What do you think?
Rate this book
The Battle At Sea
John Keegan concentrates on four key conflicts - Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the Battle of the Atlantic. Not only are we taken into the very heart of the fighting, we are also given a panoramic view of naval warfare through the centuries. 'A masterly study' DAILY MAIL 'Rich in unexpected facts and insights. . . Keegan's historical command is dazzling. ' JAN MORRIS INDEPENDENT
304 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1993
About the author
John Keegan
134 books794 followersSir John Desmond Patrick Keegan, OBE, FRSL was a British military historian, lecturer and journalist. He published many works on the nature of combat between the 14th and 21st centuries concerning land, air, maritime and intelligence warfare as well as the psychology of battle.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
September 17, 2017
While I do not see this elsewhere I believe that John Keegan's Battle At Sea as also published under The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare from Trafalgar to MidwayThe Price of Admiralty both publication dates are 1988. Both have the same Table of contents. As The Price of Admiralty, this is the third in his ground breaking trilogy that includes The Mask of Command and The Face of Battle.
Professor, Sir John Keegan is a mast of what I call level two history. Less about what unit deployed at what time to what location. Less about the mere dating of important events and more about using historic event to discuss why those events are important; how they fit into the flow of immediate history and how they effected later decision making.
He is at his best with land battles and generals. His relative lack of depth regarding the finer details of warships and naval thinking is just that relative. He knows both better than most. He is simply better at soldiering.
I have now read this book under both titles The Price of Admiralty some years ago and Battle at Sea very recently. It is worth the re-read. Indeed Sir John Keegan has never been less that illuminating.
Just to dispense with it, I agree with another reviewer who feels that Keegan’s famous case study approach needed the Battle of Leplanto. Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the Battle of the Atlantic receive regular coverage, but Leplanto is as much a case in the evolution of decision making as any other in this text. Leplanto is worth and less studied example of fundamental changes in how to fight ships, order the battle line and adopt to new weapons and ship designs As much as he demands that Jutland is the last Battle ship battle, that title must go to the final crossing of the ‘T’ at the WW II Pacific Theater battle of Surigao Strait. This battle may not deserve its own chapter, but it should have received mention. Likewise the Battleship on Cruiser battle: Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal November 14-15, 1942 does not rate its own chapter, but the problem of new technology, the ship borne RADAR and relative mistrust of it by higher command should have been a topic worth a few paragraphs.
Against the larger weight of Keegan Book and the value of his lectures, these are quibbles.
Battle at Sea is in lecture format and tone. That is it is not heavily technical or overly concerned with specific details. In the case of his analysis of Midway, Keegan could not have had the benefit of the better and more exact time line laid out in Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of MidwayThe Shattered Sword.
Keegan’s analysis of IJN and USN decision making, the relative cost risk analysis by fleet level and higher command would have been better had he the advantage of points made by Parshal and Tully. It is not fair to judge Keegan for information not yet available to him.
What I liked most about Battle at Sea was the fact that Keegan uses a more universal approach to command decision making. His analysis and thoughts about decision making are less about the specific problems of ship to ship battle and more about what commanders of any unit must consider. From Nelson to the Submarine the main issue is how to locate the enemy’s concentrations and how to intercept that fleet/convoy under terms that best advance the attacker. If the opposing forces can be brought together the next question is the one of tactics and deployment. Nelson let his “T’ be crossed and used it to double up , 2 ships to one against the French/Spainish. At Jutland, The British twice crossed the German ‘T”’ but lacked a plan that addressed the higher speeds and maneuverability of the steam powered Battle Ship. Crossing the T at sea is comparable to Flanking an enemy on land.
Ships being more a matter of technology than the Battalion, Keegan has to spend more time on the relative value of armor over speed over weapons. This is the armored tank problem writ large. Less emphasized, but never forgotten is the fact that on land individual soldiers can run from the battle. At sea there is nowhere for the typical sailor, especially ones below decks to run. The relative ease of soldier and sailor at war is a debate not addressed by Keegan, but death at sea comes in every horrible variation and too often with very few survivors.
I am rarely reading military history to learn in detail what unit was moved to where. My interest is in the decision making process and in the unchanging and changing nature of battlefield thinking dictated by the materials, strategic and political goals behind the engagement. In a sense every battle is the instantaneous outcome of specific conditions and decisions. At that level all are exceptional. In The Battle at Sea Keegan has chosen 4 atypical moments and argued how each effected the next. Each is a moment illustrative of prior events and shaper of future events.
Professor, Sir John Keegan is a mast of what I call level two history. Less about what unit deployed at what time to what location. Less about the mere dating of important events and more about using historic event to discuss why those events are important; how they fit into the flow of immediate history and how they effected later decision making.
He is at his best with land battles and generals. His relative lack of depth regarding the finer details of warships and naval thinking is just that relative. He knows both better than most. He is simply better at soldiering.
