Warfare in the Ancient World offers a complete, authoritative, and accessible record of how war was waged in antiquity. Coverage extends to all regions of the ancient world and includes period-by-period analyses of all facets of warfare, including the organization, tactics, armor, and weaponry of armies.
Peter Connolly is certainly a great illustrator of ancient warfare. Though, this is not really his book I think his contribution dominates. It's a collection of writings about the systematics of ancient warfare. (How many infantry, hows many archers etc.). And, I must confess to sometimes being overwhelmed and bored by the endless detail of serried ranks of soldiers and how they were organised into units and sub units. (Seems to me that there were almost an infinite way to organise an army. though a few things shone through .......the development of the chariot allowed an archer to become highly mobile; The greek phalanx, when used skilfully and combined with cavalry and light infantry was pretty hard to overcome. Though the macedonians improved on it with longer lances...and it was the Macedonian Phalanx that took Alexander on his rampage through Persia and to India. Not all the authors are equally skilled ....must say I found the sections by Nick Segunda rather heavy going...maybe just a bit too much boring detail. However, the book is saved by the remarkable detailed (and apparently accurate) pictures by Peter Connolly. They are gems and bring the whole to life. It's hard to picture the power of the phalanx in action from old worn relief carvings on walls or columns but with Connolloy's paintings, one can truly become the armchair general. (It would be very hard to come up against that bristling wall of spears. I also found it interesting how fashions came and went in warfare. The Roman legions were pretty much invincible ...except when they entered the Teutonburg Forest ...or were fighting other Roman legions. But eventually they found themselves up against the Alani mounted on armoured horses ...and began forming up pretty much like the Macedonian Phalanx. I found it a bit strange that the romans didn't seem to rely too much on Archers yet archers came into their own again with the Mongols and later with the English Longbow. Maybe if their is a weakness in the book it is the paucity of data about logistics; how did these armies provide food and equipment for long expeditions. There is a bit of detail but it seems to me that the actual battle time was very short relative to the time that would have to have been spent in provisioning and tra sporting armies. Despite the boring details ...which seem really suited to like-minded individuals......I give it four stars.
Perfect companion to the Connolly and Warry works on the Greeks and Romans. Covers ancient warfare from the very beginnings in Sumer through to the end of the Western Roman Empire. Well written by multiple authors, includes decent maps, photos of archaeological sites and artifacts, and great paintings by Peter Connolly.
The Book is a primer for the students of Military histroy's evolution through ages. Supported by graphics and thoroughly researched material by John Hackett is an excellent read.
This is a solid set of essays from academic specialists on ancient warfare, from the Assyrians through to the last days of the Roman Empire, edited by General Sir John Hackett and with illustrations to fit the text from Peter Connally.
The text can be densely specialist in places, the diagrams (though extensive) could have been better thought through and the narrative is nearly a quarter of a century old but it provides a continuous account of the use of force by the succession of gangsters we call kings and emperors.
Specialists will demur at my generosity in giving five stars (the easy acceptance of the presumed division between the heroic age and the age of the phalanx is no longer widely accepted) but the flow between the chapters works well and we get a strong sense of history unfolding.
In essence, warfare in the ancient world can be characterised as the skilful use of massed ranks of armed men, with the same human force being used to bring down the walls of besieged cities. The phalanx and the legion dominate the story but both are mere variations on a theme.
Technological change is present but remarkably limited. There are changes in tactics but the aim remains to get position for a set piece battle and use your men well. Naval force is of limited value except against sea brigands and still relies on brute human labour as oarsmen and marines.
Even horse power, while having an important role in battle, is weakened by the lack of the invention of the stirrup. Elephants died in cold climates. Animals were as likely to be part of the problem behind a failure as the means for success.
The genius of ancient generals lay in both a quick intelligence about the calculated risk to be taken and their ability to create or take advantage of systems that relied on masses of men being incentivised, out of fear or interest, both to win battles and exploit populations.
Many of these systems - the Assyrian, the Alexandrine and the Roman - were little more than self-creating machines for rapine and plunder and we can see the seeds of Napoleon and Trotsky in the actions of the Ancients.
Little changes when it comes to the exercise of brute power. Terrorism against populations alternates with cutting deals with troublesome enemy elites, a form of natural instinctive game theory builds up empires until the next innovator can smash them.
Empires rarely implode from within though the classic split in the ruling order can weaken an Empire and open the door to a superior organisation. Revolts rarely succeed because they cannot build the critical mass of manpower or learn how to organise themselves against the organised.
Indeed, the achievement of Trotsky and other liberation Communists in this context - mobilising and creating a military machine to defend and promote a revolution - stands up alongside those of Alexander and Caesar though, of course, the ideals were soon lost to the necessities of Power.
There is a possible truth that only the brutal realism of Communism, with its culture of terror and expediency, can overthrow the world of kings and emperors completely. Power and military ruthlessness have been and will always be inextricably linked. This book shows us for just how long.