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A Naval History of Britain #3
The Price of Victory: A Naval History of Britain: 1815-1945
The final instalment of N.A.M. Rodger's definitive, authoritative trilogy on Britain's naval history
At the end of the French and Napoleonic wars, British sea-power was at its apogee. But by 1840, as one contemporary commentator put it, the Admiralty was full of ‘intellects becalmed in the smoke of Trafalgar’. How the Royal Navy reformed and reinvigorated itself in the course of the nineteenth century is just one thread in this magnificent book, which refuses to accept standard assumptions and analyses.
All the great actions are here, from Navarino in 1827 (won by a daringly disobedient Admiral Codrington) to Jutland, D-Day, the Battle of the Atlantic and the battles in the Pacific in 1944/45 in concert with the US Navy. The development and strategic significance of submarine and navy air forces is superbly described, as are the rapid evolution of ships (from classic Nelsonic type, to hybrid steam/sail ships, then armour-clad and the fully armoured Dreadnoughts and beyond) and weapons. The social history of officers and men – and sometimes women – always a key part of the author’s work, is not neglected.
Rodger sets all this in the essential context of politics and geo-strategy. The character and importance of leading admirals – Beatty, Fisher, Cunningham – is assessed, together with the roles of other less famous but no less consequential figures. Based on a lifetime’s learning, it is the culmination of one of the most significant British historical works in recent decades.
Naval specialists will find much that is new here, and will be invigorated by the originality of Rodger’s judgements; but everyone who is interested in the one of the central threads in British history will find it rewarding.
At the end of the French and Napoleonic wars, British sea-power was at its apogee. But by 1840, as one contemporary commentator put it, the Admiralty was full of ‘intellects becalmed in the smoke of Trafalgar’. How the Royal Navy reformed and reinvigorated itself in the course of the nineteenth century is just one thread in this magnificent book, which refuses to accept standard assumptions and analyses.
All the great actions are here, from Navarino in 1827 (won by a daringly disobedient Admiral Codrington) to Jutland, D-Day, the Battle of the Atlantic and the battles in the Pacific in 1944/45 in concert with the US Navy. The development and strategic significance of submarine and navy air forces is superbly described, as are the rapid evolution of ships (from classic Nelsonic type, to hybrid steam/sail ships, then armour-clad and the fully armoured Dreadnoughts and beyond) and weapons. The social history of officers and men – and sometimes women – always a key part of the author’s work, is not neglected.
Rodger sets all this in the essential context of politics and geo-strategy. The character and importance of leading admirals – Beatty, Fisher, Cunningham – is assessed, together with the roles of other less famous but no less consequential figures. Based on a lifetime’s learning, it is the culmination of one of the most significant British historical works in recent decades.
Naval specialists will find much that is new here, and will be invigorated by the originality of Rodger’s judgements; but everyone who is interested in the one of the central threads in British history will find it rewarding.
800 pages, Hardcover
First published October 24, 2024
69 people are currently reading
653 people want to read
About the author
N.A.M. Rodger
29 books31 followersNicholas Andrew Martin Rodger, FBA, is a historian of the British Royal Navy and Senior Research Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford.
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Displaying 1 - 16 of 16 reviews
May 28, 2025
In 1997, Nicholas Rodger published The Safeguard of the Sea, the first of a projected three-volume series covering “the naval history of Britain.” Widely acclaimed for its description of English naval warfare during the medieval and Tudor eras, it was followed seven years later by The Command of the Ocean, which recounted the history of British naval power from the English Republic to the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Addressing as it did the era in which Rodger had long specialized, its perceptive analysis of how Britain established the naval dominance that buttressed its status as a global empire ensured that it became the indispensable starting point for anyone interested in the subject.
The high bar set by the first two books left their readers eagerly anticipating the series’ conclusion. It would take another two decades, however, before their patience was rewarded. Part of the reason for this undoubtedly is the sheer amount of information Rodger needed to process to do justice to his subject, which is reflected in the size of this book. Whereas his first volume covers nearly a millennia of Britain’s naval history in little more than 700 pages and the second volume addresses another sixteen decades in just under a thousand, this one takes another 800 pages to cover 130 years. Yet the years addressed were ones when the Royal Navy “ruled the waves” of the world. Explaining how the British maintained their mastery during this period requires a comprehensive work that encompasses not just naval operations, but matters of administration, technology and personnel management. This is what Rodger has provided, and more.
