“A treasure trove for historians . . . A real addition to Civil War history” (Kirkus Reviews, starred review). At the end of the American Civil War, most of the intelligence records disappeared—remaining hidden for over a century. As a result, little has been understood about the role of espionage and other intelligence sources, from balloonists to signalmen with their telescopes. When, at the National Archives, Edwin C. Fishel discovered long-forgotten documents—the operational files of the Army of the Potomac’s Bureau of Military Information—he had the makings of this, the first book to thoroughly and authentically examine the impact of intelligence on the Civil War, providing a new perspective on this period in history. Drawing on these papers as well as over a thousand pages of reports by General McClellan’s intelligence chief, the detective Allan Pinkerton, and other information, he created an account of the Civil War that “breaks much new ground” (The New York Times). “The former chief intelligence reporter for the National Security Agency brings his professional expertise to bear in this detailed analysis, which makes a notable contribution to Civil War literature as the first major study to present the war’s campaigns from an intelligence perspective. Focusing on intelligence work in the eastern theater, 1861–1863, Fishel plays down the role of individual agents like James Longstreet’s famous ‘scout,’ Henry Harrison, concentrating instead on the increasingly sophisticated development of intelligence systems by both sides. . . . Expertly written, organized and researched.” —Publishers Weekly “Fundamentally changes our picture of the secret service in the Civil War.” —The Washington Post
Though covering 594 pages of material, I did not find the material that heavy. I don't disagree that this is not a book for the common reader. It is for those individuals very specifically interested in the Civil War or perhaps the early development of America's intelligence operations. Fishel's book is very intriguing and I specifically find his treatment of General Joe Hooker very fascinating. Indeed, I now look at Hooker in a far different light, conceding that he was a much better general than I gave him credit for. I certainly agree with most assessments that he was not a great commander of the Army of the Potomac, but I do believe he was very effective at division and corps levels, positions where he could physically direct the action of his men. At higher responsibility levels, he simply couldn't not move the battle pieces around without seeing them. He needed to be on the battlefield to be effective. But, he was the first general, and is credited with, building the military's first concept at all-source intelligence reporting. He built the Military Bureau of Information so he could have an office that could collect intelligence from citizen-scouts, cavalry, prisoner interrogation, slaves, and spies and then synthesize the data into a collective strategic picture. No other commander, nor the War Department, had ever done this. It was this concept that allowed him to get his stolen march on Lee. Fishel points to evidence of the Union Signal Corps transmitting a fake message that was picked up by Lee's Signal Corps that resulted in Lee dispatching JEB Stuart on a ride to pursue a phantom force. Stuart's departure left the hole that Hooker used to get around to Lee's flank. How often is this discussed in books? It isn't. Hooker reorganized the cavalry, consolidating them into one corps, another logical and new concept. He rode in intelligence balloons, further showing his interest and understanding of the importance of intelligence gathering. No other general really understood the importance of intelligence gathering like he did. His work and understanding of it dwarfed all others. He would have done great service if an intelligence bureau at the War Department was created and he was placed in charge of it. This new dimension of Hooker is what Fishel brings forth in his work.
Fishel documents his facts well; his footnotes cover 82 pages. There are also 25 maps. Fishel analyzes all forms of intelligence utilized in the war: cavalry, the signal corps, citizen-scouts, spies (women and men), slaves, freedmen, clandestine actions, deserters, POWs, and double-agents. His efforts span primarily the events from 1861 through the battle of Gettysburg. It is a remarkable work that a student of the Civil War should find most intriguing since it adds a new dimension to think about regarding the prosecution of the war's campaigns. I'm perplexed how one reader comments on the book's lack of worth when he states he didn't bother to read very much of it after finding the author using phrases such as "may have," "possibly," or "could have." The intelligence game played by the Union and Confederate side is not consumed with extensive amounts of documentation. Confederate Treasury Secretary Judah Benjamin destroyed many of his government's secret service and intelligence files. Thus, it is up to authors to try and piece together what is available to do the best to tell the intelligence story. If one keeps this in mind, the material should not be offensive, but insightful simply because the author is attempting to explain what hardly anyone has ever bothered to write about. Many authors today put their own spin and interpretation on the war. Fishel is no different and he's dealing with far less information to build the story.
This is a history of military intelligence activities during the American Civil War, specifically focusing on the period from the start of the war through the Gettysburg Campaign and on the Union side, which the author notes is really the only side which had true intelligence gathering organizations. The author's main thrust is to explain how limited the two sides were with regarding to gathering infomation on troops strengths, intentions, logistical capabilites and the such. Unfortunately the book bogs down in page upon pages of recounting the movement of almost every agent and discussions of what the commanders thought on this day versus the next. The reader (at least this reader) soon loses track of the multitude of names of agents, bureaucrats and soldiers. The author made little effort to make the book accessible for the casual reader. Unless you are truly interested in this subject and are willing to put in the effort, you should avoid this book.
