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Conférence sur l'éthique
Dans Folioplus philosophie, le texte philosophique, associé à une œuvre d'art qui l'éclaire et le questionne, est suivi d'un dossier organisé en six points :
– les mots du texte : Valeur, sens, éthique
– l'œuvre dans l'histoire des idées : Une révolution ordinaire
– la figure du philosophe : Wittgenstein, philosopher à la limite
– deux questions posées au texte : L'éthique se moque-t-elle de la philosophie morale? Qu'est-ce qu'une expérience éthique?
–groupement de textes : L'éthique ou les intermittences de la morale
– prolongements
À partir de la terminale.
– les mots du texte : Valeur, sens, éthique
– l'œuvre dans l'histoire des idées : Une révolution ordinaire
– la figure du philosophe : Wittgenstein, philosopher à la limite
– deux questions posées au texte : L'éthique se moque-t-elle de la philosophie morale? Qu'est-ce qu'une expérience éthique?
–groupement de textes : L'éthique ou les intermittences de la morale
– prolongements
À partir de la terminale.
144 pages, Unknown Binding
First published January 1, 1929
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275 people want to read
About the author
Ludwig Wittgenstein
261 books2,955 followersLudwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (Ph.D., Trinity College, Cambridge University, 1929) was an Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
Described by Bertrand Russell as "the most perfect example I have ever known of genius as traditionally conceived, passionate, profound, intense, and dominating", he helped inspire two of the twentieth century's principal philosophical movements: the Vienna Circle and Oxford ordinary language philosophy. According to an end of the century poll, professional philosophers in Canada and the U.S. rank both his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations among the top five most important books in twentieth-century philosophy, the latter standing out as "...the one crossover masterpiece in twentieth-century philosophy, appealing across diverse specializations and philosophical orientations". Wittgenstein's influence has been felt in nearly every field of the humanities and social sciences, yet there are widely diverging interpretations of his thought.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 33 reviews
December 29, 2020
La conferencia como tal es cortita, pero se agradece los comentarios incluidos en esta edición. Grande, Witt!
December 24, 2016
Me gustaría señalar una imprecisión de la introducción a mi ejemplar de la Conferencia que podría llevar a hacer una mala lectura, redactada por Manuel Cruz. Los juicios éticos no 'muestran' nada, las únicas proposiciones que 'muestran' son las proposiciones de la lógica, que nos muestran la forma lógica de las proposiciones. Los juicios éticos son una subclase de la clase de 'oraciones' que no tienen carácter proposicional, y cualquier oración que caiga en esta clase (salvo las proposiciones de la lógica y las actitudes proposicionales) no tendrá, propiamente hablando, significado alguno. Esto es lo que debería haber dicho el autor si hubiera querido redactar una introducción a la Conferencia en consonancia con el llamado primer Wittgenstein.
June 27, 2016
Decir que es bueno (o malo) no tendría sentido
January 7, 2024
The conclusion of Wittgenstein's "Lectures on Ethics" leaves us pondering the role of ethics when attempting to articulate the ultimate meaning of life and absolute values. According to him, ethics, in its pursuit of unveiling profound truths, doesn't substantially augment our knowledge.
As a reader navigating Wittgenstein's discourse, he challenges the conventional view of ethics as a systematic discipline, characterizing it as a human inclination. This inclination, he regards with a certain level of respect, highlighting the limitations inherent in language and human cognition when wrestling with profound ethical inquiries.
In the realm of Wittgenstein's philosophy, these lectures underscore his commitment to unraveling the complexities of language and thought, particularly within the domain of ethics. Overall, "Lectures on Ethics" prompts readers to reassess assumptions about ethics, urging them to navigate the intricate terrain of ultimate meaning and absolute values thoughtfully.
As a reader navigating Wittgenstein's discourse, he challenges the conventional view of ethics as a systematic discipline, characterizing it as a human inclination. This inclination, he regards with a certain level of respect, highlighting the limitations inherent in language and human cognition when wrestling with profound ethical inquiries.