As he explains, winning naval supremacy came at considerable cost. Though Britain emerged triumphant from their conflict with France, the government faced enormous financial problems after a quarter of a century of near-continuous warfare. Addressing them required cutbacks to the fiscal-military state created to defeat the French, including a reduction in the size of the navy. This was possible thanks to the scale of their victory: with France’s defeat, no other European power possessed anything like a fleet capable of challenging Britain’s, nor were they in a position to build one. Secure in their dominance, Britain was often able to impose their will even with their reduced numbers. Rodger is careful to note the limits of these efforts, as campaigns to suppress the slave trade, to name one prominent goal, were hobbled by legal, diplomatic, and environmental problems. Administration was also hampered by the passion of the era for “efficiency” in government, an effort to which Rodger takes a dim view given the counterproductive results they often produced.
Another conviction common to the era was the prioritization of principled amateurs over supposedly self-interested “experts.” This became increasingly problematic as new technologies began to transform naval warfare. As the century wore on, steam propulsion, iron hulls, and new types of guns threatened to erase the Royal Navy’s advantage, necessitating new expenditures to maintain it. Change also came to the management of sailors, though not necessarily for the better. Rodger notes that the sometimes arbitrary discipline in previous years was replaced by an increasingly complex system of regulations that constrained a captain’s freedom of choice, creating a new divide between the officers and their men. This emphasis on greater bureaucratic direction proved true for command as well, as the new technology of the telegraph gave the Admiralty greater control over the actions of their captains in distant stations.
These forces reflected trends and changes taking place in Britain over the course of the century. Starting in the 1880s, however, external developments began playing a greater role in shaping the Royal Navy. The growing importance of the new technologies created social strains and necessitated new categories of men aboard ship who existed awkwardly with the older social structures. The pace of adaptation grew as the German Empire began to threaten British naval supremacy. Though the navy and the nation rose to this challenge, they did so with less of a natural edge than before, as the increased strength of armored warships and the growing power and accuracy of guns made older ships much more obsolescent than before. Britain was having to work harder than ever to maintain their supremacy.
Their efforts faced the ultimate test in 1914. Roger’s coverage of the First World War takes up roughly a quarter of the book, and in it he challenges many longstanding assumptions about the conflict. Perhaps the greatest of these is the Germans’ use of unrestricted U-boat warfare, which he finds posed far less of a threat than often claimed. U-boats proved more successful when sticking to the prize rules, and benefited considerably from British practices that unnecessarily exposed merchant shipping to attack. Hobbled by both an obsession with a decisive battle fleet confrontation that never took place and an emphasis on centralized control without the infrastructure to make it work, the Royal Navy struggled to make a positive contribution to their nation’s war effort, with naval planning and operations becoming more effective only in the latter half of the war.
Peace in 1918 found the British in a situation superficially similar to that of 1815, with Britian still the possessor of the world’s largest and most powerful navy. Yet unlike a century before, challengers were already on the horizon. While the naval arms treaties signed in the 1920s preserved Britain’s status as the world’s preeminent naval power for the moment, this was only because of the desire of the governments in the United States and Japan to avoid a ruinously expensive arms race. The onset of the Great Depression posed a dual challenge, as the threats posed by militarism in both Europe and the Far East grew in tandem with pressures to reduce expenditures on an increasingly aged fleet. Given the context, Rodger gives good marks to the Admiralty’s response to these problems, crediting them in particular with using excellent intelligence to make the most of their limited resources.
Rodger’s coverage of the Second World War takes up the largest portion of his book, with the narrative veering often away from an examination of British naval power during the conflict and towards a more general history of the war at sea. Unstated in this is the degree to which that British naval power was no longer the dominant factor in determining the outcome of the war. As with his coverage of its predecessor, Rodger offers some thought-provoking revisionist interpretations of the conflict, such as with his assertion that the most serious threat posed by the Germans was their embryonic surface fleet rather than the U-boats, which they already knew how to handle. The greatest challenge, though, was posted by the sheer scope of their commitments, strained British resources to their limits, most notably in terms of the need for personnel to man the vessels to wage a war globally. While the author calls out the navy out their errors, the war he describes is one in which the Royal Navy usually adapted successfully to the wide-ranging challenges posed by modern naval warfare, from operational management to coordination with their frequently difficult American ally.
