیو به استقرار و تکوین ساختمان فرد و اجتماع میپردازد و این بینان همان «نزاع برای به رسمیت شناخته شدن» است. که البته به نظر نویسنده خود هگل در دوران پدیدارشناسی از این پروژه دست می کشد. ۲- در بخش دوم این کتاب نویسنده با توجه به دستاوردهای تجربی روانشناسی اجتماعی و روانشناسی کودک به دنبال فراهم آوردن بنیانی تجربی برای این نزاع برای به رسمیت شناخته شدن است. ۳- در بخش سوم نیز نویسنده با توجه به مقدمات فلسفی و تصدیقات تجربی این مفهوم را به مثابه گرامر اخلاقی نزاع های اجتماعی در نظر میگیرد که هنجارها و رفتارهای اجتماعی را جز به کمک آن نمی توان به صورت کامل تبیین کرد.
کتاب ساختار بسیار جالبی دارد و به خوبی نشان می دهد که چگونه برای تبیین یک مسئله امروزین می توان از دستاوردهای فکری فلسفی گذشته در پیوند با یافته های تجربی امروز کمک گرفت. به نظر من همین ایده نویسنده است که کار را ارزشمند و خواندن آن را مفید می سازد

[Marcos Henrique Amaral · Rating 4 out of 5]

Nesta obra, Axel Honneth retoma o tema do reconhecimento intersubjetivo, buscando inspiração, fundamentalmente, nas obras de Hegel e Mead, para os quais a formação da identidade pressupõe a experiência do reconhecimento. Com isto, o autor busca fazer uma sistematização de uma teoria do reconhecimento, a partir de uma tipologia progressiva compreendida por três padrões de reconhecimento, a saber: (i) amor; (ii) direito; (iii) solidariedade. Para a definição de cada padrão, é válido — como faz o autor — reportarmo-nos a Hegel e Mead. Segundo Hegel, o amor pode ser concebido como “ser-si-mesmo em um outro”, o que representa uma relação simultânea de autonomia e simbiose (ligação), que lembra a idéia do “outro significativo”, que é objeto do juego da criança, segundo Mead. Sinteticamente, a forma de reconhecimento do amor não representa meramente um estado intersubjetivo, mas um uma forma de tensão comunicativa entre a experiência de poder-estar-só e a experiência de estar-fundido: a típica relação entre mãe e filho, por exemplo.
Essa experiência mútua de simultâneas liberação e ligação emotiva, que pressupõe uma contínua afirmação da autonomia — o reconhecimento do amor — gera a auto-confiança individual, indispensável para a participação na vida autônoma: algo como a passagem do juego (brincadeira) para o deporte organizado, tal qual nos traz Mead. Este seria o reconhecimento do direito, das relações jurídicas, quando a pessoa é reconhecida como autônoma e moralmente imputável, desenvolvendo uma relação de auto-respeito. Esse tipo de reconhecimento tem como base o outro generalizado, conforme contribuições de Mead, que mostra este processo enquanto o reconhecimento do outro — que, neste caso, equivale a uma coletividade — como portador de direitos. Compreender o outro generalizado como livre e autônomo é um pressuposto básico para que a pessoa tenha suas pretensões de liberdade individual realizadas.
Por fim, na esfera da solidariedade, a pessoa é reconhecida como digna de estima social, quando — além de auto-confiança e auto-respeito —, ela adquire auto-estima, completando seu processo de auto-realização. O reconhecimento da solidariedade tem como pilar uma comunidade de valores, e o que está em jogo nesta cadeia de interações é a “honra” e a dignidade.
Assim, Honneth delineia uma idéia de reconhecimento que está vinculada com o conceito de respeito. Para ele, o respeito nada mais do que o reconhecimento cognitivo entre os diferentes. E aqui, entramos na idéia de “luta por reconhecimento”, que existe justamente pela possibilidade do desrespeito, ou seja, do não-reconhecimento. Segundo ele, o não-reconhecimento “é a fonte emotiva e cognitiva de resistência social e de levantes coletivos”. Assim, deve-se entender a luta por reconhecimento como o processo no qual experiências individuais de não-reconhecimento são interpretadas como experiências cruciais para um grupo inteiro, de forma que tais experiências podem gerar uma exigência coletiva por relações ampliadas de reconhecimento. Tais lutas por reconhecimento ganham a dimensão de fundamento dos desenvolvimentos e progressos na realidade da vida social do ser humano.

