Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction

Very Short Introductions #064

by Richard Tuck

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was the first great English political philosopher, and his book Leviathan was one of the first truly modern works of philosophy. Richard Tuck shows that while Hobbes may indeed have been an atheist, he was far from pessimistic about human nature, nor did he advocate totalitarianism. By locating him against the context of his age, we learn that Hobbes developed a theory of knowledge which rivaled that of Descartes in its importance for the formation of modern philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Politics, Biography, History, Reference, Political Science

148 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1989

About the author

Richard Tuck is Professor of Government Department. Professor Tuck is a premier scholar of the history of political thought. His works include Natural Rights Theories (1979), Hobbes (1989), and Philosophy and Government, 1572-1651 (1993). They address a variety of topics including political authority, human rights, natural law, and toleration, and focus on a number of thinkers including Hobbes, Grotius, Selden, and Descartes. His current work deals with political thought and international law, and traces the history of thought about international politics from Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, and Vattel, to Kant. He is also engaged in a work on the origins of twentieth century economic thought; in it he argues that the 'free rider' problem was only invented, as a problem, in recent decades. Thus his interests to a remarkable degree span concerns in all subfields of the discipline.

Reviews

[Somayeh Fatemi · Rating 5 out of 5]

۵ ستاره کمه. خیلی ترجمه خوبی بود.
در زمینه های علم و اخلاق و مذهب و جایگاه تاریخی هابز صحبت کرد. به نسبت اینکه سال ۷۶ چاپ شده و در حال حاضر کتاب های جدید زیادی هست اما مطالب جدیدتری داشت و ارزشمند بود.

[Julian Worker · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another book in the excellent series "A Very Short Introduction", this one about the philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) who is most famous for writing the book Leviathan though his other books The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic, De Cive, and Thomas White's De Mundo Examined are also important.

The military triumph of Cromwell and his soldiers ensured that their vision of church government which would prevail in the new republic. Thomas Payne was horrified by Leviathan because Hobbes was endorsing precisely the principles held by the men who had executed King Charles I. Hobbes' old Royalist friends would have nothing more to do with him. Hobbes intended Leviathan to be offensive to Anglican sensibilities largely because Hobbes thought that Anglican clergy kept him from receiving the full payment for his work as a tutor for the royal family.

[John-Paul · Rating 4 out of 5]

Totally worthwhile. Just-long-enough treatments of Hobbes' life, work, and influence. Most importantly for me, Tuck knows ALL of Hobbes' work very well, so he's able to show what ideas Hobbes held through his whole intellectual life and then how he revised his thinking in Leviathan and other later works.

A key early detail is that Hobbes, like many 17th century thinkers, was essentially a guest/employee of an aristocrat and was therefore (1) obligated not to displease his master (or his future master) and (2) a lifelong bachelor. I think the absence of family life from most philosophers of this era (and many other eras) is underappreciated when when one considers that liberal political theory begins with a highly abstract notion of an "individual," i.e., an ablebodied adult male with no commitments.

It is also crucial to see how Hobbes was (mis)understood in his own time and how he has been interpreted over the past 350 years. Tuck only offers a few comments on what Hobbes might have to say about our own political moment.

[Kelly · Rating 3 out of 5]

An overview of Hobbes. Read this for my course, I have studied Descarte before, over a decade ago and was pleased to study him in this book in regard to scepticism and optical illusions.

[Clif · Rating 5 out of 5]

Richard Tuck relates the life of Thomas Hobbes, his work, and how his work has been received in 131 pages without wasting a word. I read this book twice and on the second reading realized 1) how carefully constructed this book is, showing how a talented writer can rise to the challenge of brevity and 2) how a second reading of anything pulls out understanding that isn't possible on first view. I wish I had the time to make second readings routine. Since all of the books of the "A Very Short Introduction" series are true to the title, I think I may indulge myself by doubling my reading of them.

Thomas Hobbes, born in the year of the defeat of the Spanish Armada by England, came along at a time when a king (Charles I) was executed and Parliament held power alone for a number of years with Oliver Cromwell waging a successful war against royalists, only to have another king enthroned.

Raging behind all this was a multidimensional dispute over religion. Though a number of the English were Catholic that faith had been rejected for the country in the previous century with Henry VIII's break with the pope over Henry's marital affairs resulting in a declaration of independence of faith that established Anglicanism. The fiercely independent Scots were Presbyterian, the Irish overwhelmingly Catholic while within Protestantism a debate over bishops was underway. Some, including Hobbes, liked the idea of Independency, where each congregation was free to go its own way free of higher clergy (bishops). Ideas could be dangerous to hold. Hobbes had to flee to France for a few years, but everyone had to commit one way or another.

Add to this turmoil the recent arrival of science (Hobbes met Galileo in Italy) as a way of looking at the world that could place religion aside. It took courage to be an atheist and though Hobbes did not proclaim himself one, he was plausibly accused of being one, insisting as he did on a completely material world free of the supernatural. He did think that people needed to worship a deity, but he denied that human beings can have any idea of what God wants them to do or that there is a God who is interested in humanity. For him, God's only role was as creator at the beginning.

With uncertainty about what and who to believe, it's no surprise that philosophers were asking what could a person be sure of. Can we believe our senses tell us anything about reality or are we living in a dream made entirely in the brain? Descartes came up with his famous statement, "I think therefor I am" but what is less known is he also insisted that we can believe we know reality because god would not deceive us. Hobbes rejected both the idea of an independent numinous self and of god having anything to do with us.