Rodger concludes his book with a short epilogue summarizing the experience of British naval power since the Second World War. It’s a disappointingly terse examination, especially when set against the scope of the analysis that preceded it. And while it’s understandable that Rodger would want to end his series with the triumph of victory, it is unfortunate that his analytical skills are not applied to the same degree considering the fate of British naval power, as it is unlikely that anyone will undertake the level of examination he provides with this series. While Rodger’s personal judgments occasionally override more balanced assessments and his bibliography has a few curious admissions, these are trivial compared to what he has accomplished in it. With this book he concludes a true masterpiece not just of British naval history but British history more generally, and one that anyone with an interest even related to these subjects will benefit from reading.
The high bar set by the first two books left their readers eagerly anticipating the series’ conclusion. It would take another two decades, however, before their patience was rewarded. Part of the reason for this undoubtedly is the sheer amount of information Rodger needed to process to do justice to his subject, which is reflected in the size of this book. Whereas his first volume covers nearly a millennia of Britain’s naval history in little more than 700 pages and the second volume addresses another sixteen decades in just under a thousand, this one takes another 800 pages to cover 130 years. Yet the years addressed were ones when the Royal Navy “ruled the waves” of the world. Explaining how the British maintained their mastery during this period requires a comprehensive work that encompasses not just naval operations, but matters of administration, technology and personnel management. This is what Rodger has provided, and more.
As he explains, winning naval supremacy came at considerable cost. Though Britain emerged triumphant from their conflict with France, the government faced enormous financial problems after a quarter of a century of near-continuous warfare. Addressing them required cutbacks to the fiscal-military state created to defeat the French, including a reduction in the size of the navy. This was possible thanks to the scale of their victory: with France’s defeat, no other European power possessed anything like a fleet capable of challenging Britain’s, nor were they in a position to build one. Secure in their dominance, Britain was often able to impose their will even with their reduced numbers. Rodger is careful to note the limits of these efforts, as campaigns to suppress the slave trade, to name one prominent goal, were hobbled by legal, diplomatic, and environmental problems. Administration was also hampered by the passion of the era for “efficiency” in government, an effort to which Rodger takes a dim view given the counterproductive results they often produced.
Another conviction common to the era was the prioritization of principled amateurs over supposedly self-interested “experts.” This became increasingly problematic as new technologies began to transform naval warfare. As the century wore on, steam propulsion, iron hulls, and new types of guns threatened to erase the Royal Navy’s advantage, necessitating new expenditures to maintain it. Change also came to the management of sailors, though not necessarily for the better. Rodger notes that the sometimes arbitrary discipline in previous years was replaced by an increasingly complex system of regulations that constrained a captain’s freedom of choice, creating a new divide between the officers and their men. This emphasis on greater bureaucratic direction proved true for command as well, as the new technology of the telegraph gave the Admiralty greater control over the actions of their captains in distant stations.
These forces reflected trends and changes taking place in Britain over the course of the century. Starting in the 1880s, however, external developments began playing a greater role in shaping the Royal Navy. The growing importance of the new technologies created social strains and necessitated new categories of men aboard ship who existed awkwardly with the older social structures. The pace of adaptation grew as the German Empire began to threaten British naval supremacy. Though the navy and the nation rose to this challenge, they did so with less of a natural edge than before, as the increased strength of armored warships and the growing power and accuracy of guns made older ships much more obsolescent than before. Britain was having to work harder than ever to maintain their supremacy.
Their efforts faced the ultimate test in 1914. Roger’s coverage of the First World War takes up roughly a quarter of the book, and in it he challenges many longstanding assumptions about the conflict. Perhaps the greatest of these is the Germans’ use of unrestricted U-boat warfare, which he finds posed far less of a threat than often claimed. U-boats proved more successful when sticking to the prize rules, and benefited considerably from British practices that unnecessarily exposed merchant shipping to attack. Hobbled by both an obsession with a decisive battle fleet confrontation that never took place and an emphasis on centralized control without the infrastructure to make it work, the Royal Navy struggled to make a positive contribution to their nation’s war effort, with naval planning and operations becoming more effective only in the latter half of the war.