[Benny]

JEG ER FÆRDIGGGGGGGG (super spændende men ej hvor fatter jeg kun halvdelen af hva’ han siger så jeg er TRÆT)

[William · Rating 5 out of 5]

I loved it so much, I have marginalia that makes rereading nearly impossible -- will get a new copy and compare notes after 8 years since first cover to cover read.

[Susan · Rating 5 out of 5]

La sua teoria è una ripresa dello Hegel jenese, lo Hegel autore de “La filosofia dello spirito”, una di quelle opere che fa parte dell’abbozzo del sistema. In quest’opera il riconoscimento ha un ruolo assolutamente centrale, molto più che nella Fenomenologia: il riconoscimento fra soggetti è una componente essenziale della vita dello spirito, è costitutivo dello spirito.

[Trevor · Rating 5 out of 5]

I was saying to someone today that the oddest thing about Hegel, and I can’t think of another philosopher this has been treated the same by history (other than perhaps Epicurus), is that about the only thing most people know about him is something he didn’t believe. If people know anything about him at all it is his triad – thesis, antithesis and synthesis, and this is about as far away from what he actually believed, or his method, as it is possible to get. Now, it is true that he had a particular fondness for threes. Unfortunate, in a way, since it seems to confirm the simplification of his ideas, but what people take the thesis, antithesis and synthesis ladder to mean – he didn’t mean that. Most people think what he meant was that you start out with one idea – that light is a wave – then you have another idea – that light is a particle – which is its opposite. Then, with modern physics, you get the synthesis, that light is both a particle and a wave. If Hegel had been around when this all happened, he wouldn’t have seen it as confirmation of his triad – since he didn’t believe in the triad – but would have said, ‘yeah, but it’s both and neither’. And that would be closer to Hegel’s actual method. Rather than this three step process resolving the initial contradiction, there generally isn’t a synthesis in Hegel – rather, the contradiction remains irreconcilable and you move to a higher level of abstraction to see if that will help clarify things. A totally different process from a synthesis resolving the contradiction only to become a new thesis facing off with a new antithesis. Even if superficially similar.

What people should remember Hegel for, to be truer to his philosophy, is probably his idea of recognition. And that is what this book is about – although, the author is trying to go beyond Hegel and to give his ideas on recognition a more general applicability. The book starts with a discussion of some of Hegel’s early works, where he first tried to see if recognition could help explain human ethics. Hegel gave up on using ethics as a basis for the development of human interaction and shifted towards consciousness and then ‘the spirit’ as the motive force of history. This idealist stance is then complemented by a materialist one in the works of Mead. For Mead, a symbolic interactionist, interactions between people was the source of social regard and even of self-awareness. For us to become self-aware, we need to first understand how we stand in relation to other people. In fact, it is only in making ourselves ‘other’ to ourselves that we can reflect on what it means to be a subject at all. Mead talks of the ‘I’ as who we are in ourselves, but this ‘I’ is the subject and so not really able to observe itself, other than as it is mirrored back at us in our interactions with other people. To be able to understand ourselves, we need to not only make other people the object of our observations, but also make ourselves into an object. Mead says this is the difference between the ‘I’ and the ‘me’. The ‘me’ is the object, and it is this that we can reflect upon as a way to understand our subjective selves.

