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The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism
Few discussions in modern social science have occupied as much attention as the changing nature of welfare states in Western societies. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, one of the foremost contributors to current debates on this issue, here provides a new analysis of the character and role of welfare states in the functioning of contemporary advanced Western societies. Esping-Andersen distinguishes three major types of welfare state, connecting these with variations in the historical development of different Western countries. He argues that current economic processes, such as those moving toward a postindustrial order, are shaped not by autonomous market forces but by the nature of states and state differences. Fully informed by comparative materials, this book will have great appeal to all those working on issues of economic development and postindustrialism. Its audience will include students of sociology, economics, and politics.
260 pages, Hardcover
First published December 20, 1989
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December 22, 2025
This book consists of two parts. The first part’s goal is to describe and explain 3 clustering regimes of welfare systems in capitalism: a “liberal” (think US, Britain), a “conservative” (think France, Italy, Germany, also Belgium), and a “social-democratic” (think mostly Sweden, but also Denmark, Norway). The main take of the author is that socialist pressure has mostly pushed forward the welfare state, but the contexts in which they did so really changed the outcome. All three also created welfare systems in line with demographic and economic developments, but the ways in which they created welfare systems (and the different outcomes) were caused by power relations and the special position of socialist pressure.
In the conservative regimes, continental Europe, the absolutist state/catholic church/corporatism of medieval guilds captured a basis of the socialist potential (and forced socialists to forge the welfare state with them) and made a specific welfare regime skewed towards preservation of traditional familyhood and institutions. These welfare regimes were also the most old ones. Indeed, as the author confirms a lot, the first welfare regimes were installed by conservative polities intended to counteract socialist agitation (such as Bismarck).
In the liberal regimes, the welfare system was rather modest. The progress of social reform was circumscribed by liberal work-ethic, as the absence of religious paternalism and the aristocracy created the context for unfettered bourgeois laissez-faire. Benefits are modest and based on absolute need (for the extreme poor, for example) and there’s also greater reliance on charity from the rich.
In social-democratic regimes, welfare states are both extensive and expensive, but have a broad support. The system was forged through a red-green alliance (agriculture being a necessary support for welfare implementation before WWII, followed by white collar workers after WWII). It did not tolerate a balance between state and market, but pushes for equality and universality of the highest standards. The system is expensive and thus the population needs to work (aka women need to go to work), which is also made easy through new welfare implementation (child care etc). Doing so they preemptively socialized family costs.
For the conservative regime, adaptation to new class structures of the post-industrial world was most easily done. For the other two, there was more of an existential question how to deal with new white collar middle classes. In liberal regimes, the low basis, but universalistic ideal was opened for a larger private welfare regime, marketizing the welfare state and creating new schisms between the more well-off which rely on the market for their welfare security, and the poor who rely on the state (and ofcourse, the new middle classes are increasingly unwilling to pay for the state benefits). In the social-democratic regimes, they changed the welfare regime to the new tastes and needs of the welfare system, incorporating a luxurious second-tier but universally inclusive earnings-related insurance scheme. This incorporated the new middle classes into the existing system.
In part two, the effect of welfare states on labour market policies and developments is analysed. Specifically, the author looks at its influence on labour-market behaviour (the supply, demand, and terms of the labour, chapter 5), the commitment to full employment (chapter 7), and the different pathways into post-industrial employment (chapter 8). An important insight is that the welfare state has been central in shaping the labour market, especially as the system was extended after WW II and was not merely an ”supplementary” for non-working anymore, it more integrally determined people’s lives and decisions. This created new conflicts and stratifications, now aligned around welfare policies.
Chapter 7 on full employment is particularly interesting. It starts from Kalecki’s essay on the political consequences of full employment to describe the three pathways of our three welfare regimes. All three were unable to ensure both full unemployment and balanced growth, and these political debates were mostly centred around the welfare regime which was now responsible for both full employment and distributional policies. However, the outcomes were different. In social-democratic regimes, labour unions were integrated in the state and could choose for wage moderation and full employment, while labour unions in liberal regimes were both isolated and scattered, which resulted in a maximalist approach to wage demands, resulting in more unemployment and bad coordination overall. For the conservative regimes the author uses Germany as case-study, which I think is less representative for this regime as the author assumes. Here as well, “Concerted Action” from the 60s on tried to manage distributional policies as to achieve full employment. From the 70s on, all three regimes faced the additional obstacle of increased international competition which required low labor costs and thus a welfare regime able to guarantee this. Interestingly, the author highlights the fact that amidst these painful discussions, a new priority came to the for: democratization as concrete new demand lacking resolute goals in distributional policies, but which was violently opposed by capitalists.
Chapter 8 discusses the trajectories of post-industrial employment, which is easy yet insightful. While Germany remained mostly industrial (no growth in post-industrial jobs, again I think that Germany was not the best case-study to look at conservative regimes, might have been better to pick France), Sweden and the US had different trajectories in post-industrial job growth. In the US there was a double movement of managerial job growth (mostly taken by white men) in the service economy linked to big business (the author explains this by referring to the welfare regime, but it might be better explained by looking at the financialisation of the American economy as its position in the global market shifted), and the growth of “junk” jobs in the entertainment etc. industry (mostly taken by minority groups). In Sweden, in contrast, post-industrial jobs grew way more through expansion of the welfare state in more qualitative jobs, while this included lots of women it did strengthen gender segregation (as women were overrepresented in these new caring jobs).
Overall, the author often returns to a Polanyian idea of decommodification as the main goal of socialist action for welfare regimes. Rather than dependency on the family/state as in conservative regimes, the goal is to maximise individual autonomy.
What I think is the most important insight is that the WW II era cannot be understood without looking at the welfare state and its fundamentally restructuring capabilities on political economy, class forging and struggles, and distributional policies. It also undergirds the kind of Hobsbawmian analyses on new class formation of the “underclass” in post-industrialised societies which now rely on welfare. Indeed, contestations over the welfare state now animate contemporary racist dichotomies and nationalist lines.