The intellectual world was in an uproar to match the almost continual war going on in the material world. It was a stimulating time to be alive. How could order be brought out of this chaos?

Hobbes answered by affirming that each individual had one absolute right, to protect his life while at the same time having an obligation not to harm anyone else unless in self-defense. Jump to 21st century America where gun advocates take exactly the same view. And it is worth following Hobbes further to see that Libertarianism cannot hold a society together because there is no guarantee that a person's perception of a threat is a real threat. We know from the daily news that "I thought he had a gun!" easily results in an innocent person being injured or killed from misinterpretation by a person carrying a gun for self-defense. Stand Your Ground laws go even further to invite the individual to act on supposition, putting his/her supposition ahead of fact.

Hobbes saw this problem clearly and proposed that the solution was in individuals collectively giving up their right to self-defense by investing an authority (Hobbes' famous Leviathan) with the power to look out for each person, keeping the peace. No longer would everyone be on the lookout for threats, the law would do that. Innocent until proven guilty would prevail and domestic tranquility would result.

I was impressed by this clear idea of the reason for government while at the same time thinking that what is going on now with 2nd Amendment advocacy is the deliberate deconstruction of society through hatred of authority, the very authority that allows us to escape Hobbes' "nasty, brutish and short" lives where everyone is out for himself. I recalled Santayana's, "those who are ignorant of history are condemned to repeat it." How many Americans have heard of Thomas Hobbes?

Across 400 years, Hobbes (like all philosophers) has something to say to us. This book by Richard Tuck offers a great way to practice a good habit by listening to wisdom before taking a position.

[Alireza Farahani · Rating 3 out of 5]

این‌گونه می‌نویسم که‌ توماس هابز، از جمله فیلسوفانی است که انسان را در نخستین گام فلسفه‌اش، برهنه از هرگونه اخلاق و هنجار در نظر می‌گیرد.

او معتقد است که اگر انسان را از قید قوانین، سنت‌ها و نهادهای اجتماعی رها سازیم، آن‌چه باقی می‌ماند موجودی است که تحت سلطه‌ی میل به بقا و گریز از مرگ، به‌سوی خشونت، سوءظن و ستیز کشیده می‌شود.

وضعیتی که او آن را «وضع طبیعی» می‌نامد، جهانی است که در آن هر کس علیه هر کس است؛ جهانی بی‌ قانون و بی‌ امنیت که در آن زندگی انسان «تنها، تهی، زشت، جانورگونه و کوتاه» خواهد بود.

این تصویر تاریک از طبیعت انسان، بازتابی است از تجربه‌ی هابز در روزگار تلاطم سیاسی انگلستان، به‌ویژه جنگ داخلی.
از منظر او، در نبود اقتدار بازدارنده، اعتماد به‌طور ساختاری ناممکن است؛ زیرا هیچ تضمینی برای پایبندی دیگران به تعهدات خود وجود ندارد.
بدین‌سان، بشر نه از سر شرارت، بلکه از سر عقلانیت، دچار خصومت و کشمکش می‌شود.

مهم است بدانیم، در نگاه هابز، شر یا خشونت، جوهره‌ای ذاتی در انسان نیست، بلکه محصول معادلات عقلانی‌ای است که در فقدان نهادهای تضمین‌کننده، تنها راه بقا را در پیش‌دستی بر دیگران می‌بیند. بدین‌ترتیب، انسان در وضع طبیعی، همچون شطرنج‌بازی بی‌داور است که برای حفظ جان خود، ناگزیر از حرکت‌های پیشگیرانه است.

نکته مهم در تحلیل فلسفه هابز آن است که «وضع طبیعی» در نزد او نه یک واقعه‌ی تاریخی بلکه مدلی نظری و فرضی است.
هابز با وام‌گیری از روش‌های هندسی و علمی، کوشید نشان دهد چرا عقل انسانی، ولو خودخواه، به سوی ایجاد نظم سیاسی حرکت می‌کند. در این معنا، فلسفه سیاسی او بیشتر از آنکه توصیفی باشد، تجویزی و راهبردی است.

راه رهایی از آشوب طبیعی، از نظر هابز، در یک توافق جمعی نهفته است: انسان‌ها با آگاهی از مخاطرات آزادی بی‌ مهار، بخشی از اختیارات خود را به موجودی جمعی – یعنی «دولت» – واگذار می‌کنند تا در ازای آن، از صلح، امنیت و بقا برخوردار شوند. این توافق بنیادین، که به «قرارداد اجتماعی» شهرت یافته، جوهر اندیشه‌ی سیاسی اوست.

حاکم یا دولت در نگاه هابز، نه مخلوقی الاهی، بلکه محصول عقلانیت انسانی و اراده‌ی جمعی مردم است؛ او همچون لوحی است که مردم حق اعمال زور و قانون‌گذاری را بر آن نوشته‌اند. این حاکم، که در کتاب «لویاتان» به شکل موجودی عظیم‌الجثه و شمایل‌وار تصویر می‌شود، تنها از آن‌رو مشروع است که امنیت همگان را تضمین کند.

هابز به‌ صراحت هشدار می‌دهد که تا زمانی که حاکم بتواند کارویژه‌ی خود – یعنی حفاظت از جان و مال مردم – را انجام دهد، نافرمانی سیاسی توجیه‌ناپذیر است.
هرگونه شورش، در واقع بازگشت به وضع طبیعی و فروپاشی قرارداد است. این باور، نقطه عزیمت بسیاری از نظریات اقتدارگرایانه در قرون بعدی شد.

اگرچه هابز خود سلطنت را شکل مطلوب‌تری از حکومت می‌دانست، اما اصل نظریه‌اش بر هر گونه ساختار حاکمیتی قابل تطبیق است، به شرط آنکه اقتدار و توان لازم برای اجرای قانون و جلوگیری از هرج‌ومرج را دارا باشد.
در این چارچوب، حاکم نه نماینده‌ی فرد یا طبقه‌ای خاص، بلکه تجلی اراده‌ی جمعی برای فرار از جهنم طبیعی است.

در فلسفه هابز، اخلاق و سیاست به‌گونه‌ای ساختاری در هم تنیده‌اند. آنچه به‌ظاهر «اخلاقی» است – مانند پایبندی به قراردادها یا خودداری از خشونت – نه از حس نیک‌خواهی، بلکه از عقلانیتی ناشی می‌شود که امنیت را به‌مثابه پیش‌شرط زندگی مطلوب می‌بیند. در واقع، قانون طبیعی در اندیشه‌ی او چیزی جز عقل عملی نیست که انسان را به صلح و همکاری دعوت می‌کند، مشروط بر آنکه دیگران نیز چنین کنند.

در این رویکرد، عدالت مفهومی وابسته به قانون مدنی است، نه یک فضیلت مستقل. آنچه عادلانه یا ظالمانه است، تنها در بستر قرارداد جمعی معنا می‌یابد. خارج از آن، هیچ محک قطعی برای تعیین خوب و بد وجود ندارد؛ بلکه تنها توان و قدرت تعیین‌کننده است.

هابز با طرد اخلاقیات مطلق‌گرا و تأکید بر واقع‌گرایی سیاسی، نوعی انسان‌شناسی عقل‌محور را جایگزین آموزه‌های دینی و سنتی کرد. انسان در نزد او، موجودی حسابگر و خودمحور است، اما دقیقاً از همین عقلانیت است که امکان صلح و مدنیت پدید می‌آید.

در نهایت، اخلاق برای هابز نه گزاره‌ای متعالی، بلکه ابزاری برای مهار ترس و خشونت است؛ زبان مشترکی برای جلوگیری از جنگ همه با همه. بدین‌��ونه، فلسفه‌ی سیاسی هابز پیش‌زمینه‌ای شد برای ظهور اندیشه‌های سکولار و دولت‌های مدرن قانون‌محور.

اگر بخواهم بررسی معاصرانه‌ای از فلسفه سیاسی هابز داشته باشم باید گفت، در سال‌های اخیر، متفکران معاصر با نگاهی تازه به هابز، جنبه‌ای کمتر دیده‌شده از اندیشه‌اش را برجسته کرده‌اند: مسئولیت دولت در محافظت از حیات فیزیکی و زیستی مردم.

از این منظر، هابز را می‌توان از پیشگامان «سیاست زیستی» دانست؛ رویکردی که بر اداره‌ی بدن‌ها، سلامت، خوراک و حیات انسانی توسط قدرت سیاسی تمرکز دارد.

هابز در نوشته‌هایش به‌ صراحت اعلام می‌کند که حاکم موظف است نه‌تنها از مرگ ناگهانی و خشونت جلوگیری کند، بلکه باید نیازهای اساسی زندگی مردم را نیز تأمین نماید. حکومتی که نتواند امنیت غذایی، بهداشت یا عدالت اقتصادی را تضمین کند، مشروعیت خود را از دست می‌دهد.

در این خوانش، هابز را نه تنها نظریه‌پرداز امنیت، بلکه پیش‌فرض‌گذار دولت رفاه نیز می‌توان قلمداد کرد. زیرا بقای فیزیکی، در اندیشه‌ی او، حق بنیادین و مطلق انسان است. و این حق تنها زمانی تحقق می‌یابد که دولت به‌عنوان نهاد مرکزی، مسئولیت مستقیم تأمین آن را بپذیرد.

تأکید بر نیازهای زیستی انسان، هابز را از چهره‌ای صرفاً اقتدارطلب، به متفکری تبدیل می‌کند که دغدغه‌اش ساختارمندی عقلانی برای بقای جمعی است؛ نه استبداد، بلکه اقتداری معطوف به زندگی.

باز هم باید اشاره داشت که اندیشه‌های توماس هابز همچنان در قلب منازعات نظری و سیاسی معاصر حضور دارند. در شرایط بحرانی – از پاندمی‌ها تا تهدیدات تروریستی – بسیاری از دولت‌ها برای حفظ نظم، به محدود کردن آزادی‌ها روی می‌آورند. این گرایش به «هابزی شدن سیاست»، نشان‌دهنده‌ی تأثیر پایدار نظریه‌ی اوست: اول امنیت، سپس آزادی.

اما همزمان، صدای منتقدانی نیز بلند است که می‌گویند فلسفه هابز تصویری ناقص و تقلیل‌گرا از انسان ارائه می‌دهد. او نقش عاطفه، همبستگی اجتماعی، فداکاری و انگیزه‌های اخلاقی را نادیده می‌گیرد؛ نیروهایی که به‌ویژه در جنبش‌های دموکراتیک، انقلابی و حقوق بشری دیده می‌شوند.