Peace in 1918 found the British in a situation superficially similar to that of 1815, with Britian still the possessor of the world’s largest and most powerful navy. Yet unlike a century before, challengers were already on the horizon. While the naval arms treaties signed in the 1920s preserved Britain’s status as the world’s preeminent naval power for the moment, this was only because of the desire of the governments in the United States and Japan to avoid a ruinously expensive arms race. The onset of the Great Depression posed a dual challenge, as the threats posed by militarism in both Europe and the Far East grew in tandem with pressures to reduce expenditures on an increasingly aged fleet. Given the context, Rodger gives good marks to the Admiralty’s response to these problems, crediting them in particular with using excellent intelligence to make the most of their limited resources.
Rodger’s coverage of the Second World War takes up the largest portion of his book, with the narrative veering often away from an examination of British naval power during the conflict and towards a more general history of the war at sea. Unstated in this is the degree to which that British naval power was no longer the dominant factor in determining the outcome of the war. As with his coverage of its predecessor, Rodger offers some thought-provoking revisionist interpretations of the conflict, such as with his assertion that the most serious threat posed by the Germans was their embryonic surface fleet rather than the U-boats, which they already knew how to handle. The greatest challenge, though, was posted by the sheer scope of their commitments, strained British resources to their limits, most notably in terms of the need for personnel to man the vessels to wage a war globally. While the author calls out the navy out their errors, the war he describes is one in which the Royal Navy usually adapted successfully to the wide-ranging challenges posed by modern naval warfare, from operational management to coordination with their frequently difficult American ally.
Rodger concludes his book with a short epilogue summarizing the experience of British naval power since the Second World War. It’s a disappointingly terse examination, especially when set against the scope of the analysis that preceded it. And while it’s understandable that Rodger would want to end his series with the triumph of victory, it is unfortunate that his analytical skills are not applied to the same degree considering the fate of British naval power, as it is unlikely that anyone will undertake the level of examination he provides with this series. While Rodger’s personal judgments occasionally override more balanced assessments and his bibliography has a few curious admissions, these are trivial compared to what he has accomplished in it. With this book he concludes a true masterpiece not just of British naval history but British history more generally, and one that anyone with an interest even related to these subjects will benefit from reading.
January 5, 2025
This is an outstanding book. The third of a massive three volume "Naval History of Britain", this takes in the post-Napoleonic war period to the end of the Second World War. It moves chronologically but covers in detail similar themes over particular chunks of time, namely policy and operations; government and administration; ships and weapons; and social history, So the reader gets a thorough examination of how the navy (both RN and related services) operated. The book also considers the naval position of friend and foe, especially the US services. This is needed to explain the British naval experience.
This is a very detailed book that requires deep concentration. Yet it is readable and accessible. I thoroughly recommend immersion in this fine piece of historical writing.
This is a very detailed book that requires deep concentration. Yet it is readable and accessible. I thoroughly recommend immersion in this fine piece of historical writing.
January 24, 2025
Magnificent, pity you can’t give 6 stars.
Similar in scope to Daniel Todman’s history of the Second World War it looks at the whole picture, social and scientific.
If you are looking for a full description of the big Naval battles, look elsewhere. The Battle of Jutland is covered in a couple of pages or so, but the decisions leading up to it and its aftermath are covered in great detail, but always accessible and easy to read.
One of the underlying themes is the feuds within each service, between the services, and Allies in all competing countries.
If you have any interest in the Royal Navy I would heartily recommend picking up courage and buying this book
Similar in scope to Daniel Todman’s history of the Second World War it looks at the whole picture, social and scientific.
If you are looking for a full description of the big Naval battles, look elsewhere. The Battle of Jutland is covered in a couple of pages or so, but the decisions leading up to it and its aftermath are covered in great detail, but always accessible and easy to read.
One of the underlying themes is the feuds within each service, between the services, and Allies in all competing countries.
