On the outbreak of World War 2, Halifax was told "You have struggled for peace devotedly to the last minute…and it is largely due to you that we all go into this horrible business with a good conscience. The country, and history, will give you thanks." Roberts biography primarily seeks to redress his concern that, as a result of misunderstanding Halifax’s motives, Britain has done nothing of the kind. Instead, as noted in Halifax’s obituary in the Observer "Lord Halifax dies a controversial figure, and is likely to remain so for some time to come." ‘It is for the part he played in appeasement that Lord Halifax stands in the dock of history.’
In setting out a path to redemption, Roberts takes readers through Halifax’s conversion from passionate proponent, with Chamberlain, for appeasement, to a staunch supporter of resisting German aggression. He believes ‘there ought to be some recognition for Halifax, who stayed on and took the hard decisions, tackling from the inside the ghastly business of pre-war decision -making.’ ‘In November 1937, he shook hands with some of history’s most evil tyrants and failed to find them anything by quite charming.’ But Halifax was the first statesman of seniority and prestige in the government to conclude that until Nazism was destroyed there would be no peace in Europe.’ Roberts also credits Halifax’s contribution to Churchill’s coronation as Prime Minister: ‘The finger of the Holy Fox was on Churchill’s arrival at the Premiership at that precise moment in 1940.
In finding redemption for Halifax, Roberts fails to explore or critique some of Halifax’s views. Roberts notes that ‘although during the Phony War Halifax felt no objection to hearing what proposals Hitler had to offer, he was resolute in refusing them, believing that Britain could win the war without apocalyptic expense of blood and treasure.’ But Roberts provides no critique of this naïve and ridiculous view by Halifax that Britain could ever win the war - it ultimately took the combined effort of the USSR, the US, Britain, the Commonwealth (et al) to finally win the war against Germany.
Throughout Roberts rightly critiques Churchill and notes that Halifax was one of the few willing to stand up to Churchill's excesses and bullying. But at times Roberts reaches conclusions - eg ‘Had Churchill had his way, friendly Turkey might have fallen and Italy come in earlier’ - which he does not support with any evidence. Unlike many authors and historians, who too often ignore the complexity of the current situation as they seek to clearly outline their point of view, Roberts highlights concurrent issues, such as Japanese pressure on the concession at Tientsin in April 1939, which were influencing the decisions of the politicians, providing readers with a richer insight into the complexities of contemporary decision making.
Throughout the book, Roberts unnecessarily takes aim at fellow historians. For example he notes that recently released documents have the celebrated historian Arthur Bryant, who in the 1930s described himself as "one of the few Englishmen who may still be thought…sympathetic to the German point of view" noting Hitler as "the great man he is". Like many authors who have thoroughly researched their topic, Roberts includes too much material that a stronger editor would have removed. We do not need to know that Lady Halifax thought that Maisky’s wife looked like a man dressed as a woman; this is simply not relevant. And the opinion of Balfour’s niece on Halifax’s appointment as Foreign Secretary is even less relevant. Roberts has too many quotes from people of whom we know nothing as he fails to introduce them or explain why the reader should think their opinions matter. Roberts repeats multiple times that Halifax considered Beaverbrook ‘The Toad’ of Toad Hall, but this doesn’t really add to our understanding of Halifax or his motivations. Too often this extraneous material distracts and disrupts rather than adds to the text.
Sloppily there are numerous errors in the bibliography with author’s names and titles spelt incorrectly as well as spelling errors in the text. Stronger editing should have fixed these.
While its faults detract from this book, it remains an informative biography of one of the key players in Britain’s descent into war in the 1930s and early 1940s.