فلاسفه‌ای چون رالز، هابرماس و سندل بر آن‌اند که عدالت، گفت‌وگو، و کرامت انسانی مفاهیمی‌اند که فراتر از ترس و منفعت شخصی‌اند. جامعه سیاسی، در نظر آنان، باید فضایی برای شکوفایی فضیلت‌های جمعی و مشارکت عمومی باشد؛ چیزی که در نظام بسته و اقتدارگرای هابز مجال بروز ندارد.

در نهایت، هابز فیلسوف نظم است؛ نظمی که ریشه در ترس و عقلانیت دارد. اما سیاست مدرن، افزون بر نظم، در پی آزادی، معنا، مشارکت و عدالت نیز هست. بنابراین، اگرچه نظریه هابز برای تحلیل وضعیت‌های اضطراری مفید است، اما برای طراحی آینده‌ای انسانی‌تر، باید آن را در کنار نظریه‌هایی اخلاق‌محورتر و مردم‌سالار قرار داد.

[Jochen Seifert · Rating 4 out of 5]

Enorm interessant en verhelderend boek over de Engelse filosoof Thomas Hobbes. Jammer dat er veel misconcepties zijn rond het gedachtengoed van deze man, als iedereen dit boek zou lezen zouden veel meer mensen de relevantie van zijn denken onderschrijven. Zeker aan te raden voor iedereen die interesse heeft in filosofie of meer te weten wil komen over de omstreden figuur Hobbes.

[Mehmet · Rating 4 out of 5]

İş Bankası'ndan çıkan Hobbes biyografisindense bunu daha çok beğendim. Diğeri inanılmaz detaya girmişti, ki onun da kendine göre faydası var elbette. Ancak bana Hobbes ile ilgili düşüncelerimi toparlayabilecek derli toplu bir eser lazımdı ve bu kitapta buldum. Merakınız varsa bu kitabı tercih edebilirsiniz.

[Justin Evans · Rating 5 out of 5]

Okay, to be fair, I already agree with much of Tuck's method. I do think the best way to understand political thought is to pay attention scrupulously to its historical context; that such attention will probably reveal no Immortal, Eternal Wisdom but rather a set of tactical responses to actual political events; that the first interpreters of political books are most likely the best interpreters. So I'm biased.

All that said, this was one of the best VSIs I've read: a massive amount of information, a clear and reasonably readable style, a perfect balance between depth and breadth. You get a great summary of Hobbes' context and his biography, a good summary of his thought (including, crucially, his physics, metaphysics, methodology and religious thought as well as the ethics and politics), and a great summary of Hobbes interpretation. It's unclear to me why Goodreads reviewers insist on giving it 3 stars, unless they're all Straussians or are put off by Tuck's unbalanced description of C. B. McPherson's work (which - in 'Possessive Individualism' at least - does not claim, as Tuck suggests, that Hobbes is the defender of the bourgeoisie; it argues quite persuasively that Hobbes took his own social context to provide an eternal picture of human nature).

Highly recommended.

[Marc Lamot · Rating 1 out of 5]

Strongly apologetic: the author defends Hobbes against allegations of atheism, materialism and absolutism. The whole argument is difficult to follow for laymen. This book seems more a reckoning with the author's colleagues. The notion of power is not touched upon at all.

[Justin Barbaree · Rating 4 out of 5]

For someone who wrote that the the “natural” condition of humankind is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”, I went into reading this short introduction with a little bit of trepidation. The quote bothers my romantic predilections, located somewhere between Calvinistic depravity and optimism about human potential. Based on this quote alone, I was wary of Hobbes in perhaps the same way I’m wary of hardline Calvinism. But my fears turned out to be somewhat unfounded. Hobbes is not the radical pessimist that I thought he might be (though he certainly is pessimistic about certain things) and I found myself actually enjoying some of the insights he offers, as curmudgeonly as they may appear on first blush.

The religious wars post-Reformation that plagued all of Europe over Catholicism, protestantism, and sectarianism meant that most in Europe lived with “a substantial degree of fundamental ideological conflict” all around them. This gave rise to rational calls for religious toleration ( a la Locke and Lipsius) and skepticism. This was culminated in the idea that religious fervor was deadly, and “the wise man took his own survival to be his central obligation” (10). Self interest and preservation accordingly meant a dampening down of enthusiastic belief.

For Hobbes, this idea of self preservation was the basis of the only fundamental, universal right humankind could claim. Philosophical skepticism (we can’t really know anything) and interreligious conflict demonstrated that even with something monolithic like Scripture, people would always disagree on what they would hold as fundamental assertions. This is because, as Hobbes would say, we can’t really know much of anything, and the things that we think we know with certainty are really only seen through our subjectivity. This idea leads Hobbes to formulating a very narrow idea of the human condition: the only thing we can truly know is that we want to survive, to preserve ourselves, and to protect whatever means that allows us to flourish. This is the height of “polite society”, and what the Dutch theologian Grotius (1583-1645) would call the fundamental right to self preservation and not to unnecessarily or wantonly harm others (26). This was a narrow and extremely minimal view of society: “one could envisage a society of rather stand-offish individuals who had no sense of common welfare beyond the common security of their own persons” (26). This, as reduced and minimal as it sounds, is the basis of civil society.