In the conservative regimes, continental Europe, the absolutist state/catholic church/corporatism of medieval guilds captured a basis of the socialist potential (and forced socialists to forge the welfare state with them) and made a specific welfare regime skewed towards preservation of traditional familyhood and institutions. These welfare regimes were also the most old ones. Indeed, as the author confirms a lot, the first welfare regimes were installed by conservative polities intended to counteract socialist agitation (such as Bismarck).
In the liberal regimes, the welfare system was rather modest. The progress of social reform was circumscribed by liberal work-ethic, as the absence of religious paternalism and the aristocracy created the context for unfettered bourgeois laissez-faire. Benefits are modest and based on absolute need (for the extreme poor, for example) and there’s also greater reliance on charity from the rich.
In social-democratic regimes, welfare states are both extensive and expensive, but have a broad support. The system was forged through a red-green alliance (agriculture being a necessary support for welfare implementation before WWII, followed by white collar workers after WWII). It did not tolerate a balance between state and market, but pushes for equality and universality of the highest standards. The system is expensive and thus the population needs to work (aka women need to go to work), which is also made easy through new welfare implementation (child care etc). Doing so they preemptively socialized family costs.
For the conservative regime, adaptation to new class structures of the post-industrial world was most easily done. For the other two, there was more of an existential question how to deal with new white collar middle classes. In liberal regimes, the low basis, but universalistic ideal was opened for a larger private welfare regime, marketizing the welfare state and creating new schisms between the more well-off which rely on the market for their welfare security, and the poor who rely on the state (and ofcourse, the new middle classes are increasingly unwilling to pay for the state benefits). In the social-democratic regimes, they changed the welfare regime to the new tastes and needs of the welfare system, incorporating a luxurious second-tier but universally inclusive earnings-related insurance scheme. This incorporated the new middle classes into the existing system.
In part two, the effect of welfare states on labour market policies and developments is analysed. Specifically, the author looks at its influence on labour-market behaviour (the supply, demand, and terms of the labour, chapter 5), the commitment to full employment (chapter 7), and the different pathways into post-industrial employment (chapter 8). An important insight is that the welfare state has been central in shaping the labour market, especially as the system was extended after WW II and was not merely an ”supplementary” for non-working anymore, it more integrally determined people’s lives and decisions. This created new conflicts and stratifications, now aligned around welfare policies.
Chapter 7 on full employment is particularly interesting. It starts from Kalecki’s essay on the political consequences of full employment to describe the three pathways of our three welfare regimes. All three were unable to ensure both full unemployment and balanced growth, and these political debates were mostly centred around the welfare regime which was now responsible for both full employment and distributional policies. However, the outcomes were different. In social-democratic regimes, labour unions were integrated in the state and could choose for wage moderation and full employment, while labour unions in liberal regimes were both isolated and scattered, which resulted in a maximalist approach to wage demands, resulting in more unemployment and bad coordination overall. For the conservative regimes the author uses Germany as case-study, which I think is less representative for this regime as the author assumes. Here as well, “Concerted Action” from the 60s on tried to manage distributional policies as to achieve full employment. From the 70s on, all three regimes faced the additional obstacle of increased international competition which required low labor costs and thus a welfare regime able to guarantee this. Interestingly, the author highlights the fact that amidst these painful discussions, a new priority came to the for: democratization as concrete new demand lacking resolute goals in distributional policies, but which was violently opposed by capitalists.
Chapter 8 discusses the trajectories of post-industrial employment, which is easy yet insightful. While Germany remained mostly industrial (no growth in post-industrial jobs, again I think that Germany was not the best case-study to look at conservative regimes, might have been better to pick France), Sweden and the US had different trajectories in post-industrial job growth. In the US there was a double movement of managerial job growth (mostly taken by white men) in the service economy linked to big business (the author explains this by referring to the welfare regime, but it might be better explained by looking at the financialisation of the American economy as its position in the global market shifted), and the growth of “junk” jobs in the entertainment etc. industry (mostly taken by minority groups). In Sweden, in contrast, post-industrial jobs grew way more through expansion of the welfare state in more qualitative jobs, while this included lots of women it did strengthen gender segregation (as women were overrepresented in these new caring jobs).
Overall, the author often returns to a Polanyian idea of decommodification as the main goal of socialist action for welfare regimes. Rather than dependency on the family/state as in conservative regimes, the goal is to maximise individual autonomy.
What I think is the most important insight is that the WW II era cannot be understood without looking at the welfare state and its fundamentally restructuring capabilities on political economy, class forging and struggles, and distributional policies. It also undergirds the kind of Hobsbawmian analyses on new class formation of the “underclass” in post-industrialised societies which now rely on welfare. Indeed, contestations over the welfare state now animate contemporary racist dichotomies and nationalist lines.
February 22, 2022
exceedingly good. bit dry but what would you expect.
November 4, 2022
Essential reading for anyone studying social policy. A little outdated and very Europe focused so ensure you need to read or at least take a look at some other authors’ criticism for it.
April 5, 2022
Nordic-style social democracy is not just a matter of executive decrees—it's a delicate balance between the state, capital, and labor. From an Indonesian (or American) PoV, the labor unions in the Nordics would seem incredibly powerful.
Welfare states are often categorized into three types: conservative, liberal, and social-democratic.
In a conservative welfare regime, kinship relations became the primary locus from which the state distributes social benefits. In this typology, the individual is protected from the forces of the market by embedding itself in a collectivist social structure such as the family and the village. Benefits get transferred from the state to the household, the hamlet, and the village; not to the individual citizens. This tied individuals up to their social groups (and usually disadvantaged the fringes of the society such as queers and Dalits, who couldn't access welfare because they're rejected from their social groups)
In a liberal welfare regime, the idea of social citizenship has a logical understanding that falls closer to the concept of market citizenship. This is because the citizens’ right to social protection was just granted after the mechanism of the market failed to bring welfare, instead of because of a political response to a social risk that occurred as an effect of the market’s destructiveness. The flagship welfare policies are almost always means-tested, instead of universal. I haven't studied it closely, but I think the recent covid relief packages are examples of this type of policymaking. In general, Indonesian welfare policies since SBY is trending toward this type.
The ideal social-democratic welfare regime is based on the principle of universalism, granting access to benefits and services based on citizenship. Such a welfare state is said to provide a relatively high degree of autonomy, limiting the reliance on family and the market. In order to achieve autonomy, social-democratic welfare states are characterized by a high level of decommodification and a low degree of stratification. In contrast to liberal welfare regimes in which social policies are perceived as complementary to the (failings of the) market, social policies in social-democratic regimes are perceived as ‘politics against the market’.
Firms in the Nordic countries face significant control by unionized workers and strong labor movements. The majority of workers in the Nordic countries are unionized. On average, about 63% of workers in the Nordic region are a member of labor unions. As a comparison, only 10% of workers in the United States are unionized while in the United Kingdom only a quarter of the workers are unionized.
The Nordic model does not have minimum wages law, but they do have strong labor unions, sectoral bargaining, and strong socialist parties, boasting a high number of workers with collectively bargained labor union contracts. This is due to the nature of labor market institutions in those countries that employ a centralized bargaining system. Rather than bargain with employers at the firm or plant-level, labor unions leverage their power to bargain at a national or sectoral level. The outcome of those collective bargaining agreements set the wages and working conditions for the entire sector of the economy.
The strong position of labor with a high degree of class consciousness enables Nordic countries to achieve the keystone of a functioning social democracy: the decommodification of basic human necessities. Labor's combative stance against market forces is central to Nordic social-democracy, and it necessitates the existence of a far stronger and more organized labor movement than Indonesia currently has. Otherwise, there would be no incentive nor political will for the Indonesian (or any) government to implement social-democratic welfare policies.
Welfare states are often categorized into three types: conservative, liberal, and social-democratic.
In a conservative welfare regime, kinship relations became the primary locus from which the state distributes social benefits. In this typology, the individual is protected from the forces of the market by embedding itself in a collectivist social structure such as the family and the village. Benefits get transferred from the state to the household, the hamlet, and the village; not to the individual citizens. This tied individuals up to their social groups (and usually disadvantaged the fringes of the society such as queers and Dalits, who couldn't access welfare because they're rejected from their social groups)
In a liberal welfare regime, the idea of social citizenship has a logical understanding that falls closer to the concept of market citizenship. This is because the citizens’ right to social protection was just granted after the mechanism of the market failed to bring welfare, instead of because of a political response to a social risk that occurred as an effect of the market’s destructiveness. The flagship welfare policies are almost always means-tested, instead of universal. I haven't studied it closely, but I think the recent covid relief packages are examples of this type of policymaking. In general, Indonesian welfare policies since SBY is trending toward this type.
The ideal social-democratic welfare regime is based on the principle of universalism, granting access to benefits and services based on citizenship. Such a welfare state is said to provide a relatively high degree of autonomy, limiting the reliance on family and the market. In order to achieve autonomy, social-democratic welfare states are characterized by a high level of decommodification and a low degree of stratification. In contrast to liberal welfare regimes in which social policies are perceived as complementary to the (failings of the) market, social policies in social-democratic regimes are perceived as ‘politics against the market’.
Firms in the Nordic countries face significant control by unionized workers and strong labor movements. The majority of workers in the Nordic countries are unionized. On average, about 63% of workers in the Nordic region are a member of labor unions. As a comparison, only 10% of workers in the United States are unionized while in the United Kingdom only a quarter of the workers are unionized.
The Nordic model does not have minimum wages law, but they do have strong labor unions, sectoral bargaining, and strong socialist parties, boasting a high number of workers with collectively bargained labor union contracts. This is due to the nature of labor market institutions in those countries that employ a centralized bargaining system. Rather than bargain with employers at the firm or plant-level, labor unions leverage their power to bargain at a national or sectoral level. The outcome of those collective bargaining agreements set the wages and working conditions for the entire sector of the economy.
The strong position of labor with a high degree of class consciousness enables Nordic countries to achieve the keystone of a functioning social democracy: the decommodification of basic human necessities. Labor's combative stance against market forces is central to Nordic social-democracy, and it necessitates the existence of a far stronger and more organized labor movement than Indonesia currently has. Otherwise, there would be no incentive nor political will for the Indonesian (or any) government to implement social-democratic welfare policies.
August 1, 2023
iN sWeDen🤌
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October 3, 2025The 'canonical' text re the study of the welfare state with its typology of Liberal/Conservative/Social Democratic welfare regimes being unavoidable these days. There's not much I could add here that's not been done to death already in 'the literature'. However, a few things struck me about the text itself:
1) That in 1990 the author still felt it necessary to engage with (structuralist) Marxists analyses of the welfare state. I think the thrust of his critique aimed at the functionalism of such accounts wasn't misplaced and its funny he relies on Kautsky and Eduard Heimann to rebut it. He (of course) doesn't engage with explanations that see the growth of the social wage for workers in the Global North as related to imperialist domination of the Global South.
2) The analysis in this book has often come under fire for 'Eurocentrism' or even 'Swedocentrism' in that it measures all against the Swedish case. Indeed the focus upon North and North-Western Europe, the US and Australia means that it has even often been critiqued as inadequate for examining Southern and Eastern Europe. This has typically focused on the case selection and I guess would be excused by the author in terms of available data. However, what I found interesting is the eurocentrism or chauvinism that creeps into the text itself. Sometimes this is subtle such as the reference to 'our economies' when discussing the industries 'dissapearing or moving elsewhere' [my emphasis]. Less subtle is the is the only time a location outside of the 'west' is explicitly mentioned in the text. This occurs in Chapter Two in the form of an uncited anecdote about Haitian workers used to illustrate paternalism:
3) People hate on intersectionality but this guy repeatedly refers to race and gender as equivalent categories in Chapter Eight.
1) That in 1990 the author still felt it necessary to engage with (structuralist) Marxists analyses of the welfare state. I think the thrust of his critique aimed at the functionalism of such accounts wasn't misplaced and its funny he relies on Kautsky and Eduard Heimann to rebut it. He (of course) doesn't engage with explanations that see the growth of the social wage for workers in the Global North as related to imperialist domination of the Global South.