I have now read this book under both titles The Price of Admiralty some years ago and Battle at Sea very recently. It is worth the re-read. Indeed Sir John Keegan has never been less that illuminating.
Just to dispense with it, I agree with another reviewer who feels that Keegan’s famous case study approach needed the Battle of Leplanto. Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the Battle of the Atlantic receive regular coverage, but Leplanto is as much a case in the evolution of decision making as any other in this text. Leplanto is worth and less studied example of fundamental changes in how to fight ships, order the battle line and adopt to new weapons and ship designs As much as he demands that Jutland is the last Battle ship battle, that title must go to the final crossing of the ‘T’ at the WW II Pacific Theater battle of Surigao Strait. This battle may not deserve its own chapter, but it should have received mention. Likewise the Battleship on Cruiser battle: Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal November 14-15, 1942 does not rate its own chapter, but the problem of new technology, the ship borne RADAR and relative mistrust of it by higher command should have been a topic worth a few paragraphs.
Against the larger weight of Keegan Book and the value of his lectures, these are quibbles.
Battle at Sea is in lecture format and tone. That is it is not heavily technical or overly concerned with specific details. In the case of his analysis of Midway, Keegan could not have had the benefit of the better and more exact time line laid out in Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of MidwayThe Shattered Sword.
Keegan’s analysis of IJN and USN decision making, the relative cost risk analysis by fleet level and higher command would have been better had he the advantage of points made by Parshal and Tully. It is not fair to judge Keegan for information not yet available to him.
What I liked most about Battle at Sea was the fact that Keegan uses a more universal approach to command decision making. His analysis and thoughts about decision making are less about the specific problems of ship to ship battle and more about what commanders of any unit must consider. From Nelson to the Submarine the main issue is how to locate the enemy’s concentrations and how to intercept that fleet/convoy under terms that best advance the attacker. If the opposing forces can be brought together the next question is the one of tactics and deployment. Nelson let his “T’ be crossed and used it to double up , 2 ships to one against the French/Spainish. At Jutland, The British twice crossed the German ‘T”’ but lacked a plan that addressed the higher speeds and maneuverability of the steam powered Battle Ship. Crossing the T at sea is comparable to Flanking an enemy on land.
Ships being more a matter of technology than the Battalion, Keegan has to spend more time on the relative value of armor over speed over weapons. This is the armored tank problem writ large. Less emphasized, but never forgotten is the fact that on land individual soldiers can run from the battle. At sea there is nowhere for the typical sailor, especially ones below decks to run. The relative ease of soldier and sailor at war is a debate not addressed by Keegan, but death at sea comes in every horrible variation and too often with very few survivors.
I am rarely reading military history to learn in detail what unit was moved to where. My interest is in the decision making process and in the unchanging and changing nature of battlefield thinking dictated by the materials, strategic and political goals behind the engagement. In a sense every battle is the instantaneous outcome of specific conditions and decisions. At that level all are exceptional. In The Battle at Sea Keegan has chosen 4 atypical moments and argued how each effected the next. Each is a moment illustrative of prior events and shaper of future events.
August 31, 2020
A brilliant book. Keegan has a profound grasp of history and of naval tactics and strategy.
Read
August 12, 2016Another masterpiece from John Keegan with all the insight and analysis one would expect from the Master of this form of history.
It is easy but unrewarding to compare this to his "Face of Battle" which redefined military history and it's writing styles. This is not on the same level as that but, in truth, very few history books can hope to match the sheer left field re-invention of the genre that was Face of Battle. In style, this is very similar- offering a brief overview then dealing with the more human elements of the campaigns analysed (Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the largest convoy assault of the Battle of the Atlantic) Perhaps Mr Keegan is less comfortable dealing with naval mattters as the analysis does not seem quite so searing as I recall Face of Battle being. That is not to suggest this is a bad book or that nothing is to be learned from it. A casual reader will gain much from it and the style is always highly readable. Perhaps those with a greater knowledge base will look elsewhere.
An enjoyable and highly rewarding read, easily on a par with Mask of Command.
It is easy but unrewarding to compare this to his "Face of Battle" which redefined military history and it's writing styles. This is not on the same level as that but, in truth, very few history books can hope to match the sheer left field re-invention of the genre that was Face of Battle. In style, this is very similar- offering a brief overview then dealing with the more human elements of the campaigns analysed (Trafalgar, Jutland, Midway and the largest convoy assault of the Battle of the Atlantic) Perhaps Mr Keegan is less comfortable dealing with naval mattters as the analysis does not seem quite so searing as I recall Face of Battle being. That is not to suggest this is a bad book or that nothing is to be learned from it. A casual reader will gain much from it and the style is always highly readable. Perhaps those with a greater knowledge base will look elsewhere.
An enjoyable and highly rewarding read, easily on a par with Mask of Command.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews