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AUSA Books – Foreign Military Studies
The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger
Surrounded by potential adversaries, nineteenth-century Prussia and twentieth-century Germany faced the formidable prospect of multifront wars and wars of attrition. To counteract these threats, generations of general staff officers were educated in operational thinking, the main tenets of which were extremely influential on military planning across the globe and were adopted by American and Soviet armies. In the twentieth century, Germany's art of warfare dominated military theory and practice, creating a myth of German operational brilliance that lingers today, despite the nation's crushing defeats in two world wars.
In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the mid–nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military means.
In this seminal study, Gerhard P. Gross provides a comprehensive examination of the development and failure of German operational thinking over a period of more than a century. He analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of five different armies, from the mid–nineteenth century through the early days of NATO. He also offers fresh interpretations of towering figures of German military history, including Moltke the Elder, Alfred von Schlieffen, and Erich Ludendorff. Essential reading for military historians and strategists, this innovative work dismantles cherished myths and offers new insights into Germany's failed attempts to become a global power through military means.
464 pages, Hardcover
Published September 16, 2016
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
February 27, 2017
Over the years there has been many books about the course of German military campaigns from the 1860s to 1940s as the German military emerged as a dominant power. Gerhard Gross has written a carefully thought-out study of the reasons why and how the nation came to develop the most formidable military machine of that era. Gross’s book “The Myth and Reality of German Warfare” examines the evolution of the German General Staff’s operational thinking from the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 to the Bundeswehr’s role in NATO.
The book examines the successes and failures of German operational planning in the management of five distinct armies. He examined Erick Ludendorff, Alfred von Schlieffen and others. Including, Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke’s string of military campaigns that led to the defeat of Austria at Koniggratz in 1866 to the 1870 defeat of the French Army at Sedan. Even the capture of Emperor Napoleon III at Sedan did not result in France’s surrender. Instead, the defeat only stiffened French resolve, leading to a costly war of attrition. This same pattern was repeated during both world wars, with the German Army winning brilliant tactical victories but losing the broader strategic campaigns.
Gross suggests the Germans based their operational thinking on a geopolitical premise that hostile nations surrounded their country on all sides, making it necessary that they conduct military campaigns on multiple fronts at once. They relied on swift movement, maneuvering and envelopment in hopes of bringing conflicts to a rapid conclusion. That objective was not always achievable.
The book is well written and researched. It is a scholarly work aimed at students of military staff colleges and historians. It is a fascinating study of how those at the highest levels of the German General Staff thought in the past instead of current times. Unfortunately, I think most militaries are still thinking/planning for the past.
Gross is a German historian; the book was translated into English by military historian, David T. Zabecki. The book is 464 pages and published in 2016.
The book examines the successes and failures of German operational planning in the management of five distinct armies. He examined Erick Ludendorff, Alfred von Schlieffen and others. Including, Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke’s string of military campaigns that led to the defeat of Austria at Koniggratz in 1866 to the 1870 defeat of the French Army at Sedan. Even the capture of Emperor Napoleon III at Sedan did not result in France’s surrender. Instead, the defeat only stiffened French resolve, leading to a costly war of attrition. This same pattern was repeated during both world wars, with the German Army winning brilliant tactical victories but losing the broader strategic campaigns.
Gross suggests the Germans based their operational thinking on a geopolitical premise that hostile nations surrounded their country on all sides, making it necessary that they conduct military campaigns on multiple fronts at once. They relied on swift movement, maneuvering and envelopment in hopes of bringing conflicts to a rapid conclusion. That objective was not always achievable.
The book is well written and researched. It is a scholarly work aimed at students of military staff colleges and historians. It is a fascinating study of how those at the highest levels of the German General Staff thought in the past instead of current times. Unfortunately, I think most militaries are still thinking/planning for the past.
Gross is a German historian; the book was translated into English by military historian, David T. Zabecki. The book is 464 pages and published in 2016.
June 13, 2017
There have been a great many books written about the conduct of warfare by the Prussian / German Army during the period between 1870, when Moltke stunned Europe by defeating the continent's premiere military power, France, and 1945, when Hitler brought Germany to utter ruin. It has become a common theme that the secret of German success was the combination of its general staff system and its focus on the operational level of warfare, which led to such success as Sedan in 1870, Tannenburg in 1914 and the Ardennes offensive in 1940. The reader might therefore be forgiven for looking askance at yet another book on the subject.
In the event, Gerhard Gross, a colonel in the Bundeswehr and one of its leading figures in its historical analysis, provides a startling new interpretation. Perhaps surprisingly, Gross shows how deep the flaws were in the German model. Tracing the concept of the operational level through from the time of Moltke, he demonstrates that the German staff officers grappled with the challenge of a potential two-front war against both France and Russia in the context of their deliberate mis-reading of Clausewitz. Whereas Clausewitz had argued for the primacy of policy over military matters, with warfare being an extension of politics by other means, the German general staff argued that politics gave way once the guns began to fire, such that the conduct of the war was a purely military affair. As a consequence, they also looked at the problem of a two-front war from a purely military perspective: to defeat superior foes it was necessary to make maximum use of the benefits of time and space offered by interior lines. This required rapid mobilisation and movement, aggressive commanders, and a relentless search for quick victories, which meant encirclements rather than frontal attrition.