2) The analysis in this book has often come under fire for 'Eurocentrism' or even 'Swedocentrism' in that it measures all against the Swedish case. Indeed the focus upon North and North-Western Europe, the US and Australia means that it has even often been critiqued as inadequate for examining Southern and Eastern Europe. This has typically focused on the case selection and I guess would be excused by the author in terms of available data. However, what I found interesting is the eurocentrism or chauvinism that creeps into the text itself. Sometimes this is subtle such as the reference to 'our economies' when discussing the industries 'dissapearing or moving elsewhere' [my emphasis]. Less subtle is the is the only time a location outside of the 'west' is explicitly mentioned in the text. This occurs in Chapter Two in the form of an uncited anecdote about Haitian workers used to illustrate paternalism:
Feudal ideals are strongly antagonistic to the commodity status; markets do not matter and wage labor is only marginally important for human well-being. A ( true) story illustrates the logic well: a typical American corporation ( textiles) decided in the 1970s to start production in Haiti, attracted by the prospects of extraordinarily low wage-costs. Upon completion of the plant, the firm's managers, all Americans, decided to lure the island's best workers by offering a marginally higher wage. Of course, on the opening day, the unemployed came by the thousands to offer their services, and management had no difficulty in selecting a choice workforce. Yet, after only a few months, the plant was closed down. Why? The reason was simply that American management had failed to reckon with feudal welfare arrangements which provide that when a worker's mother's ho~se burnt down, it was the boss's (in Haiti, workers call him Papa) obligation to repair it, or when a child needed medical attention or a brother was getting married, again it was Papa's obligation to help. Obviously, the Americans assumed wrongly when they accepted the market wage as the real wage. Where workers are genuinely commodified, the manager is no Papa. We should not dismiss the feudal paternalism of Haiti as a relic of our own distant past. Patronage and clientelism are modern versions of the same phenomenon, and have been extraordinarily influential in taming the brutal world of commodification. (p. 38-39)
3) People hate on intersectionality but this guy repeatedly refers to race and gender as equivalent categories in Chapter Eight.
July 13, 2020
H θεωρητική πραγματεία του Gosta Esping-Andersen, που φέρει τον τίτλο 'Οι τρεις κόσμοι του καπιταλισμού της ευημερίας,' κινείται πάνω στον άξονα ανάλυσης των τύπων κοινωνικού κράτους που ενέσκηψαν ιστορικά στο λεγόμενο Δυτικό κόσμο, ακολουθώντας, πέραν της ανάπτυξης των καπιταλιστικών σχέσεων παραγωγής, την ανάδυση αυτού που αποκλήθηκε ως κοινωνική-πολιτική 'νεωτερικότητα.' Και η πραγματεία του Andersen θεωρούμε πως αποκτά και μία ιδιαίτερη επικαιρική διάσταση συνεπεία της εκδήλωσης της εξελισσόμενης πανδημικής κρίσης. Ως προς αυτό, η πρόκληση για το κράτος πρόνοιας, το σύγχρονο κράτος πρόνοιας, δεν προσδιορίζεται μέσω της εκδήλωσης μίας βαθιάς οικονομικής κρίσης όπως αυτή της περασμένης δεκαετίας που άφησε ρωγμές στην οργάνωση, στη χρηματοδότηση, στη στρατηγική αλλά (κρίσιμο σημείο) και στη συμπεριληψιμότητα του, αλλά, εκφράζεται εν καιρώ πανδημίας και των διακυβευμάτων που αυτή θέτει στο προσκήνιο. Η μαζική και τάχιστη αναπαραγωγή του ιού σε ευρωπαϊκές χώρες (η ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρος θεωρείται η 'μήτρα' του κράτους πρόνοιας), προκάλεσε δυσλειτουργίες και βίαιους εσωτερικούς κραδασμούς σε ό,τι ορίζεται ως δημόσιο σύστημα υγείας που λειτουργεί ουσιωδώς εντός του ευρύτερου κράτους πρόνοιας, που εν προκειμένω, προστέθηκαν στην αποδιοργάνωση ή αλλιώς, στη 'βίαιη' συρρίκνωση παρεχόμενων υπηρεσιών, αμφισβητώντας εμπράκτως την λογική της 'αυτοματοποιημένης' λειτουργίας. Αναφέραμε προηγουμένως, ό,τι σε αυτή την περίπτωση έχουμε να κάνουμε με μία κρίση δημόσιας υγείας η οποία και συνιστά πρόκληση για το κράτος πρόνοιας και όχι για την αναπαραγωγή μίας κοινωνιο-οικονομικής κρίσης που εκκινεί από την σφαίρα της παραγωγής και της οικονομικής διαδικασίας. Επιθυμούμε σε αυτό το σημείο να διευρύνουμε το σκεπτικό μας: Η πλέον πρόσφατη κρίση, για την αντιμετώπιση της οποίας ενεργοποιείται το κράτος και κρατικές υπηρεσίας ως 'γραμμή άμυνας,' δύναται να αποκαλύψει εμπρόθετα τις ρωγμές που έχουν προκληθεί στο κοινωνικό κράτος και σε δημόσια συστήματα υγείας, δίχως όμως να αποτελούν, αυτές οι ρωγμές (ή οι ίδιες 'ρηγματώσεις') πανάκεια για την εξέλιξη που προσέλαβε η μεταδοτικότητα του κορωνοϊού σε χώρες όπως η Μεγάλη Βρετανία, η Ιταλία, η Γαλλία, η Ισπανία και οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, η δράση με όρους απο-εμπορευματοποίησης, αποτελεί μείζον διακύβευμα. Αντιθέτως, σε αυτή την παράμετρο, δύναται να προσθέσουμε την αργοπορημένη κρατική αντίδραση, την αίσθηση μίας 'ανθεκτικότητας' και μη-ευαλωτότητας που σε επίπεδο ασκούμενης ρητορικής και πολιτικοϊδεολογικού λόγου έσπευδε να επικαλύψει κενά και παραλείψεις, με την ίδια την εξάπλωση του κορωνοϊού να προβάλλει ευδιάκριτα, κοινωνικά, πολιτικά και κύρια υγειονομικά, το πρόσημο της 'απορίας' για τα βασικά του χαρακτηριστικά. Εάν δε εξειδικεύσουμε