Race, ethnicity, nationality, religion, gender, sexuality: in the past couple of decades, a great deal of attention has been paid to such collective identities. They clamor for recognition and respect, sometimes at the expense of other things we value. But to what extent do "identities" constrain our freedom, our ability to make an individual life, and to what extent do they enable our individuality? In this beautifully written work, renowned philosopher and African Studies scholar Kwame Anthony Appiah draws on thinkers through the ages and across the globe to explore such questions.
The Ethics of Identity takes seriously both the claims of individuality--the task of making a life---and the claims of identity, these large and often abstract social categories through which we define ourselves.
What sort of life one should lead is a subject that has preoccupied moral and political thinkers from Aristotle to Mill. Here, Appiah develops an account of ethics, in just this venerable sense--but an account that connects moral obligations with collective allegiances, our individuality with our identities. As he observes, the question who we are has always been linked to the question what we are.
Adopting a broadly interdisciplinary perspective, Appiah takes aim at the cliches and received ideas amid which talk of identity so often founders. Is "culture" a good? For that matter, does the concept of culture really explain anything? Is diversity of value in itself? Are moral obligations the only kind there are? Has the rhetoric of "human rights" been overstretched? In the end, Appiah's arguments make it harder to think of the world as divided between the West and the Rest; between locals and cosmopolitans; between Us and Them. The result is a new vision of liberal humanism--one that can accommodate the vagaries and variety that make us human.
Kwame Anthony Appiah, the president of the PEN American Center, is the author of The Ethics of Identity, Thinking It Through: An Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy, The Honor Code and the prize-winning Cosmopolitanism. Raised in Ghana and educated in England, he has taught philosophy on three continents and is a former professor at Princeton University and currently has a position at NYU.
Summary: Identity doesn't quite make sense if the categories only exist in our heads. That's what he's trying to address. In that regard, he's right and the whole book is pretty intriguing on telling you why that's a potential problem both for how we treat ourselves and others in a host of stuff that matters.
I'll be reviewing on Instagram (IGTV) later this week. Check it out: WHEREISMAYLING & Youtube DIARY OF A SPEED READER
So weird, whenever I read the philosophy book reviews, I'm always like... did I read the same book as everyone else. Look, I know there is a need to use other author's names and use big words, but it's really not necessary. I mean, you benefit if you have a background, but mostly what he's saying doesn't truly require that big a background in philosophy. It's pretty deep though.
Notes: The whole preface has to be read with a fine-tooth comb. If you don't understand it, I can see how you swerve into crazy land like some of the reviews that make no sense.
p. xiv - His point is that there is a complex structure of identity that exists even before you start to wonder who you are. "we make our lives as men and as women, as gay and as straight people, as Ghanaians or as Americans, as blacks and as whites." Right, this is what you choose out of what SOCIETY gives you, not what is true or innate or some sort of essence. So then he asks these simple/not so simple questions: "Do identities represent a curb on autonomy or do they provide us with contours? What claims, if any, can identity groups as such justly make upon the state? ... What's age-old is that when we are asked - and ask ourselves - who we are, we are being asked what we are as well." That's deep b/c what he's saying is that 250,000 years ago when there was no crazy land structure like there is now, none of those questions would have existed. It would have just been, I'm thinking, therefore I am. Now, it's more like I think And Also there’s this stuff asserted upon me by categories in society (so am I really thinking)and after all that stuff then I am.... or am I? Dope, right?
p. 6 - His whole deal with Mills is that in the book On Liberty (It's been a while for me, so I'm quoting Appiah, not my knowledge of it) Mill is like... you got to make your own choice in life to take command of your state of being, your liberty, your freedom. Appiah's like.. that's cool, Dude. I feel you. But how about this, let's say I choose to do exactly what everyone else is doing. That doesn't mean I'm not free. I made a choice. But maybe...maybe...the relative freedom of that choice relates to how much of it was this identity I had thrust on me and how much I was down with having that identity to begin with. ... at least that’s what I think he’s saying here. Then he writes a bunch arguing for or against that.
p. 7 This all has to do with Mill's deal with having a plan. What ought to be done, b/c this idea of liberty and will and freedom has more to do with the long term plan, not the falling into the short term needs and urgencies. But Appiah is like... good try dude... but I don’t think that’s how it works. Then he’s like..no one plans to cheat on thier wife or do a series of stupid bonehead moves. And all this is relevant b/c he's like what about the more important long term plans that are thrust upon us BECAUSE we are white/black/asian/gay/straight? What about that? Boom!