In the realm of Wittgenstein's philosophy, these lectures underscore his commitment to unraveling the complexities of language and thought, particularly within the domain of ethics. Overall, "Lectures on Ethics" prompts readers to reassess assumptions about ethics, urging them to navigate the intricate terrain of ultimate meaning and absolute values thoughtfully.
January 8, 2025
In 1929 shortly after his return to Cambridge Wittgenstein gave a lecture on Ethics to the “Heretics”, a group, who the introduction tells us, were not academic philosophers. A former member of them had been Virginia Woolf and also David Pinset.
I am not especially interested in Ethics. (I think Asimov said everything you need to know: Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right. And if you pretend, I add, not to know what is right, you are lying.)
But this lecture is really interesting. And the most interesting are the introductory remarks. After he apologizes for his bad English he tells them gently that they would not understand a lecture on logic.
And then he says this:
Ethics he defines as Moore did as the general enquiry into what is good. And as alternatives: Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important. Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.
Nothing really exciting, except maybe that we see that he touches on the idea of family resemblance.
There is, he says, a relative (and trivial) sense of good. “Thus when we say that this man is a good pianist we mean that he can play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity.”
A judgement of relative value (e.g. about the right way to Granchester) can be formulated in a way that there is no appearance of a judgement of value left. And he concludes: “No statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgement of absolute value.”
The absolute right road would be a chimera. A “characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions.”
Ethical judgements are a form of nonsense. Wittgenstein is still in the framework of the Tractatus. But we can see already the mind of the PU working:
Ethics can be no science. But it is also not nonsense in the sense of gibberish as the resolute readers want you to believe. Ethics does not add something to our knowledge of the world. “But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.”
The lecture consists of less than ten pages. To make a book out of it of nearly 150 pages is a remarkable accomplishment. But I should not ridicule the effort. At least there is a wonderful letter by his sister Gretl to Wittgenstein that is at least as valuable as the lecture itself.
I am not especially interested in Ethics. (I think Asimov said everything you need to know: Never let your sense of morals prevent you from doing what is right. And if you pretend, I add, not to know what is right, you are lying.)
But this lecture is really interesting. And the most interesting are the introductory remarks. After he apologizes for his bad English he tells them gently that they would not understand a lecture on logic.
And then he says this:
Another alternative would have been to give you what is called a popular-scientific lecture, that is a lecture intended to make you believe that you understand a thing which actually you do not understand, and to gratify what I believe to be one of the lowest desires of modern people, namely the superficial curiosity about the latest discoveries of science.
Ethics he defines as Moore did as the general enquiry into what is good. And as alternatives: Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important. Ethics is the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living.
Nothing really exciting, except maybe that we see that he touches on the idea of family resemblance.
There is, he says, a relative (and trivial) sense of good. “Thus when we say that this man is a good pianist we mean that he can play pieces of a certain degree of difficulty with a certain degree of dexterity.”
A judgement of relative value (e.g. about the right way to Granchester) can be formulated in a way that there is no appearance of a judgement of value left. And he concludes: “No statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgement of absolute value.”
The absolute right road would be a chimera. A “characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions.”
Ethical judgements are a form of nonsense. Wittgenstein is still in the framework of the Tractatus. But we can see already the mind of the PU working:
My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk ethics or religion was to run against the boundaries of language.
Ethics can be no science. But it is also not nonsense in the sense of gibberish as the resolute readers want you to believe. Ethics does not add something to our knowledge of the world. “But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.”
The lecture consists of less than ten pages. To make a book out of it of nearly 150 pages is a remarkable accomplishment. But I should not ridicule the effort. At least there is a wonderful letter by his sister Gretl to Wittgenstein that is at least as valuable as the lecture itself.
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December 12, 2017A strange mixture of brilliant intelligence and sophomoric stupidity.