Our interactions with other people develop – something Hegel was particularly interested in – and they come in three major forms. The first is through ‘love’. Love is quite literal – although, more general than just love between two people, although he meant this as well. We love the other because they are both different from us and, in a certain sense, also complete us. Love allows us a sense of self-confidence. But it is impossible for the recognition that comes from love to become more general than that shared between people who know each other – and, in a society, recognition needs to be more general than that you can form based on mutual and intimate knowledge. In a way, although, I’m not sure the author would agree with me here, the next level of recognition is based more on Kant’s categorical imperative to treat other people as ends, rather than means. This becomes the basis of recognition that is based not on love, but on rights and laws. And this form of recognition provides the individual with self-respect. I have rights and I expect you to respect those rights. And in doing so, I recognise your rights as well. The last form of recognition goes beyond this. It is recognition as a form of social solidarity – beyond mere legal recognition. And from this form of recognition comes self-esteem.

The author then tries to show that it is this last form of recognition that can lead to forms of social revolution. It is when social solidarity is violated, when one group who was held with social esteem is diminished in that esteem, or when a group demands the same level of social esteem as other groups take for granted, that social change becomes virtually inevitable. Some practical examples might help here.

Take the Luddites. They were not quite like what we generally now think of them. Our current view is that they were foolishly afraid of the introduction of machines and so went around smashing them. This isn’t really what happened. They were highly skilled craftspeople who were being thrown out of work by machines that were being introduced to make their lives, and the lives of the people who worked the machines, much worse. They weren’t attacking the machines, but rather the people who owned the machines and were introducing them in a way that made everyone’s life worse, other than the machine owners. And because one of the main ways in which the Luddites were able to hold any self-esteem was through the high regard that their work had been held in by the rest of society – the introduction of the machines was a direct attack on their self-esteem. Something that diminished them not only in the eyes of society, but in their own eyes too. This disrespect – this inversion of recognition – laid the ground for the Luddites to ‘take it personally’ and attack the machines that were destroying both their livelihood and their sense of self respect.

Another example might be marriage equity. The hint is even in the name. For a very long time, homosexuals were not granted the same level of social esteem as straight people in terms of the regard held for their relationships. We can basically follow the Hegelian triplet here, in a sense, not the triad, of course. Firstly, the self-confidence that comes from love, in choosing your own partner, in that primary sense of recognition. Then the recognition that was denied in legal right – that there was no legal right that recognised same sex relationships. This denial was also a denial of self-respect, since the lack of legal right to a relationship is an attack on the validity of the first level of recognition as well and therefore of one’s self-confidence. This is a clear violation of Kant’s categorical imperative – to treat one’s maxim as if it could be a universal law. Denying the right of same sex relationships to have the legal status of other forms of relationships made it an attack on the self-respect of those in such relationships. And then finally, the recognition that was being denied undermined social solidarity, since the disrespect being shown made those in same sex relationships ‘others’ undermining their ability to belong within the social system. It was only through recognition of the legal and personal right of people to be in such relationships that a sense of recognition as social solidarity became possible.

This is a deeply interesting book. I’ve had to read it a couple of times, and I still don’t think I’ve fully understood everything it has to offer. But I do like the idea of recognition and that it has different levels and that each level helps to complete us as more fully human.

[Sergei Moska · Rating 5 out of 5]

Another Goodreads user, Chris Byron, wrote an extensive review of this book, so check out that review if you want details.

I frankly just wanted to say that this is an unambiguous 5-star book for me. It's a rare find: a relatively difficult - if Chris' review didn't make any sense to you, you probably should read it a bit later - book that's nonethless a real page-turner. I loved it. I do think that some of Honneth's remarks in the third section of the book are undermined by some recent work on the social bases of self-respect (e.g.: see some of the selections in Jost & Major's "The Psychology of Legitimacy"), but this book made a huge impact on me.

[Micky · Rating 4 out of 5]

A necessary update for sociology's "critical theory" that reminds us to remember the importance of moral and corporeal disparagements when talking about social movements/struggles, their development and recognition.

[Gerardo · Rating 4 out of 5]

Il testo propone di vedere nella lotta per il riconoscimento una struttura capace di spiegare i processi storici.