For Hobbes (and Descartes before him) we are all prisoners in Plato’s Cave, and the cave is our own minds. What we see in the external world is a product of our minds, what Hobbes calls “seemings and apparitions only” (50). It’s not that there aren’t objects out there (as Descartes would question), it’s just that we can only see them through our limited, subjective lenses. What we could have is an idea of the thing, but not the thing itself. Language itself is a demonstration of this. Language is only an unstable and arbitrary referent to the real thing, and yet it is how we come to understand the real thing. It’s, in fact, the only way we can understand it, the only tool of reason we have (51). For Descartes, the only thing we could know was the self (Cogito, ergo sum), but to Hobbes, even this self was imaginary. A disembodied mind could go on still having ideas and vocabulary even if the world ceased to exist, but the locus of the ideas and vocabulary as self is destabilized. The self, like ideas and vocabulary, is also a construct (53). This skepticism went as far as to question even space and time– since we do not directly experience them (I cannot demarcate exactly what space or time is), we can only deduce and construct based on what we think we experience (53). But what we can know, and this puts us in a slightly more stable place than the Cartesian Ego, is that we experience something.

The material world for Hobbes is real. The only thing that can spark a sense perception are actual objects in motion. “The answer to the solipsist was… that there must be or have been some material object outside himself which was causing him to have the perceptions… He could not be causing them himself (since there is no self, but just a train of perceptions). And the thing outside him must be material, since nothing else could produce a change in anything (55). If your head is spinning now like mine, I’ll try and break it down for both of us. 1. The material world exists and it is in motion. 2. Our perceptions of these things in motion is what we can come to know, not the things as they are. 3. What is imaginary is our ideas of the things, not the things themselves. 4. So what we ultimately know, then, is that there is a material reality (and that may be all there is).

What this all leads up to is that experience concludes nothing universally (59). Even scientific discovery begins with presuppositions and concludes with interpretations, so theories must tread carefully against what we perceive. A strong example is Galileo. Perception would tell us that heavenly bodies move around us, since we cannot perceive the earth in motion. Hobbes stresses the “need to think of the world as essentially different from how we experience it” (60). This would be the basis of many important scientific discoveries to come.

In terms of a society’s moral and ethical foundations, the core, fundamental law and right was that of self preservation. Everything else then– laws, mores, codes of conduct, would be up for grabs. Any law that didn’t violate the first principle of self preservation could fly. The radical cultural relativism here is tempered by one common core– “societies could differ extravagantly in their laws, and anything that was accepted as law in a particular society would be immune to moral criticism from someone outside the society” (62). In this, Hobbes denies any type of Logos that determines morals universally: ‘though common language and common sense might lead us to think that something is really and objectively good, in the same way as we might think something is really and objectively red, in fact such ideas are illusions or fantasies, features of the inside of our heads only” (63). What we deem “good” is only what is good for us. These may differ from society to society. The only thing that all would agree on is that it is better to be safe and stay alive than to die. Hobbes did think, though, that within a particular society, it was important to have a common understanding of morality and ethics (65). But just how can we all agree?

For the rationalist, we could come to understand philosophical truths through careful reasoning. We could come to a clearer understanding of the way the world works and shape our political system accordingly. For the religious person, we could use universal truths based on revelation and scripture to order our society accordingly. Both approaches, in varying ways, powered much of the political theories coming out of the Enlightenment and Reformation. But as I mentioned before, the 17th century was beginning to be an unstable and potentially dangerous place with all of the competing ideologies trying to assert power. Everyone would claim inviolable truth and reason to be on their sides to define what is right, what is good and virtuous. Hobbes writes, “This common measure, some say, is right reason: with whom I should consent, if there were any such thing to be found or known (in nature). But commonly they that call for right reason to decide any controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing right reason is not existent, the reason of some man, or men, is he or they, that have sovereign power” (67). And this is where Hobbes asserts his perhaps most unpalatable idea to many (but not all) modern ears: the idea of the absolute rule of the sovereign.

To better understand why the absolute rule of the sovereign was not just the correct political idea but maybe an attractive one also for Locke, let’s consider a couple of things. One, as I already mentioned, you have war all around at precisely the time when reason and cooler heads should have prevailed. Reason as an ontical and operative feature of society does very little good when what is good, true, and virtuous can’t be reached by reason alone. And this was the case at the time– ideological difference, factions, religious intoleration, and warring ideologies were prevalent amongst those many people who were all certain of their propositions (could we say that it is any different today?). But the second consideration, which I find more subtle and ultimately more compelling, is Hobbes’ discussion of “the state of Nature” and the “social contract” that emerges to elevate humanity out of the state of nature.

In the state of Nature, men are “naturally and savagely at war with one another” (68). The universal of self-interest and preservation is still at play in the state of nature, but absent of agreed upon law, this is a dangerous universal. For example, in the state of nature we all will defend ourselves against attack. But in the state of nature, we are the arbiters of how and when to defend ourselves, which creates an instability. Tuck provides a nice illustration here:

“Suppose I see you walking peacefully through the primitive savannah, whistling and swinging your club: are you a danger to me? You may well think not: you have an entirely pacific disposition. But I may think you are, and the exercise of my natural right or self-preservation depends only on my assessment of the situation” (69). This fact creates a precarious position for everyone. Any attacks can be justified based on the right of self-preservation, and thus we are in “a state of war, savagery, and degradation” (69). It’s important here to unpack the key difference between what Locke would call a “law” and a “right”. The “law” (the universal), is that “all men will always, whatever the circumstances, want to preserve themselves– and that is the only thing which they will always want to do” (71). But the “right” depends on the “will of the individual agent”. In a state of nature, the rights of one can be calamitous to another. We are left to a world of ethical relativism.