περαιτέρω, θα αναφέρουμε πως η ύπαρξη πολλών θανάτων σε δομές φροντίδας ηλικιωμένων σε χώρες όπως η Γαλλία, η Ιταλία, η Ισπανία, αντανακλά την αμφισημία καθεστώτων πρόνοια που δύνανται να συναρθρώσουν την ατομικότητα με την έλλειψη μίας συνεκτικής δια-γενεακής πολιτικής. Κλείνοντας αυτή τη σύντομη παρέκβαση, ας επιστρέψουμε στα του βιβλίου. Κατ' αρχάς, αξίζει να επισημάνουμε το γεγονός ό,τι η μετάφραση της Άσπας Γολέμη είναι αρκούντως επιστημονική ή αλλιώς, διαφορετικά τιθέμενο, κινείται πάνω στο πλαίσιο της επιστημονικότητας που υιοθετεί ο Gosta Esping - Andersen, δίχως να διστάζει παράλληλα να αναμετρηθεί με τα πυκνά νοήματα και το πλέγμα ιδεών που θεμελιώνει ο συγγραφέας της πραγματείας αυτής. Περαιτέρω, η εισαγωγή της Μαρίας Πετμεζίδου που τιτλοφορείται 'Από τη "χρυσή εποχή" στην εποχή της κρίσης" διαμορφώνει τις προϋποθέσεις λειτουργίας της ως 'βιβλίου εντός βιβλίου,' επικαιροποιεί και εμπλουτίζει τις θεωρητικές επεξεργασίες του Andersen, ενσωματώνοντας τις μεταβολές και τους μετασχηματισμούς που έχουν επέλθει σε επίπεδο κράτος πρόνοιας την περίοδο της διεθνοποίησης του κεφαλαίου, προεκτείνοντας το έως την εποχή της οικονομικής κρίσης. Από αυτή την άποψη, συνιστά το ιδανικό υπόβαθρο για την γνωριμία με το συγκεκριμένο έργο του Andersen, έργο κλασικό για το πεδίο της κοινωνικής πολιτικής, όσο και για την τυπολογία διάκρισης μεταξύ διαφορετικών καθεστώτων κράτους πρόνοιας. Και ο καθηγητής του Πανεπιστημίου Pompeu Fabra της Βαρκελώνης, δεν φείδεται της απαραίτητης και για την 'οικονομία' της πραγματείας του μεθοδολογικής και αναλυτικής εμβάθυνσης, ώστε να παρουσιάσει, αφενός μεν τα χαρακτηριστικά που διακρίνουν τον τύπο κοινωνικού κράτους, και, αφετέρου δε, να προβεί σε μία ακόμη και έμμεση σύγκριση τους, επιδιώκοντας να αναδείξει όχι το 'βέλτιστο' αποτέλεσμα, αλλά την λειτουργία που κάθε φορά δύναται να συσχετισθεί με παραμέτρους όπως το επίπεδο ανάπτυξης, η ιδεολογία του κυβερνώντος κόμματος, οι ασκούμενες κυβερνητικές πολιτικές, η επίτευξη ισορροπίας μεταξύ κράτους και αγοράς. Με άλλα λόγια, την κατά το δυνατόν πληρέστερη λειτουργία. Το κράτος πρόνοιας αντλεί τόσο από την οιονεί σφαίρα της παραγωγής, όσο και από την δυνατότητα άμβλυνσης των εντάσεων και των ανισοτήτων που ενσκήπτουν στο πεδίο του κοινωνικού, αποτελώντας εν ευρεία εννοία, 'προϊόν' πολλών παραμέτρων που αν φέρει κάτι, αυτό είναι ο δείκτης της ισότητας. Στους 'τρεις κόσμους' που συγκροτούν ένα κοινωνικό περιεχόμενο, η δόκιμη επιστημονική γλώσσα του Esping-Andersen διαπερνά την βιβλιογραφία περί κοινωνικής πολιτικής, αναδεικνύει τις απαρχές του κοινωνικού κράτους με σημείο αναφοράς την ευρωπαϊκή ήπειρο (που δεν νοείται βέβαια ως ενιαίος οικονομικός χώρος), εννοιολογεί το σημαίνον της 'απο-εμπορευματοποίησης' στο βαθμό που αυτή ενσωματώνεται εντός του κράτους πρόνοιας ωθώντας ή και πιέζοντας προς την ίδια κατεύθυνση της προσβασιμότητας σε αυτό, της εξισορρόπησης της 'πώλησης' της εργατικής δύναμης διαμέσου όχι της προσφοράς ενός 'καρότου' στον βιομηχανικού τύπου προλετάριο και στην εργατική τάξη (μισθός), αλλά της ένταξης του στο μηχανισμό λειτουργίας ενός κράτους πρόνοιας, αρχή του οποίου καθίσταται η αμοιβαιότητα-ανταποδοτικότητα. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα δύναται να προσλάβουμε την όλη πολιτική της Σοσιαλδημοκρατίας. Συμβολικά, το κράτος πρόνοιας αναγνωρίζει το πρόσωπο πριν από την κοινωνική τάξη και την κοινωνική τάξη με 'πρόσωπα,' κοινωνικά επενεργεί επί των σχέσεων κεφαλαίου-εργασίας, πολιτικά, διευρύνεται κατά τι. Με αναλυτική ενάργεια ο Andersen εντοπίζει τρεις τύπους κράτους πρόνοιας, ήτοι τον συντηρητικό (βλέπε Γερμανία), τον φιλελεύθερο (ΗΠΑ), και τον σοσιαλιστικό (Σκανδιναβικές χώρες), όλα υποδείγματα που δεν χωρίζονται από ευμεγέθη στεγανά. Συστηματοποιώντας την μελέτη του, εξετάζει τις μεταβλητές που χαρακτηρίζουν τον κάθε τύπο κοινωνικού κράτους, συναρθρώνει τον και τους βαθμούς κοινωνικής προστασίας με πολιτικές και καθεστώτα συνταξιοδότησης, προσφέροντας στον αναγνώστη μία ευρύτερη οπτική αυτού που θεωρήθηκε ως κοινωνικό-πολιτικό επίτευγμα, συνδεόμενο με την μεταπολεμική 'ένδοξη τριακονταετία.' Ο βαθμός εξέλιξης του κράτους πρόνοιας ανά περίπτωση απηχεί ευρύτερους μετασχηματισμούς στη δομή των κομματικών-πολιτικών δρώντων, στην καπιταλιστική οικονομική παραγωγή, στις αναπαραστάσεις που χρησιμοποιούν τα κόμματα για να ορίσουν τον κόσμο τους. Και εάν έπρεπε να διαλέξει ο συγγραφέας; Κάτι τέτοιο δεν δηλώνεται ρητά, αφήνεται όμως να διαφανεί μία λεπτή προτίμηση προς το σοσιαλιστικό καθεστώς ως προς το πλέον αντιπροσωπευτικό και εξισωτικό, που αποτελεί αποτέλεσμα ευρύτερων κοινωνικών-ταξικών συμμαχιών της Σοσιαλδημοκρατίας στις Σκανδιναβικές χώρες, την Σοσιαλδημοκρατία που την σημερινή περίοδο ταλανίζεται από την μη ουσιώδη απόκριση της πάνω στο τι δύναται να συμβάλλει στην εκ νέου διαμόρφωση ενός κράτους πρόνοιας με το βλέμμα στραμμένο στην εργασιακή επισφάλεια. Και ποιο στοιχείο χαρακτηρίζει όχι το επιτυχημένο αλλά διευρυμένο κράτος πρόνοιας; Η δυνατότητα άμβλυνσης ενός πατερναλιστικού προστατευτισμού που παρέχεται πέραν του κράτους. Και εάν κάτι προσδιόριζε ιστορικά-πολιτικά-ιδεολογικά το σοσιαλιστικό, Σκανδιναβικό καθεστώς ήταν η προσαρμοστικότητα του και η χάραξη στρατηγικών συμπερίληψης και 'οικογενειακότητας' που απαντούν σε διαφορετικούς τύπους αναπαραγωγής. Η 'τελειότητα,' ο περφεξιονισμός δεν αναζητάται στο βιβλίο. Οι 'Τρεις κόσμοι' του καπιταλισμού που αναπαρήχθη σε ένα περιβάλλον ανταγωνισμού, από τη μία πλευρά είναι ένα κλασικό βιβλίο, από την άλλη, ένα επιδραστικό, ισορροπώντας ιδανικά μεταξύ επιστημονικότητας και ρέουσας αφήγησης που στέκεται σε ένα υπόδειγμα όσο χρειάζεται ώστε να μεταβεί στο επόμενο.
