Alex de Waal has been a respected interlocutor and occasional mediator for heads of state, rebel leaders and warlords in Northeast Africa for over 30 years. He is a profound student of the region and has written more articles and contributed to more books on the Horn of Africa than most people have read. For decades he’s been both observer and participant in what he calls “the Horn of Africa’s cornucopia of violence and destruction”; he’s been in the room during the big peace talks, interviewing and befriending the region’s Big Men and ridden in the backs of trucks under cover of darkness with guerrillas. He did his D. Phil thesis on Darfur and twice served as senior adviser to the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan. He knows his stuff.
The Horn of Africa formerly consisted of 4 countries: Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia plus the enclave of Djibouti. Now it is seven. Eritrea broke away from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan. Somaliland isn’t recognized internationally (nor by Somalia) but is a functioning state with a government that delivers services to its citizens, which Somalia is not. There are case studies of each of the countries mentioned except Djibouti plus an additional one on Darfur.The Horn is an inhospitable part of the world with little transportation infrastructure, endless spaces and a harsh climate much affected by global warming but with a surprisingly globalized and cosmopolitan political ecosystem.
The book investigates and describes how decisions are made in the Horn, the ‘political circuitry’ that exists there, how power is accumulated and lost and the use of violence and cash in the real political life of the region. De Waal shows that the that politics in the Horn is best understood as a marketplace, where the currency is money and the ability to wage war. States are largely imaginary constructs; what matters in politics is accumulating as large a ‘political budget’ as possible – the discretionary funds that any leader can spend on buying support, both in votes and guns.
Two examples of how political budgets work are revenue from oil or other large scale industrial extractive operations and artisanal mining of alluvial gold, diamonds or near-surface coltan. Oil in Sudan or copper in Eritrea are part of international commodity economics dominated by a few companies and based on payments flowing from these companies to the treasuries of central governments. These payments are diverted from the provision of public goods or state building to political funding with secondary investments in construction, real estate, energy and transport that generates crony capitalism and more corruption. Small scale mining--smaller even than that run by foreign militaries in the eastern Congo--finance local political entrepreneurs who can control the simple, labor intensive technology for diamonds and riverine gold and exported using trucks or light aircraft. Provincial elites such as rebel commanders, local chiefs and army officers use these funds for their own political budgets, including bribery, payments to unofficial recruits and weapons procurement. In both cases the funds extracted never benefit the residents of the areas affected and are often used to their detriment.
De Waal sees little good news coming from the Horn of Africa anytime soon. The countries there have proved to be politically unstable for decades with more of the same to come.