Hobbes’ solution to ethical relativism was not enlightened relativism or divine revelation, but simply that in our reflective moments, the “law of nature obliges [us] to renounce [our] right of private judgment over what is to count as dangerous in dubious cases, and to accept for ourselves the judgment of a common authority” (75). We relinquish our own autonomy to judge and give it over to a sovereign. In a way, this is very similar to Christianity (we crucify our sinful natures and give over our wills to the sovereign Creator). But since we, as was made clear, cannot agree on that will of the Creator, Hobbes insists that the Sovereign is an earthly ruler or a ruling body with absolute authority and power: the State. The state is what Hobbes’ calls “Gods Lieutenant” to “whom in all doubtfull cases, we have submitted our private judgments” (76). What’s interesting here, I think, is that Hobbes didn’t seem to care whether the sovereign was theologically accurate as God’s representative. Rather, he meant, that since we can’t agree much on theological ideas, the State will be a strong and powerful stand in for God’s authority. In relinquishing our agency in arbitrating our right to self-preservation, we enter into “the social contract”, which is simply, I will obey the sovereign as long as the sovereign protects my self-interest and self-preservation. My will and the unified will of the body politick is all now, not just represented, but taken under, the will of the sovereign. The public has no right to overthrow a sovereign unless the sovereign endangers the subjects of the state (77). As for external threats, it is in the hands of the sovereign to determine what is or isn’t a threat (78). So, the social contract comes down to two things: 1) You (the sovereign) will do everything in your power to protect me; and 2) everything you say that doesn’t endanger me goes– I will be an obedient subject.

As anti-liberal and anti-democratic as this is, we must admit that this is a rather simple and plainly elegant presentation of a kind of politics. And when we hear the word the State, we must remember that in Locke’s conception the State was what we might call “ideologically neutral”, in that it wouldn’t have a particular ideological axe to grind. It’s primary function is “to secure the survival of its citizens” (85). In this way, the State would not be dogmatic, and no type of Church could come to power over another (the Catholics, Anglicans, Presbyterians, etc.) but that the state would be above the church and could in fact determine which doctrines were correct. As odious this is to the modern idea of choice and our modern liberal fear of totalitarianism, Hobbes saw the Sovereign’s role in this as essentially negative: “to align opinions, not work hard in order to secure the acceptance of any particular point of view” (85). This is rather pessimistic about the role of human freedom and supposes a general lack of courage and conviction in that we would willingly give up agency in the name of mere protection. And such a simple formulation could result in insidious and treacherous forms. For example, in this type of Government, Nazi Germany would have dutifully filled this role as sovereign over the German citizens. It promoted a state church. It presumed what the threat was to Germany, and it carried out its duty to protect and promote its citizens.

On Metaphysics

For Hobbes, God was unimaginable and beyond the realm of ideas (89). The only place for God in philosophy was as a first cause. Hobbes was not in the modern sense what we’d call an atheist, though that term was levelled at him in his own time plenty enough. Hobbes believed in God, and he even believed that God, as the all-powerful first cause, elicits, quite naturally, worship (90). In fact, for Hobbes, what he defined as atheism was both imprudence and ignorance (90)– the existence of God was held together by what he saw as strong arguments (issuing from the first cause). But as we can see from the arguments above, that he drew plenty of criticism about his views from the orthodox of the time. Part of what got him into hot water has to do with his disavowal of Aristotelian ways of knowledge. The rationalist perspective of Christianity was that with right thinking/right doctrine, reason was God’s gift to draw us into more complete understanding of Him. We could reason, in a sense, our way to God. Of course there were many varying conceptions of this, and for the Calvinist, perhaps who shared more with Hobbes, right reason was impossible in human terms alone. Hobbes, in his basic arguments that even in our perceptions we can never know the true nature of an object, saw God as even more beyond the pale of what we can know. For Hobbes, belief in God was a matter of faith, and taking it on trust. Here’s what he writes: “Seeing then the acknowledgement of the Scriptures to be the word of God, is not evidence, but faith; and faith… consists in the trust that we have in other men: it appears plainly that the men so trusted, are the holy men of God’s church succeeding one another from the time of those that saw the wondrous works of God Almighty in the flesh” (95). So, in short, scripture doesn’t provide a rational basis for belief, but a belief based on trust of what has been handed down.

As for problems that Hobbes needed to address about his ideas on God, an important one was his denial of the spiritual realm. To answer, he says that our inability to think of God in material terms (which Hobbes believes God is material), results in our heuristic, or short cut, of thinking of God as Spirit. And the mentions of the Spirit in Scripture? Hobbes says that those, too, have material explanations (i.e the Spirit over the water in Genesis was the wind). As far as interpretation, rather than relying on our internal judgment, we place it in the Church. But that gets us to the problems of correct theology that caused faction and violence in the 17th century. Who then? It could be the State, but the State would need have th church in an advisory position (much like that of the Anglican Church in England). This line of thinking would have made him good company with devout clergymen (96-97).