October 17, 2020
Esping-Andersens classic The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism works as an interesting explanation as to why different countries have resorted to different solutions in order to fight unemployment, inequality and poverty. Although the findings still have relevance (albeit relying on statistics from the 1980's) a follow-up-study would be welcomed.
October 13, 2024
A new approach to understand the industrialized western society
Overall a hard book for me to read because the author obviously has a profound grasp and understanding about all the relative welfare state theories and conducts a new approach to modify the paradigm of understanding the post-war industrialized western countries (capitalism, he called, but under doubt for this statement). To put in a simple way, although quite dubious for doing so for this huge academic milestone, the author used quantitative data, and def some qualitative data to trace the history and culture, and put developed countries into three categories: social democracy, liberal, and conservative. And chose three representatives in each of the category to discuss their different policies and functions towards the labor market, namely, Sweden, US, and Germany. The author painstakingly emphasized that thinking about welfare state is a by-product of the industrialization is wrong, we should see their institutionalization and regard them as a driven force towards the future, although even for the different western developed countries all ready have three fundamentally different types.
Key points note and comments:
The leading theme in our account, however, is that the history of political class coalitions is the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations.
The welfare state has been approached both narrowly and broadly. Those who take the narrower view see it in terms of the traditional terrain of social amelioration: income transfers and social services, with perhaps some: token mention of the housing question. The broader view often frames its questions in terms of political economy, its interests focused on the state's larger role in managing and organizing the economy. In the broader view, therefore, issues of employment, wages, and overall macro-economic steering are considered integral components in the welfare-state complex. In a sense, this approach identifies its subject matter as the 'Keynesian welfare state' or, 'welfare capitalism’.
Example for difference between broad picture and narrow picture: when we study pensions, for example, our concern is not pensions per se, but the ways in which they elucidate how different nations arrive at their peculiar public-private sector mix.
What is important of welfare state: de-commodification, social stratification, employment. Each type of welfare state has its own logic of organization, stratification and societal integration.
Two question for welfare state: First, will the salience of class diminish with the extension of social citizenship? In other words, can the 'welfare state fundamentally transition capitalist society? Second, what are the causal forces behind welfare-state development?
Conflict between liberals and democracy: au fur et a mesure de the industrialization, more proletarian emerged and may cast influence by using suffrage towards the market decision.
The solution for this conflict from the conservatism: their ideal was the perpetuation of patriarchy and absolutism as the best possible legal, political, and social shell for a capitalism without class struggle. One prominent conservative school promoted the 'monarchical welfare state', which would guarantee social welfare, class harmony, loyalty, and productivity. !Status, rank, and class were natural and given; class conflicts, however, were not.
Social democracy’s prove for parliamentary democracy can boost the equality because: The first was that workers require social resources, health, and education to participate effectively as socialist citizens. The second argument was that social policy is not only emancipatory, but is also a precondition for economic efficiency. 为经济体培养了可以高效工作的公民。
为什么选择social class作为分析福利国家的不同路径的成因：因为institutionist and structures both have their own problems. its emphasis on the social classes as the, main agents of change, and in its argument that the balance of class power detennines distributional outcomes.
The single most difficult problem for this thesis is to specify the conditions for power mobilization. Power depends on the resources that flow from electoral numbers and from collective bargaining. 权力是怎样流动的？plz remember that the author has a strong criticism towards the linear comprehension about the power, the power should be comprehended via social connection instead of social categories.
The author gives the definition of the welfare state based on the word “de-commodification”. De-commodifying welfare states are, in practice, of very recent date. A minimal definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary.