If you have any interest in the Royal Navy I would heartily recommend picking up courage and buying this book
August 21, 2025
I have just two of my great-grandfather's items from his time as an electrician aboard ship in the Royal Navy: a boxing cup won when he was a teenager at Malta in 1905 and a medal awarded to everyone on his ship for his part in the evacuation of the victims of the Sicilian earthquake of 1912. Having left the navy just before the outbreak of World War I, he re-enlisted and spent the next four years away from home. Sadly I don't know on which ship he served or whether he saw any action (in all likelihood not).
N.A.M. Rodger's fascinating study of the navy and society, 1815-1945, helped me to imagine something of my ancestor's experience on board ship. It weighs in (and weighs feels an appropriate word) at over 600 pages of text but the attention barely wanders. It is quite magnificent.
Despite the framing dates, the narrative is mostly twentieth century, indeed mostly post world-war 1. Whereas thematic sections on governance and the naval experience are dealt with in decades for the nineteenth century, this happens in individual years for the 1940s. This is of course unsurprising although at times perhaps there could have been more to be said about 1815-1914. For instance, the tragic and avoidable collision between HMS Victoria and HMS Camperdown in 1893 which cost the navy its flagship and hundreds of lives is mentioned in passing but no description of the event given.
Although at times the language can feel a little specialised for landlubbers like me with its talk of beakheads and bulkheads, Rodger does usually stop to allow us to catch up, explaining some of the terms. For the most part this is not a problem and once Rodger gets into his narrative flow, especially from 1914 onwards the book becomes compulsive reading.
Rodger lets his own opinions flow forth, with regular sallies taken at popular imagination and history (occasionally, I thought, straying into straw man territory). He is mostly pro-Churchill, pointing out that he was the only leading player who opposed the Gallipoli landings. He is less keen on Roosevelt "charming and duplicitous" and one whose promises always came with a discount. Incompetent, arrogant and blinkered admirals and politicians get short shrift, whilst the lesser known heroes (Chief Gunner Grant who saved HMS Lion at Jutland, the Ordinary Seaman who insisted that he saw the Japanese battleship Haguru through the storm cloud at a remarkable 35 miles) get their due. Myths and sacred cows are similarly disposed of. The Bismarck was built to an obsolete design and had inadequate armour. It was the psychological shock of HMS Hood exploding that gave the ship her legend. As a result her sister ship, the Tirpitz, which only once fired her guns in action, had more of an influence simply existing in her Norway bolthole than she would have had on the open sea.
Whereas in the First World War the navy saw very little action (my great grandfather probably faced very little peril), in the Second World War the navy lost a higher percentage (eight) than the army or air force. For submariners 38% lost their lives. The merchant navy lost 28,000 men, especially in the dark year of 1941.
As well as heroism, The Price of Victory, is not short on human folly. In fact there are times when it feels as though you are reading a non-fiction version of Catch-22. For instance, the story of the first British encounters with sea mines in the Crimean Warn resulted in first one admiral - and then a second! - blowing themselves up (not, astonishingly, fatally) by showing their students how a mine blows up. The US Navy, the particular subject of Rodger's frustration, could list its enemies in order as (1) The US Army, (2) The British, (3) The Japanese, (4) The Germans. Indeed the theme of US Navy Anglophobia comes across very strongly. Even in the 1930s the working assumption of the navy was that they would be defending themselves against a British/Canadian attack. And many admirals welcomed the opportunity. And a final example, perhaps the most unbelievable, of incompetence was the misreading of a keel-mast line of 7 feet rather than 17. By the time the error was spotted, 23 destroyers had already been built and had to have their armaments halved. Errors like this, and most egregiously the US refusal to countenance convoys throughout 1942, cost thousands of lives.
A fascinating book and one to which I hope one day to return.
N.A.M. Rodger's fascinating study of the navy and society, 1815-1945, helped me to imagine something of my ancestor's experience on board ship. It weighs in (and weighs feels an appropriate word) at over 600 pages of text but the attention barely wanders. It is quite magnificent.
Despite the framing dates, the narrative is mostly twentieth century, indeed mostly post world-war 1. Whereas thematic sections on governance and the naval experience are dealt with in decades for the nineteenth century, this happens in individual years for the 1940s. This is of course unsurprising although at times perhaps there could have been more to be said about 1815-1914. For instance, the tragic and avoidable collision between HMS Victoria and HMS Camperdown in 1893 which cost the navy its flagship and hundreds of lives is mentioned in passing but no description of the event given.