August 18, 2025
El libro rescata una breve conferencia que da el autor en Cambridge, 1929. Rescato tres ideas principales:
1) Generalmente pensamos la ética como el estudio de lo que es bueno o el estudio de lo que es correcto, en general, aplicado a la conducta humana. El autor amplía esta perspectiva: entiende la ética conectada estrechamente con el sentido de la vida; lo que hace que valga la pena ser vivida. Porque si la vida no tiene un sentido, todo estaría permitido. En ese sentido, la ética estaría conectada con la estética.
2) Cuando decimos que algo es bueno o correcto, podemos estar queriendo decir dos cosas distintas. En la primera posibilidad, cuando decimos "esta es una buena silla" o "este es el camino correcto para ir de Linares a Talca", lo que queremos decir es que la silla o el camino cumplen ciertos criterios: la silla es adecuada para que se siente un humano, es suficientemente firme, el camino es el que nos ayuda a llegar a destino en el menor tiempo posible. Algo es bueno-para. En otras palabras, se trata de una declaración de hechos, una constatación de que algo cumple cierto estándar, es adecuado para cierto objetivo. No implica nunca que algo sea bueno o malo, solo que es. Wittgenstein llama a esto juicio de valor relativo. En la segunda posibilidad, cuando decimos "usted debería querer comportarse mejor", estamos haciendo un juicio de valor absoluto, es decir, estamos queriendo decir que algo es bueno o malo en sí mismo.
3) Los juicios de valor relativos están sujetos al estudio científico y pueden expresarse mediante el lenguaje. Pero los juicios de valor absolutos no. De estos realmente no podemos hablar con certeza y los límites del lenguaje no nos permiten expresarlos correctamente. Solo podemos hablar de ellos mediante metáforas, pero nunca de manera precisa. La ética y la religión pertenecen a este último tipo de juicios. Por eso, «la Ética, si es algo, es sobrenatural, pero nuestras palabras solo expresarán hechos» (p. 29). No se puede ir más allá del mundo.
Esperablemente, el autor concluye de este análisis que de la ética no puede realmente hablarse, pues siempre que lo intentamos chocamos contra los límites del lenguaje. Intentar hablar sobre ella es una inclinación natural, pero, al fin y al cabo, una tarea sin esperanza, un esfuerzo fútil:
A primera vista, el panorama que delinea Wittgenstein no es nada alentador. Tampoco es ninguna sorpresa: ya había escrito en el Tractatus que "de lo que no se puede hablar, es mejor callar la boca". Sin embargo, visto pragmáticamente, creo tiene algo rescatable: nos recuerda que en el terreno de la ética —así como en el de la política, la estética o la religión— no encontraremos verdades absolutas. Podemos estudiarlas todo lo que queramos, pueden pasar cientos o miles de años, pero no por eso llegaremos a un conocimiento sólido y definitivo. Y así fuera, sería una quimera. Sería material para un cuento de Borges. Ya no habría nada más a lo que ponerle atención, sería lo único importante. No habría nada más de lo que valdría la pena hablar, porque «si un hombre pudiera escribir un libro de Ética, que realmente fuera un libro de Ética, este libro destruiría, con una explosión, todos los otros libros del mundo» (p. 29).
1) Generalmente pensamos la ética como el estudio de lo que es bueno o el estudio de lo que es correcto, en general, aplicado a la conducta humana. El autor amplía esta perspectiva: entiende la ética conectada estrechamente con el sentido de la vida; lo que hace que valga la pena ser vivida. Porque si la vida no tiene un sentido, todo estaría permitido. En ese sentido, la ética estaría conectada con la estética.