p. 14 So then he's like let's say I decide to be a vagabond nomad (Which quite frankly, I think is awesome), but then my parents are all upset about it. If I used a lot of common sense to do it, then I'm in the clear. I am free. But if I just fell into that choice, then I'm not. "For on the former view [the view where I just fell into it], my choice is not arbitrary. It reflects the facts of my capacities, and given that I have enough 'common sense and experience,' I am likely to do a better job than anybody else of judging how to make a life that fits those capacities. In this view, I discover life for myself, based on the facts of my nature and my place in the world. Here the charge against individuality is that it is arbitrary."
p. 15 - His deal with individuality is that it is necessarily "unsociable." We are not choosing it b/c others have suggested it. That’s so deep.
p. 17 So then Mills is not willing to accept that you might choose something totally crazy pants as your identity, so he comes up with this thing that as appaih states: "The reasonable idle view is that constructing an identity is a good thing (if self-authorship is a good thing) but that the identity must make some kind of sense. And for it to make sense, it must be an identity constructed in response to facts outside oneself, things that are beyond one's own choices." So like later that becomes a problem, but he's not ready to argue his issues with it. Instead, he’s like: Sartre according to Foucault - "avoids the idea of the self as something that is given to us but through the moral notion of authenticity, he turns back to the idea that we have to be ourselves - to be truly our true self." He tries to establish this issue of authenticity. But let's be honest... that's some B.S. And so then it goes on to nearly an idea of relative authenticity or identity to the circumstances. But that's also b.s. So then he's like, how about this. What if AI does everything and now you don't need to do anything. What's your identity then?
So like going back to mills: "To create a life is to create a life out of the materials that history has given you." (a form of relative identity) But what it if it gives you some racist B.S. Ok... so now we're to where Appaih can start really talking.
p. 30 "Mills himself, though he thought the cultivation of individual exellence was central to the role of the state, was hardly impetutous about enlisting state power in the service of this good." Like the state is suppose to try to better people, but not in a way that is forceful.
p. 36 - Dworkin, he points out is like, it's not authentic if you just borrowed your authenticity b/c you weren't able to come up with your own deal. So like if the state’s busy cultivating stuff. It might cultivating authenticity and like that’s no good because it cancels out the idea of being real...
p. 59 - He's talking about choices people make. How free are they in this view of what identity is? p. 60- Then he talks about the idea that a lot of people are taking meds and making choices and if they make bad choices, it's just adjust your meds (slightly out of context the way I'm presenting, but not really).
p. 64 - In and out group creation as relates to identity and what one does as a part of causal actions.
p. 67 - Gay identity is differentiated from straight identity as a reaction, but stereotype truth is another thing. And how both these exist has an impact on the choices they make once they identify. AND it's a choice to identify.
p. 72 "The human rights, as framed in our convention and in law, should always be the rights of persons, not of groups." And how do we think of this in the modern age? Those that got it right are about anger against individuals who violate the rights of people EVEN above the promotion of the rights of groups.
p. 96 - Thomas vs. The Review Board. The dude's job gets changed but because he's a jehovah's witness he is a pacifist and sues b/c he doesn't want to make guns for a living, but because he quit, he's technically not eligible for unemployment. Interesting application of identity applied to the law.
p. 101 I think what he's saying is that when there is a majority language and it is taught, the minorities all have thrust upon them this idea of being the other (less dominant or worthy). Intriguing.
p. 112 - Some minority identities were created as a way of classifying oppression, but some communitiies have reclaimed them to create solidarity. p. 116 - He finds America with its need for diversity weird, given it has less diversity than other nations where the diversity is more ... (in my words) essential, i.e. different languages, legitimately different genetics with far longer specific histories, etc.
p. 131 - "The nature of their cultural identity... is dynamic, not static." The point is that cultures transform as well as their identity, an interesting point as relates to what it means to adopt them.
p. 181 - He talks about the complexity and lack of logic to identity. You can have cognitive dissonance and conflict in your identity. Problem with that is that Mills is all about logic of identity but here we're like, no there is embedded illogic so then your sense of self makes no sense. It’s No good!
p. 192 - So he's saying on the previous page, maybe government can help lesson some of these cognative dissonances. "of course, you can debate whether this is a state intervention or the cessation of one. What's more it will be correctly observed, at this point, that the policy I am speaking of here is necessary only because the state already collects racial 'data.' Why not simply say that the state should stay away from all racial classifications? There are benefits that might ensue; but of course, the result would be to prevent the government from being able to assess the presence of discrimination." How crazy is that? The very act of having racism creates a need to quantify it which reinforces it, but you can't undo it b/c otherwise, you will remove one of the major ways of combatting it. Appiah is dope for calling it out.
p. 234 - "Many ethical engagements are forced on us in much the same way that family relations are. Opting out is not always feasible or even possible; many relational identities are far from voluntary." This is a really nuanced way he's re-introducing structuralism.
p. 262 - His point is that just passing a law doesn't mean that the people will adopt it into their culture. Stuff like requiring a woman to consent doesn't mean anything if the culture is super steeped into the idea that you marry who you’re told by family or other for other reasons. He is talking in terms of US aid in Africa. So like change the culture isn’t just change the law or something . It’s kinda cool he's just calling it out.
p. 275 He calls out Mills for possibly taking credit for writing the book from this woman Harriet Taylor. Man... I got to learn about this one. Intriguing.
I really enjoyed this! The writing is clear, occasionally funny, and also quite academic, and the ideas are insightful and thought-provoking. Appiah investigates the meaning, morality, and political implications of concepts we often take for granted, such as autonomy, identity, diversity, culture, and more. I found his explanations to be quite helpful and his analysis to be generally convincing.
Appiah, as usual, has written a comprehensive (and importantly, readable) text on the intersection of autonomy, social structure v. individual agency, liberalism, culture, and cosmopolitanism both as pragmatic and theoretical concepts. His references to classical thinkers such as J.S. Mill and Kant, are apty and clearly juxtaposed to postmodern philosophers such as John Rawls, Charles Taylor, Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel and Richard Rorty. Ultimately Appiah gives a thorough ethical, political and moral analysis on what it means to be a person "endowed with...unalienable rights."
Appiah's book is a stimulating introduction to many important contemporary discussions on identity, as well as a presentation of his own view ("rooted cosmopolitanism"). Appiah's position is informed primarily by classical liberalism, but many competing views are also presented (with varying degrees of generosity, but never unfairly, in my opinion). As such I recommend it. But before I praise "The Ethics of Identity" some more, I want to address the two biggest issues: its lack of accessibility and its US-centrism.
The first issue is the accessibility of the writing style. "The ethics of identity" was written in the early 2000s, at a time when this topic was less central to mainstream political discussion. It is perhaps because Appiah was working on this topic "before it was cool" that he wrote this book for specialists rather than for a wider public. To take an example: as a French native, I had no trouble with the occasional use of French, but I wondered what it achieved: why write "le grand départ" when you really mean "the French summer holidays"? Why write "les coutumes étrangères" rather than "foreign customs"? Why not translate these expressions in a footnote? Besides the occasional use of French, German, Latin, and Greek words, there are also countless geographical, cultural, and especially moral/political philosophy references that will trigger helpful associations for the worthy few, and confused stares from everybody else. Often, a footnote or an endnote would have helped immensely... but we are refused it. This stylistic issue goes beyond this: Appiah's style is generally one of subtlety and restraint, with minimal redundancy and simplification. Appiah prudently, progressively draws a complex picture with plenty of subtle strokes; but it is up to you, reader, to figure out what the finished picture represents. So this is a book that has only one level of reading: maximal effort. Many who would benefit from this book will be put off by its elitism.
The second issue is the US-centrism of much of the discussion. This was a shocking surprise to me - Appiah, after all, has African/Ghanaian roots, grew up in England, and is a specialist of John Stuart Mill... Yet he spent most of his life in the USA, and his references (cultural, historical, philosophical) are for the most part North American (although Ghanaian roots may also play a part, e.g. nationalism being seen as an anti-colonial power, useful for state-building). Continental European ones (let alone, say, Asian ones) are copiously ignored. For instance when Tolstoy writes "to destroy war, destroy patriotism", Appiah responds (p222) that the declaration is made "a couple of decades before his country was swept by revolution"!! He conveniently disregards that The Great War of nationalism, which killed three million Russians, was the trigger for that revolution... In general, Appiah's views with respect to nationalism, patriotism, and religion, are informed primarily by North American and British history, mythology, and culture. Thus religion is viewed primarily as needing protection from oppression, rather than as an oppressor. Patriotism and nationalism are seen as presenting rather limited dangers. In my view, the potential of "identities" for producing oppression, war, and genocide, while acknowledged and discussed, is not given the attention it deserves.
Despite these issues, I must recognize that "the Ethics of Identity" intelligently tackles essential concerns not only of contemporary politics, but also of human life in the most general sense. It is the kind of philosophy that belongs not in academia, but in the world. For myself, expect the contents of this book to slowly transform many of my views on a wide range of subjects, including Black Lives Matter, international charity, feminism, immigration, the role of the state, the European project, the UN, human rights, who I am, and who I ought or would like to be... But I would have gained even more if I had known more moral and political philosophy; and I would have understood much less if I had not received some university education on the subject.
I love this book. It's in my Top 3 books so far this year.
The first two chapters took more concentrated reading than the last few. I annotate my reading (my non-fiction mostly) and ended up with a dozen pages on this. Because I cannot possibly cover my thoughts here, I'll just note that basically Appiah contributes marvelously to the debates that make up liberalism and offers a new reading of John Stuart Mill. (Because the terms here can get so confusing, this is classical liberalism -- "real liberalism" as my Dad would say ;) -- a political philosophy in which freedom of the individual is the most important consideration of the state.)
What i think matters more in this book is its clarity both in the formation of the arguments and the presentation of the author's points. What comes next, is the heartfelt temperament and the rich language, somehow unusual in this kind of books. These are not obvious remarks, and made me really appreciate a book that doesn't necessarily agree with all its readers. There is a lot of Mill interpretation, and a lot of literature -Tolstoy and Ishiguro mostly but many more references (which i also enjoyed). There are many paradigms and intellectual experiments, a lot of criticism... It's the first appiah-book i read, absolutely thoroughly, and it was a pleasurable journey
For the month of November, I read The Ethics of Identity by Kwame Anthony Appiah. This book was sent to me by my undergraduate Philosophy advisor after I graduated, and a few months into my service seemed as apt a time as any to break apart identity creation and the ethics appended to it. To detail the book's primary arguments and even its purview would require more pages than this book review will allow. So I will stick to the ideas from the text that related to my work at MERC.
In a large, non-specific sense, Appiah writes about the way we shape our own identities, and the way that the state should allow us to or interfere with our ability to do so. While at MERC, I have been struck by my placement within a system of oppression whose overall shape I can recognize but not correct in my daily work. The system to which I refer here is the factory model of standardized education, and I have felt demoralized at times by my inability to do more. My position as a mentor for my students places me in the role of identity director. That my student's identities may involve home lives I can't understand, or problems I've never faced, problematizes for me the belief that I can tell them what is best for them. At play is a problem akin to multiculturalist, pluralist, or liberalist discourses on state politics. Should the state be able to hinder people's rights to do certain things that may harm them? What if these harmful pursuits are on a person's genuine itinerary towards human fulfillment, or the pursuit thereof? I didn't come away from my reading of Appiah's text with a functional answer to these questions, but with a series of new prisms through which to understand my experience as a mentor at MERC, and as an identity tutor to my students.
Another more personal takeaway from the book addressed my work as a service member in se, and as a person in my early twenties searching for sustainable meaning in my life. Human fulfillment–what could be loosely called eudaemonia–comes in finding purpose or value in the things that we do. Time is allocated to various engagements in an attempt to satisfy the myriad meters of fulfillment we all comprise. That's kind of an obnoxious sentence, but basically the point is that learning French, or social aid, or tending to an intimate partnership may all be things that draw equally at our time as we search for fulfillment. To create a hierarchy out of these desires is a complex, and arguably impossible process, but yet we try to strike a balance nonetheless. Personally, my schedule at MERC allows me time in the afternoons to read or write–important activities that benefit my quest for fulfillment. However that time could be spent at a part time job, which would allow me to fulfill other comparable needs: to live a life that feels secure, and less riddled with financial anxiety. Again, I didn't figure it all out, and never really plan to. But I did learn more about how to consider these problems, and how to let them swirl around me as ontologies that must be accepted rather than solved.
Here's a book that I cannot truly give an accurate review of because of a combination of its length, breadth, and my poor memory. It spans so many different topics, so many different arguments, that as I finish this book today, I would be lying if I told you I knew the different topics in chapter 2 vs chapter 3.
Nonetheless, I still have a few remarks to add. First, though I have admitted the breadth of the book has made it difficult to rate this book for me, it was also very interesting to see Appiah connect so many different topics together. The way arguments connected together and depended on each other was made very lucid and were easy to follow (in the moment; not anymore!).
Second, I enjoyed the mini-arguments Appiah would give to defend some position or knock down another. I recall many times where he says something along the lines of "if it isn't apparent yet, this argument is wrong because..." which I found helpful. Given the many topics I wasn't familiar with, every argument I read and understood I was immediately convinced by, and Appiah was always there to stop that. Nonetheless, I can tell that many of the arguments are most likely hotly debated, with Appiah always getting the final word in. This is not a slight towards Appiah; it is the nature of writing a book spanning so much material.
Last are comments about the prose of the book. It was a very easy read for the most part, especially when compared to other philosophy books. Sentences flowed well and there was not too much previous knowledge needed to understand what was being said. However (and this mostly happened in the first half of the book and sometimes in the footnotes), I would often read one paragraph, move on to the next, and be confused as to how we arrived there. Admittedly this is, again, philosophy, and I basically reread every paragraph twice before continuing. But I'd often have to go back 1-3 pages to recall what was going on -- am I just bad at keeping track of arguments or could he have done a better job at sign-posting? There was also a problem with vocabulary for me. Appiah uses some truly difficult SAT words, latin, and french? which often had me searching google for their definitions. Nothing was too egregious and you could sometimes(rarely?) guess what he meant; but it happened to what I considered an absurd amount. YMMV but I never considered myself someone with a bad vocabulary.
All in all, a good read. As Appiah himself says (at least I think he does at the beginning), this book is best used to explore the many different answers and questions there are in regards to the ethics of identity and how to think about them. In that vein, it does a superb job.
In Kwame Anthony Appiahs „The Ethics of Identity“ wird eine differenzierte Untersuchung darüber vorgelegt, wie individuelle Autonomie und soziale Identitäten innerhalb eines liberalen Rahmens miteinander vereinbar sind. Ausgehend von John Stuart Mills Idee der „Lebensexperimente“ argumentiert Appiah, dass ein gelingendes ethisches Leben darin besteht, die eigene Individualität aktiv durch Entscheidungen zu formen. Identität erscheint dabei nicht als festgelegtes Schicksal, sondern als dynamischer Prozess der Selbstgestaltung, in dem Individuen die sozialen Kategorien, in die sie hineingeboren werden, reflektieren, verändern und neu kombinieren können. Zugleich setzt sich das Buch kritisch mit kollektiven Identitäten wie Religion, „Rasse“ oder Geschlecht auseinander. Appiah erkennt ihre existentielle Bedeutung für menschliche Selbstverständnisse an, warnt jedoch davor, ihnen eine absolute moralische Autorität zuzuschreiben. Besonders deutlich kritisiert er einen normativen „Identitarismus“, der Menschen auf eine einzige Zugehörigkeit reduziert und damit individuelle Freiheit unterminiert. Stattdessen plädiert er für einen liberalen Pluralismus, in dem staatliche Institutionen die Voraussetzungen für ein gelingendes Leben sichern sollen, ohne Vielfalt gegen Autonomie auszuspielen. Ein zentrales Konzept des Buches ist der von Appiah entwickelte „verwurzelte Kosmopolitismus“. Dieser Ansatz versucht, die Spannung zwischen lokalen Bindungen und globaler moralischer Verantwortung produktiv aufzulösen. Appiah zeigt, dass es möglich ist, zugleich loyal gegenüber der eigenen Gemeinschaft und offen gegenüber der Welt zu sein. Kosmopolitismus bedeutet hier nicht die Auflösung kultureller Zugehörigkeiten, sondern die Anerkennung der gleichen moralischen Würde aller Menschen. Toleranz entsteht dabei nicht durch bloße Duldung von Differenz, sondern durch dialogische Offenheit und die Bereitschaft, die eigenen Überzeugungen im Licht anderer Perspektiven kritisch zu prüfen. Insgesamt bietet „The Ethics of Identity“ eine überzeugende Synthese aus politischer Philosophie und normativer Ethik. Der Mensch erscheint als ein Wesen, das gleichermaßen Freiheit und Zugehörigkeit benötigt. Appiahs Argumentation mündet in ein klares liberales Plädoyer: Die Würde des Individuums liegt nicht in der Identität, die ihm zugeschrieben wird, sondern in der Fähigkeit und dem Recht, diese Identität selbst zu gestalten. Das Buch leistet einen zentralen Beitrag zur Debatte über Multikulturalismus, Individualrechte und die Zukunft des Liberalismus in pluralen Gesellschaften.
A profound and important read for those seeking clear understanding of human rights, respect, and constructions of identity in our conflicted time. Evading sensationalism and extremism, Appiah thoroughly measures the language of both the right and left to redefine the way we consider structures of governmental power. Particularly relevant to the subjects of police brutality, trans and womens’ healthcare, faith politics, BLM, and land/property ownership.
From where can we understand the source(s) of identity? Is identity natural? Is it conceived? Is it imposed? Is it chosen? Is it the profound understanding of the self in isolation, or the self in the polity? Is it none of these? Is it all of these? This book deals with all of this and more, and it does it very well.
Appiah organizes a cogent argument with respect to historical context, respect for discourse, and a range of theory, bottom, and evidence. A great framework for looking at individuality, group, and cosmopolitan identities in a diverse world.
"Even though my race and my sexuality may be elements of my individuality, someone who demands that I organize my life around these things is not an ally of individuality."
Appiah's Ethics of Identity is one of those books that I picked up wanting to dislike or, at least, disagree with. Having read it, I still have plenty of issues, not the least of which are the difficulties involved in metaphysically grounding the sort of liberal individualism/autonomism favored by Appiah (though, in fairness to him, similar problems arise when non-liberal perspectives are taken as points of departure), the class elisions of his account, and the socioeconomic and political barriers to its realization. Concerning these last two points, the author would no doubt contend that the greater part of his argument is not contingent for its realization on access to material resources beyond the reach of most stable governments. He stresses this point in the later chapters. Still, it is easy to see that overly rigidified nationalism, sectarianism, and allegiance to private profit present obstacles to a world in which the social contexts recognized by the Millian Appiah for autonomous self-making are absent or suboptimal for a sizable portion of humankind.
A substantial fulfillment of this vision may well call for another world; those goals that are within reach are generally paid lip service by both liberal and illiberal regimes already--and frequently flouted by both. While I haven't read his continuation of this argument in Cosmopolitanism, Will Hanley, writing from a Middle East/area studies perspective, offers a critique that resonates with some of my reservations about Ethics (the gist is that Appiah occasionally shortchanges complex political and historical realities in the service of his argument, while cosmopolitanism as described by him is an elite project and one that can be projected backwards only at the risk of anachronism).
That said, it is an eloquent, well-argued, and often humorous book. Some of the debates contained in its pages, such as those concerning cultural preservation and religious freedoms, feel especially relevant today. His historicization of the differences between universalist "civilisation" and particularist "Kultur" is helpful. His engagement with a wide array of scholars writing from constructivist, individualist, and communitarian perspectives is nuanced and impressive. In particular, his reading of John Stuart Mill, which sees self-making as both individual and socially situated, as well as his dialogue with Richard Rorty, are approaches that may well have use for those of us interested in thinking through the complex imbrication of the individual in the social, and vice versa. While I may not agree with everything in its pages, this book is one that I will be digesting for some time and, I feel certain, returning to in the future.
This book was a very, very timely book for me to read in 2016, as American higher education convulses with controversy and Trumpism™ & Brexit alter the political landscape.
The book is a book of moral philosophy, exploring what we mean when we talk about "identity" and how it might inform our ethics and political engagement. After a romp through many philosophical problems, Appiah arrives at what he calls "rooted cosmopolitanism," which is his preferred way of balancing diverse 21st-century global identities with Enlightenment liberalism. I have to say, his argument made me rethink a lot of the Enlightenment bashing I have enjoyed in the past. In his view, the failures of old dead white guys are not the fault of the Enlightenment; they are a failure to fully be the Enlightenment. Fascinating words from a gay Ghanaian/British man with impeccable intersectionality cred.
The prose itself is very witty and even manic at times, and his argument is buoyed by a bounty of literary examples which enliven the book considerably.
Also, John Stuart Mill figures large in the first third of the book, and as I am unfamiliar with the works of Mill, it was a great introduction to some of his key ideas. I appreciated the invitation to move past the caricatures I had to hear him in his own words.
EoI is clearly written, but somehow not clear about what its ultimate points and positions always are. Lots of interesting takes on other philosophers and interpretations of autonomy, culture, etc. Keeps going on about Mill and his Ghanaian patriot pops. A reference to Eminem win KAA points, though.
Starts with a common critique of individualism and a not so common approach to Mill's 'On Liberty', reading him as having a quasi-Hegelian view of the individual/subject. Halfway through and I'm not finding anything that wasn't covered in Multiculturalism or in some of Walzer's recent works. After hearing a phenomenal speech by him entitled 'Experimental Philosophy', I was expecting much more.
In this volume, Appiah investigates claims of indiviuality and identity as social categories and how an account of ethics that connects moral obligations with collective allegiances.