Although at times the language can feel a little specialised for landlubbers like me with its talk of beakheads and bulkheads, Rodger does usually stop to allow us to catch up, explaining some of the terms. For the most part this is not a problem and once Rodger gets into his narrative flow, especially from 1914 onwards the book becomes compulsive reading.
Rodger lets his own opinions flow forth, with regular sallies taken at popular imagination and history (occasionally, I thought, straying into straw man territory). He is mostly pro-Churchill, pointing out that he was the only leading player who opposed the Gallipoli landings. He is less keen on Roosevelt "charming and duplicitous" and one whose promises always came with a discount. Incompetent, arrogant and blinkered admirals and politicians get short shrift, whilst the lesser known heroes (Chief Gunner Grant who saved HMS Lion at Jutland, the Ordinary Seaman who insisted that he saw the Japanese battleship Haguru through the storm cloud at a remarkable 35 miles) get their due. Myths and sacred cows are similarly disposed of. The Bismarck was built to an obsolete design and had inadequate armour. It was the psychological shock of HMS Hood exploding that gave the ship her legend. As a result her sister ship, the Tirpitz, which only once fired her guns in action, had more of an influence simply existing in her Norway bolthole than she would have had on the open sea.
Whereas in the First World War the navy saw very little action (my great grandfather probably faced very little peril), in the Second World War the navy lost a higher percentage (eight) than the army or air force. For submariners 38% lost their lives. The merchant navy lost 28,000 men, especially in the dark year of 1941.
As well as heroism, The Price of Victory, is not short on human folly. In fact there are times when it feels as though you are reading a non-fiction version of Catch-22. For instance, the story of the first British encounters with sea mines in the Crimean Warn resulted in first one admiral - and then a second! - blowing themselves up (not, astonishingly, fatally) by showing their students how a mine blows up. The US Navy, the particular subject of Rodger's frustration, could list its enemies in order as (1) The US Army, (2) The British, (3) The Japanese, (4) The Germans. Indeed the theme of US Navy Anglophobia comes across very strongly. Even in the 1930s the working assumption of the navy was that they would be defending themselves against a British/Canadian attack. And many admirals welcomed the opportunity. And a final example, perhaps the most unbelievable, of incompetence was the misreading of a keel-mast line of 7 feet rather than 17. By the time the error was spotted, 23 destroyers had already been built and had to have their armaments halved. Errors like this, and most egregiously the US refusal to countenance convoys throughout 1942, cost thousands of lives.
A fascinating book and one to which I hope one day to return.
February 13, 2025
We have been waiting some time for Rodger to complete his survey of British naval history since The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649 - 1815 was published in 2004. It was worth the wait, which he explains in the foreword.
As with previous volumes the author develops his argument by considering policy & operations, government & administration, ships & weapons, and social history as parallel threads. The book thus addresses navy, nation and their global context as an integrated whole.
The much-overworked phrase 'panoramic scope' is wholly appropriate here and it would be unreasonable to expect deep analysis of individual events from primary sources. We don't find it. Instead we meet well-written, impressive scholarship based on a lifetime's research (the bibliography is 70 pages long) looking at events from a refreshingly different angle.
Which is not to say that Rodger avoids controversy. Some famous British admirals receive an entertainingly caustic assessment of their ability, while his view of US skills and behaviour in WW2 is positively biting.
The book's title refers to the challenge new enemies and weapons posed to Britain's nineteenth century dominance. Their defeat came at a heavy and permanent cost to the country's economy. This is a theme the author returns to in the Epilogue where he asserts, 'British people were already well disposed towards the United States, and largely unaware of the extent to which dislike of Great Britain was a core element of American patriotism. While the war lasted, the Englishman in the street had little sense of the degree to which American assistance had sustained the common war-effort on terms that deliberately undermined the British economy.' He goes on to quote data in support of this thesis.
The book is illustrated with 10 useful and well-drawn maps, 64 generally well-chosen illustrations, and amplified by five appendices. There will be disagreements but it deserves a place in any library.