So what, then, got him in trouble? In Leviathan, Hobbes seems to change his tune in that he says that the “only interpreter of Scripture could be the civil sovereign, and that there was nothing special about a church at all. In essence, Hobbes is advocating for a state sanctioned Church. As awful as this sounds, Hobbes wasn’t advocating that the state Church be particularly dogmatic. Much like Locke, Hobbes saw faith as primarily a matter of conscience (99) and the sovereign’s role in enforcing doctrine was essentially negative, intended “above all to stop non-sovereigns (i.e. certain denominations) from claiming the right” to enforce such doctrines (100). So rather than a tyrannical state church persecuting its subjects in the name of orthodoxy, Hobbes’ church, much like the state, was to protect the citizen from radicalism and persecution. His example was Galileo’s persecution from the Catholic Church. Any non-sovereign entity should not have the right enforce its particular doctrine and punish those who seem to threaten it (100). In this way, Hobbes seems to be advocating for a kind of soft church, in which faith was a matter of conscience to believers, and philosophical enquiry would be safer to practice outside of the fear of being branded a heretic.

Ultimately, Hobbes’ skepticism lies in his boiling down both knowledge and ethics to their barest parts. He was a materialist through and through- we shant be bothered with discussions of the spiritual, even when they pertain to religion, because, well, they are for Hobbes, doubtful as they are to any modern skeptic who says, “show me”. Secondly, he boiled down ethics to it’s basic principle, what he saw as natural law: that all humans are at their bedrock most concerned with self-preservation. We might, as I do, see this outlook as pessimistic and woefully reductionist. But Hobbes does offer us a way of thinking about philosophy, ethics, and politics in a way that addresses material and human concerns at a basic level. What can we know here and now without getting bogged down in metaphysics? And stripping down the human condition to one natural law of self preservation at least gets us thinking about the role of politics given this one fact.

[M. Ashraf · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very good book on Hobbes his life, his works and his influence.
"Leviathan" was one of the first books in political philosophy I read with Locke "Two Treatises of Government" .
This one is short and concise.
A very good VSI.
A good breakdown and summary.

[Elia Mantovani · Rating 3 out of 5]

In spite of being very complex in some parts, it is certainly a very good introduction and a highly scholarly essay.

[Bennett Rogers · Rating 3 out of 5]

Good, albeit rather academic introduction to Hobbes - maybe too academic for this series.

[N · Rating 3 out of 5]

Came across an interesting question in an interview about the relevance of old white men like Hobbes today, especially to us brown folk. The answer was an assortment of words that have that characteristic OOP variable feel to it, pointing to something but containing nothing, in this case pointing to the twin ideas that there was indeed an answer, and that he might even know it, but couldn’t or wouldn’t say it. This book is a good enough start at finding not his answer, nor the answer, but atleast having my own:
1. Hobbes was a polymath of the best sort, unlike the later ones like Mill, instead of the Descartes/Leibniz sort, one whose poly-ness displays a remarkably integrated Weltanschauung rooted to a powerful idea viscerally experienced and ‘known’ in the human sense of the word, ie known down to the depths of the soul like the truth of one’s love for his child rather than the truth of gravity and electromagnetism. Political theory inextricable from scientific philosophy. Padua scholastics method of resolve (analytic) and compose (synthetic), the watchmaker turning his sight to social systems. At root of social system is the individual’s right to self-preservation.

2. We inherit pre-modern philosophy at very high Shannon entropy levels, without the space, pace, or redundancy to invite examination and internalization. No wonder then that I can do both capitalist and socialist readings of Hobbes, theist and atheist, liberal and conservative, Kantian and Aristotelian. Strip away the Leviathan and you have a Hobbesian state of nature that is paradoxically not antithetical to Rousseau but instead philosophically identical, this is why we can so easily build the political theory of Rawls/Nozick as an off-shoot of Hobbes, not a contradiction.

3. Hobbes’ line of enquiry reveals the discipline of fundamental philosophy, in this case the first principle of political thought: what is the nature of an attractive strong force that can overcome the electromagnetic repulsion of autonomous self-interested individuals. If objective knowledge is impossible, and all a priori facts are analytic not synthetic, then we have the irreducible problem of moral relativism between many valid judgments about one’s perceived threat. This first principle of unlocking non-zero gains from cooperation unites Hobbes and Rousseau, Smith and Marx, Hegel and the Pope, where the Leviathan, Church, Free Market, and God are all just models of mediated Nash equilibria.

[Molsa Roja(s) · Rating 5 out of 5]

Molt bo. Spinoza deia allò de “no odiar, no menystenir; comprendre.” I Deleuze, allò altre de “tot concepte remet a un problema.” El problema de Hobbes era precís: com evitar el poder de l’esglèsia, com evitar el caos de la guerra civil? I si se’l pot culpar de quelcom, és de manca d’imaginació: la seva solució és no la de donar el poder al poble, com farà Rousseau, sinó la de concentrar-lo en un Estat superior, l’horrorós Leviatà. Només llegint sobre la seva vida, una arriba a comprendre els motius finals d’una filosofia mecanicista que, per contra, hauria d’inspirar enormement a Spinoza —i només per això és un regal. Simplificar Hobbes parlant d’omnium bellum i subjugació és sempre plaent, però el cert és que va molt més enllà en la seva nova figuració del que és ser humà, del que és la naturalesa humana, a través d’una crítica a Descartes i el perspectivisme escèptic present.

