Similar in concept to the book “Convoy Commander" by Rear Admiral Sir Kenelm Creighton. Woodward was assisted by Patrick Robinson. Woodward writes about the hundred days that he commanded the naval element of the British force re-taking the Falkland Islands after their invasion by the Argentinians in 1982. Woodward commanded everything that moved on the water from the surface ships, the aircraft carriers, the Harriers that flew from the aircraft carriers, the submarines (indirectly), the supply ships, the troop ships, the landing craft, the service (tugs, repair and supply ships) and hospital ships, and had a major role in the selection of landing beaches that he had to defend until they could defend themselves. His ships and aircraft were responsible for bombardment of all shore based targets identified by the infantry for pre-landing destruction.
Woodward’s decision to employ a professional writer (Patrick Robinson), was the right one as the book is much more articulate than memoires or “as I saw it” stories often are. His story is truly “big picture” with detail brought in whenever important decisions had to be made. Woodward was the man who made the decisions. He decided which ships would be out front to take the brunt of the fighting, which weapon systems would be tested and trusted, and which seemed to be less trustworthy, and he decided which battles would be fought today and which would be fought tomorrow (of those started by the British). Ultimately he decided where and when it was safe(r) to place the unweaponized but very vulnerable support vessels. He decided when to attack the Argentine navy; this required a revision to his rules of engagement (ROE). The book includes one or two chapters on Woodward’s education in the Royal Navy (RN). I suppose these show the growth of his ability to make decisions, not always necessarily by the book, but always correct.
The Battle Group, as his fleet of warships was called, was formed initially from a couple of fleets that were at sea in the Mediterranean on spring training when the crisis arose. He was given command of what naval HQ considered to be the best and most appropriate ships from the entire bunch. They were directed to Gibraltar where they were equipped for war. Woodward was flown to HQ for consultations and to ensure that he understood his ROE. Timing was set based on victory by the end of June. This meant about five key dates had to be met: start of hostilities; infantry landing day (D-day), and unconditional surrender of Argentinian forces. On return to Gibraltar, a few more ships had joined and they all sailed to Ascension Island (4000 miles from the Falkland Islands) which was the closest British location for jet aircraft access, or for naval repair or refit. At Ascension, the fleet practiced working together and a few more ships joined. They would still wish for more anti-aircraft and anti-missile ships; the first of these would arrive in time for the last battle.
This book could easily turn into a series of entries from his logbook. However, they did an excellent job of keeping to an interesting narrative. And it is very interesting. The ROE popped up a few times in the book. We could think of the Britain’s naval management or political oversight as being risk averse, meaning decision averse. In this case, under Margaret Thatcher, the senior admirals and cabinet acted quickly and revised the ROE several times at Woodward’s request. In each case, he was allowed to be more aggressive in his execution of the war. There is at least one episode in the book that war news watchers would remember that occurred directly as a result of Woodward’s request to revise the ROE.
This was a surprisingly great book. Great if you are looking for real live action and great if you are looking to see how a senior commander deals with strategic considerations with life and death impacts on men, their ships, and a war. I have never read a better book for telling the story of naval command. Five stars.