This is a very easy book to get lost in. For one, the picture editing was superb and the format big enough for spreads of old photos. The details and dimensions made it like looking through a stereoscope and being brought unsettlingly close among a skating party of officers wives and children on a frozen pond near a Montana post in 1880, or bivouacked black troops posing jauntily with bottles and six-shooters. The reproduced artifacts (recruiting posters, cavalry guidons, an army surgeon’s field kit, all bone saws and trepans) are also big and textured and scary. In short, Time-Life Books Inc. made great use of archival materials to ensure that this overview of Army life on the frontier, 1865-90 (Sand Creek to Wounded Knee, roughly), was as vivid and striking as possible; and then there’s the prose:
In[Boston newspaperman-turned-army officer John:]Cremony’s day there was a 125-mile stretch between the New Mexican settlements of Dona Ana and Socorro without a single habitation. For 95 of those miles there was neither shade nor water. Worse yet was the imminent danger of attack by Apaches, who lurked in the surrounding hills. Because of this threat, the stretch was known as the Jornada del Muerto—the Journey of Death—and Cremony made the trip alone.
He had a fine horse and made the trip without difficulty. After spending two days in Socorro he started back toward Dona Ana at 3 o’clock in the morning. By mid-afternoon he had made about 55 miles; for half of them he trotted on foot beside his horse in order to save its strength for any emergency that might arise. The sun ‘glared like a shield of red-hot brass,’ he later said, and he was thinking of stopping for a while when he saw a column of dust moving rapidly toward him from the left. To John Cremony that meant Apaches.
David Nevin spent his youth at ghostly old western forts as the son of a U.S. Cavalry veterinarian (the army used horse solders until the 1930s), and wrote two other books in this series, The Mexican War and The Texans, which I have to read. His pulpy, punchy style is always clean, concise, and absorbing, as in his narrative of John Cremony’s galloping fight with Apache warriors, full of shortcuts and switchbacks and embedded arrows, through 70 miles of New Mexico desert. Some of the feats of arms—-of endurance, rather—-retold in this book are simply incredible.
In January 1867 a young cavalry lieutenant named George A. Armes led 55 men to the relief of a party of woodchoppers who were surrounded in Dakota by Cheyenne warriors 40 miles away. He had been dispatched on patrol to recover some livestock taken by rustlers and was camped in a blizzard when a woodsman who had escaped the Indian siege found him.
Armes broke camp at 3 a.m. on a Tuesday in driving snow. At 8 a.m. he stopped for an hour, ate hastily, and then moved on again. The snow was blinding. Men rode with their faces down, their eyes slitted, their hands tucked into their coats. Twenty miles farther on, a concealed mass of Indians burst from the woods with shrieks and rifle fire, the noise of their attack partially muffled by the snow. Armes rallied his men and charged, driving the Indians over the ridge and into a ravine deep with snow. His horsemen floundered three miles up the ravine before he admitted that the Indians had escaped. One of his own men was missing, either killed or captured.
He gave his men time to brew coffee and take a hasty meal, and then marched again for the woodchoppers’ camp. The snow was a foot deep and drifting on level ground, as much as six feet deep in depressions. The soldiers reached the camp and drove the Indians away. The blizzard was increasing, the temperature falling. The soldiers warmed themselves at the woodsmen’s fires, ate another quick meal and mounted again to attack the Indians in their village, 10 miles ahead. At 4 a.m. Wednesday they charged the village—and found it empty. But the Indians’ trail was plain in the heavy snow, and the soldiers followed it for 10 more miles, sometimes struggling through drifts as much as 10 feet deep.
At noon Wednesday Armes gave up the hopeless pursuit. He turned back, and between 11 and 12 o’clock that night the troop reached an isolated ranch. Armes was lifted off his horse. The ice on his face was so thick that he could not speak. Only 10 of his 55 men were still functioning; he brought the remainder back in wagons, and most of these men had lost toes and fingers. In 45 hours they had marched the appalling total of 145 miles, fought two actions, eaten three meals, rested hardly at all, and had never been out of the cold and snow.
So yeah, the frontier really offered American soldiers the worst of everything: insane extremities of climate, a determined enemy defending that which is most worth fighting for—-freedom, family, a “way of life”-—and officers that were kind of crazy, though one could argue that Lt. Armes lacked only Arctic overshoes and buffalo robes, and furthermore had, back in 1867, what everyone realized a decade later to be the “right” idea (right tactically; of course its not right at all, morally): “officers are expected to continue pursuit until capture”--capture meaning destruction--was the winning mantra of General Nelson Miles, a virtuoso Indian fighter who presided over the final massacre of resistance at Wounded Knee, in 1890, and, if we go by the page-filling portrait in this book, a dashingly handsome blade, a mighty specimen of murderous empire-building Victorian male pulchritude. Miles, a dry goods clerk who purchased an officer’s commission when the Civil War started, was chief of the army by the turn of the century, when we entered the Big Imperial Game, when America, having consolidated the continent and built the world’s greatest industrial powerhouse, roughed up feeble Spain—-an easy enough mark, the beginner has to pace himself—-and made off with its Caribbean and Asiatic colonies.