As with previous volumes the author develops his argument by considering policy & operations, government & administration, ships & weapons, and social history as parallel threads. The book thus addresses navy, nation and their global context as an integrated whole.
The much-overworked phrase 'panoramic scope' is wholly appropriate here and it would be unreasonable to expect deep analysis of individual events from primary sources. We don't find it. Instead we meet well-written, impressive scholarship based on a lifetime's research (the bibliography is 70 pages long) looking at events from a refreshingly different angle.
Which is not to say that Rodger avoids controversy. Some famous British admirals receive an entertainingly caustic assessment of their ability, while his view of US skills and behaviour in WW2 is positively biting.
The book's title refers to the challenge new enemies and weapons posed to Britain's nineteenth century dominance. Their defeat came at a heavy and permanent cost to the country's economy. This is a theme the author returns to in the Epilogue where he asserts, 'British people were already well disposed towards the United States, and largely unaware of the extent to which dislike of Great Britain was a core element of American patriotism. While the war lasted, the Englishman in the street had little sense of the degree to which American assistance had sustained the common war-effort on terms that deliberately undermined the British economy.' He goes on to quote data in support of this thesis.
The book is illustrated with 10 useful and well-drawn maps, 64 generally well-chosen illustrations, and amplified by five appendices. There will be disagreements but it deserves a place in any library.
November 16, 2025
This is the final volume in Rodger's three part series. This coves a lot of ground that includes Britain's height of imperial/naval hegemony and then its exhaustion after two world wars. Read this book if you want to learn about the details that actually go into an important national organization like the Royal Navy. Things like politics, administration, logistics, ship design, talent pipelines, engineering difficulties, etc. Rodgers goes deep. Things like:
1) Fire control on big guns on warships is a very hard technical challenge and wasn't really solved until the 2nd World War with more advanced electronics.
2) In the coal fired age of ships, most of the navy were coal stokers. The limit of range was actually their exhaustion, not how much coal was on board.
3) Twice the number of bombs were dropped on Malta in WW2 as on London during the Blitz!
4) Britain's naval dominance was tied to economic dominance and was sea power/trading based. Sea based trade is so powerful and economical that it was cheaper to ship a ton of coal by sea than train within Britain itself!
5) Britain had a monopoly over undersea cables for global communications. They used this as a weapon to spy on enemy communications and to cut off others access to the network. Sound familiar to the SWIFT banky network today?
6) Welsh coal was the best coal. So good that the Austo-Hungarian navy stockpiled before the war enough that they used it exclusively throughout WW1.
1) Fire control on big guns on warships is a very hard technical challenge and wasn't really solved until the 2nd World War with more advanced electronics.
2) In the coal fired age of ships, most of the navy were coal stokers. The limit of range was actually their exhaustion, not how much coal was on board.
3) Twice the number of bombs were dropped on Malta in WW2 as on London during the Blitz!
4) Britain's naval dominance was tied to economic dominance and was sea power/trading based. Sea based trade is so powerful and economical that it was cheaper to ship a ton of coal by sea than train within Britain itself!
5) Britain had a monopoly over undersea cables for global communications. They used this as a weapon to spy on enemy communications and to cut off others access to the network. Sound familiar to the SWIFT banky network today?
6) Welsh coal was the best coal. So good that the Austo-Hungarian navy stockpiled before the war enough that they used it exclusively throughout WW1.
October 19, 2025
I loved the first two volumes of this series, but found the conclusion disappointing. Part of it is the scope - covering the entire first and Second World War at sea in a single volume is daunting, not to mention a full hundred years before them. The coverage of the Second World War in particular felt poor - in particular, the author’s animus towards the US Navy borders on open spitefulness, and is deeply distracting. It feels like he has the same emotional deeply embedded grudge he so constantly accuses the US navy of having, and it does not improve the final product.
I also just felt like the book got away from him a bit - maybe because the modern area was not his previous research focus, or the very long passage of time since he wrote the first two books. But the structure and flow felt messy, and the end was odd.
Still giving it three stars out of respect for the scope of what he did. But felt disappointing.
I also just felt like the book got away from him a bit - maybe because the modern area was not his previous research focus, or the very long passage of time since he wrote the first two books. But the structure and flow felt messy, and the end was odd.