Because of the emphasis is placed on the relationship between different social groups, the social stratification turns out to be one of the distinctive difference between different types of welfare state. 济贫法和speenhamland法作为liberal解决方法的代表污名化了接受帮助的人从而形成了很明显的二元社会分离，conservative希望consolidate divisions among wage-earners by legislating distinct programs for different class and status groups, what’s need to mark is that it places much emphasis on giving great service to public service ppl. The third is universalistic system promotes equality of status. In this sense, the system is meant to cultiyate cross-class solidarity, a solidarity of the nation.
Liberal state: meanstested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans predominate. In this model, the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic norms. this type of regime minimize decommodification-effects, effectively contains the ream of social rights, and erects an order of stratification that is a blend of a relative equality of poverty among state-welfare recipients, market~differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two. The archetypical examples of this model are the United States, Canada and Australia.
Conservative state: the historical corporatist-statist legacy was upgraded to cater to the new 'post-industrial' class structure. In these conservative and strongly 'corporatist' welfare states, the.liberal obsession with market efficiency and commodification was never preeminent and, as such, the granting of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. What predominated was the preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status. A second regime-type clusters nations such as Austria, France, Germany, and Italy.
Social democracy state: composed of those countries in which the principles of universalism and decommodification of social rights were extended also to the new middle classes.Rather than tolerate a dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class, the social democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere. the most salient characteristic of the social democratic regime is its fusion of welfare and work. On the one side, the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection. On the other side, the enonnous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic, and de-commodifying welfare system means that it must minimize social problems and maximize revenue income. This is obviously best done with most people working, and the fewest possible living off of social transfers. N eitherof the two alternative regime-types espouse full employment as an integral part of their welfare-state ~ommitment. In the conservative tradition, of course, women are discouraged from working; in the liberal ideal, concerns of gender matter less than the sanctity of the market.
In the second part of the book, since advanced countries have already been allocated into three different caregories, and being in one category is regarded as a independent variable. And the next question is how do different types of welfare states systematically influence social and economic behavior in advanced capitalism? First principal hypothesis is that the peculiarities of welfare states are reflected in the ways in which labor markets are organized. Second, it focuses on examining how nations' capacity to maintain full employment over the post-war period has been decisively influenced by the welfare state. Lastly, the article focus tracing welfare states' influence on contemporary employment shifts and social stratification in the emerging ‘post~industrial' society.
What kind of institutional framework will permit private enterprise and a powerful working class to coexist? The welfare state emerged as the major outlet for full-employment pressures, principally in the shape of the deferred social wage. the viability of a deferred-wage strategy depends ultimately on one's ability to collect on it in the future. This has proven itself the Achilles' heel of the deferred wage.
Overall a hard book for me to read because the author obviously has a profound grasp and understanding about all the relative welfare state theories and conducts a new approach to modify the paradigm of understanding the post-war industrialized western countries (capitalism, he called, but under doubt for this statement). To put in a simple way, although quite dubious for doing so for this huge academic milestone, the author used quantitative data, and def some qualitative data to trace the history and culture, and put developed countries into three categories: social democracy, liberal, and conservative. And chose three representatives in each of the category to discuss their different policies and functions towards the labor market, namely, Sweden, US, and Germany. The author painstakingly emphasized that thinking about welfare state is a by-product of the industrialization is wrong, we should see their institutionalization and regard them as a driven force towards the future, although even for the different western developed countries all ready have three fundamentally different types.
Key points note and comments:
The leading theme in our account, however, is that the history of political class coalitions is the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations.
The welfare state has been approached both narrowly and broadly. Those who take the narrower view see it in terms of the traditional terrain of social amelioration: income transfers and social services, with perhaps some: token mention of the housing question. The broader view often frames its questions in terms of political economy, its interests focused on the state's larger role in managing and organizing the economy. In the broader view, therefore, issues of employment, wages, and overall macro-economic steering are considered integral components in the welfare-state complex. In a sense, this approach identifies its subject matter as the 'Keynesian welfare state' or, 'welfare capitalism’.
Example for difference between broad picture and narrow picture: when we study pensions, for example, our concern is not pensions per se, but the ways in which they elucidate how different nations arrive at their peculiar public-private sector mix.
What is important of welfare state: de-commodification, social stratification, employment. Each type of welfare state has its own logic of organization, stratification and societal integration.
Two question for welfare state: First, will the salience of class diminish with the extension of social citizenship? In other words, can the 'welfare state fundamentally transition capitalist society? Second, what are the causal forces behind welfare-state development?
Conflict between liberals and democracy: au fur et a mesure de the industrialization, more proletarian emerged and may cast influence by using suffrage towards the market decision.
The solution for this conflict from the conservatism: their ideal was the perpetuation of patriarchy and absolutism as the best possible legal, political, and social shell for a capitalism without class struggle. One prominent conservative school promoted the 'monarchical welfare state', which would guarantee social welfare, class harmony, loyalty, and productivity. !Status, rank, and class were natural and given; class conflicts, however, were not.
Social democracy’s prove for parliamentary democracy can boost the equality because: The first was that workers require social resources, health, and education to participate effectively as socialist citizens. The second argument was that social policy is not only emancipatory, but is also a precondition for economic efficiency. 为经济体培养了可以高效工作的公民。
为什么选择social class作为分析福利国家的不同路径的成因：因为institutionist and structures both have their own problems. its emphasis on the social classes as the, main agents of change, and in its argument that the balance of class power detennines distributional outcomes.
The single most difficult problem for this thesis is to specify the conditions for power mobilization. Power depends on the resources that flow from electoral numbers and from collective bargaining. 权力是怎样流动的？plz remember that the author has a strong criticism towards the linear comprehension about the power, the power should be comprehended via social connection instead of social categories.
The author gives the definition of the welfare state based on the word “de-commodification”. De-commodifying welfare states are, in practice, of very recent date. A minimal definition must entail that citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of work when they themselves consider it necessary.
Because of the emphasis is placed on the relationship between different social groups, the social stratification turns out to be one of the distinctive difference between different types of welfare state. 济贫法和speenhamland法作为liberal解决方法的代表污名化了接受帮助的人从而形成了很明显的二元社会分离，conservative希望consolidate divisions among wage-earners by legislating distinct programs for different class and status groups, what’s need to mark is that it places much emphasis on giving great service to public service ppl. The third is universalistic system promotes equality of status. In this sense, the system is meant to cultiyate cross-class solidarity, a solidarity of the nation.