The men under Armes, like the rest of the rank-and-file grunts Nevin portrays in this book, suffered a lot for that classic American reason: the government half-assed it for a long time. America’s big 19th century conquests (of the far West in the Mexican War of 1846-47; of the rebellious Confederacy; of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines in 1898-1902) were done under a halo of good, idealistic propaganda, with an army festively swollen by jingoistic volunteers...but when the conquest wasn’t a glamorous pageant; when the enemy wasn’t another state but bands of free people; when it came down to the obvious dirty work of destroying or displacing the indigenous families, soldiering became appropriately déclassé, and the military budget a grudged pittance. I guess there’s some residue of morality to that, or at least of shame; or maybe it was just denial and cognitive dissonance in the face of so "un-American" a reality. By the late 1860s many of the Plains Indians realized what was coming, and resolved to fight, and this was exactly the time at which the US government, exhausted by the Civil War, began to vacillate, Nevin writes, “between wishing the problem would go away and deciding it was not that serious after all. This was the real reason that soldiers of the time were underequipped, underfed and underpaid.”
And boy did they treat these guys like shit! President Grant’s leech brother Orvil and secretary of War Belknap (the secretary of Defense, in our more euphemistic times) sold lucrative post trader contracts, and the steep kickbacks meant that the traders themselves, in order to clear a profit, had to overcharge the troops for the items the army refused to provide—-yep, the government was actively fleecing its own troops. Shortly before his final battle, Custer testified before Congress about this swindle, incurred the displeasure of President Grant and thereby screwed his career, and was only able to participate in the Little Big Horn expedition by getting down on his knees and tearfully begging his commanding officer for a second chance; this happened at a fort that I live near but have never visited. He didn’t want to die, in fact he hoped a timely victory would make him president, but as one of America’s original media celebrities, the idea of going out in a blaze of glory while still young, beautiful and beloved probably wasn’t repulsive to his instincts.
Soldier’s pay was anyway so low most were never out of debt. They could only afford bargain-basement whores (“soldier’s woman” was cowboy slang for an ugly or handicapped prostitute). Their rations (at worst green, rotten bacon and biscuits so hard they had to be broken open with rifle butts) were inedible and, seemingly, anti-nutritive; scurvy was frequent. Their training was a matter of indifference. There was little to no target practice, or instruction in riding—-cavalry recruits, many of them urban immigrant laborers from the east unable to find work during the long depression of the 1870s, were expected to just hop on and tangle with Indian warriors who’d been on horseback practically since birth. Army law listed 12 death penalty offenses, and tormenting enlisted men with harsh punishments (the ball-and-chain; being strung up by the thumbs; marching up and down the parade ground all day long with a 40-lb log; languishing in a deep pit covered with planks, one Custer's inventions) was an officer pastime surpassed only by prodigious drinking (the ledgers of many post traders have survived, and list, gallon-by-gallon, the weekly whisky intake of these bored, disillusioned martinets). “Tyrannical superiors” contributed, Nevin writes, to the astronomical desertion rate: fully one-third of soldiers recruited during the Indian wars ended up running away. Desertion amounted to a "vernal rite": as soon as weather became hospitable to the wayfarer, men took off.
This spectacle of social unhealth dwarfs any photo shopped montage of fast food ads and broken-up street protests Adbusters cares to put forth as apocalyptic: the US Army had sadistic drunks lording over malnourished chain gangs made up of desperate immigrants, the unemployed, drifters, war-lovers who re-enlisted after the Civil War, ex-cons, fugitives trying to stay a step ahead of their pasts and, finally, the usual allotment of fresh-faced boys naively looking for adventure. They were assigned with exterminating the native tribes of what would become 14 American states, or forcing them onto reservations barren but for the same whisky traders and sutlers who gouged the troops. And they got it done, as Nevin marvels again and again. The component parts and ethos of an effective killing machine don't have to be, can't ever be, socially healthy, "Be All You Can Be" and "Army of One" notwithstanding. For all the incompetence, corruption, neglect and dithering that characterized its administration, the US Army accomplished what the country wanted: to defeat the Indian warriors and open up the tribes’ ancestral hunting grounds to settlement, to agriculture, to capitalism, to “progress...or whatever you want to call it,” as General Sheridan shrugged in his Memoirs.
Nevin’s mixture of breathless adventure story prose and grim inventory of social suffering reminded me of Bernard Cornwell’s Sharpe novels, and a lot of the military fiction I devoured as a kid. (“Childish imperialism,” Mandelstam’s phrase for his boyish entrancement by the martial spectacle of St. Petersburg's parade grounds.) Sharpe moves in the same universe of deprived, terrorized enlisted men, second-rate junior officers and an ungrateful, eye-averting, slightly ashamed government and nation. Britain defeated Napoleon and secured its empire using an armed mob largely made up of social cast offs—-“the scum of the earth,” as the Duke of Wellington once referred to his victorious army. Without ever forgetting that they were employed as instruments of terror, I’m very touched by the ramshackle pride America’s frontier soldiers could salvage, the grimy esprit de corps they managed to rig up. Nevin quotes an old barracks ballad:
Oh the drums would roll, upon my soul,
This is the style we’d go,
Forty miles a day on beans and hay
In the Regular Army O