Molti autori, soprattutto in ambito sociologico, hanno sottolineato l'importanza delle lotte nei processi di cambiamento sociale. La lotta è sempre stata vista come il tentativo di sopraffare l'avversario, dandole così un valore negativo e distruttivo. Per Honnet, al contrario, la lotta nascerebbe da una volontà affermativa, dal desiderio di essere riconosciuto dall'altro che ignora l'esistenza di una particolare voce della società.

L'individuo è, di fatto, colui che si distacca dal comportamento normale: egli può affermarsi solo se dimostra di avere delle caratteristiche peculiari che lo distanziano dal resto. Più l'individuo si distacca dalla norma e maggiore sarà la lotta che dovrà intraprendere per affermare il proprio Sé.

Il riconoscimento è possibile in tre ambiti: amore, diritto, società. Nel primo caso, il rapporto madre-figlio è la forma base del riconoscimento: il bambino, infatti, attraverso il rapporto con la madre si riconosce in quanto individuo, ma anche in quanto essere diviso dalla madre. Infatti, all'inizio, il bambino non sa distingue tra il suo Sé e il resto, credendo di essere una potenza divina capace di ottenere tutto ciò che vuole attraverso il pianto. Soltanto crescendo, attraverso il rapporto con la madre, il bambino si accorge di essere una singolarità e non il tutto. Nel caso del diritto, le forze politiche lottano affinché vengano riconosciuti dei diritti, così da far divenire "normativi" alcuni aspetti della vita che fino a quel momento non erano stati presi in considerazione. Infine, c'è il riconoscimento sociale o stima, in cui l'individuo afferma le sue capacità rispettando cosa ci si aspetta dal suo ruolo e allo stesso tempo mostrando capacità eccezionali, innovando rispetto alla norma del ruolo stesso.

Il riconoscimento, tolto il primo aspetto che appartiene alla nostra natura biologica, è un fattore storico che muta: di fatto Honnet si occupa di mostrare le regole del processo, ma non il processo stesso.

In sostanza, l'essere umano può esistere solo a patto di essere riconosciuto, andando a confermare la sua natura profondamente sociale. Inoltre, tutto ciò permette anche di delineare un processo etico, in quanto costruzione delle norme dell'agire umano secondo una visione più alta, per il bene di tutti. Lottare significa far riconoscere l'esistenza di determinate esigenze: chi lotta, quindi, agisce secondo un principio etico a difesa del concetto di esistenza stessa. Anzi, si delinea un'etica della r-esistenza, cioè di un'affermazione della propria esistenza attraverso una lotta che non ha intenzione di distruggere l'altro, ma soltanto di farsi riconoscere dall'altro.

[David · Rating 5 out of 5]

