Coincidently, I completed this review on the exact 106th anniversary of that Red Sunday.
Aiming to establish meticulous and prudent views on historic matters, one may find it confusing when dissecting interwinding issues of WHAT HOW WHY. If we talk about humanitarian crimes, sometimes the facts, documents and archives just generate a sense of moral pressing, demanding us to answer comprehensively WHY, yet in many times we just fall short of knowledge as well as sympathy to comfort such pressing.
Suny’s transcendent work manages to address WHAT and WHY, whereas the latter appeals to me most. Attributing to various causations, Suny obviously made sound arrangement, focusing especially on emotions, say, on Page 362, “(Genocide killers’) resentment toward those who received more than they deserved from those who received less; fear of the other and the future, anger at what had been done to oneself and one’s compatriots.” Suny, though not without any controversy as I check here in Goodreads, points to the inner consideration of those Young Turks elites, the so-called “affective disposition”, which as Suny articulates, should hold the responsibility of the Genocide. It was a sense of insecurity stemming from being surrounded by enemies, surpassed by European powers in recent centuries, imposed by Europeans an unpopular, at least among Muslim, reform to improve or protect Armenian minority, got horrible defeat in Sarikamis and that a handful of Armenian soldiers defecting to Russian army. All in all, combining above and other negative events together, Young Turks elites thought it a must to make resolution stance toward Armenians. Hostility between Muslim and Armenians had always been there for years, but now here comes the Hatred, which as on Page 362, ”required that the other be eliminated”.
But don’t jump into the pitfall of so-called inevitability. Suny reiterates that hostility did not necessarily lead to hatred, especially the hatred encouraged by Istanbul. Yes, the tinderbox was there, but Genocide was still avoidable. Nevertheless, WWI occurred. On Page 360, “had there been no World War there would have been no genocide, not only because there would have been no “fog of war” to cover up the events but because the radical sense of endangerment among Turks would not have been as acute.”
I think this is one of the most daring argument Suny put forward in this work. He has to strife a balance on two, in my view, somewhat contradictory points. While blaming on the affective disposition of Young Turks elites, he also underlines the tipping point brought by the crucible of WWI. To what extent WWI and henceforth military pressure could exculpate Young Turks elites as well as more widely, Muslims? Speaking of the latter, Suny downplays religious element in Genocide, yet readers can hardly omit that it was Muslim who actively participated in the plunder, loop and murder against Armenians. Moreover, if we take a look at WWI, we can easily find that Young Turks never got hesitant to call for jihad against British and Russians in Middle East, which means that weapon of religious conflict was in Young Turks’ arsenal. Given that Armenians had always petitioned to show off their loyalty to Istanbul, though in vain, as well as for years Armenians had been regarded as more obsequious than Kurds, it is pretty dubious that Istanbul kept suspecting them. I’m not sure whether I was too careless that I had ignored other convincing explanation. Does Suny overestimate Triumvirate’s impact on their colleagues and compatriots? Was the hostility so pervasive and uncompromising, that a killing order from Istanbul could easily spark a large scale of massacre?
Decree from Istanbul had been implemented efficiently outside the capital by CUP elites, while it met resistance in vilayets whose governors were not from CUP. 3 places (Adana, Ankara and Diyarbakir) were named on Page 309, though the recalcitrant local officials were replaced later by CUP loyalists. But at least for a while, local administrators’ defiance was there and withstood first wave of cruel order from Istanbul. Here we can grasp a glimpse on the obvious, if not material, difference between Young Turks’ Ottoman and Nazi Germany. Multiethnic as it had always been, Ottoman differs from Nazi Germany in that its vilayets were not always in complicity with Istanbul. Historically local officials were granted high degree of discretion on various issues. Doubtlessly, due to military factors Young Turks’ ruling was brutal and capricious, but hardly can be referred to as totalitarian, as it could never effectively mobilize Arabs, Kurds, let alone Armenians who Istanbul itself regarded as disloyal, to combat in east frontline against British and Russians. Hence, tense conflicts between vilayets and Istanbul had always taken root throughout Ottoman Empire, even after Young Turks took power and vowed to centralize power in the name of “progress”. I find it perhaps more tempting to reach that it was Young Turks’ connivance with local Muslims’ xenophobia that directly exacerbated Genocide. BTW, Triumvirate’s views on Armenians were not in uniformity. Talat surely was most determined, yet Enver seemed more reluctant. Speaking of that, I have to be hesitant toward Suny’s “affective disposition” assumption. To what extent that Talat the hawk had to be affective and stubborn, so that he could facilitate the deportation and Genocide? My historic view always asks me to head up on the explanation attributing to leaders’ characters. That elites’ mood helps shape history is one thing, while such mood could suffice the whole story is another.
On Page 206, Suny wrote that Young Turks preferred Pan-Turkism path after 1908. I find similar narratives in different books and articles, and I think it’s convincing. Young Turks must find it annoying in 1910s, especially after losing Balkan War. Perhaps not surprisingly they just shrugged shoulders when hearing about Armenians being massacred, OK SO LET IT BE, let’s build a Pan-Turk society without Armenians, without Greeks, without Christians. In my humble view this was the catalyst of the Genocide, I’m not sure if my view is correct but that’s my first impression after finishing Chapter Six.
This work is not too academic, nor too easy for casual reader. I’ve said that it nicely covers WHAT WHY, but it also illustrates HOW in detail, though I find it too horrible to read. As for WHY, like I stated above, I have some after-class thinking. Maybe I should revisit this great work. Right now, I’d recommend it to my friends as persuasive, though not perfectly conclusive in my view, and truly propitious if we want to grasp an objective understanding on Armenian Genocide. Reading is disturbing, yet worthwhile and even obliged in that of commemorating the victims on this solemn day. Violence can be under the camouflage of “progress”.
In all, I’m pretty glad that I’ve enjoyed this work, fascinating, consistent and inspiring.