Liberal state: meanstested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans predominate. In this model, the progress of social reform has been severely circumscribed by traditional, liberal work-ethic norms. this type of regime minimize decommodification-effects, effectively contains the ream of social rights, and erects an order of stratification that is a blend of a relative equality of poverty among state-welfare recipients, market~differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political dualism between the two. The archetypical examples of this model are the United States, Canada and Australia.
Conservative state: the historical corporatist-statist legacy was upgraded to cater to the new 'post-industrial' class structure. In these conservative and strongly 'corporatist' welfare states, the.liberal obsession with market efficiency and commodification was never preeminent and, as such, the granting of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested issue. What predominated was the preservation of status differentials; rights, therefore, were attached to class and status. A second regime-type clusters nations such as Austria, France, Germany, and Italy.
Social democracy state: composed of those countries in which the principles of universalism and decommodification of social rights were extended also to the new middle classes.Rather than tolerate a dualism between state and market, between working class and middle class, the social democrats pursued a welfare state that would promote an equality of the highest standards, not an equality of minimal needs as was pursued elsewhere. the most salient characteristic of the social democratic regime is its fusion of welfare and work. On the one side, the right to work has equal status to the right of income protection. On the other side, the enonnous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalistic, and de-commodifying welfare system means that it must minimize social problems and maximize revenue income. This is obviously best done with most people working, and the fewest possible living off of social transfers. N eitherof the two alternative regime-types espouse full employment as an integral part of their welfare-state ~ommitment. In the conservative tradition, of course, women are discouraged from working; in the liberal ideal, concerns of gender matter less than the sanctity of the market.
In the second part of the book, since advanced countries have already been allocated into three different caregories, and being in one category is regarded as a independent variable. And the next question is how do different types of welfare states systematically influence social and economic behavior in advanced capitalism? First principal hypothesis is that the peculiarities of welfare states are reflected in the ways in which labor markets are organized. Second, it focuses on examining how nations' capacity to maintain full employment over the post-war period has been decisively influenced by the welfare state. Lastly, the article focus tracing welfare states' influence on contemporary employment shifts and social stratification in the emerging ‘post~industrial' society.
What kind of institutional framework will permit private enterprise and a powerful working class to coexist? The welfare state emerged as the major outlet for full-employment pressures, principally in the shape of the deferred social wage. the viability of a deferred-wage strategy depends ultimately on one's ability to collect on it in the future. This has proven itself the Achilles' heel of the deferred wage.
November 3, 2025
Very useful work that focuses on the social equality lacuna of developed post-industrial capital economies. It redefines welfare and elevates it from spending to effectiveness. His concept of "de-commodification" (separation of rights from the performance of market) developed from Polyani is brilliant. However, the frameworks of measurement that he presents to conclude his three welfare regimes: conservative, liberal, and social democratic are somewhat dated. Maybe they were more relevant in 1990 when the book was written. Still a classic work in political theory and I'm glad I read it. My most favorite sentence related to both Adam Smith and Karl Marx: "What they attacked was a system of ·government that repressed their ideals of both freedom and enterprise. Hence, theirs was revolutionary theory, and from this vantage point, we can understand why Adam Smith sometimes reads like Karl Marx. (supported by a nice note in Ch 1: Adam Smith is often cited but rarely read. A closer inspection of his writings reveals a degree of nuance and a battery of reservations that substantially qualify a delirious enthusiasm for the blessings of capitalism).
November 11, 2024
Of course it’s a model and in real life will not resemble with the theory. And of it’s base on ‘first world countries
There is too much attention on social benefits and to little and social services
And well of course will not be applicable on the rest of the countries
But it’s a good guidance to understand the ideals, and levels of decomodification on each region and it really shows how a passive intervention of the state promotes dependency on the private market giving them more control/power
There is too much attention on social benefits and to little and social services
And well of course will not be applicable on the rest of the countries
But it’s a good guidance to understand the ideals, and levels of decomodification on each region and it really shows how a passive intervention of the state promotes dependency on the private market giving them more control/power
December 9, 2024
Genuinely titanic work of scholarship/research. Must read for anyone looking to get a grasp of welfare state systems. Its critique is somewhat weakened by a Nordic social democratic bent which excludes the possibility of revolutionary situations in advance. On the other hand it’s a really keen look at a socdem realpolitik - how can welfare be distributed in such a way as to a) actually decommodify and universalize the materials of every day life while also b) maintaining that distribution system against potential political antagonism. Great stuff. Bit dense and data heavy at points.
March 11, 2018
Esping-Anderson presents a knowledgeable and well-formulated account of the US and European welfare states, their origins, evolution and potential trajectories. With few exceptions, the presented model remains quite relevant and, at times, surprisingly prescient – making this read all the more interesting. 👍
May 31, 2017
A detailed overview of the welfare regimes and how this has affected policy outcomes in those countries.
December 9, 2019
Read for school and thought Esping-Andersen had some very interesting takes on the concept of the welfare state and how different welfare states form/are reinforced.
July 9, 2020
A dense, but comprehensive authority on welfare programs in capitalist societies.
August 21, 2021
Read as a coursebook.
Read
September 19, 2021Ideas muy sólidas, una obra de referencia que 30 años después sigue sirviendo para pensar las políticas de bienestar y la relación entre Estado y mercado desde la economía política.
September 18, 2022
An excellent comparative history of the emergence of modern welfare-states under various conditions of history and class struggle.
October 3, 2024
Read for thesis. Interesting foundational remarks on the formation of welfare states and their implications
Read
June 20, 2025a little overrated but nice overall
October 20, 2025
Unc was prescient
November 27, 2007
first off I only could read half of this... it is ridiculously dry... but slightly progressive... so it paints decent picture of the social welfare state, at least for an econ book!
April 3, 2013
Slightly progressive and a great introduction for who wants to know about the alternatives among capitalism.
February 2, 2015
seminal book on welfare regimes
Read
October 27, 2019Already a classical book in labor and welfare economics, it introduced into the field the regime classification of welfare states in the West.
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