2) Cuando decimos que algo es bueno o correcto, podemos estar queriendo decir dos cosas distintas. En la primera posibilidad, cuando decimos "esta es una buena silla" o "este es el camino correcto para ir de Linares a Talca", lo que queremos decir es que la silla o el camino cumplen ciertos criterios: la silla es adecuada para que se siente un humano, es suficientemente firme, el camino es el que nos ayuda a llegar a destino en el menor tiempo posible. Algo es bueno-para. En otras palabras, se trata de una declaración de hechos, una constatación de que algo cumple cierto estándar, es adecuado para cierto objetivo. No implica nunca que algo sea bueno o malo, solo que es. Wittgenstein llama a esto juicio de valor relativo. En la segunda posibilidad, cuando decimos "usted debería querer comportarse mejor", estamos haciendo un juicio de valor absoluto, es decir, estamos queriendo decir que algo es bueno o malo en sí mismo.
3) Los juicios de valor relativos están sujetos al estudio científico y pueden expresarse mediante el lenguaje. Pero los juicios de valor absolutos no. De estos realmente no podemos hablar con certeza y los límites del lenguaje no nos permiten expresarlos correctamente. Solo podemos hablar de ellos mediante metáforas, pero nunca de manera precisa. La ética y la religión pertenecen a este último tipo de juicios. Por eso, «la Ética, si es algo, es sobrenatural, pero nuestras palabras solo expresarán hechos» (p. 29). No se puede ir más allá del mundo.
Esperablemente, el autor concluye de este análisis que de la ética no puede realmente hablarse, pues siempre que lo intentamos chocamos contra los límites del lenguaje. Intentar hablar sobre ella es una inclinación natural, pero, al fin y al cabo, una tarea sin esperanza, un esfuerzo fútil:
La Ética, en tanto surge del deseo de decir algo acerca del significado último de la vida, del bien absoluto, de lo absolutamente valioso, no puede ser una ciencia. Lo que dice no le agrega absolutamente nada a nuestro conocimiento en ningún sentido (p. 43).
A primera vista, el panorama que delinea Wittgenstein no es nada alentador. Tampoco es ninguna sorpresa: ya había escrito en el Tractatus que "de lo que no se puede hablar, es mejor callar la boca". Sin embargo, visto pragmáticamente, creo tiene algo rescatable: nos recuerda que en el terreno de la ética —así como en el de la política, la estética o la religión— no encontraremos verdades absolutas. Podemos estudiarlas todo lo que queramos, pueden pasar cientos o miles de años, pero no por eso llegaremos a un conocimiento sólido y definitivo. Y así fuera, sería una quimera. Sería material para un cuento de Borges. Ya no habría nada más a lo que ponerle atención, sería lo único importante. No habría nada más de lo que valdría la pena hablar, porque «si un hombre pudiera escribir un libro de Ética, que realmente fuera un libro de Ética, este libro destruiría, con una explosión, todos los otros libros del mundo» (p. 29).
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October 23, 2025''Now I am tempted to say that the right expression in language for the miracle of the existence of the world, though it is not any proposition in language, is the existence of language itself. But what then does it mean to be aware of this miracle at some times and not at other times? For all I have said by shifting the expression of the miraculous from an expression by means of language to the expression by the existence of language, all I have said is again that we cannot express what we want to express and that all we say about the absolute miraculous remains nonsense''
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
7. Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.
December 23, 2022
Excelente. La edición trae comentarios, y al final unas anécdotas de conversaciones con Wittgenstein que ayudan a aclarar (u oscurecer) su posición. Aunque claro, la idea original es de Kierkegaard, y si vamos más atrás es en realidad de Schelling, pero eso es otra historia.
November 18, 2025
vaya pedazo de petardo
May 9, 2021
Le texte lui-même est court, pas trop dense, et comporte des exemples qui éclairent le propos. Un très bonne introduction à la philosophie de Wittgenstein.
J'enlève une étoile pour l'édition Folio Philosophie: la conférence elle-même fait 20 pages, et le dossier qui l'accompagne 100. L'édition est clairement à destination des terminales; mais il n'y a pas que des élèves qui lisent de la philosophie... à lire en conjonction avec d'autres textes de Wittgenstein, certainement pas à acheter seul comme je l'ai fait.