I'd been wondering about military intelligence in the Civil War... not the overwrought and overdone "civil war spy" stories, but about real intelligence work. This book is what I was looking for. So much of what would come to be recognized as intelligence work was prefigured in the Union Army of the Potomac's Bureau of Military Information, from collating interrogation reports to reading enemy signal flag messages to constructing orders-of-battle of the opposing forces, all in one organization. It seems that all the components had been available for some time; what was missing was a central staff to coordinate information-gathering and to put the reports from various sources together, resulting in a fuller picture of the situation.
For instance, a picket might report that the enemy picket across from him had changed, from somebody in Heth's division to somebody new. That fact is not very useful in itself, but if it's put together with a report from a nearby town that a brigade had passed through and the order-of-battle information on Heth's division, then you can start figuring out that a brigade has been pulled off the line and is on the march in a particular direction.
It appears that this story was untold for many years to protect the identities of a number of the people involved; but intelligence analyst Edwin C. Fishel happened across the records of the Bureau in the archives, still bound up with red ribbons, unread for a century or more. The story is told in exacting detail up through the excellent Union intelligence work that enabled the victory at Gettysburg; the second half of the war, unfortunately, is only lightly covered in an "Epilogue."
This is a book for serious civil war groupies. Fishel found a trove of correspondence from mostly Union intelligence operations in the National Archives, largely unreviewed. It's an interesting addition to the military history, but you have to be deep into that history to follow the story. The book follows several campaigns in northern Virginia and Maryland - ending at Gettysburg - and the role intelligence efforts played in shaping those battles. It's hardly an unqualified success story, given the nature of northern military commanders -- many political ppointees - and the very inconsistent way information flowed to those commanders. Everyone who knows civil war history knows how the union army's George McClellan refused to act, making ridiculous overestimates of enemy strentgh that were aided by his "spies," chiefly Allan Pinkerton, who enabled McLellan until LIncoln changed generals. Fishel's book is minutely detailed, and that's a problem. It's hard to follow unless you have military battle order, command structures and maps of northern Virginia and Maryland in your head. The mulitple adventures of numerous spies, who constantly enter and leave the narrative, are equally hard to follow. Their exploits are heroic, often under appreciated and in some cases vital to the battle's outcome. Their information was often rejected, often late in reaching the field commanders, often contradicted by other infomration. The information came from observation, subterfuge (changing into confederate uniforms and riding with the army), from loyalists behind enemy lines, from deserters and escaped slaves.Neither army had a formal intelligence operation, only a few Union generals -- the mostly successful ones -- placed a priority on getting information, chiefly on the enemy's whereabouts or direction of travel. A better organized narrative would have brought these spies more to the front of the story instead of dropping them in and out of the story as military campaigns progressed. An important element of civil war history, but a little dense, repetitive and hard to follow in some cases.
This is considered a seminal work in Civil War and intelligence circles and has long been on my bucket list to read. I finally completed it but it was a tough slog at times. Fischel has provided a huge historical service in unearthing U.S. Bureau of Military Information records and reconstructing, likely for the first time, a blow-by-blow account of military intelligence in support of Union forces during the Civil War. His detailed description of U.S. secret agents and formation of the first all-source intelligence unit in the nation's history is extremely detailed. Fischel's writing style does not lend itself to quick reading and the minute details can be taxing at times. And it's important to note this detailed history only covers the campaigns in the Eastern theater from the First Battle of Manassas through Gettysburg. He covers the 1864 Overland Campaign in a glancing manner and nothing for the Western theater. His comparison of how Hooker, Meade, Grand and Lee used and exploited intelligence is of high interest and value. Well worth a read for students of Civil War and military history.
This book was a surprise to me. I had never thought about spies during the Civil War. But here is a fantastic treatment of the subject.
Like so many things in that conflict resources were not balanced between the sides. A medical doctor invented signing with flags before the war and trained a flag corp. When the war broke out all of his students went to the rebel side. The result was disastrous for the Union during the first few battles.
There was a balloon corp. But only on the Union side. That didn't exist all of the time due to restructuring of bureaucracy as command kept changing.
There are fascinating stories about the privatization of spying and then the move toward the army having its own spies.
The book is well written and is a compelling subject.
This book described the Union's intelligence gathering efforts during the war through the battle of Gettysburg. The first part was slow as he talked about the beginning spying efforts. It wasn't interesting. However, once he started describing how the intelligence effort or lack thereof affected various battles, it shed a whole new light on those battles.
Liked the information supplied by Fishel. Found it hard sometime to read because he puts a lot of information into a sentence. I also found it difficult to keep up with all of the personage in the book.