The problem with this, as Gross shows, was that the problem of a two-front war could not be resolved in this way. The military-economic potential of Germany's enemies was simply too great for a purely military solution. Rather than accept this and recognise the primacy of politics, the German general staff all too often simply ignored reality and became lost in a world of self-delusion. To an extent, the creation of the operational level of warfare was a means by which the importance of politically-led strategy could be brushed aside. The result was frequently campaigns that, though successful, led only to 'ordinary' victories, that were not decisive, or to catastrophic defeats. Yet these were ascribed to the failings of individuals rather than being recognised as flaws in the basic approach.
The extension of the coverage of the book up until the late 1950s requires some explanation, as it cuts across the usual divisions of historical study. As Gross shows, however, the new Bundeswehr was led by, and hence imbued by the philosophy, of the pre-1945 general staff. It's whole approach was therefore one of operational maneouvre. This philosophy, however, was undermined by the switch in NATO doctrine from conventional defence towards a reliance on ground focres as merely a tripwire for a nuclear response. There was no place for operational-level manoeuvre here, so the approach was lost for two decades, until rediscovered in the 1980s, just at the point when it was rendered irrelevant by the end of the Cold War.
Perhaps the most interesting point Gross makes is that the German philosophy of warfare at the operational level was based on a context where armies manoeuvred near to the country's borders, in areas with excellent road and rail networks, where campaigns could be concluded in a matter of months. Logistics was therefore of minimal importance. Gross shows how this approach fell apart in the vast spaces of Russia during both world wars, as a consequence also leading senior German commanders to pull back from the emphasis on freedom of initiative for subordinate commanders.
The publishers are to be congratulated for bringing this work in translation to an anglophone readership. The case for doing likewise with the other volumes in the exceptional series of which Gross's work forms part must be strong.
In the event, Gerhard Gross, a colonel in the Bundeswehr and one of its leading figures in its historical analysis, provides a startling new interpretation. Perhaps surprisingly, Gross shows how deep the flaws were in the German model. Tracing the concept of the operational level through from the time of Moltke, he demonstrates that the German staff officers grappled with the challenge of a potential two-front war against both France and Russia in the context of their deliberate mis-reading of Clausewitz. Whereas Clausewitz had argued for the primacy of policy over military matters, with warfare being an extension of politics by other means, the German general staff argued that politics gave way once the guns began to fire, such that the conduct of the war was a purely military affair. As a consequence, they also looked at the problem of a two-front war from a purely military perspective: to defeat superior foes it was necessary to make maximum use of the benefits of time and space offered by interior lines. This required rapid mobilisation and movement, aggressive commanders, and a relentless search for quick victories, which meant encirclements rather than frontal attrition.
The problem with this, as Gross shows, was that the problem of a two-front war could not be resolved in this way. The military-economic potential of Germany's enemies was simply too great for a purely military solution. Rather than accept this and recognise the primacy of politics, the German general staff all too often simply ignored reality and became lost in a world of self-delusion. To an extent, the creation of the operational level of warfare was a means by which the importance of politically-led strategy could be brushed aside. The result was frequently campaigns that, though successful, led only to 'ordinary' victories, that were not decisive, or to catastrophic defeats. Yet these were ascribed to the failings of individuals rather than being recognised as flaws in the basic approach.
The extension of the coverage of the book up until the late 1950s requires some explanation, as it cuts across the usual divisions of historical study. As Gross shows, however, the new Bundeswehr was led by, and hence imbued by the philosophy, of the pre-1945 general staff. It's whole approach was therefore one of operational maneouvre. This philosophy, however, was undermined by the switch in NATO doctrine from conventional defence towards a reliance on ground focres as merely a tripwire for a nuclear response. There was no place for operational-level manoeuvre here, so the approach was lost for two decades, until rediscovered in the 1980s, just at the point when it was rendered irrelevant by the end of the Cold War.
Perhaps the most interesting point Gross makes is that the German philosophy of warfare at the operational level was based on a context where armies manoeuvred near to the country's borders, in areas with excellent road and rail networks, where campaigns could be concluded in a matter of months. Logistics was therefore of minimal importance. Gross shows how this approach fell apart in the vast spaces of Russia during both world wars, as a consequence also leading senior German commanders to pull back from the emphasis on freedom of initiative for subordinate commanders.
The publishers are to be congratulated for bringing this work in translation to an anglophone readership. The case for doing likewise with the other volumes in the exceptional series of which Gross's work forms part must be strong.
March 7, 2022
Through examination of German “Way of Warl
Well written and exhaustively footnoted exploration of the German Way of War as practiced in World War I & II. The book is a must read for anyone seeking to truly understand the origins of “blitzkreig” and its inherent flaws at the strategic level. A little dense at times due as the author traces the evolution of German thinking the conclusion of the book does an excellent job summarizing the key points.
Well written and exhaustively footnoted exploration of the German Way of War as practiced in World War I & II. The book is a must read for anyone seeking to truly understand the origins of “blitzkreig” and its inherent flaws at the strategic level. A little dense at times due as the author traces the evolution of German thinking the conclusion of the book does an excellent job summarizing the key points.
December 27, 2019
Work of Art!
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews