Crouching Tiger is the 4th book I've completed this spring to help inform me about the increasing competition between China and the U. S. and the real dangers of conflict in the western Pacific. Peter Navarro's focus is on the military buildup underway in China and their usurping of scattered island groups in order to create a defensive shield, all of it made possible by their huge economic gains in the last 25 or 30 years.
Navarro writes what everyone else is writing, or at least what I'm reading. There's a concern that a real danger of conflict exists. But Crouching Tiger is organized differently than other studies. It's presented in short chapters, each of them dealing with a specific issue--military budgets, for instance, or the feasibility of a "grand bargain" with China. The chapters begin with questions which the text answers. As you might expect, this use of concisely written explanations to specific questions (there are 45 of them) neatly isolates the many issues and makes their understanding easier.
His assessment, like the others I've read and am reading, is sobering. The Chinese sense of having endured a century of humiliation at the hands of the west coupled with the American unwillingness to give up its primacy as the leader of liberal order in the western Pacific may make some kind of confrontation inevitable. He spends some time discussing the now famous Thucydidean Trap, the idea 1st written about 2500 years ago during the Peloponnesian War in which an established power (Sparta) resists the rise of a new one and its threat to its primacy (Athens). That political dynamic has arisen many times in history and is said to exist today in the western Pacific.
Navarro's emphasis is on the militaries. But he explains that China hopes to win by soft power, by a war of comprehensive national power in which the strength of its economy, the skill of its labor force, its stable political system, its unlimited natural resources, the quality of its education, technological innovation and the strength of its political alliances overwhelm a weakened America and convince it that military force is useless. The final point in the important Chapter 41 is that the perception in the region is that America doesn't have the capacity at present to enforce the rules we have been the caretaker of all these decades. Sixteen pages later Navarro reminds us that weakness always invites aggression. This is unsettling reading but enormously informing.