Honneth beginnt mit einer Lektüre der Schriften Hegels. Hegel verwirft die Hobbes'sche Naturrechtslehre des (ökonomisch-utilitaristischen) Kampfs jeder gegen jeden, da dieses nur "als ein Zusammehaang isolierter Einzelsubjekte, nicht aber nach dem Modell einer sittlichen Einheit aller gedacht zu werden vermag" (S. 23, s.a. S. 75). Im Gegenteil beschreibt Hegel "den Prozeß der Etablierung von ersten Sozialverhältnissen zunächst als einen Vorgang der Herauslösung der Subjekte aus natürlichen Bestimmungen" (S. 33). Im Hinblick auf Kriminalität soll gezeigt werden, "daß allein durch solche der Destruktion die sittlich reiferen Anerkennungsbeziehungen überhaupt erst geschaffen werden" (S.42). Zu Konflikten kommt zur Sprache, dass "die zerstrittenen Subjekte nicht als bloß egozentrisch handelnde, voneinander isolierte Wesen aufzufassen seien", sondern beide Subjekte "vielmehr ihr Gegenüber jeweils schon positiv in die eigenen Handelsorientierungen miteinbezogen" haben (S. 77). Konkret sieht Hegel drei Stufen der Anerkennung vor: Familie (Liebe), Bürgerliche Gesellschaft (Recht) und Staat (Solidarität) (S. 45/46). Honneth bespricht auch die verschiedenen Phasen in der Anerkennungsphilosophie Hegels. So kritisiert Honneth an Hegel, er habe "seine ursprüngliche Absicht, den Aufbau eines sittlichen Gemeinwesens philosophisch als die Stufenfolge eines Kampfes um Anerkennung nachzuvollziehen, auf halbem Wege preisgegeben", er habe "sie dem Ziel er Errichtung eines bewußtseinsphilosophischen Systems aufgeopfert und unvollendet hinter sich zurückgelassen." (S. 107), Hegel bleibe zu "spekulativ" (S. 111).
Diese Lücke versucht Honneth im weiteren Verlauf zu füllen. Insbesondere zieht Honneth hierzu die Entwicklungspsychologie George Herbert Meads zurate. Als "ersten Schritt zu einer naturalistischen Begründung der Anerkennungslehre Hegels" zitiert er Mead, "ein Bewußtsein seiner selbst kann ein Subjekt nur in dem Maße erwerben, wie es sein eigenes Handeln aus der symbolisch repräsentierten Perspektive einer zweiten Person wahrnehmen lernt" (S. 120f).
Auf dieser Grundlage arbeitet Honneth die drei Hegels Anerkennungsstufen erneut aus, erarbeitet verschiedene Parallelen (Selbstvertrauen -> Selbstachtung -> Selbstschätzung), Entwicklungsschritte, etc. (S.211), verwoben mit Beobachtungen z.B. zur Herausbildung der Grundrechte seit dem 18. Jahrhundert.
Wieder zurück zu "Persönlicher Identität und Mißachtung" geht es wieder etwas konkreter um den "Kampf". Zum Beispiele stellen Formen der Missachtung "nicht die gewaltsame Einschränkung der persönlichen Autonomie allein dar, sondern deren Verknüpfung mit dem Gefühl, nicht den Status eines vollwertigen, moralisch gleichberechtigten Interaktionspartners zu besitzen" (S.216) Weder Hegel noch Mead hätten aber gesehen, dass dies Subjekte dazu motivieren kann, in einen praktischen Kampf oder Konflikt einzutreten (S.219).
Zu "Moral und gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung rezensiert er dann Marx, Sorel und Sarte. Der frühe Marx habe die Trennung der Arbeiter von den Produktionsmitteln als moralischen Konflikt um Anerkennung begriffen (S. 233), allerdings das Konfliktmodell damit auch "produktionsästhetisch vereinseitigt" (S. 236) Allerdings kann Marx das Anerkennungsmodell nicht voll entfalten, in seinen späteren Schriften reduzierter er den Klassenkampf dann doch wieder auf ökonomische Aspekte (S. 237f). Zu Sorel und Sartre kritisiert Honneth, sie hätten "dem Formalismus des bürgerlichen rechts nicht den moralischen Stellenwert einräumen können, der in dem Maße zutage tritt, in dem am 'Kampf um Anerkennung' mit Hegel und Mead jene drei unterschiedliche Stufen unterschieden werden", und speziell zu Sartre, weil er "zwischen rechtlichen und rechtsjenseitigen Formen der wechselseitigen Anerkennung analytisch keine klaren Trennungslinien gezogen hat, muß sich ihm genauso wie jenem das Ziel der individuellen oder kollektiven Selbstverwicklichung mit demjenigen der Erweiterung von Freiheitsrechten auf unentwirrbare Weise vermischen" (S. 254).
Zuletzt bespricht Honneth noch die eigene Sicht auf die "moralische Logik sozialer Konflikte". In der "akademischen Soziologie" würden "Motive für Aufruhr, Protest und Widerstand kategorial in 'Interessen' umgewandelt, die sich aus der objektiven Ungleichverteilung von materiellen Lebenschancen ergeben sollen, ohne mit dem alltäglichen Netz moralischer Gefühlseinstellungen noch irgendwie verknüpft zu sein" (S.258); im Kontext der Untersuchung müsse man aber "individuelle Erfahrung von Mißachtung in einer Weise als typische Schlüsselerlebnisse einer ganzen Gruppe" deuten (S.260). Der "Einsatz im politischen Kampf" schenkt dem Einzelnen "ein Stück seiner verlorengegangenen Selbstachtung zurück", weil er "genau die Eigenschaft öffentlich demonstriert, deren Mißachtung als Kränkung erfahren wird" (S.263) Allerdings stellt Honneth klar, dass dieses Konfliktmodell nur eine Ergänzung, aber kein Ersatz für das utilitaristische Modell ist (S.265). Zum Schluss beschreibt Honneth gewissermaßen schon die Entwicklung der aktuell vielbesprochenen "Identitätspolitik" vorher: "mittlerweile sind nämlich durch soziostrukurelle Umbrüche in den entwickelten Gesellschaften die Möglichkeiten der Selbstverwirklichung objektiv so sehr erweitert worden, daß die Erfahrung einer individuellen oder kollektiven Differenz zum Anstoß einer ganzen Reihe von politischen Bewegungen geworden ist; deren Forderungen lassen sich langfristig wohl nur erfüllen, wenn es zu kulturellen Wandlungen kommt, die eine radikale Erweiterung von Beziehungen der Solidarität mit sich bringen" (S. 286f.).