J'enlève une étoile pour l'édition Folio Philosophie: la conférence elle-même fait 20 pages, et le dossier qui l'accompagne 100. L'édition est clairement à destination des terminales; mais il n'y a pas que des élèves qui lisent de la philosophie... à lire en conjonction avec d'autres textes de Wittgenstein, certainement pas à acheter seul comme je l'ai fait.
February 26, 2016
La versión de Ediciones Tácitas está terrible bonita.
February 14, 2020
Solo tengo esto para decir: Wittgenstein es un papucho! 😍
August 4, 2025
En linea con las ideas propuestas en su "primer" pensamiento, los límites del mundo son los limites de lo decible. Lo que es dicho puede ser dicho en la medida que la veracidad de las preposiciones se evalua logicamente según su correspondencia empirica. Lo que no pueda ser evaluado de esa forma, no tiene sentido que se intente evaluar al menos no en el plano del lenguaje. Es por ello que la etica y la estetica asumen una excepcionalidad o exceso al lenguaje. El juicio etico y estetico supone una preposición no evaluable contingentemente según cuan verazmente describen al mundo. Las preposiciones sobre bueno y lo bello exceden la capacidad logica para evaluar su veracidad y, sin embargo, existen en el lenguaje. Es por esto que se asumen como juicios absolutos y que desde un primer Wittgenstein pueden pensarse como un limite que el lenguaje le pone al sujeto.
"Nuestras palabras, usadas tal como lo hacemos en la ciencia, son recipientes capaces solamente de contener y transmitir significado y sentido, significado y sentido naturales. La ética, de ser algo, es sobrenatural y nuestras palabras sólo expresan hechos, del mismo modo que una taza de té sólo podrá contener el volumen de agua propio de una taza de té por más que se vierta un litro en ella."
"Nuestras palabras, usadas tal como lo hacemos en la ciencia, son recipientes capaces solamente de contener y transmitir significado y sentido, significado y sentido naturales. La ética, de ser algo, es sobrenatural y nuestras palabras sólo expresan hechos, del mismo modo que una taza de té sólo podrá contener el volumen de agua propio de una taza de té por más que se vierta un litro en ella."
May 3, 2023
Hay en este Wittgenstein una dimensión estética que produce esculturas textuales. Es austero, preciso, desconfiado, magnánimo. La tensión es insoportable. Empuja hacia la nada al descubrir la limitación de la condición humana, mientras empuja hacia el todo al advertir que algo indescifrable lo reclama. Entre lo posible y lo imposible, entre lo relativo y lo absoluto, se abre este limbo Wittgensteiniano. No deriva en el cinismo, ni en la implosión en la nada del escepticismo antiguo. No se resigna, presenta batalla. Por eso es primero una estética del límite. De ahí derivan todas las jaulas. No se puede realmente conocer nada. Es indispensable depurar ilusiones. No es posible una ética. Los valores pertenecen a otro mundo inaccesible al ser humano. Es un problema estructural, una condición de imposibilidad. Cuando parece haber una ética, una mínima inspección muestra que se trata de una confusión del lenguaje. Wittgenstein es el más feroz destructor de mundos.
June 26, 2024
La conferencia son seis páginas. Te las lees (dando tiempo a pensar sobre lo que estás leyendo) en 15 minutos y te vuelan la cabeza.
Los anexos de esta edición están muy bien porque sirven para indagar un poco más en la concepción que tenía Wittgenstein acerca de la ética. Hay una correspondencia con un amigo en la que habla de la importancia de que, al final de la conferencia, esté hablando en primera persona. Además hay también una discusión muy interesante acerca del asesinato de César por parte de Bruto.