Still giving it three stars out of respect for the scope of what he did. But felt disappointing.
February 8, 2025
I was deeply impressed with the author’s The Wooden World, and appreciated the second volume of sequence of which this is the third.
The scholarship of the current volume remains at a high standard, but I tired of the repeated anger at the U.S., particularly the U.S.N., and Ernest J. King most of all. I believe more attention is paid to King than any other individual, but only to damn him over and over.
Rodger’s love for his navy is clear, but his partisanship leads him to ascribe the worst of motives to all who fail to share his love. The Empire was, as presented here, primarily a charitable enterprise.
I found very interesting that the collision that sank H.M.S. Victoria is essentially suppressed from the narrative, when other authors have treated it as emblematic of the 19th century RN emphasis on gentleman status over mere competence. What other elements were left out?
The scholarship of the current volume remains at a high standard, but I tired of the repeated anger at the U.S., particularly the U.S.N., and Ernest J. King most of all. I believe more attention is paid to King than any other individual, but only to damn him over and over.
Rodger’s love for his navy is clear, but his partisanship leads him to ascribe the worst of motives to all who fail to share his love. The Empire was, as presented here, primarily a charitable enterprise.
I found very interesting that the collision that sank H.M.S. Victoria is essentially suppressed from the narrative, when other authors have treated it as emblematic of the 19th century RN emphasis on gentleman status over mere competence. What other elements were left out?
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November 29, 2024My final recommendation is made speculatively, since N.A.M. Rodger’s The Price of Victory: A Naval History of Britain 1815-1945 (Allen Lane) is still days away from publication as I write these words. But we have waited 20 years for the final instalment of his trilogy on the naval history of Britain from the seventh century to the 20th, and I have no doubt it will be just as thrilling as the two previous volumes.
Read History Today’s Books of the Year 2024 at https://www.historytoday.com/archive/...
Yuan Yi Zhu is Assistant Professor of International Relations and International Law at Leiden University
Read History Today’s Books of the Year 2024 at https://www.historytoday.com/archive/...
Yuan Yi Zhu is Assistant Professor of International Relations and International Law at Leiden University
August 8, 2025
This book is the third volume of Professor Rodger's trilogy on the history of the British Navy. The Price of Victory is a massive undertaking by a master of research and writing. He presents a sharp, well-defined telling of a subject that is often fuzzy and blurry, and does it in a way that captures the macro and micro levels of his story. This book is a must-read for any historian looking at Britain since Napoleon. While it is a long book, Professor Rodger writes in a pleasant (even entertaining) style. He is informative and thorough, without being boring or pedantic.
June 7, 2025
I’m currently reading this, the third and final instalment of Rodger’s truly awesome British Naval history trilogy.
I don’t want to repeat the encomiums I’ve offered up to the first two volumes. Suffice it to say this last tome keeps up the traditions established by the first two.
I used to really only read about land warfare. But as time has gone on, watery warfare has grown ever more compelling. And I’ve never read better on the subject.
Can’t recommend these books highly enough.
I don’t want to repeat the encomiums I’ve offered up to the first two volumes. Suffice it to say this last tome keeps up the traditions established by the first two.
I used to really only read about land warfare. But as time has gone on, watery warfare has grown ever more compelling. And I’ve never read better on the subject.
Can’t recommend these books highly enough.
May 11, 2025
An utterly brilliant book and essential for any avid Royal Naval history buff. Prof Rogers’ judgments on the Royal Navy’s performance since the overwhelming victories of the Georgian Navy are relentless. The Admiralty must surely hang its head in shame whilst reading this book. Only criticism it’s a heavy book to hold whilst you read in bed!
March 30, 2025
Like the previous two instalments, a masterful survey of the naval history of the period covered, with a focus on Britain but making connections both to the naval histories of other nations and the social, political, technological, and economic history of Britain.
November 5, 2025
A welcome addition to naval history but suffers from a weird, abrupt anti-American bias in the last quarter.
November 20, 2025
It's just too comprehensive for one book. Each chapter covers a separate topic for a certain period. I would have enjoyed it more if it had been two, or even three, separate books.
November 26, 2025
Wonderfully written and full of interesting history! World Wars I and II naval history from a British point of view is priceless.
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