Alles in einem ein sehr gutes Buch, das die Theorien besprochenen Autoren wie Hegel, Mead, Marx gut analysiert und vergleicht und die Theoriebruchstücke zu einem kohärenten Bild vereint. Das Anerkennungsmodell ist sicherlich eine gute Bereicherung für die Beschreibung aktueller Konfliktlinien, wie angedeutet bezüglich persönlicher Identitäten von linker Seite, aber auch bzgl. AfD, Querdenkern u.ä.

[Leonardo]

El planteo inicial de Taylor pronto recibiría un desarrollo mucho más sistemático en obras como Multicultural Citizenship (1995), de Will Kymlicka, y en The Struggle for Recognition (1996), del filósofo alemán Axel Honneth.

Teoría de la Justicia, Clase 1.

[Tom Calvard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Not the most engaging read but a carefully worked-through piece of social theory on the struggles for recognition and solidarity in societies with diverse groups. Struggle is certainly an apposite word if you look at how democracies are still struggling with these issues 20 years after this book was written.

[Humberto Ferreira · Rating 4 out of 5]

Honneth tem um trabalho excelente. Trazer essa perspectiva para a américa latina requer um cuidado, já que ele escreve do meio da europa, onde claramente não tem as mesmas urgências democráticas. Contudo ele nos abre portas que o marxismo "duro" está deixando passar, onde somente o conceitos de ideologia já não responde os conflitos.

[Cem Türkoglu · Rating 5 out of 5]

Böyle bir kitaba yorum yapmak haddime değil ama, türk okurlar için kesinlikle okunması gereken ufuk açıcı bi fikir çalışması olduğunu söyleyebilirim. Kitabın ismini duyduğumda çok etkilenmiştim. Okuduktan sonra da bu kanım katlanarak güçlendi.

[Sievertje - · Rating 5 out of 5]

Een andere focus op politieke en sociale filosofie: erkenning. Welke manieren van erkenning heeft een persoon nodig om deel te zijn van een individu in de samenleving te zijn? Honneth onderscheid liefde, respect en waardering die nodig zijn om volledig mens te zijn. Hegeliaans geinspireerd.

[Kyan Kyan · Rating 4 out of 5]

what the fuck

[Ashley Shan · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very important book in contemporary critical theory. Honneth identifies three stages of the struggle for recognition for individual development and social movement as hinted, but not fully developed, in Hegel and Mead. Sharply points out the methodological deadends of Hegel's phenomenology of the spirit, and Mead and other Marxists' one-sided, ethically charged notion of labor.

I read this book in order to get some ideas for revising my thesis, but turns out to be a very worthwhile read - one of the most illuminating books I've read this year.

[Regitze Xenia · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another BA read, another fine book.