La conclusión a la que llega Wittgenstein en la conferencia es la misma que la del Tractatus: de ética no podemos hablar. Pero es increíble cómo, arrojando a la ética a la papelera, la salva acto seguido para que ascienda a los cielos. Porque aquello de lo que nada puede decirse es precisamente lo más importante. Voy a darle un par de días para releerlo más adelante, porque me ha gustado mucho, pero quiero ver cómo resiste a un poco de crítica y tiempo.
Los anexos de esta edición están muy bien porque sirven para indagar un poco más en la concepción que tenía Wittgenstein acerca de la ética. Hay una correspondencia con un amigo en la que habla de la importancia de que, al final de la conferencia, esté hablando en primera persona. Además hay también una discusión muy interesante acerca del asesinato de César por parte de Bruto.
La conclusión a la que llega Wittgenstein en la conferencia es la misma que la del Tractatus: de ética no podemos hablar. Pero es increíble cómo, arrojando a la ética a la papelera, la salva acto seguido para que ascienda a los cielos. Porque aquello de lo que nada puede decirse es precisamente lo más importante. Voy a darle un par de días para releerlo más adelante, porque me ha gustado mucho, pero quiero ver cómo resiste a un poco de crítica y tiempo.
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August 14, 2023That is to say: I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language.
This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.
This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.
May 31, 2023
One cannot speak of ethics, one can only live it.
As I'm reading Levinas and Sartre at the same time, I see a similar theme of ethics that only gets its meaning in situation.
In the examples of ethical situations given by Wittgenstein, I see a similarity with Sartre in that responsability is firstly "Pour-soi-pour-autrui", remaining in an ontological state of solipsism. Where is the real place for the Other? In that respect, Levinas has a more solid ethics framework that still respects the ineffable.
But in the end, certainly they would all agree that ethics is as beyond the self as it is beyond language, that ethics is transcendental.
As I'm reading Levinas and Sartre at the same time, I see a similar theme of ethics that only gets its meaning in situation.
In the examples of ethical situations given by Wittgenstein, I see a similarity with Sartre in that responsability is firstly "Pour-soi-pour-autrui", remaining in an ontological state of solipsism. Where is the real place for the Other? In that respect, Levinas has a more solid ethics framework that still respects the ineffable.
But in the end, certainly they would all agree that ethics is as beyond the self as it is beyond language, that ethics is transcendental.
Read
July 8, 2025A fascinating brief read. Think it traces the transition between early and late Wittgenstein well: he’s reached a point where he sees the most fundamental philosophy (ethics) as essentially ineffable and perhaps even meaningless in some sense, yet still frames this within the context of a logical, scientific worldview.
January 10, 2021
Nu er jeg langt fra en ekspert, men det der var da en gang vrøvl..
Nuvel, den er læst.
Lad mig endelig blive irettesat..
Nuvel, den er læst.
Lad mig endelig blive irettesat..
August 8, 2021
La conferencia pese a ser cortita es muy interesante, sirve para entender un poco más el pensamiento de Wittgenstein.
May 30, 2022
More of a lecture on the language around ethics rather than the ethics itself
August 15, 2022
It is not worth the price
It is very expensive for a short text and some images of facsimiles. It would be better invest in the most relevant text of Wittgenstein like Tractatus.
It is very expensive for a short text and some images of facsimiles. It would be better invest in the most relevant text of Wittgenstein like Tractatus.
March 31, 2024
Sencillo de leer pero poco de acuerdo con algunos puntos
February 11, 2025
absolutamente precioso
March 24, 2025
ou seja, tudo é possibilidade, tudo é estupidez. ensaios filosóficos levam sempre ao mesmo.
October 3, 2025
¿Quizás carecería de sentido decir si es bueno o malo?