[Peter · Rating 3 out of 5]

The historian of political thought Richard Tuck wrote the book Hobbes: A Very Short Introduction. I read the 2002 edition. The book has illustrations. The book includes a section entitled “Further Reading” (Tuck 135-140). The book has an index and a section of references. The book is divided into four chapters. The first chapter is a short biography of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes lived between 1588 and 1679 (Tuck 2, 48). The second chapter is on the work of Thomas Hobbes. The second chapter covers Hobbes’s views on early scientific theories (Tuck 49-60). Hobbes might have met Galileo Galilei in 1636 in the Italian city of Florence (Tuck 5). Hobbes was also influenced by the work of Robert Boyle (Tuck 58-59) and by other early scientists. The various chapters explore Hobbes' perspectives on ethics, politics, and religion. Chapter 3 is entitled “Interpretations of Hobbes” (Tuck 104-127). The last chapter, the conclusion, contains several closing thoughts on the overall philosophy of Hobbes. Tuck writes that he hopes to explain the paradoxes of Hobbes’s philosophy in his book (Tuck 128). Tuck writes that he believes that Richard Hooker and Thomas Hobbes created the field of philosophy in the English language (Tuck xi). Tuck’s book on the philosophy of Hobbes is a well-done introduction to the subject.

[Feliks · Rating 3 out of 5]

'The Father of English Philosophy'; and as the author notes, one of the most misconstrued and unfairly maligned. Hobbes, (Tuck tries to show) has been as misappropriated as Nietzsche. Or has he? There's sure some interesting factoids in the first section on this strange man's life. I appreciated seeing the human side of this famous Proteus. And for being able to sift his views without delving back into his magnum opus, which (as Tuck points out) is not really where his genius lay and where the most misunderstanding occurs. Oh well. As far as the disturbing menacing aspect of Hobbe's outlook on life, you will have to make up your own mind about it yourself.

p.s. Boy! This VIS series from Oxford is really the cat's meow!

[Hughesie · Rating 3 out of 5]

The book assumed a level of knowledge of other philosophers and philosophical ideas, which I did not have. This made parts of the chapters on Hobbes's life and some elements of the 'Interpretations of Hobbes' chapter a little hard to fully comprehend. The section on Hobbes's life also felt as though it went on for longer than was really necessary. However, the largest segment (around 2/3 of the book), on Hobbes's work, was really interesting, as was the 'Interpretations of Hobbes', despite my not completely grasping the significance of some of the wider philosophical contexts.

[Aamina · Rating 3 out of 5]

”Hobbes believed that there was a solution to moral conflict...he proposed that the route to agreement must lie through politics.”

“He contrasted a ‘state of nature’ (by which he meant the condition of men without some proper political organisation) with the state of men under a regime of civil laws”

”Men in a state of nature will come to see...that the law of nature obliges them to renounce their right of private judgement over what is to count as dangerous in dubious cases, and to accept for themselves the judgement of a common authority.”

[Boone Ayala · Rating 3 out of 5]

The brevity of this book hides a tremendous amount of density. Tuck situates Hobbes in the context of Renaissance skeptical philosophy, and sees him as questing for some measure of certainty. This is true across Hobbes’s thought, in his ethics, politics, and religion as well as his science. Like many skeptics, he argues that people ought to observe the customs of their country, but goes a step further by imagining a sovereign who ultimately is empowered to define those customs in religion, politics, etc. The sovereign exists to settle the infinitude of relativism.

[G Horton · Rating 3 out of 5]

I was most interested about how Hobbes views fitted in with historical context, they may sound extreme to us today however after a long bloody civil war then an oppressive dictatorship in a time of religious extremism, it makes sense he is advising for a strong ruler who will keep the church in line and to end the predictions. The book wasn't as easy to read as others in the "very sorry introduction" series, however it is full of interesting analysis to round out the world of Hobbes.

[Jonathan Van dijk · Rating 3 out of 5]

Finally a book in this series providing context of the period in which the philsopher lived, his cicumstances, allowing for a better understanding of Hobbes' philosophies. One of the first where I could grasp what his reasoning was. Also enjoyed the history of his thoughts throughout later years and how later philosophers used his ideas to defend, or combat philosophies.

Still won't dive into philosphy reading full time but this one is as good as it gets.

[Peter · Rating 5 out of 5]

Good first book to read about Hobbes. Provides good biographical background so you can better understand, concretely, the social, political, and intellectual contexts motivating Hobbes's philosophical projects. Also contains a useful section glossing the various ways people have read Hobbes from Kant onward, with many cogent critiques, as well as a lot of references for further reading.

[Jim Cook · Rating 5 out of 5]

An outstanding short introduction to the first major philosopher to write, at least some of his work, in English (rather than Latin).

The book is essentially divided into three parts: his life and times, his works, his reception and contemporary perspectives on his work.

The book really excels at placing Hobbes writing in its historical context. Outstanding job, Professor Tuck!

[Ed · Rating 5 out of 5]

A brilliant book in this generally very good series. I needed an instant summary of Hobbes for a novel I am writing about someone who sees a lot in Hobbes and this book was perfect. Well written insightful and concise

[Joseph · Rating 2 out of 5]

Compared to the other short introduction on Descartes I found this book to be very difficult to follow. Passages from Hobbes are not often explained but rather stated and as someone not well versed in philosophy this was frustrating.

[Yilmaz Aksoy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Benim için karışık bir anlatımdı. Bütün kitaptan aklımda sadece üç beş fikir kaldı. Belki de bu sayı benim için göründüğü kadar az değildir. Bir sürü düşünüre referanslar olduğu ve bunların sadece adlarını ama düşüncelerini bilmediğimden zor bir okuma oldu.

[Bob · Rating 3 out of 5]

Unless you're interested in Hobbes's biography or his science, start on pg 60.

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

A superb introduction into Hobbes thought and time. I found myself learning much.