January 31, 2019
Just as Wittgenstein is, and perhaps should, be considered an anomaly within the philosophic traditions, so too is his “Lecture on Ethics” an anomaly within moral philosophy. And as an anomaly, it would be more helpful to agree, or at least begin with, with what Joachim Schulte says, mainly that the “Lecture” is not an original contribution to ethics as a philosophical doctrine; rather, it is a thoroughly characteristic document of Wittgenstein’s personality (“Wittgenstein: An Introduction”). As with works by Nietzsche and Plato, the “Lecture” is a very personal document and Zamuner’s introduction helps establish this by reminding us that for Wittgenstein, ethics was a life-long preoccupation for him and one to the point of his self-torture (perhaps, how it should be for all people), not as preoccupied with advancing a painstakingly near-perfect doctrine of moral philosophy (as it seemingly is for most philosophers or, at least, “philosophers”).
In the “Lecture,” the only one of its kind, Wittgenstein, made himself and his content available, personally and without philosophical pretensions and as one of the drafts, which are included in this edition, states, he speaks as one human to another, attempting to disavow his authority (as a world-famous philosopher) (Zamuner). This is supported by Wittgenstein’s word choice in the presented or official lecture: “I should speak about something which I am keen on communicating to you, and that I should not misuse this opportunity.”
The “Lecture” itself is so short that to provide a summary of it would be to cover the entire lecture. Seemingly. So, as opposed to focusing on the Lecture’s content, I will highlight what Zamuner, and most, believe to be the purpose of the “Lecture,” which is not to understand its content anymore than it is to simply agree or disagree with it. As Nietzsche and Jung have taught us, a philosopher’s person, his childhood or experiences, influences or creates his philosophy, and Wittgenstein was not concerned with Ethics proper but rather was annoyed with people talking about ethics, to “claptrap” about ethics, all the while never being ethical or becoming ethical.
Even worse, when we read moral philosophy (assuming we are not reading it just to be informed or understand it), we are not so much trying to become ethical under the guidance of sages as we are escaping the personal demand to be ethical by evading its challenge to us, which is always and solely (and seemingly uniquely fitted) to each and every one of us, by allocating the situation, an existential situation I would say, to what someone else said for us to do; so, asking ourselves, “What would Aristotle or Kant say that I should do in this situation” is a Nietzschean really, “Man, I’m really hoping there’s something in Aristotle or Kant that can tell me what to do,” an evasion of the ethical, and one might add of even autonomy. The ethical is demanded of us after all, not two dead philosophers in Aristotle or Kant.
Whatever ethics is, it is no science, and it has neither facts nor methods that are applicable to everyone. But we want it to be a science as our lives would certainly be easier if it was. If it was a science, we could so easily follow it, just as one would a Test of General Relativity, and we would easily and correctly have addressed the dilemma. For Wittgenstein, reading a book on ethics makes as much sense as reading a book on how to change your life (if you love self-help bestsellers, he would have some bad news for or terrible thoughts about you, I'm afraid): again, it is not a science but wholly personal, seemingly unique to each and every one of us, and it is this demand, this inconvenience, that is the takeaway from the “Lecture,” a reminder that ethics is each and every person's personal dilemma, not some convenient abstraction or theory for everyone.
While the “Lecture on Ethics” does not fit any traditional presentation of ethics, it has its spirit in common with works by thinkers such as Plato and Nietzsche, neither of which preached, much less preached a program, a method, or an imperative, and for whom the truth about one’s way of life is left to the individual to workout for himself or herself, whether one sees that as fortunate or unfortunate.
Unlike the “Tractatus,” which he later disavowed, and the “Philosophical Investigations,” which if he could have ever disavowed, he never lived long enough to, Wittgenstein never disavowed the “Lecture on Ethics” (that we know of), but like most personal thinkers, he would seemingly welcome any disagreement with it as long as it was accompanied by a genuine, Rilkean “Du mußt dein Leben ändern.”
In the “Lecture,” the only one of its kind, Wittgenstein, made himself and his content available, personally and without philosophical pretensions and as one of the drafts, which are included in this edition, states, he speaks as one human to another, attempting to disavow his authority (as a world-famous philosopher) (Zamuner). This is supported by Wittgenstein’s word choice in the presented or official lecture: “I should speak about something which I am keen on communicating to you, and that I should not misuse this opportunity.”
The “Lecture” itself is so short that to provide a summary of it would be to cover the entire lecture. Seemingly. So, as opposed to focusing on the Lecture’s content, I will highlight what Zamuner, and most, believe to be the purpose of the “Lecture,” which is not to understand its content anymore than it is to simply agree or disagree with it. As Nietzsche and Jung have taught us, a philosopher’s person, his childhood or experiences, influences or creates his philosophy, and Wittgenstein was not concerned with Ethics proper but rather was annoyed with people talking about ethics, to “claptrap” about ethics, all the while never being ethical or becoming ethical.
Even worse, when we read moral philosophy (assuming we are not reading it just to be informed or understand it), we are not so much trying to become ethical under the guidance of sages as we are escaping the personal demand to be ethical by evading its challenge to us, which is always and solely (and seemingly uniquely fitted) to each and every one of us, by allocating the situation, an existential situation I would say, to what someone else said for us to do; so, asking ourselves, “What would Aristotle or Kant say that I should do in this situation” is a Nietzschean really, “Man, I’m really hoping there’s something in Aristotle or Kant that can tell me what to do,” an evasion of the ethical, and one might add of even autonomy. The ethical is demanded of us after all, not two dead philosophers in Aristotle or Kant.
Whatever ethics is, it is no science, and it has neither facts nor methods that are applicable to everyone. But we want it to be a science as our lives would certainly be easier if it was. If it was a science, we could so easily follow it, just as one would a Test of General Relativity, and we would easily and correctly have addressed the dilemma. For Wittgenstein, reading a book on ethics makes as much sense as reading a book on how to change your life (if you love self-help bestsellers, he would have some bad news for or terrible thoughts about you, I'm afraid): again, it is not a science but wholly personal, seemingly unique to each and every one of us, and it is this demand, this inconvenience, that is the takeaway from the “Lecture,” a reminder that ethics is each and every person's personal dilemma, not some convenient abstraction or theory for everyone.
While the “Lecture on Ethics” does not fit any traditional presentation of ethics, it has its spirit in common with works by thinkers such as Plato and Nietzsche, neither of which preached, much less preached a program, a method, or an imperative, and for whom the truth about one’s way of life is left to the individual to workout for himself or herself, whether one sees that as fortunate or unfortunate.
Unlike the “Tractatus,” which he later disavowed, and the “Philosophical Investigations,” which if he could have ever disavowed, he never lived long enough to, Wittgenstein never disavowed the “Lecture on Ethics” (that we know of), but like most personal thinkers, he would seemingly welcome any disagreement with it as long as it was accompanied by a genuine, Rilkean “Du mußt dein Leben ändern.”
February 22, 2017
En esta breve conferencia, Ludwig Wittgenstein saca consecuencias no exploradas de su teoría del Tractatus sobre el lenguaje y el mundo. Lo ético escapa a lo proposicional, de manera que todo enunciado ético supone un mal uso del lenguaje, un intento de expresar algo que escapa de los límites del lenguaje y del mundo.
Me da la impresión de que Wittgenstein no tiene aquí su posición final sobre la ética. Los cambios de posición en las Investigaciones filosóficas acerca del lenguaje son tan cruciales que parece adecuado pensar que el autor haya movido también su posición en torno a la ética. ¡Necesitamos ayuda especializada para averiguar este punto!
Me da la impresión de que Wittgenstein no tiene aquí su posición final sobre la ética. Los cambios de posición en las Investigaciones filosóficas acerca del lenguaje son tan cruciales que parece adecuado pensar que el autor haya movido también su posición en torno a la ética. ¡Necesitamos ayuda especializada para averiguar este punto!
May 13, 2015
This is a descendent of an earlier publication by the same name and the same editors from an Italian publisher. This is shorter and cheaper and more easily available. The editing of the material seems to be the same, but the interpretation of the material has changed.
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